

pendix. For example, chapter 6, "The Basic Convention," and chapter 10, "The Fishery Convention," are diplomatic documents and should not constitute independent chapters.

Despite some obvious weaknesses, this book offers a significant contribution to the diplomatic history of East Asia. It is to be hoped that it will stimulate scholarly interest in the subject both in Japan and the Soviet Union as well as in the West.

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RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA: AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA. By *Edward M. Bennett*. Waltham, Mass., Toronto, and London: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1970. vii, 232 pp. \$2.95, paper.

PROGRESSIVNYE SILY SShA V BOR'BE ZA PRIZNANIE SOVETSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA, 1917–1933. By *D. N. Stashevsky*. Akademiia nauk ukrainskoi SSR, Institut istorii. Kiev: Izdatel'stvo "Naukova dumka," 1969. 213 pp. 1.06 rubles.

Two more volumes have appeared on the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933. In view of subsequent dramatic events in our relations with Russia, the continued interest in this episode may seem at first glance surprising. Yet it was a "happening" that highlighted much of the past and future course of the Soviet-American ordeal.

Making excellent use of the important source materials that have now become available, Professor Bennett has retold the story with new insights, broad strokes of perceptive interpretation, and graceful prose. He begins with a review of the recognition policy of the United States before 1913, when Woodrow Wilson added the test of constitutionality or legality in his consideration of the Huerta government in Mexico. In 1917 the president applied the same standard to the Soviet regime. But unlike the relatively brief Mexican embroilment, the Bolshevik experiment persisted. During the twenties Washington was faced with the fact of a viable Soviet state, playing an increasingly important role in international economic and political affairs, with which it had no official relations. The diplomatic problems involved in a reversal of this unrealistic position were complicated by emotional public attitudes on the issue, in part generated by the government itself. In the early thirties Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, influenced by ominous events in the Far East, reconsidered the nonrecognition policy, but any contemplated change was vetoed by President Hoover, who remained to the end of his life an opponent of diplomatic relations with Communist Russia. Stimson did, however, manage to lay some of the groundwork for Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision in 1933.

Today it seems inconceivable that Roosevelt could have acted otherwise. Recognition was necessary and beneficial. Its tragedy lay in the unfounded optimism that motivated many of the American negotiators, compounded by an apparent inability to profit in the decade following from the lesson of 1933–36—the folly of utopian hopes in dealing with the USSR. In his summation the author stresses these and other conclusions in the same engaging style that marks the rest of his narrative. Unfortunately the volume is marred by the absence from the bibliography of a number of authors who have made major contributions to the subject, such as Foster Rhea Dulles, Meno Lovenstein, T. A. Bailey, Louis Fischer, Christopher

Lasch, and Pauline Tompkins. These omissions cannot really be excused by the justification in the acknowledgments. Otherwise the work sets a high standard for subsequent volumes in the new series, *Topics in United States Diplomatic History*, under the general editorship of Norman A. Graebner.

D. N. Stashevsky's book is primarily an analysis of political, social, and economic forces, especially the "progressive" elements in the United States, which worked for or against or were indifferent to recognition of the Soviet Union. It contains no new material of significance and its arguments and conclusions are predictable. In the course of his research the author did, however, consult most of the important and several obscure American works on the subject, as well as a good deal of the periodical literature, particularly from the left-wing and labor press. His explanation for the opposition and in some cases apathy of much of the working class in the recognition debate is that it was "stupefied by anti-Soviet propaganda, terrified by government repression, and preoccupied with its own personal 'prosperity,' although sympathetic at heart with the Russian workers and peasants."

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THE OTHER SIDE OF COEXISTENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY. By *Albert L. Weeks*. New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1970. v, 304 pp. \$7.50.

The focus of the book is the other (i.e., Soviet) side of coexistence. On the basis of the interrelationship between four modes, national security, ideology, leadership, and economics, Professor Weeks hopes to arrive at a useful analysis of Soviet foreign policy. However, Weeks's understanding of these categories will leave many readers dissatisfied. For example, he explains Soviet motivation in concluding the Nazi-Soviet pact as, first, national security and, second, "traditional Russian expansion, a characteristic form of service to the national interest" (p. 50). When Weeks chides a recent Soviet writer for failing to mention Soviet national interest as a motivation for the Soviet invasion of Poland and he quotes *Kommunist* as saying "it was crucial for the U.S.S.R. to undertake whatever measures necessary to postpone the danger of an immediate military conflict," one wonders what Weeks understands by "national security" or "interest." Most definitions of the terms would encompass measures to delay a war with a stronger power and precipitate a conflict among several powers all viewed as potential if not actual enemies of the Soviet Union.

Ideology is interpreted rather narrowly as a set of beliefs which impel Soviet leaders to support revolutions where they do not conflict with Soviet national interests. No consideration is given to the legitimizing function of ideology within the Soviet Union. Thus Weeks can speculate (pp. 256-57) that a major motivation in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was "girding up NATO" because of the potential danger from China. The consequences for Soviet internal affairs of Czechoslovak heresy or defection do not enter into the analysis.

Professor Weeks is well informed and his speculations are often original and imaginative, but the lack of rigor in his conceptual framework, illustrated above, renders the book unsatisfactory.

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