

band music on Sunday mornings, the "Café mit Schlag," and the golden epaulettes on the ushers' uniforms in the Vienna Opera House. The image of this world reflects reality, but only in a limited sense—limited by the somewhat smug penchant of the middle class to see its own world in universal terms, a misunderstanding pardonable to some measure, because both the upper and lower classes did share in the preponderant middle-class ethos of the times. Yet, to the extent that the working-class slums in Vienna were immune to *gemülichkeit*, they were still part and parcel of Vienna; and in Budapest, too, the coffee-house culture waned in direct proportion to the distance from the center of the city.

There is nothing wrong with nostalgia; it is a legitimate human response, and it does bring us closer to the often precious values of the past. However, to make its message more meaningful, it ought to break out at times from the confines of its own stifling sentimentality and subconscious awareness of class. Long after I grew up, I began to notice and even enjoy with some embarrassment how my grandfather's stories about his years in the Austro-Hungarian cavalry were only slightly personalized versions of scenes from a Kálmán or Lehár operetta. Reading Ernst Roth's book, I was captivated by the same sense of ambivalence.

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DIE UNGARISCHE REVOLUTION VON 1848/49 UND DIE DEMOKRATISCHE BEWEGUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND. By *Karl Obermann*. Kommission der Historiker der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Volksrepublik Ungarn, vol. 1. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971. 70 pp. \$2.40.

This first volume of what had seemed to be a promising new series undertaken by a joint historical commission of the DDR and Hungary is a disappointment. If the author's intention is to demonstrate the impact of the German democratic movement on the Hungarian revolution, or vice versa, the book falls far short of his goal. At best, Obermann is able to show that there was a great amount of sympathy in some quarters for the Magyar people "fighting bravely for their freedom and independence." But were the sympathies as widespread and as deeply ingrained among the Germans as Obermann purports? He does not bring any exceptions to the reader's attention, which makes one suspicious that the homogeneity of evidence is due to the careful screening of the available data.

There is another problem. Among the Germans, who were those who looked to Hungary as the "last bastion of the fight against the counterrevolution"? For Obermann they are the "democrats and workers" of Germany, "who felt strong solidarity with all the people fighting for their freedom and independence" (p. 11). (He repeats this phrase often enough!) Are freedom and independence really synonymous? Did the people know, or did they think they knew, what freedom was? What form of independence did the democrats and workers want? Obermann does not answer these and many other questions. Furthermore, those segments of society who are excluded by Obermann from being designated as part of the people are labeled counterrevolutionary. Yet there were great numbers of German-speaking men and women who did not feel as passionately about Hungary as Obermann's democrats and workers, but who did not belong to the counterrevolution in any sense. It was these apathetical multitudes who constituted, and usually constitute,

the majority. It would take a lot more evidence than Obermann offers to prove the contrary.

The third difficulty with Obermann's handling of his evidence is that there is a great deal of confusion between the Germans living in Germany and Austria and those living in Hungary. One does not know, for instance, what proportion of the minute German legion which fought in Transylvania came from outside the Habsburg Monarchy, in spite of Obermann's cover statement (p. 37) that the legionaries came from all lands of Germany. Moreover, and this is probably the greatest fault of the book, the sympathies of the Germans, Austrians, and the Magyars for each other are intermixed to the extent that Obermann must have thought them to be equivalent. Yet it is surely obvious that the Germans had more reason to be interested in the events in Vienna than in Buda, and that the Austrians had more of a vested interest in the outcome of the war in Hungary than the Germans did. In spite of the sympathies manifested and however widespread they might have been (and this Obermann cannot bring himself to admit), the Germans of Germany did little, if anything, for Hungarian independence.

It is one thing to write inspiring pamphlets about the brotherhood of peoples and another to take up arms in support of that principle. In brief, the book is too idealized and loosely argued, hence not recommended to the academic reader.

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AZ ÚTON VÉGIG KELL MENNI. By *György Marosán*. Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1972. 475 pp. 31 Ft.

This book is the second volume of an intended three-volume memoir by Marosán, and it has caused a mild sensation among Budapest intellectuals. The fascinating, now already obviously Soviet-staged and Communist-featured parliamentary struggle in post-World War II Hungary is shown through the eyes of the author and involves mostly the Social Democratic Party's leaders and their relations with the Communists. The theme of the book is the merging of the two Hungarian Marxist labor parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, into one cohesive unit.

Marosán rose from the ranks of bakery workers to the highest echelon of the Social Democratic Party. After his party's fusion with the Hungarian Communist Party in 1948, he continued organizational activities in the Hungarian Workers' Party and was appointed minister of light industry in the Rákosi regime. He also served in the Kádár government as a state minister without portfolio from November 4, 1956, to January 16, 1960, and as one of the three vice presidents of the Hungarian Presidential Council (Elnöki Tanács) from October 7, 1961, to March 3, 1963. Because of his pro-Communist and pro-Soviet stance throughout his career, Marosán was often labeled a "crypto-Communist" and a "Communist agent" among the Social Democrats. As a top party secretary he assumed the responsibility for campaigning in the provinces, where organized labor was the weakest and the "reactionary" clergy had the strongest influence. But whenever the question of dealing with the all-powerful Communists arose, Marosán was brought back to the capital—not so much because the Social Democrats had no other able representative but because the Communists always requested his presence, for they had complete faith in him.