

As a popularization this work is both slick and effective. The high point of the text is the depiction of the October Revolution, the drama and complexity of which is masterfully conveyed. The feature distinguishing this popularization from others and providing it with a potentially large market is the abundant amount of information about Russian art and artists. The work furnishes a historical background for an increasingly large public willing to buy books about Constructivist art.

The visual portion of the book is superb. The designer, Jean-Claude Soares, deserves congratulations for bringing to bear the full resources of modern publishing. He includes familiar and unfamiliar black-and-white prints, in which luminous blacks and sumptuous grays have been rendered from negatives that usually produce only muddy tones. Not only are the reproductions of paintings and posters well selected, but the colors are excellent as well.

Of what use is *Russia in Revolution* to the specialist in Soviet affairs? It will make an ideal gift for in-laws who insist they have no understanding of his work.

GEORGE M. ENTEEN
Pennsylvania State University

SAILORS IN REVOLT: THE RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET IN 1917. By *Norman E. Saul*. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978. xiv, 312 pp. + 8 pp. plates.

MORIAKI V BOR'BE ZA SOVETSKUIU VLAST'. By *Samuil Semenovich Khesin*. Moscow: "Nauka," 1977. 174 pp. Illus. 65 kopecks.

Soviet and Western historians agree that, to a considerable extent, the Soviet government maintained control immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power through the support of revolutionary-minded sailors from the Baltic Fleet. The process by which such sailors developed into advocates of Soviet power is the theme common to Saul's and Khesin's works, though the manner and depth of its treatment differ markedly.

In attempting to determine why the sailors of the Baltic Fleet constituted one of the most radical segments of the Russian population in 1917, Saul explores the relationship between the war and the Revolution, the nature of organizations and leadership at various levels within the fleet, and the influence of party programs on rank-and-file sailors, while noting the importance of factors peculiar to the fleet. One of Saul's major premises is that the Revolution was neither as spontaneous nor as inevitable as the extreme examples of previous treatments have asserted. Saul was unable to obtain access to the relevant Soviet archives, most notably TsGAVMF, which remains closed to Western scholars. However, he has used Finnish archives containing many original naval documents of the period and has carefully employed Soviet documentary collections, monographs, and articles, as well as Soviet and émigré memoirs. Regrettably, there exist few memoirs by anarchists, Left S.R.'s, and officers who stayed on to serve in the Red Navy from which the roles of these groups in 1917 can be determined.

Saul's exposition of the major events within the Baltic Fleet in 1917 is the best Western account yet to appear, but it suffers from two weaknesses. First, by providing too much coverage of events in Helsingfors (for which he could draw upon archival sources) and too little of local affairs in Kronstadt and Revel (for which he could not), Saul fails to follow through on his initial, correct assertion that the Revolution showed different characteristics at each of the major Baltic Fleet bases. The reader is told a great deal about what happened in Helsingfors, a day's journey from Petrograd, but little about what motivated the actions of the Kronstadters, who were based only twenty-five miles from the capital. The result is a distortion in perspective. Second,

Saul fails to distinguish between the cadres and the sympathizers of the various Revolutionary parties at many points, lumping both together as "Bolsheviks" or "S.R.'s" when the reality was considerably more complex. This practice is particularly unfortunate in regard to the pre-1917 period, when the very existence of a Revolutionary movement in the Baltic Fleet is questionable, and the presence in the fleet of "Bolshevik" sailors adhering to a recognizably Bolshevik party line is at best doubtful. Saul's book also contains a number of minor factual errors, none of them crucial, such as assertions that Trotsky, Lunacharskii, and Chudnovskii were Bolsheviks in May 1917, and that certain coastal defenses on the mainland were located on the same island as Kronstadt.

Khesin's work can best be measured against his own *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i flot* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), which is certainly the best Soviet treatment of the subject in recent years. Whereas the earlier work was a scholarly monograph, this one is a popular history, with annotation kept to a minimum and confined largely to published sources. The central theme in both works is the bolshevization of Russia's naval forces in 1917. Parts of *Moriaki* are obviously condensed from *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia*, but with less factual reporting and more quotations from Lenin (and Brezhnev). *Moriaki* also differs from *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia* in that it goes beyond the Bolshevik seizure of power to cover the first months of Soviet rule, and it is here that it makes a contribution to the literature on the subject. More than half of the book is devoted to the establishment of Soviet control over the various fleets, the sailors' role in safeguarding the new regime from counterrevolution, and the employment of men from the fleets to implement the first of the new government's decisions. Although the story is told in far too general terms to satisfy the serious scholar and with an eye to illustrating the sailors' devotion to the Bolshevik regime, it does offer some useful information on an important period in Soviet history. On balance, however, this Soviet popular history compares rather unfavorably with its scholarly predecessor.

J. DANE HARTGROVE
Washington, D.C.

PHILIP MIRONOV AND THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR. By *Sergei Starikov* and *Roy Medvedev*. Translated by *Guy Daniels*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. xvi, 267 pp. \$15.00.

Starikov and Medvedev set out to rehabilitate one of the genuine military heroes of the Revolution and civil war—the Don Cossack general, Philip Mironov. Through impressive research in Soviet archives, the authors have re-created the career of Mironov, and in doing so, they have provided a vivid picture of the chaos and violence which ravaged the Cossack lands in the post-Revolutionary period. Mironov emerges as a brilliant tactician who earns the loyalty and admiration of his troops, and also the envy and fear of both the White and Red political leadership in the Don. Although devoted to the Revolution, Mironov appears to have been more concerned about the fate of the Don Cossacks. He was not hesitant to speak his mind, particularly when he believed that local political officials were not acting in the interests of the Cossack population.

Mironov was a decisive and active military man, often irked by what he perceived as inaction or delay. His own drive to act often caused him to run afoul of his superiors and, in one episode, led to charges of treason and the suspicion that he was about to take his troops over to the side of the Whites. Nonetheless, he was released, and in an era of desperate need his outstanding talents came to the attention of Soviet leaders. Yet they temporized in utilizing Mironov in large part because of his reputation for independent action.