

denounces Ivan Dziuba, the nonperson of nationality dissent in the Ukraine, but suggests that the late Mykola Skrypnyk had some "interesting thoughts" to offer (p. 519). The very mention of these names shows an improved climate of inquiry. In short, Kulichenko reveals certain stirrings in the nationality section of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism which this reviewer prefers to take as a sign of active and concerned intellectual communication.

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VAD HÄNDER I BALTIKUM? By *Andres Küng*. Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1973. 274 pp.

In spite of the recent growth of scholarly interest in Soviet nationality questions, many of the non-Russian areas of the USSR remain understudied. The Baltic republics fall into this category. The uneven collection of articles by Vardys, *Lithuania Under the Soviets*, focuses on only one of the Baltic republics and is by now nearly a decade old. There is nothing which could serve as a continuation of the 1938 (reprinted in 1970) survey of the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs on the Baltic states in general. In such a situation Andres Küng's popular work acquires value for the scholar as well as for the general reader at whom it is aimed.

Küng succeeds in presenting in a very effective way a large body of diverse information about three different countries. The reader is introduced to the most Western, the most economically developed, and in some senses the most restless region of the USSR. This restlessness, the pervasive aura of instability, which seems to permeate the current Baltic scene, forms a leitmotif for the work. The question of nationalism which manifests itself in various subtle ways on an everyday basis, such as the frequently noted Estonian reluctance publicly to demonstrate any knowledge of Russian, and in occasional dramatic outbursts, such as the Kaunas riots in the summer of 1972, is pervasive. In addition, a picture is presented of the problems attending rapid economic growth and of the relations between local authorities and the central government in Moscow.

Implicitly the author seems to doubt any possibility of a gradual resolution of the current tensions within a Soviet framework. He makes few attempts to determine the eventual outcome of the current state of affairs. However, he does feel that their perceived cultural superiority vis-à-vis the dominant nationality in the USSR will ensure a successful resistance to Russification among the indigenous Balts (p. 189).

Occasional factual errors appear both in the presentation of the historical background and in the description of more recent events. For instance, the postwar Lithuanian guerrilla resistance is presented as having ended in 1953 (p. 55). This reviewer has seen a typewritten resistance prayerbook dated 1956 on display at the Vilnius Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism.

Analyses of official explanations could have strengthened the presentation. Although occasionally one or another Soviet explanation for a topic under consideration is presented, as in the discussion of the Letter of the Seventeen Latvian Communists, more often than not the Soviet view is ignored. The relative sparsity of documentation is another major flaw. Some incidents posited in demonstration of trends remain undocumented, giving the impression of a possibility of confusion of hearsay with fact. It would have been worthwhile to mention the source for news

of the spring 1972 First All-Union Hippie Congress in Vilnius (p. 61) or for the closing of the Riga Phosphate Plant in the late 1960s for environmental reasons (p. 108).

In spite of its shortcomings, the work is perhaps the best available introductory book for anyone interested in the contemporary Baltics. It should be hoped that a translation into a major Western language will be forthcoming.

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THE WAR HITLER WON: THE FALL OF POLAND, SEPTEMBER 1939.

By *Nicholas Bethell*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. viii, 472 pp. \$10.00.

CODEWORD BARBAROSSA. By *Barton Whaley*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973. xxviii, 376 pp. \$10.00.

The English historian and journalist Bethell has utilized the recently opened British archives together with a variety of published materials—including Polish ones—to prepare an account of the first portion of World War II. The author combines a considerable use of quotations with the passing out of evaluations; the main actors, like pupils in school, are awarded grades for most performances and utterances. Even when the reader agrees with the grade, there is something grating about the procedure.

As an account of last-minute diplomacy, the book is not up to the standard of Walther Hofer's book on the same subject. The picture of Polish planning and actions is, on the whole, convincing, while that of the German military plans and operations is curiously thin for a book with the title of this one. The beginnings of the German occupation, however, are described carefully, as is the Polish reaction to it. The most valuable portions of the book deal with the internal developments in Britain's government and society. Bethell demonstrates Neville Chamberlain's complete unsuitability as a war leader, illuminates the oft-forgotten opposition to the war in circles on the British right and left, and has some very useful points to make on the relation between the war and Britain's imperial ties. His presentation of British military leaders, especially General Ironside, is devastating. Gamelin comes off no better, but there is much less on France than on England. The author has little understanding of American politics and developments, and his chapter on the United States is even worse than his rather superficial treatment of Soviet policy.

Churchill is Bethell's hero. How the author came to think of the man who once went to Belfast to speak for Home Rule, and who as chancellor of the exchequer made permanent the ten-year-rule which crippled British rearmament, as always a hardliner on Ireland and always in favor of rearmament is difficult to understand. Presumably written for a wider audience, this book will be helpful to scholars primarily for its picture of an England moving slowly and reluctantly into war—though it should be remembered that, apart from Daladier, Chamberlain was the only leader who took his country into a war with Hitler *before* the latter had attacked it.

Whaley's book on Barbarossa—the German plan to attack Russia—takes up the interesting question of what intelligence was actually received by the Soviet Union about these German intentions, when such information was transmitted, and how it