

1 Theoretical Framework

A fundamental aspect of the study of social movements is the analysis of their success. However, before one can engage in such an assessment, we must first understand what success means in the context of social movements. For decades, scholars of collective action have paid only scant attention to the outcomes and political success of movement activities (Bosi et al. 2016; Giugni 2008), a fact that may be explained, at least in part, by the conceptual and methodological difficulties inherent in the task of explaining success (Amenta & Young 1999; Earl 2000).

A large part of the academic literature on social movement success is deeply intertwined with related – but not identical – terms, such as *impact* (Burstein & Linton 2002; Escobar et al. 2018), *influence* (Cress & Snow 2000; Ganz & Soule 2015; Olzak & Soule 2009), *consequences* (Amenta et al. 2010; Lyman 2016), and *outcomes* (Amenta et al. 2018; Andrews 2004; Bosi & Uba 2009; Diani 1997; Earl 2013; Giugni 2007; Thomas et al. 2018; Tilly 1999). Methodological difficulties include the problem of causal attribution, the small number of subjects, time reference and effect stability, goal adaptation and subjectivity, interrelated effects, and indirect and unintended outcomes (see Bosi et al. 2016; Giugni 1998; McAdam 1989; Rucht & Ohlemacher 1992). Finally, one of the key challenges of the field is that most insights have been derived from the US context, leaving unclear how these insights can be applied to other national and regional contexts, including outside the Western world (Giugni 2008: 1583). In short, there is no scholarly consensus on how to define or measure social movement success (Alvarez et al. 2018; Bosi & Uba 2009).

Despite a still relatively limited, albeit rapidly growing, number of scholars who explicitly and systematically address the success of social movements, the field provides valuable works and useful insights into the question, offering means to assess when and how movements influence the political process and its outcomes (see Alvarez et al. 2018; Amenta 2014; Giugni 1998, 2007; McAdam 2017; Roggeband & Klandermans 2017; Uba 2009; Yates 2015). We aim to integrate, systematize, and

elaborate upon these insights to construct a comprehensive theoretical framework for assessing and explaining social movement success and to test it on the specific case of the Israeli settler movement.

This chapter starts with a discussion of how the literature on social movements addresses the issue of success. After identifying the key frameworks and variables for assessing and explaining political success, we present our own theoretical framework. We argue that political success of social movements is multifaceted, encompassing policies, resources, and support, and is best analyzed through the individual contributions of the three essentially separate but intimately connected *branches* of a social movement (institutions, networks, and influencers), each of which specializes in a specific *repertoire of actions* (combining moderate, radical, or extreme actions) and targets specific *political arenas* (state, civil society, and society at both the national and international levels). In the following sections we present the various parts of our theoretical framework.

1.1 Defining Social Movement Success

Conceptualizing success in relation to social movements is no simple task. The range of outcomes attributed to social movements varies widely, from “state-level policy decisions to the expansion of a movement’s social capital to changes in participants’ biographies” (Cress & Snow 2000: 1064). Most research in this realm “focuses on the determinants of policy outcomes and . . . is geared towards assessing whether, when, and how movements influence the policy process and its outcomes” (Giugni 2008: 1583). Many scholars offer broader definitions, which extend beyond policy outcomes to include attainment of tangible benefits that meet the organization’s goals; formal acceptance by political elites; legitimization of the movement’s goals; and transformation of the individual or group consciousness (Bell 2014; Jenkins & Klandermans 1995; Kolb 2007). In all these cases, success can be whole or partial, gauged by the attainment of some, but not all, of the movement’s stated objectives (Gamson 1975). Still another approach conceptualizes success as the movement’s survivability and longevity, in contrast to material gains or policy change (Meyer 2004; Van Dyke & Amos 2017).

More recently, social movement scholars have attempted to rectify the subjective nature of measuring success by designating distinct categories for measurement. Specifically, the means by which the social movement achieves its outcomes can be understood and conceptualized in the context of three sets of outcomes identified in the social movement literature: (a) attainment of goals (also known as policy success); (b)

mobilization of resources; and (c) acceptance by society. In this book, we adopt this multifaceted approach to political success, focusing on both institutional and noninstitutional changes and outcomes.

The primary indicator of political success is whether the social movement manages to attain its stated goals, in whole or in part (e.g., Banaszak 1996; Bosi et al. 2016; Burstein et al. 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Rochon & Mazmanian 1993). Thus, the first outcome type defines success in terms of *policy* gains and changes (Amenta & Caren 2004; Klandermans 2016). Most contemporary scholars of social movements working within the US context analyze to what extent the goals of social movements and advocacy organizations are realized in Congress through policy change and the development and funding of programs (Burstein & Linton 2002; Gamson 1975). These institutional changes include what Felix Kolb (2007) has termed “substantive change” – that is, changes in the political agenda and public policy, and/or changes in political institutions and the policymaking process.¹ Scholars have also distinguished between short-term gains (changes in political decisions), medium-term gains (major changes in policy and in its bureaucratic enforcement and implementation), and long-term gains (changes in the distribution of public goods) (Jenkins 1982).

A second set of outcomes treats success as a measure of a movement’s ability to garner *resources*. The literature generally focuses on two specific, tangible types of resources: members and money (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2018; Amenta & Caren 2013; McAdam 2017; Thomas et al. 2018). In a democratic system, mobilizing relatively large numbers of committed people is often necessary to win new collective benefits. Resource mobilization theory (RMT) is a useful tool to assess the success of social movement organizations in these terms, because it shows how organizational resources are translated into concrete, quantifiable gains for the organization’s adherents. It holds that successful social movement organizations – that is, those that maximize their resources – also contribute to the sustainability of their internal organizational structure by realizing their purpose as a function of collective action.

The third set of outcomes measures success in terms of *support* – that is, whether, and to what extent, the social movement and its goals are accepted by society, at both the elite and mass levels (e.g., Amenta & Caren 2013; Luders 2010; Melucci 1989; Staggenborg 2015). There is evidence that the success of social movements can be significantly enhanced when they seek other political groups as allies (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995; Klandermans 2016). Such alliances provide access to elites and enhance the movement’s image in society (Giugni et al. 1999). For instance, social movements benefit substantially from

obtaining the support of a major political party (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995: 289). Such connections not only bolster the movement's image but also improve outcomes in the first two areas (resource mobilization and policy change) – for example, by increasing the movement's inclusion in the national discourse and in political circles, by encouraging officials to aid its constituents, and by increasing its general leverage over political processes.

William Gamson (1990) offers important insights into the process of institutional acceptance, a modified version of “inclusion,” whereby a challenger is recognized as a legitimate representative of a previously underrepresented constituency, which can lead to collective benefits. In other words, the political system becomes biased in favor of the movement. Gamson distinguishes between three categories of political influence: participatory gains, material gains, and discursive gains. Participatory gains refer to the challenger's acceptance by the political elite and the latter's recognition of the social movement as a player within the political sphere. Material gains denote the elite's acceptance of new policies promoted by the efforts of the social movement. Finally, discursive gains reflect the elite's acceptance of the movement's “narrative and social orientations” and the assimilation of these cultural ideologies or opinions into the collective consciousness (Khalifa 2009: 28–29).

Although the abovementioned theoretical framework emphasizes the differences between each category, success is also affected by interactions between the various factors. That is to say, the parameters that define the success of a social movement are inextricably intertwined, with one measure affecting the outcomes of the others. We acknowledge that the different dimensions of success (policies, resources, support) are not exhaustive, but we also believe that even this relatively simple framework, which broadens the conceptualization of success beyond policy gains, can help uncover important processes and determinants of social movement achievements.

1.2 The Three Branches of Social Movements

The organizational infrastructure of a social movement ultimately determines how groups within it best survive and empower themselves, and, more importantly, the degree to which this involves the pursuit of political objectives. Yet most studies of the political effectiveness of social movements ignore variation in the achievements of different organizational subgroups and goals.

We treat social movements not just as unitary actors but also as pluralistic entities composed of institutions, networks, and influencers, with

organizational objectives that may be complementary or contradictory. We argue that social movement scholars should look more closely at the impact of organizational diversity on various movement-related outcomes (see also Clemens & Minkoff 2004; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004) and, specifically, at how a *range* of mobilizing structures, including decentralized and informal as well as centralized and formal ones, affects the strategies and the success of social movements (Staggenborg 2013).

Historically, the nexus of organizational scholarship and social movement theory has been a rich area of inquiry, and each field has learned a great deal from the other. Social movement researchers have borrowed insights from organizational ecologists to help explain the organizational forms and network dynamics of social movements. Likewise, scholars of organizations have drawn on social movement theory to describe how movements impact basic organizational processes. However, as Sarah Soule (2013) has recently asserted, this relationship has become lopsided, with social movement scholarship moving away from explicitly utilizing organizational scholarship (see also Caniglia & Carmin 2005; Clemens & Minkoff 2004; Minkoff & McCarthy 2005). Social movement scholars have become more interested in loosely structured networks of social movement participants, who seem to deliberately eschew formal organizations (Roggeband & Duyvendak 2013). In reality, however, “social movements [assume] various organizational forms ... including hierarchy, decentralized networks, and a spontaneous, leaderless form without much organization at all” (Campbell 2005: 67).

Scholarship suggests that contemporary social movements are likely to be diverse, with informal networks of activists coexisting alongside more formal organizations. How this manifests in the real world is still largely an open question. How does such heterogeneity affect the movement’s ability to act in different public spheres? Are movements with organizational diversity more successful? Are they more likely to be repressed? In general, it is assumed that social movements comprised of diverse groups, with multiple and sometimes competing leaders or centers of influence, and with some form of integration across organizations, are better tasked to achieve the goals of the movement (Gerlach & Hine 1970). However, while social movement scholars assert that organizational diversity is important to movement processes and outcomes, very few have actually studied this empirically.

We know that some degree of organization is a “structural necessity [enabling the] step up from loosely-related protest events to sustained collective action, one of the distinguishing features of social movements” (Klandermans 2001: 273). A movement, if it is to be sustained for any length of time, requires leadership, administrative structure, incentives

for participation, and means for acquiring resources and support – in short, some sort of organization (McAdam & Scott 2005). However, as argued by Dieter Rucht (2013), the generic notion of “structure” in social movements needs to be unpacked.

Social movements are complex entities, composed of many organizations and agents pursuing different strategies (Della Porta & Diani 1999; Gamson 1990; Klandermans 2016). These can vary dramatically in their mobilizing configurations, the number and strength of the actors they incorporate, and the extent to which they are coordinated (McCarthy 1996). According to RMT, a social movement consists of an array of interrelated *individuals*, social *networks*, and formal or informal *institutions* acting together in a coordinated way to achieve some shared goals (Pagnucco 1996; Shannon 2011). Importantly, groups choose organizational configurations that reflect and support their actions, behaviors, and identities (Rohlinger 2002; Staggenborg 2015).

Social movement organizations are organized elements within social movements. They are social structures characterized by both internal divisions of labor, where different organization members work in tandem to reach the organization’s goals, and external divisions of labor, where different organizations take responsibility for different subgoals, strategies, and tactics (Della Porta & Diani 1999; Edwards & McCarthy 2004; Morris & Staggenborg 2004). It is assumed that social movements are most viable when they encompass a number of organizations fulfilling varied functions and dealing with different strategic possibilities (Zald & Ash 1966). However, despite attempts to create a sense of solidarity and mutual aims, social movements are seldom internally cohesive, with a range of affiliated organizations working in tandem toward the same ends. Instead, they tend to fracture internally along a variety of axes (Gupta 2002). Therefore, rather than one homogeneous unit for analysis, we shift our focus toward an analysis of the social movement as a multifaceted “network of networks” by highlighting the various formal and informal groups within it. Specifically, to gain greater insight into the structure of the movement, to capture the process that links resources, tactics, and political ties, and to achieve the movement’s goals, an analysis of the main *branches* of the movement is essential.

Individuals and organizations can be categorized into three branches according to their organizational structure, ranging from strongly hierarchical and formalized organizations to extremely decentralized and informal circles of friends: the centralized branch (*institutions*), the decentralized branch (*networks*), and the individual branch (*influencers*). The centralized branch consists of highly structured and institutionalized organizations, often subsidized by the state and sometimes even officially

connected to the state. The decentralized branch comprises a broad range of informal and formal groups, which can be subsidized but are clearly delineated from the state. Finally, the individual branch consists of prominent influencers, who can be members of groups or organizations within the other two branches but whose actions are primarily individual and their relevance is based on their own personal reputation rather than that of the group(s) they belong to – one can think of athletes, intellectuals, movie stars, pundits, singers, and so on.

Each branch has a specific role to fulfill within the broader social movement. The key role of the centralized branch (institutions) is collaborative – that is, working with(in) the state to further the social movement's goals. By contrast, the decentralized branch (networks) is figuratively positioned in opposition to the state. Its main role is to apply pressure, either pushing the state to advance the social movement's goals or pushing back against state actions that could impede them. Finally, the main role of the individual branch (influencers) is to influence elite and public opinion, primarily through the media, to become more supportive of the social movement and its goals. It should be clear that these branches are fluid and dynamic; the categories are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. The relationships between the different branches can vary. Influencers, networks, and institutions may coordinate and even collaborate, either on an ad hoc basis or in a more structured way.

The Israeli settler movement operates within a multiform, or polymorphic, framework – that is, it consists of interrelated institutions, networks, and influencers who share the common goal of the settlement enterprise but disagree on the best means to achieve this. The configurations and interactions of the different types of actors create their own order rather than having an organizational order imposed upon them. Hence, rather than developing a strict typology of mutually exclusive and distinct categories, we discuss the three key branches of social movements and examine their main areas of activity and the ways they seek to gain political influence.

1.2.1 *Institutions*

Resource mobilization theories of collective action have long highlighted the dominant role of formal, centralized organizational structures (Olzak 1989). Ironically, however, leading proponents of RMT, when defining social movements, did not directly refer to organizations as a constitutive element but rather spoke generally of structural relations within such movements. A good example is Rucht's (2013) description of structure

as a pattern of more or less stable relationships within and between various elements of a larger entity.

Social movement organizations are formal groups that mobilize human and material resources and activate and coordinate strategic action within the broader social movement (Smith 2005). They vary in their degree of *formalization*, or the presence of formally defined roles, rules, and criteria of membership, and *centralization*, or the degree to which decision-making power is concentrated (Gamson 1990). Specifically, institutions, defined in a narrow way, are usually associated with characteristics such as formal membership criteria, a clear division of roles and internal functions, a mission statement, and legal status (Rucht 2013: 170). The relationship between institution leaders and members is formalized and can be expressed vertically or hierarchically, such that the lines of command are clear and the roles are well defined and handed down by the leadership (Willems & Jegers 2012).

The chief benefit of a centralized organizational structure is that it can broadly maintain the goals and momentum of the social movement even when the economic or political climate may not be favorable or hospitable to other organization types (Staggenborg 1988, 2015). Furthermore, institutions are usually more accessible to outsiders, especially when they have newsletters, offices, spokespeople, and websites. This means they are better placed to fundraise, which ensures the continuation of the organization and increases awareness of its aims. Although many contemporary social movements eschew formal organizations, institutions are far from moribund. Several studies have shown that they remain a vital mode of organization within social movements of varying sorts (Earl 2010; Polletta et al. 2013; Soule 2013; Vermeulen 2006; Walker et al. 2011).

1.2.2 *Networks*

Informal, loosely connected groups exist side by side with institutions within a multi-organizational field (Diani 2013). Alberto Melucci (1989: 71) describes movements as consisting of “submerged networks” that emerge from time to time for collective action, while Mario Diani (1992: 13) sees movements as “networks of informal interaction” among individuals and groups that engage in political or cultural conflict and share a collective identity. Networks have become the prime mode and structure of organization within social movements (Castells 1996).

A number of scholars posit the idea of a shift from the dominance of formal organizations to more informal, sometimes temporary or issue-specific networks (Bauman 2000; Dalton 2008; Roggeband & Duyvendak 2013; Schudson 2006; Zukin et al. 2006). The argument is that

contemporary activists are likely to prefer diffuse and decentralized networks over formal organizations (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp 2004; Taylor 2000). They explicitly reject a hierarchal structure of governance, instead creating alternative structures that offer participants many access points. In such networks, so the theory goes, decisions are made spontaneously, in contrast to the top-down, elite-driven manner predominating in social movement institutions.

These so-called light communities are informal, open, and temporary, compared with traditional organizations, resulting in loose ties, short-term engagements, and low levels of identification (Roggeband & Duyvendak 2013: 97). They are often characterized by interactions that are flexible in both form and content, with spontaneous exchanges of information, resources, and so on replacing formal divisions of labor and with ad hoc or short-term coordination by operational equals replacing an overarching hierarchy (Diani 2013; Rucht 2013). This pattern of autonomous structures frees the collective actors to a large extent from the cumbersome “coalition work” (Staggenborg 1986: 387) that characterizes many other groups. However, sometimes these networks become internally differentiated, establishing committees, sub-groups, task forces, and so on, which focus on specific functions, thereby forming extremely complex structures. In addition, while these nonhierarchical structures sometimes compete for scarce resources, they also may fall naturally into an implicit division of labor, reducing competition between them and allowing for more fruitful cooperation.

Networks provide the channels through which social movement frames, repertoires, and sometimes even triggers are diffused to a wider population of potential participants (Andrews & Biggs 2006; Hedström et al. 2000; Krinsky & Crossley 2014; Oliver & Myers 2003). The decentralized networks often rely on grassroots outreach and volunteers, as opposed to the more formalized relationships in institutions. Indeed, they may attract more participants than institutions do, because the costs (financial, social, time) of engagement in these networks are much lower than in institutions, which may entail dues-paying, regular meetings, and other commitments (Roggeband & Duyvendak 2013). Furthermore, decentralized networks may result in better deliberative practices, more innovative tactics, and political leaders who are more representative and accountable (Polletta 2002). Some even argue that this type of mobilizing structure may be harder for governments to suppress and may be more successful at infiltrating the national consciousness and discourse.

1.2.3 *Influencers*

The last branch is the least well-known and understood. Influencers are individual actors who work outside formal institutions and hierarchical leadership structures (Phillips 2011), and sometimes even outside the loose networks described earlier. Some influencers create their own loose networks using online forums, blogs, and open databases (Roggeband & Duyvendak 2013). While social movements have always had influencers – think of Harry Belafonte and the US civil rights movement – social media has amplified both the number and reach of influencers. For example, when international pop star Ariana Grande retweets an anti-animal-abuse tweet by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), she not only reaches a much larger audience (in December 2019 she had an estimated 68.4 million followers on Twitter versus PETA’s 1.1 million) but also a very different audience (e.g., younger, less political).

While influencers can be linked to movement organizations, be they formal or informal, their political significance does not derive from the organization. Rather, they act as independent individuals, or small groups of people (often spousal teams or a few friends), using their individual reputation and skills to advance the goals of the movement. The most important influencers are celebrities, such as actors, authors, journalists, singers, and sports personalities, whose personal audiences often reach far beyond that of the social movement. A second group of influencers are individuals and groups who work together to create groups, including businesses that promote the movement’s ideology and goals. Finally, a third group includes influencers in key state positions, from generals to judges, who do not represent social movement organizations, but do support the movement and its goals, in word and, often also, deed.

1.3 **Repertoire of Actions**

Few social movements aim to fulfill only one solitary political goal. Similarly, few employ only one type of strategy to achieve their goals. Social movements make use of a broad range of actions, the so-called action repertoire, to further their goals. This also applies to the different branches of the social movement. Given the various roles that they perform within the broader movement, each branch specializes in a different set of actions from the broader action repertoire. Branches often apply more than one action strategy at any given time. In some cases, such multifaceted or “hybrid” strategies (Burstein & Linton 2002) involve both collaborative and confrontative elements.

Scholars have devoted much attention to determining how different *modes of collective action* have a positive or negative influence on the success of a social movement. Doug McAdam and Yang Su, for example, identify two competing theoretical models that outline the relationship between the mechanisms employed by collective action groups and policy change. The first is through *threat or disruption*, which social movement organizations use to facilitate change by causing disorder in the public realm so as to “achieve bargaining leverage” (2002: 23). The second is *persuasion*, in which advocates of social change try to achieve their goals by affecting public opinion. In democratic systems, expression of opposition is an inherent tool for a population that wishes to protest a policy it considers unfair or unjust.

Democracies offer their citizens a variety of means to express their discontent under the protection of the law, such as petitions, demonstrations, and lobbying. This type of activism, often termed *moderate* (or conventional), refers to actions sanctioned by laws and regulations in relation to a contentious policy issue (Shuman et al. 2016). These tactics emphasize working within the political framework and a “willingness to bargain and compromise with opponents” (Karapın 2010: 46). Overall, participation in moderate opposition has increased in most Western countries since the 1970s. This trend can be explained by the growing acceptance of moderate forms of action (notably nonviolent protest), on the part of governmental authorities, free access to legitimate means of participation (which were not available in the past), and familiarity with conventional forms of collective action (Tarrow 1998: 95–98).

Yet moderate activism may seem futile for a population determined to stop a policy from being implemented by any means necessary. Sometimes, activists are tempted to engage in unlawful behavior, which entails acts that are against the law and are intended to affect public policy by way of illegitimate (threat of) force (Kaase & Marsh 1979). Unlawful activism varies in the degree to which it violates the law and can range from relatively mild infractions, such as blocking roads, to extreme acts of violence, sabotage, and terrorism (e.g., Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2016; McAdam & Tarrow 2000; Tausch et al. 2011; Wright et al. 1990).

It is therefore useful to differentiate not only between legal and illegal actions, but also between violent and nonviolent actions. Within the tactical repertoire, scholars identify three broad types of collective action – moderate and legal, illegal but nonviolent, and illegal and violent – which they refer to under various sets of names (Taylor & Van Dyke 2004; Tarrow 1998; Wang & Soule 2016).² We largely follow this distinction, but prefer the following terminology for the trilogy: moderate, radical, and extreme. Moderate activism, that is, actions that are legal and

nonviolent, was already discussed before, so we now focus only on radical and extreme actions.

Radical action is illegal but nonviolent. Roger Karapin (2010: 46) describes this type of action as “the disruption of political or economic routines in nonviolent ways in order to get public attention, gain public support, influence elites, seize control of important resources, spur broad policy debates, and gain policy reforms.” Radical activities may include blockades, housing takeovers, sit-ins, and illegal encampments. Such actions can be taken in response to an organization’s lack of resources or simply because of a belief that they are the best means to achieve the movement’s goals (Cross 2013; McCarthy & Zald 1977; Cloward & Piven 1977; Tarrow 1998).

The last category, *extreme* action, is both illegal and violent. There is some debate within the literature over what exactly constitutes “violence.” For some, violence includes a broad range of actions, including (threats of) physical attacks on both human beings and property (Taylor & Van Dyke 2004). For others, violence should only be used for (threats of) harm to human beings, not properties (or innate objects). We agree with this stricter approach to violence, and therefore categorize property destruction (including arson and vandalism) as radical actions, and only consider (threats of) physical attacks on human beings as violence and therefore as extreme actions.

That said, the boundaries are not always so clear, as certain acts of vandalism can have (intended or unintended) threats to the safety of human beings – for example, a Molotov cocktail at a car (with someone in it) or an arson attack on someone’s house (even if the person is not at home at that moment). Sometimes the attack is clearly aimed at a property but includes a threat to a person (e.g., a note at the scene that reads “next time we will wait till you at home”). This is the case, for example, with the bulk of actions that constitute the contested term of “ecoterrorism” (Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde 2014).

The repertoire of actions forms a pyramid (see figure 1.1), with a base comprising legal political actions (*moderate*), a middle layer of illegal but nonviolent actions (*radical*), and an apex of illegal and violent actions (*extreme*) (see also McCauley & Moskalenko 2017; Moskalenko & McCauley 2009). The more extreme the action, the less activists and organizations participate. For the great majority of activists and organizations, the use of illegal tactics, and particularly the use of violence, is a red line that cannot be crossed. In fact, very few people in social movements – usually 1 or 2 percent – endorse or engage in extreme activities (Barnes et al. 1979; Weisburd 1989). This observation affirms the well-known participation paradox: the more intensive a form of political participation,




Figure 1.1 Repertoire of actions

in terms of the risks and resources it involves, the more skewed its distribution across the population (Verba et al. 1995).

Agencies of collective action, that is, organizational structures through which people commonly mobilize for political expression (Norris 2004), are important for explaining modes of action and opposition. Studies have found that the type of organizational structure can have direct implications for tactical decisions and, in accordance, the mode of collective action employed. That is, aspects of an organization's formal or informal structure may place limits on the use of some tactics and increase the likelihood of others. In particular, in social movements dominated by networks, involving loose coalitions that are relatively flat and horizontal, activists may be exposed to a range of political ideas that they would not otherwise encounter – and as such, are at greater risk of becoming radicalized (Della Porta & Haupt 2012). Accordingly, while institutions are more likely to use a moderate, nonconfrontational repertoire of actions, which often engage directly with the state and remain within the law, networks are more likely to use a more confrontational, that is, radical or even extreme, repertoire of actions (Della-Porta & Diani 1999; Edwards & McCarthy 2004; Tilly 1995; Verba & Nie 1972).

The repertoire of actions used by different bodies within a social movement can also be affected by factionalism. Social movements, especially when they grow and expand, are likely to fracture into distinct groups and subgroups, which may disagree on both conceptual – for instance how to define the problem – and practical issues – including the actions they believe can legitimately be employed to achieve the movement's goals (Balsler 1997; Blee & Taylor 2002). Different subgroups can also part ways because of bureaucratization and professionalization, produced by the need for skills in accounting, and fundraising and lobbying (McCarthy

& Zald 1977: 1234). These practical exigencies can give rise to different worldviews as well as differences in the modes of action considered legitimate. Hence, a social movement may have a moderate camp, which aims to reform the social system using actions drawn from the repertoire of traditional bureaucracies, alongside a radical camp, which strives to restructure rather than reform the social system (Wrenn 2016: 2).

1.4 Political Arena

The success of the settler movement is often stated without much knowledge about what the movement has actually achieved. One reason for this may be that success on the part of social movements tends to be defined rather narrowly, in terms of whether a given action influences key decision makers – or, in the case of the settler movement, in terms of settler numbers and settlement counts. Another reason may be that we tend to judge the success of social movements based on a biased “sample,” with both researchers and the media focusing on actions and movements that are unusually visible (Gamson 1975, 1990). Moreover, scholars use different reference points, including standards and case selection, and often overstate the scope of their findings. The result is that most studies represent only part of the story.

In fact, social movements are generally neither wholly successful nor entirely unsuccessful. Rather, they negotiate their course through assorted ups and downs in a variety of arenas. Hence, only by examining outcomes in a range of arenas can we reach a realistic understanding and assessment of the success of a social movement. Following Marco Giugni and his collaborators (1999), we suggest that success should be assessed in three interlinked arenas: the state, civil society, and the public – each has both a national and an international dimension. Gains in each realm contribute in some way to the success of the broader movement, and actors that fail in one arena can still prosper overall.

We challenge contemporary research to offer a more precise understanding of the interaction between these three realms by unpacking more specific relationships and processes of influence. By doing so, we also hope to strengthen the recent engagement between scholars who study social movements, civil society, and institutional state organizations (see Weber & King 2014).

1.4.1 *The State*

The first political arena that social movements try to influence is the state. The state apparatus comprises various sets of actors, including

governments, bureaucracies, and the judiciary at the supranational, national, and subnational levels (Meyer & Reyes 2010). Social movements that gain access to the policymaking process can successfully influence policies through formal political institutions (Andrews 2001; Zald 2017). The state is also crucial for the access to resources it provides. These resources can manifest themselves in many ways, including concrete assets, such as financial support granted as part of the political process, and more figurative resources, such as legitimacy by way of favorable political conditions (Cress & Snow 2000; Edwards & Marullo 1995; Snow et al. 2004).

Political opportunity plays an integral role in resource mobilization, allowing social movements to bolster their impact and resources (including financial resources, benefits, and manpower) by leveraging political conditions to obtain support from the state or institutional actors (Amenta et al. 1992; Cloward & Piven 1977; Goldstone & Tilly 2001; Lipset & Marks 2000; Skocpol 1992). Thus, social movements must form coalitions with members of the political establishment (civil servants and other appointed or elected officeholders), winning support from within the establishment by adopting organizational forms that fit current political conditions, or even becoming part of the establishment itself (Roggeband & Klandermans 2017; Snow et al. 2004; Tilly 1975).

Social movements can influence state bureaucracies through different mechanisms, ranging from open collaboration to open opposition. Given that opposition is inherently reactive, this path will mainly prevent things from happening. But social movements can also use threats of opposition to pressure the state into implementing certain policies (Quadagno 1992). Collaboration can be both active and reactive, aimed at furthering or preventing policies. Theoretically, there are different levels of collaboration, depending on the level of openness and shared purpose between the movement and the state. For example, in the case of infiltration, or “capture,” social movements try to influence states covertly, for instance, by changing the institutional environment through the policies and regulations that affect organizations. In contrast, in the case of co-optation, it is often states that try to covertly influence the social movement.

Social movement institutions are most likely to collaborate with or be co-opted by the state for at least three reasons. First, their organizational rationale mirrors that of the state. Indeed, the defining characteristic of institutions is the subjugation of the individual to the impersonal rational rules and hierarchies of bureaucratic rule (Weber & King 2014: 487). Second, states often require a high level of organization to implement their policies. And third, the state is one of the few actors that can guarantee institutions the resources they need to sustain themselves. In

sharp contrast, networks are more likely to work through pressure, that is, through (the threat of) opposition, mostly directed at forcing the state to (not) implement certain policies (Wapner 1995; Yates 2015). Influencers, for their part, are uniquely suited to infiltrate, for example, as bureaucrats or educators. However, whether through infiltration or co-optation, influencers will often have only limited impact in the state arena, as they can only influence a small subsection of the larger project – apart from some very highly placed bureaucrats.

Success in the state arena can range in importance from the most insignificant, such as winning “a specific state policy decision with no long-term implications for the flow of benefits to the group,” to the highest realization of group goals, with actions that provide “continuing leverage over political processes” (Giugni et al. 1999: 31). In fact, there are many possible manifestations of “success,” even in terms of a social movement’s policy impact. For example, some scholars examine passed legislation (Burstein 1979), while others measure public spending on a particular policy (Giugni 2004). One useful measure by which to score the success of social movements with respect to the state is whether the state provides movement actors with open access, that is, openings in the political opportunity structure (Tarrow 1994).

As noted by David Meyer and Daisy Reyes (2010: 221), “political opportunities affect the social movement’s potential to mobilize, advance particular claims, cultivate alliances, employ particular strategies and tactics, and influence mainstream institutional politics and policy.” Such political opportunities include (1) ties and collaboration with state actors; (2) access to the electoral and judicial processes; (3) socialization of citizens, most notably through the educational system; and (4) budgetary subsidies made in response to the movement’s professed needs. Increased political opportunities are thus both an outcome measure for social movement success, and an antecedent of it. Indeed, gaining access to the policy process is the most effective way for social movement organizations to have an impact on policy outcomes, because authorities are often more willing to offer inclusion in the process than they are to accept social movement demands for policy change (Rochon & Mazmanian 1993). However, specific characteristics of social movements shape their ability to achieve favorable policies, and to influence institutional priorities and resources (Harrison 2016: 536).

Characteristics of the state bodies with which social movements interact can also influence the relationship and, therefore, their impact on policy outcomes. The literature identifies three vital intraorganizational factors that shape how organizations implement social movement policies: (1) ideological commitment to movement policies – whether

relevant staff exhibit a “pro- or anti-movement orientation” (Zald et al. 2005: 275); (2) organizational capacity to respond to movement demands; and (3) surveillance and sanctions that compel compliance. State bureaucracies are shaped not only by rational decisions about efficiency but also by norms, shared meanings, and pressure from movements and politicians (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Thus, to fully explain social movement policy outcomes further, the beliefs of state representatives – and how they apply them – are key variables.

There is evidence that social movement activities that respond to the electoral concerns of elected officials can have a particularly potent impact. Officeholders are most likely to pay attention to groups whose members vote and participate in politics. In accordance, social movement organizations are most likely to influence policy when “they change their activities in ways that attract legislators’ attention, and when the attention-getting activities in turn lead legislators to worry that if they do not respond to the organizations’ demands, their chances of reelection will suffer” (Burstein & Linton 2002: 387; see also Amenta & Poulsen 1996). Another effective tactic is to provide elected officials with information and resources (e.g., members, money, and media access) relevant to the officials’ reelection (Lohmann 1993).

In this book, we will analyze the role of the settler movement and its supporters within state organizations, and in particular in the administration of the occupied territories. In doing so, we will consider both the *direct* and *indirect* impact of the settler movement on the state bureaucracy. The former refers to the organizations’ impact on the final stage of legislative activity, when policy changes are, or are not, enacted into law. The latter refers to organizations’ success in getting issues on the political agenda, influencing how issues are framed, providing information, and affecting public opinion. We thereby distinguish between the overall long-term goal of the settler movement (i.e., the realization of *Eretz Yisrael*) and more concrete short- and medium-term goals (such as the building, expansion, legalization and protection of concrete settlements).

1.4.2 *Civil Society*

The state is not the sole antagonist or contested site for social movements. They also operate outside the formal political system, targeting other forms of authority (Baron 2003; Bartley 2007; Weber & King 2014). Thus, social movement scholars have begun to expand their domain of interest, turning from an exclusive concern with “public politics” to various forms of “private politics,” that is, means and modes of inter-organizational conflict resolution in which public authorities have only

a limited role (De Bakker et al. 2013: 576; see also Armstrong & Bernstein 2008). Social movement research has increasingly broadened from state-oriented action to, more generally, conceptions of conflict or collaboration with different types of institutional and noninstitutional targets, including civil society associations (Alexander 2006; Meyerson & Scully 1995).

The civil society arena is largely defined by what it is not. It is the amorphous space between state and society (Kopecký & Mudde 2003). Civil society thus includes a broad range of political actors and structures and should not be perceived as homogeneous or unitary. An active civil society is broadly considered a measure of democratic success (Foley & Edwards 1996; Putnam 1993), although recent research has problematized this relationship. From Weimar Germany to twenty-first-century Egypt, (fragile) democracies have been challenged, and defeated, by highly active civil society groups (Berman 1997). Moreover, in some cases in postcommunist Eastern Europe, “civil society” has been detrimental to democracy, while “uncivil society” has been beneficial (Kopecký & Mudde 2003).

Social movements that focus on civil society strive to garner collective benefits outside the realm of state legislation or policy. Building ties with civil society groups, whether through memberships or partnerships, enables networking, cooperation, and collaboration to achieve mutually beneficial ends (Caniglia et al. 2015; Putnam 1995). As Anthony Oberschall (2012: 189) has argued, “when favorable changes in public policy and legislation occur, the social movement input is one component of a larger coalition of political groups, lobbies and supportive publics, all of which were crucial for success.”

For social movements, three specific non-state actors are of particular importance: political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the media (Benford & Snow 2000; Melucci 1996). All three are imperative to furthering the cause of any social movement, albeit via different processes. Logically, social movements will try to influence civil society actors who share, at least in part, their ideology and interests; see, for example, the relationship of US civil rights organizations to black churches during the 1950s and 1960s (Morris 1999). In fact, in some cases, social movements will not even have to influence these actors, which chose to advocate for their shared agenda anyway.

The bridge or conduit between the formal activity of the state and the informal political activity of social movement organizations is political parties. Although conceptualized in a variety of ways, the most concise definition comes from the late Italian political theorist Giovanni Sartori (1976: 63), who defined a political party as “any political group identified

by an official label that presents elections, and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office.” Some scholars exclude parties from the sphere of civil society, arguing that they are part of the state (Carothers & Barndt 1999). However, despite growing connections between them (Katz & Mair 1995), political parties are, for the most part, distinguishable and formally independent from the state. For social movements, they are particularly important as policymakers. While the state *implements* policies, political parties actually *introduce* them, through their actions in executives and legislatures (Burstein & Linton 2002).

Scholars who examine the interactions between social movement organizations and other political actors often employ a *political opportunity structure* (POS) framework to see how and to what degree different institutions influence and benefit from mutual cooperation. The framework examines the importance of the political context and the opportunities it offers social movements, including the configuration of power within the party system. For example, Hanspeter Kriesi and his collaborators (1992) have suggested that the need for social movements to engage in mobilization is directly related to political tendencies on a linear, left–right spectrum. Practically, this means that if a left-leaning party dominates the government, social movements with similar views have less need for mobilization, as they foresee greater chances of reform in their favor. The flip side is that social movements whose views clash with those of the government have greater need to mobilize supporters. Thus, political parties act not only as a channel between non-institutional action and governmental processes, they also magnify or minimize the need for internal mobilization, depending on the party’s current electoral fortunes.

Given that most political parties are, first and foremost, driven by the need to maximize their electoral support, the branch of social movements that should hold the largest influence over them is the institutions (Tarrow 1994). The greater the electoral power of social movement institutions, based on the number of voters they can mobilize, the greater their potential influence. Examples, in the US context, include the American Association for Retired People (AARP) and the National Rifle Association (NRA), who have a large and highly mobilized membership (as well as significant financial resources), making them formidable players within US politics. Networks have less power, because they represent constituencies outside the established political organizations, which have the most significant and direct ability to affect politics (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Similarly, most influencers have limited power, because their (increasingly online) followers are not easily mobilized in the real political world.

Influencers can have an impact through infiltration, and to a certain level, co-optation, but only if they achieve a particularly powerful position within a party (Waddock 2017). Influencers require capital, information, labor, and skills. While holding some of these resources themselves, they often complement them by accessing their contacts (Greve & Salaff 2003). In general, the relationship between influencers and political parties is symbiotic: political parties offer influencers complementary resources to produce and deliver their goods or services (Teece 1987), and can provide influencers with increased visibility and legitimacy. In turn, influencers afford political parties access to people and organizations by fostering connections and leveraging new media platforms.

Nongovernmental organizations range from small, poorly funded local groups formed around specific issues like the local playground to global behemoths like Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Social movements mainly reach out to NGOs to increase their resources, including finances and personnel. Nongovernmental organizations and social movements, however, often occupy the same conceptual playing field, leading to tensions, politically and organizationally, in their interactions with each other and with third-party actors. Indeed, as Alejandro Bendaña (2006: 1) argues, social movements can end up “absorb[ing] and reorient[ing] NGOs,” or conversely, experiencing an “NGO-ization of movements and politics.” That is, interactions between the two can result in the assimilation of NGOs into social movements, or the effective professionalization of social movements to resemble NGOs, as manifested in their organizational frameworks and modes of action.

Inherently, social movements and NGOs have different bottom lines, and therefore work to achieve their goals via different means. NGOs are intrinsically dedicated to “policy advocacy [and] service delivery and monitoring” (Bendaña 2006: 7), and are characterized by a certain (though limited) accountability and transparency. Social movements are mass or popular movements that owe accountability only to their constituents. Yet although the fundamental construction of NGOs and social movements differ, they share the desired outcome of (not) changing social, political, and economic policies.

Despite the tension between social movements and NGOs, their shared interests mean that they can achieve the most when they act together, such “that none loses its autonomy and each contributes according to their particular strengths” (Bendaña 2006: 18). Social movements can attract mass constituency support, a feature that most NGOs frequently lack. For their part, NGOs can give social movements legitimacy in the eyes of the political elite and the “neutral” public, and can open channels to the government. Partnerships between NGOs and social movements

can come to fruition either incrementally or as a “single process of elaborating common national and international projects” (Bendaña 2006: 18). The formation of such coalitions can help social movements expand beyond their core constituencies to include grassroots members, civil servants, and the political elite.

We can assume a natural tendency toward “like to like,” meaning that individuals and groups will gravitate toward structurally similar individuals and groups. For example, social movement institutions are likely to pursue collaborative efforts with more organized NGOs, whereas informal networks will tend to engage with less organized groups. Likewise, influencers will most frequently collaborate with other influencers. However, this tendency for organizationally analogous actors to seek one another out is ameliorated by the possibility of dual membership. In other words, given that the goal of movement organizations is resource mobilization, the “like to like” tendency is mitigated by a more primary urge to enlist maximum capital. When informal networks determine that they can bolster their group’s potential for success, it is commonplace for them to seek partnerships with structurally dissimilar groups.

The media are of primary interest due to its influence on public opinion and its power to help set the political agenda (King et al. 2017; McCombs 2013; Soroka 2003). The media – particularly television, the press, and online outlets – are also a malleable organizing tool, one that evolves in accordance with the changing (and sometimes conflicting) needs of activists. Studies have shown that the media can facilitate connective engagement and protest mobilization, enabling grassroots campaigns to build quickly and effectively (Hensby 2017). When a social movement challenges a cultural code, a change in the media arena both signals and spreads the change (Gamson 2004). Additionally, mass media also play a key catalyzing role in public protest, as all players in the policy process accept their pervasive influence. As such, media coverage can greatly influence “the nature, development and ultimate success of social protest” (Corbett 1998: 42).

The media are not a neutral actor, but part of the dominant power structure, and act as a “gatekeeper” of content (Corbett 1998: 43). That is, traditional news outlets can pick and choose what content they wish to disseminate or suppress. As such, the media also control which social movement institutions they respond to. Social movement institutions, for their part, can develop structural relationships of collaboration and interdependency with media organizations, for example, by providing them with access, information, and talking heads. Social movement networks mainly try to influence the media by creating “newsworthy” events. Influencers, finally, can impact specific media by either working for

them, as journalists, or by functioning as “experts” on issues related to the broader political agenda of the social movement.

Not only do media outlets play a crucial role in determining whether a particular social movement is newsworthy, they also have a huge hand in the narrative of certain movements (Breuer et al. 2015). By presenting an organization as sympathetic, aggressive, or victimized, the media can affect the resource and constituency mobilization of the group. In this respect, getting noticed by the media has traditionally been most important for small, resource-deprived groups, who have few other instruments of mobilization. In fact, the success of a social movement is often indicated by its “ascension to a permanently newsworthy status” (Roscho 1975: 101).

Regardless of a social movement’s size or degree of formality, the media are an indispensable arbiter in a social movement’s interaction with the public. This gives media actors a huge amount of control over the framing of the public discourse. It is still unclear what this means in the age of social media. Developments in communication, and changes in how people connect with information sources, have created new opportunities for engaging and mobilizing mass audiences, both online and offline. Unlike traditional forms of collective action, social media do not rely so strongly on organizational resources. Rather, they transmit ideas and messages virally through networks such as Facebook and Twitter – what Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2015) refer to as “connective action” logic. Following this logic,

activists can disseminate first-hand accounts of events via social networking sites – events which previously might have received one-sided coverage in the mainstream media or no coverage at all. Moreover, these sites are extremely popular, enabling activists to connect with like-minded people across the globe, as well as open their campaigns out to wider, less-politicized audiences (Hensby 2017: 468).

Mark Tremayne (2014), for example, has argued that the proliferation of social media content created for Occupy Wall Street was a key driver of the movement’s upward “scale shift” to a worldwide phenomenon.

On the other hand, studies have demonstrated that the media have the power to severely limit the information that audiences receive and can eliminate alternative solutions to political problems from public debate (Happer & Philo 2013). Moreover, repeated exposure to media messages can have a reinforcing effect on public opinion. In experimental research, individuals who were more exposed to a specific media message were increasingly less open to new information, and less flexible in assimilating any new information that filtered through. This was evident even if the

message was inaccurate (Happer & Philo 2013). Therefore, the increased proliferation of messages by members of social movement networks across social media could have a significant effect on public opinion, building public support that can be translated into resource mobilization. This brings us to the third political area, the public.

1.4.3 Society

Social movements mainly meet society in the public arena, in a battle over public opinion, or *public values*, in what is amorphously termed “culture.” Culture can be conceived of as “the norms, values, traditions, artifacts, and expectations [that operate] within a community” (Fine 1995: 127). Cultural context is imperative in the formation and framing of social movements, which are, in fact, *cultural* movements. Not only do cultural cues define the figurative bounds of social movements, but they are also in constant interaction with the movement organizations – dynamically framing and reframing the boundaries as cultural pressures and themes shift (Snow et al. 1986; Snow & Benford 1992).

Despite conceptual and methodological dilemmas, which make this a particularly challenging area of inquiry, social science research has made significant advances in identifying and demonstrating specific cultural outcomes related to the success of social movements (Hart 1996). These include changes in *public opinion*, changes in *cultural products* and everyday practices (e.g., in language, music, fashion, visual culture, the academy, and literature), and the (re)emergence of (new) communities and/or *identities* (d’Anjou 1996; d’Anjou & Van Male 1998; Earl 2013; Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Melucci 1989; Rochon 1998).

The public arena is where individuals and groups meet and exchange views concerning their interests, while at the same time deliberating, raising objections, and making suggestions concerning public issues (Habermas 1989). Within this more general space of the public arena exists the space of public opinion, which denotes the collective expression of citizens’ views on issues of public concern, and which serves as a means of regulating the activities of formal, institutional bodies. Public opinion can be expressed informally or, as in the case of elections, formally (Habermas & Lennox 1974). In general, the public sphere operates as the broker between society and the state, and is thus pivotal in relaying the desires and opinions of the masses to the political elite and state institutions.

Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1987: 158) maintain that the public arena comprises a set of discursive groups, namely a group of people interested in an issue, “with a view to registering a collective opinion

which is expected to affect the course of action of some decision-making group or individual.” Gamson suggests straightforwardly that the public arena can be conceived of as a forum in which public discourse is carried out (in Snow et al. 2004). This discourse is carried out by individuals or collective actors in a myriad of different *public galleries*, including the mass media, parliaments, and social media. These actors take on a performative role in the public forum in order to foster resource mobilization by appealing to the masses to gain legitimacy.

The public arena is indispensable to social movements, because it is the most open space in which social movements operate: “It is the space where people come together as citizens and articulate their autonomous views to influence the political institutions of society” (Castells 2008: 78). In addition to being crucial for solidifying constituents’ affective attachment to the social movement, organizations that know how to successfully co-opt public opinion can garner resources to maintain and perpetuate the movement, and push civil society and the state to further their cause (Keane 2018; Schurman 2004).

Accordingly, to the extent that social movements are conceived of as vehicles for social change, the effects these challengers have on belief systems and ideologies, as well as on “the practices and culture of mainstream institutions,” become a yardstick for social movement success (Giugni et al. 1999: 34). Moreover, the creation of (new) collective identities can serve as proxy gains within the public framework. In fact, Gamson’s (1975) well-known definition of movement success includes public acceptance or recognition, in the sense that the movement’s objectives become part of the public agenda, as a core component. Some of the biggest achievements of social movements lie in broadening the public discourse. Bringing public attention to the claims of the social movement can itself have an enormous effect, in particular if the movement does so by inventing new tactics (Zimmermann 2015).

At least within a democratic context, though to some extent even in authoritarian settings (Geddes & Zaller 1989; Soroka & Wlezian 2010), politics is largely a struggle over public opinion. Electoral competition means that officials seeking reelection – indeed, all candidates seeking office – must respond to the public, which may lead them to promote policies that accord with public opinion, even, in some cases, regardless of their own personal views (Burstein & Linton 2002; Parinandi & Hitt 2018). Social movement mobilization can serve a key role in this process by providing decision makers with information on public preferences (Uba 2009). Hence, political actors try to influence not just what people think about a certain issue, but also what issues they think about. In other words, social movements aim not only to make people see their point of

view on a specific issue, but also to make people consider that issue to be of vital importance (Benford & Snow 2000).

Although much of the debate on movement outcomes has focused on the role of public opinion, the empirical evidence is still inconsistent (Burstein & Linton 2002; Giugni 2004; Soule 2004). This may be in part due to differences in the measures used to assess the impact of social movements on public opinion. Importantly, the role of public opinion also varies across measures of organizational resources and activity (Parinandi & Hitt 2018; Uba 2009). For example, while institutions have sometimes been included in analyses of a social movement's impact on public opinion, much less attention has been paid to networks or influencers.

Social movement organizations can influence the public sphere, and by extension, public opinion, in different ways – both *indirectly*, through the state and civil society organizations (like schools and the media), and *directly*, through their own political campaigns. Their level of organization and resources means that institutions are likely to have more sustained influence on both issue salience and issue positions. In contrast, networks mainly have a short-term agenda-setting function, through well-mediatised actions. Influencers normally have only a limited impact on both aspects, barring some exceptional individuals and events. Examples are influencers who reach a broader audience in another capacity than social movement activist and use that position to change opinions about the movement's cause. This includes celebrities who speak out for a cause, like US actress Angelina Jolie on human rights, Canadian actress Pamela Anderson on animal rights, or Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg on the environment.

The phenomenon of celebrities and cultural icons using their agency to advance a social cause or agenda has in fact become a fixture of the social movement landscape (Wilson et al. 2015). Zeynep Tufekci (2013) has suggested that recent developments in media ecology add to the development and production of “attention” as an asset for social movements, with it becoming an invaluable resource for gaining traction, soliciting new membership, and presenting preferred frames. The result is that celebrities are increasingly useful as movement advocates. Equally, the movement serves the celebrity in a reciprocal relationship, keeping the spotlight on that individual. David Meyer and Joshua Gamson (1995: 181) have even suggested that it is far more anomalous to see a celebrity “*without a cause*” these days.

The specific areas in which celebrities' contributions to social movements appear to be most significant are resource mobilization and collective identity. The resource that celebrities offer to social movements is visibility. This is primarily realized on the media stage, where the public is

informed by news outlets and sources as to what is important: “Once an individual has been certified as newsworthy, he or she has been empowered, within limits, to make news” (Gitlin 1980: 146). Celebrity icons and personalities are intrinsically newsworthy, and therefore their association with a movement or cause imbues it with their status and media attention. In fact, while experts may have more knowledge about a particular cause, celebrities have exponentially more access to the public eye and therefore serve as an attractive and efficient pathway. Celebrity participation in a protest or rally on behalf of a given movement organization will also have a reinforcing effect for the constituency. This combination then catalyzes a positive loop for the movement’s resource mobilization; the presence of a celebrity attracts media and strengthens constituent support at events or rallies, which then furnish larger attendance and further justification of the event as “newsworthy.”

1.4.4 *International Arena*

There has been a significant increase in transnational activity among social movement organizations over the last 50 years (Della Porta & Tarrow 2005). Transnational activism refers to an appeal to international support networks on behalf of actors who may be too weak to progress their own cause on the domestic arena, or who seek to leverage their movement with international pressure. Sidney Tarrow (2005) argues that with the rise of internationalism, transnational activist networks have provided domestic activists with added resources and legitimacy, especially if the international actors come from the political elite. The intersection of globalization and internationalization has resulted in a surge of transnational activists, who are conceived of as actors or groups that act both within multiple countries in order to catalyze resource mobilization – in particular by eliciting support from external, international allies.

Cultural, geopolitical, and social paradigm shifts have affected social movements’ institutional and cultural environments, such as the transformation of the media system, globalization of the economic system, and the presence of political authorities on the international level (Della Porta & Tarrow 2005). These global forces encompass information exchange, global cultural and policy diffusion, and the interdependence of trade and production (Almeida & Chase-Dunn 2018). It is important to note that the relationship between transnational allies is generally mutually beneficial. In other words, activists tend to engage international actors or groups whose own ideologies or driving tenets align with their own, or who stand to benefit from a symbiotic alliance.

Building alliances with international actors can be a potent tool for social movements, because it multiplies opportunities for mobilizing support and resources. That is, the international arena provides new space for lobbying and alternative paths of access to political processes (Passy 1999; Smith 1999). Clifford Bob (2005) suggests that disadvantaged movements around the globe increasingly seek out the assistance of international organizations, both governmental bodies and NGOs, precisely because they feel they lack the resources and influence to successfully fight for change on their own. The European Union (EU), for example, provides a supranational forum where advocacy groups can present their grievances while also generating momentum through formal policy-making channels (Ruzza 2004; Tarrow 2005; Zippel 2004).

Whereas groups lacking transnational contacts might find themselves either ignored or repressed by their own national governments, those whose struggles are recognized by international actors can gain political leverage in their domestic contexts. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) describe this strategy of using the international stage to influence the behaviors of national governments as a “boomerang effect.” Certification by international actors or institutions, whether transnational citizens’ groups or international agencies, has important effects on national political struggles, as it demonstrates the movement’s claims are viewed as legitimate by those outside the country in question. This can enhance activists’ sense of efficacy and can help local groups mobilize resources from the transnational activist community. International allies, in turn, can contribute significantly to the success of a social movement by creating pressure from above and below the national state. Thus, by participating in the international arena, social movements can “bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from the outside” (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 12).

What is novel about these international alliances is the ability of national social movements, including from relatively small countries, to persuade, pressure, and exert leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Alliances with international actors – including international NGOs, governmental organizations, social movements, and professional bodies and conferences – provide vital resources for domestic social movements, and help spread the movement’s ideas, practices, and frames from one country to another. In creating these networks with international actors, social movements try not only to influence policy outcomes but also the nature of the debate, building legitimacy, awareness, and a voice for the social movement from the outside (Tarrow & McAdam 2005). Social movements can also bolster their cause by challenging international institutions to intervene in problems or domestic

conflict and mobilizing resources, including money, information, and activists for the movement's project and activities.

The boundary-less nature of online media has made the transnational approach more efficient and feasible (Bennett 2003). The Internet has broken the monopoly of communication once held by traditional elites, such as governments, churches, or political parties. Activist websites assembled by the independent media as well as movement-specific Facebook sites and free international messaging applications (such as Skype, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Telegram) perform a broker role for social movements by connecting organizations and individuals globally (Della Porta et al. 2006; Horstink 2017; Juris 2005). These websites and digital messaging applications offer logistic information in multiple languages for coordinating local events as well as transnational campaigns (Almeida & Lichbach 2003; Howard 2010).

Social media platforms, in particular, have served as outlets for social movements to propagate ideas, mobilize members for collective action, and coordinate activism. Online websites, for example, create opportunities for interaction and connection, often featuring numerous international and interorganizational hyperlinks (Burriss et al. 2000; Daniels, 2009). As Francesca Polletta (1999: 3) notes: "Free spaces supply the activist networks, skills, and solidarity that assist in launching a movement." The Internet has also simplified the process for appealing to international support in circumstances where information would not be diffused by official channels (Karolak 2017). Furthermore, it enables individuals to become political broadcasters and voice their opinions on an equal footing with any other user, thereby allowing marginalized groups to become (more) vocal and reach international audiences (Karolak 2017). As such, social media have further democratized the various arenas in which social movements operate.

1.5 Internal and External Antecedents of Political Success

Social movement scholarship has identified both internal and external factors that impact social movement success. Among the most oft-mentioned internal factors are the movement's tactical repertoire and organizational infrastructure. The main external factors are the political opportunity structure and public acceptance (McAdam 2017).

1.5.1 *Internal Factors*

It seems obvious that the tactics adopted by any organization, group, or movement will have an effect on the group's ability to achieve its goals.

Early work on the impact of social movements emphasized the advantages of radical action strategies (e.g., Gamson 1990; Piven & Cloward 1993). Yet findings on the effectiveness of different tactical repertoires are mixed and inconclusive at best. Social movements do not exist within a vacuum. Their actions, be they moderate, radical, or extreme, are limited and influenced by other players in the sociopolitical system. That is, the application of violence is a dynamic result of differing opportunities and limitations that the contemporary political opportunity structure offers protesters and law-enforcement alike (Tarrow 2011). For example, with the normalization of protest in Western democracies, people have come to see peaceful protests (demonstrations, marches, rallies) as a legitimate way of expressing demands (Norris et al. 2005), whereas illegal and violent acts have become less accepted (Della Porta & Diani 1999; Tarrow 1994).

Decision makers within social movements must weigh the costs and benefits of moderate versus radical or extreme modes of action. Studies have found that in the United States, social movements which opted for more moderate, insider tactics were more successful in generating Congressional support (e.g., Gamson 1990; Santoro & Fitzpatrick 2015; Soule et al. 1999). Radical, disruptive actions have the advantage that they can garner the attention of target authority figures and can serve to mobilize a sympathetic audience (Bearman & Everett 1993). But disruptive, radical modes can also undermine a movement's cause by alienating the movement's support base if it goes too far, particularly when it veers into the territory of violent acts (Biggs & Andrews 2015; Elsbach & Sutton 1992; Johnson et al. 2006; Kanter & Troup 2018).

Social movement organizations that have a cause with broad appeal are more likely to use radical disruptive methods, but less likely to resort to extreme (violent) measures. In contrast, organizations with narrow appeal are more likely to opt for extreme means. This is because more-niche organizations inherently have a smaller support base, making them less dependent upon broader support but more dependent upon attention-grabbing tactics to arouse media attention (Wang & Piazza 2016). When the target of the organization is the government, there is a success trade-off when employing violent tactics. Extreme actions are likely to lead to the marginalization of protestors, and it can alienate elected officials and potential sympathizers (McAdam & Su 2002). Hence, social movements may choose nonviolent actions over violent ones to gain recognition as respectable players who should be listened to (Tilly 1999, 2008).

While there is considerable debate on the effectiveness of different types of actions, most scholars agree that social movements are more

successful when they employ a *variety of tactics*, that is, when they draw from a broad tactical repertoire rather than a more narrow one (e.g., Fishman & Everson 2016; McCammon 2012; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004; Tilly et al. 1975). For example, they point to the success of the women's movement in the second half of the twentieth century, which incorporated both moderate and radical protests (Gelb & Hart 1999; Rupp & Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1991). Several scholars have noted that cultural change is particularly likely to follow “moments of madness,” that is, a snowball effect where more and more organizations engage in various collective actions (Koopmans 1993; Kriesi et al. 1992; Tarrow 1993).

Successful social movements also engage in novel or “hybrid” tactical actions to enhance their effectiveness and survival over time (Dalton et al. 2003; Katzenstein et al. 1998; McAdam 1983; Meyer & Tarrow 1998). Novel tactics can refer to a range of activities, including art, protest music, speak-outs, street performances, and theater. Although social movements are often reluctant to stray from familiar tactics, there is evidence that organizations willing to try novel tactics often enjoy more successful policy outcomes (Snow et al. 2004; Wang et al. 2018). However, in practice, a movement's pool of viable tactics can be constrained by the resources and opportunities available. That is, a group's choice of particular actions will reflect a combination of external factors and internal conditions, including the political opportunity structure and the group's internal preferences, organizational identity, and resources (Balsler & Carmin 2002; Jasper 1997; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Zald & Useem 1987).

Another factor that underpins the success of social movements is their *organizational size and infrastructure* (Andrews 2004; Ganz 2010). Larger organizations can be more sustainable, as their size bolsters the organization both internally, by affirming the commitment of the organization's constituency, and externally, by empowering outsiders to join. Large protest activities have the aesthetic benefit of being attention grabbing. For example, Aldon Morris (1993) cites the size of the civil rights movement as one of the key elements behind its success in influencing public opinion and political institutions. Not only do large membership and protest participation numbers attest to the legitimacy of the movement, in that they convey broad appeal, but numerical superiority has greater “disruptive potential” (Snow et al. 2004: 281). The structure of an organization, whether formal or informal, also plays a role in determining the degree of success the organization can attain. In fact, structuralist theory holds that the structure of social movement organizations explains the greatest variation in the outcome of campaigns both within and across movements (Krause 2011).

Some studies have found that organizational form can influence a movement's ability to facilitate policy change (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995). Several scholars have identified typologies of organizational forms based on dimensions such as bureaucratization, centralization, formalization, and professionalization – all of which can inform the success potential of social movement organizations (Gamson 1975; Mirowsky & Ross 1981; Staggenborg 2015; Wrenn, 2016). Bureaucratization or formalization are the common terms scholars employ to describe increasing control or rigidity in the management and upkeep of the organization's administrative aspects and internal infrastructure. While some degree of administrative formalization may be useful, too much bureaucratization makes organizations “more oligarchical and rigid, less democratic and spontaneous,” and increases their reliance on ambiguous sources of authority (Corbett 1998: 44–45). Although research suggests that less centralized, more informal networks are more likely to succeed (Breines 1982; Gerlach & Hine 1970), there is also evidence that bureaucratization can contribute positively to movement sustainability (Kielbowicz & Scherer 1996). In particular, having a clear organizational infrastructure can help social movements maintain a presence in the mass media, and therefore, in the public eye – thus making them more relevant to policymakers. In short, movement success requires different organizational competencies and forms in order to mobilize support from state authorities, civil society, and the public.

1.5.2 *External Factors*

Among the external factors most relevant to the mobilization and success of social movements is *political context* (Jenkins 1995). Social movements, like other aspects of society, are influenced and informed by existing power relations and political structures (McAdam 1982, 2017). The political opportunity approach to the study of social movements examines the openness of the political system – that is, limitations to formal political access, the level of stability afforded by political alliances, the availability of potential partnerships, and political conflicts among elites (Tarrow 1994). Studies show that the openness of the political system and governmental institutions' tendency to inhibit challenger groups strongly inform which tactics social movement organizations select, and ultimately help shape their outcomes (Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998).

It should be emphasized that political opportunity structures may constrain as well as empower social movements. In some cases, the political context is such that social movement activities are met with public outcry, including condemnation and countermobilization, both

within the state and internationally (Alimi & Hirsch-Hoefler 2012). Likewise, a social movement can give rise to or strengthen opponents as well as allies. For example, the activities of the settler movement have produced opposing responses in three different arenas: Jewish Israeli (e.g., Peace Now, B'Tselem), Palestinian (inside both Israel and the West Bank), and international (notably the EU, UN, and the United States – both at the government and civil society level). It has also for at least the last decade, but arguably about two decades, come to increasingly divide Jewish communities outside Israel (primarily in the United States).

The final factor that contributes to social movement success is the *framing narrative* of the organization, or its “cultural resonance” (Snow et al. 2004: 282). The tactics of social movement organizations are not exclusively a function of cost–benefit analysis, but also reflect and reinforce the group’s ideological/cultural identity (Dalton 1994; Polletta 2016; Snow & Benford 1988, 1992). Social movements construct and adapt their identity in order to appeal to their own constituencies, to the wider public, and to institutional operatives that can help them achieve their goals. As such, the specific framing that an organization chooses to identify can affect the success of both the specific organization and the broader movement. Group ideology can also serve as a frame of reference for either justifying or delegitimizing violent means of facilitating social change. As noted by Ted Gurr (1970: 194), one of the main functions of political ideology is to provide “norms about the desirability of political violence.”

While the choice of frame is largely an internal factor, it is significantly influenced by the broader political context. In particular, a social movement will be more successful if it can design a narrative that resonates with the cultural ideology of the mainstream public (Baumgarten & Ullrich 2016). This is what Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999) have termed the “discursive opportunity structure,” sometimes also referred to as “cultural opportunity structure,” that is, “political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘legitimate’ by the audience” (Kriesi 2004: 72).

A large component of the junction between cultural resonance and social movement organization and mobilization is consciousness-raising. Consciousness-raising is akin to public support capital and is often a top priority of first-generation activists in any given movement (McGehe et al. 2014: 143). Raising public awareness of a social movement can heighten its success by reinforcing individuals’ connection to and enlisting participation in the social movement (Eisenstein, 2001). By

increasing participation and membership the social movement increases its visibility and legitimacy, thereby bolstering perceptions of the organization and its chances of success. While consciousness-raising usually reinforces individual participation, it can also strengthen public support by eliciting sympathy for a cause, which, while not always culminating in active participation, can facilitate further awareness of the social movement (McGehe, Kline & Knollenberg 2014).

1.6 Conclusion

The question of success is at the heart of most research of social movements, and yet very few studies explicitly define what “success” constitutes and how best to assess it. Building upon the existing literature, we have developed an original and comprehensive theoretical framework in which the key concepts of *success* and *social movement* are deconstructed into separate components, which will allow us, and others, to assess success in a more fine-grained manner without losing track of the overall assessment.

Table 1.1 provides a visual representation of our theoretical framework for the assessment and explanation of the success of social movements. It distinguishes four categories, where the first, the dimensions of success, is crucial to *assessing* success. Specifically, after having established the main goal(s) of the social movement on the basis of its own documents and statements, we argue that its success must be assessed vis-à-vis three separate but related areas: policies, resources, and support. Has the social movement been able to advance policies that further its main goal(s)? Has it been able to mobilize resources to strengthen and sustain the social movement itself? And has the social movement created support for its goal(s) among the elites and masses?

The other three categories – the types of movement branches, actions, and political arenas – help us to better *explain* the (lack of) success of a social movement. To better understand *how* social movements do (not)

Table 1.1 *Theoretical framework of social movement success*

<i>Success</i>	<i>Movement branches</i>	<i>Repertoire of actions</i>	<i>Political arenas</i>
Policies	Institutions	Moderate	State
Resources	Networks	Radical	Civil society
Support	Influencers	Extreme	Society

achieve success, we propose to look at the movement as the sum of three branches. Institutions constitute the most formalized, organized, and centralized branch of the movement. Not all social movements have institutions, particularly not at the beginning, but many of the more successful ones do. Networks are less formalized and institutionalized and operate in a more decentralized manner, with fluid memberships and organizations. Influencers, finally, are individuals who play an important role irrespective of their organizational connections in the movement. Their influence is based on their personal appeal, related to activities outside the realm of the social movement (e.g., actors, artists, athletes).

Social movements employ different types of activities, legal or illegal, violent or nonviolent. The most common type of action is moderate and includes all activities that are legal and nonviolent, such as demonstrations, lobbying, and mass media communications. Illegal actions are divided into nonviolent (radical) actions, such as blockades or sit-ins, and violent (extreme) actions, notably (threats of) physical attacks on persons. In most cases, a minority of social movement activists and groups are involved in radical actions and only a tiny portion engages (also) in extreme actions (see Figure 1.1).

Finally, social movements try to achieve success by influencing different political arenas, both at the national and international level. The first arena is the state, which includes the government, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, and military. The second is civil society, most notably political parties, NGOs, and the media. Third, and final, is the public, most notably public opinion. Obviously, the three arenas are closely related; for example, governments and legislatures are mostly occupied by leading members of political parties, who are very sensitive to public opinion. Moreover, the three arenas exist at both the domestic and foreign level, and interconnect in many different ways. A foreign government can subsidize a domestic NGO or domestic parties can try to influence international public opinion.

It is important to note that our theoretical framework is not an alternative to existing (meta)theories like POS or RMT. Rather, it is consistent with them, but elaborates upon them. It allows a more fine-grained analysis of resource mobilization of the social movement as a whole, by distinguishing the activities of its different, constituent branches. Similarly, there are interesting interactions between POS theory and our theoretical framework. The political opportunity structure describes the political context in which social movements operate, providing challenges and opportunities not just for the movement as a whole, but also for its individual branches. For instance, a more open political opportunity structure, in which the state (and major parties) are sympathetic to the

goals of the social movement, encourages collaborative behavior and moderate actions, strengthening the power of the institutions within the broader social movement. In contrast, a more closed political opportunity structure, and particularly a hostile state (and major parties), will encourage more radical, and perhaps even extreme, actions, increasing the importance of the networks.