

classifying the views Marx expressed there as “essentially Hegelian and Feuerbachian” (as well as “metaphysical tripe”). I would be the last to deny that the Hegelian and Feuerbachian influences are powerful and pervasive. But that this is Marxism in its original philosophical form of expression is, I believe, shown conclusively by a mass of evidence adduced in my book. For example, the 1844 manuscripts are characteristically Marxian in that Marx, quite unlike Hegel or Feuerbach, here defines alienation as an economic phenomenon primarily, and views economic activity as the basis of all history. The latter proposition is of course a first premise of historical materialism.

As for the point that Marx never published the manuscripts, this is no serious argument against attaching large importance to them in an interpretation of Marx’s thought. I have dealt briefly in the book with the question of why Marx did not publish them, but would now like to add the following. It is common experience for a creative thinker to write his book to himself in voluminous notes before he writes it for publication. One who has done this does not ordinarily publish the raw notes, yet likes to keep them for future reference because they record his thought process at a decisive stage. So it was with Marx. The 1844 manuscripts are, as it were, the notes in which he first wrote down Marxism to himself in the idiom of German philosophy before publishing it to the world. Why should we not, then, expect to find in them an invaluable source of insight into the creative mental process by which Marxism was born, and so of deeper understanding of its meaning?

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PROFESSOR HOOK REPLIES:

I took no exception to Professor Tucker’s attempt to analyze Marxism in religious terms. This is a familiar enough approach and if we disregard the traditional connotations of the word “religion,” may even be useful for some purposes. I did and do take exception to Professor Tucker’s view that Marx’s mature thought can be truly characterized as a restatement of his early Hegelian notions, and that according to Marx, history is a process through which man overcomes his “self-alienation” on the road to a classless society.

The whole notion of “self-alienation” is derived from religious assumptions and presupposes the existence of a self or soul in union with the One or God from which alienation takes place. I pointed out (the argument is developed in the new introduction to the paperback reprint of my *From Hegel to Marx*, University of Michigan Press, 1961), that it is completely incompatible with the Marxian view that man’s nature develops in history, and that he has no original or true self or nature from which he is alienated. To my question: “What is the self alienated from?” Professor Tucker replies that Marx views human nature as both an historical variable and a constant, and that his constant nature is to be “the producing animal, a being whose nature is to find self-fulfillment in freely performed productive activities of various kinds.”

This conception of human nature is both pre-Darwinian and pre-Marxist. When Professor Tucker says that it is implicit in Marx's later writings he means either that it is implied by a text or implied by some doctrine. If it is implied by a text, I shall be grateful for the reference. If it is implied by a doctrine, which one?

The view that human nature can be divided into a constant and a variable part is unintelligible on Marx's (and even Hegel's) view. For both, the allegedly constant and variable parts are in continuous interaction with each other. Marx stresses the historical transformations of human nature to a point where he even suggests that they will affect man's biological functioning, so that even the strict division between man's human *biological* nature and *social-historical* nature would be denied by him. Man's human biological nature is always culture bound. This view may be wrong and utopian but it is Marx's.

What Professor Tucker attributes to Marx as his view of the constant in human nature is mistaken on its very face, for, as the words used by Professor Tucker show, it is not a description but a *normative* goal to be achieved only in the classless society. Man found anywhere may be a producing, or better, a "tool-making" animal, but he is *not* "a being whose nature it is to find self-fulfillment in freely performed productive activities of various kinds." If he were, he would already be very close to "the true realm of freedom." But savage or primitive man is obviously very far away from "the realm of freedom," despite his allegedly "constant" nature. After all, even the very needs and wants of man change with his society according to Marx.

The following passage from *Capital* indicates that what Marx takes as a *goal* or *ideal* of the social development of man, Professor Tucker mistakenly makes part of the very definition of man.

Just as the savage must wrestle with nature, in order to satisfy his wants, in order to maintain his life and reproduce it, so civilized man has to do it, and he must do it in all forms of society and under all possible modes of production. With his development the realm of natural necessity expands, because his wants increase; but at the same time the forces of production increase, by which these wants are satisfied. The freedom in this field cannot consist of anything else but the fact that socialized man, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power, that they accomplish their task with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. But it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its base. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise (Vol. III, English translation by Untermann, Chicago, Charles Kerr, 1909, pp. 954-55).

This may be optimistic but it is not mystagogic. The reference to the shortening of the working day marks the distance Marx has traveled from the metaphysical extravagances about self-alienation to the sobrieties of empirical description.

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