EXIT OVER VOICE IN DOMINICAN ETHNORACIAL POLITICS

Danilo Antonio Contreras
College of the Holy Cross

Abstract: This article examines the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on electoral politics in the Dominican Republic and provides an explanation for the low salience of race and ethnicity in political behavior in Latin America. I argue that, under certain conditions, individuals will deal with ethnoracial discrimination and stratification through exit rather than voice—that is, they will reclassify their way out of marginalized ethnoracial categories instead of voting for candidates or parties that share their ethnoracial identities. This tends to be the case where ethnoracial group identity is inchoate and group boundaries are permeable. I also argue that where ethnoracial group loyalties are weak and immigration is widespread, citizens may emphasize national origin over race or ethnicity. Findings from an original field experiment and survey in Santo Domingo show that candidates did not consistently support candidates that shared their ethnoracial attributes, but they did slightly favor candidates perceived as white. Respondents strongly discriminated against candidates of Haitian origin.

The absence of ethnoracial electoral politics in Latin America poses an interesting puzzle. Much of the literature on race and ethnicity from outside of Latin America would expect ethnoracial diversity in the region to generate electoral behavior based on ethnoracial identity, especially given high levels of stratification in the region. Ethnoracial cleavages in much of the world tend to lead to distinct and competing collective interests. These interests in turn generate demands for ethnoracial candidates and parties and produce a supply of ethnoracial voters and entrepreneurs.

Although ethnoracial identity has recently played an important role in elections in a few countries in Latin America with large indigenous populations, such as Bolivia, it has been historically of low salience in elections. This has been especially the case in Afro-Latin America. Afro-descendants have not typically affirmed a distinct group identity or expressed unified electoral interests. Moreover, candidates rarely have made ethnoracial appeals. The few contemporary Afro-descendant-based political parties that have emerged have had little success in mobilizing and competing in elections outside of the regional level. Afro-Latinos in rural and regionally isolated communities in Central and South America have been more likely to achieve group consciousness, secure land and cultural rights,

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and engage in ethnoracial political behavior (Hooker 2005, 295–296). But they represent a small percentage of Afro-Latin America.[1]

What explains the absence of ethnoracial political behavior in Latin America, especially in predominantly Afro-descendant countries? And what role, if any, does ethnoracial identity play in electoral behavior? Are voters likely to favor candidates who share their ethnoracial identity? Or are they more likely to prefer candidates perceived as white to candidates perceived as black?

In this article, I examine the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation in the Dominican Republic (DR) and provide an explanation for the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. I argue that ethnoracial cleavages are not automatically salient in elections in ethnoracially diverse societies, even where there are high levels of stratification. Stratification may actually impede the activation of ethnoracial cleavages. I define ethnoracial stratification as the uneven access to resources and institutions among members of different ethnoracial groups.

Where ethnoracial group identities are inchoate and ethnoracial boundaries are porous, individuals may identify with more privileged categories rather than with marginalized ethnoracial categories. In Albert O. Hirschman's (1970) terms, incentives to "exit" reduce the possibility that individuals will "voice" ethnoracial grievances and decrease the likelihood that entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial cleavages in elections. In addition, I contend that nation-building efforts may obstruct the formation of strong ethnoracial identities and suppress ethnoracial political behavior. Nation building is understood here as inclusive and exclusionary policies that state actors enact to reimagine ethnoracial and national boundaries. Ultimately, I suggest that the confluence of nation building, ethnoracial stratification, and inchoate ethnoracial group identification has reduced the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in the DR.

The DR is an appropriate case in which to examine the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on electoral preferences. Ethnoracial group identity is largely unconsolidated, and socioeconomic inequalities tend to fall along ethnoracial lines. Moreover, enduring anti-Haitianism in the country provides an opportunity to assess the effect of nationalism and nation-building efforts on ethnoracial politics.

To test my arguments, I conducted an original survey experiment in 2011 in the province of Santo Domingo based on a stratified random sample of 694 adult citizens.[2] Results from the survey lend support to my primary hypotheses. I find that despite significant ethnoracial cleavages, respondents did not consistently support candidates based on ethnoracial attributes, though they slightly favored white candidates. Respondents more strongly discriminated against candidates of Haitian origin, however. I suggest this is the direct result of nation-building efforts in the DR.

Throughout the article, I employ the terms "ethnoracial" or "ethnosomatic"

1. These Afro-Latinos communities, as Hooker states, "have been able to cast themselves as 'autochthonous' groups having an indigenous-like status and distinct cultural identity" (293).

2. Funding limitations prevented me from collecting data in the borderlands contiguous to Haiti and in other regions of the country.

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rather than "race" or "ethnicity," except when referring to those literatures specifically. Typically, race has been understood in the literature based on biological characteristics or somatic features, and ethnicity has been associated with cultural characteristics, including language, history, ancestry, and territory (Chandra 2006). Although scholars remain divided over whether it is useful to retain a distinction between race and ethnicity as categories of analysis, some acknowledge that there are overlaps between the two as categories of practice (Paschel 2013).[3]

In the DR, retaining a strict distinction between race and ethnicity as categories of analysis is inconsequential. Roth (2012, 26) correctly notes that race in the DR is understood as closer to what the literature has conceived as ethnicity, and it is often evoked synonymously with ethnicity and nationality. As in much of Latin America, ethnoracial classification in the DR is not necessarily determined by cultural characteristics or by visible or ethnoracial attributes (Flores and Telles 2012). Social class, nationality, age, education, popular culture, social movements, and occupation may also shape ethnoracial classification (see Bonilla-Silva 2006; Schwartzman 2007; Bailey 2009).

In addition, I define national origin as the perceived homeland of an individual—that is, the country that an individual and his or her recent ancestors feel most affinity with. National origin has more rigid criteria and transmission of membership than race, ethnicity, and even nationality (which can be acquired and relinquished in most cases, though it may be difficult to do so). National origin may also be stickier and more sociopolitically consequential than ancestry (which may be unknown even to individuals themselves) because it is more temporally proximate and retains a greater degree of "unassimilatedness."

EXISTING APPROACHES TO ETHNORACIAL IDENTITY AND CANDIDATE EVALUATION

Most studies of ethnoracial identity in Latin America have not directly addressed the extent to which perceived ethnoracial identity might affect elections. The few studies that have done so have focused mostly on indigenous electoral mobilization and party politics in the Andes (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005; Madrid 2012). It is unclear, however, whether findings based on indigenous politics can speak to Afro-Latin America. A few studies of ethnoracial identity and elections have been conducted in Brazil (Mitchell 2009; Dunning 2010; Aguilar-Pariente et al. 2015), but their findings are contradictory.[4]

Studies of the DR, meanwhile, seldom engage the intersection between ethnoracial identity and electoral behavior. The literature on elections, institutions, and state formation in the DR has paid greater attention to social class than race (see Betances 1995; Hartlyn 1998; Espinal, Hartlyn, and Morgan 2006). And the vast literature on race in the DR has not primarily focused on electoral behavior (see Franco 1969; Tolentino Dipp 1974; Torres-Saillant 1998; Sagás 2000 Howard 2001; Candelario 2007; Simmons 2009; Mayes 2014).

Despite the paucity of studies on the effect of ethnoracial identity on electoral

3. See Brubaker (2004) for a distinction between categories of analysis and categories of practice.
4. Aguilar-Pariente (2011) has also carried out experimental research in Mexico on this subject.

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behavior in Latin America and the DR, we can employ broader approaches to generate predictions about how perceived ethnoracial identity might affect candidate evaluation in the DR. Although these approaches shed light on important questions, they cannot fully explain why ethnoracial identification is of low salience at the ballot box in countries such as the DR.

Group-Specific Approaches

Group-specific approaches from the literature on comparative ethnic politics and American politics typically emphasize the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. They presuppose that individuals who share ethnoracial categories also hold consolidated group identities and collective preferences, a premise that Jenkins (1994) and others have challenged. They also assume that individuals express collective preferences at the ballot box. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985) argued that voters would engage in ethnic voting. Indeed, the ethnic outbidding thesis not only assumed that ethnic voters would support candidates that share their ethnic category but also that they would respond to strong ethnic appeals. Such response to ethnic appeals, in fact, would lead ethnic entrepreneurs to make ever more extreme ethnic appeals in order to outbid their competition.

The American politics literature on race similarly assumes that members of the same racial category tend to favor each other, share a common sense of fate, and give primacy to collective benefits (Tajfel 1981; Dawson 1994). Survey- and experiment-based studies of racial voting in the United States have found considerable evidence of racial matching among black and white US voters (see Terkildsen 1993; Sigelman et al. 1995; Reeves 1997; Tate 2003; Gay 2004; Philpot and Walton Jr. 2007). Black politicians especially appear as "reliably more likely to advance the interests of those who share their personal characteristics" (Broockman 2013, 1).[5] Thus, a group-specific approach might expect the following hypothesis to hold:

H_1: Voters will favor candidates who share their ethnoracial identity.

The assumptions undergirding group-specific approaches do not entirely hold sway in the DR. The DR, and much of the region, has had a racialization process more closely tied to nation building (Loveman 2014). Although ethnoracial categories are socially and economically consequential in the DR (as I will show), they were not legally institutionalized. Nor did nation building help to congeal ethnoracial group identity as it did in the United States and South Africa (Marx 1998). Most Dominicans are of mixed descent and identify situationally with ambiguous and porous ethnosomatic categories. They also tend to engage in hyperdescent to manage elites' historical ethnoracial prejudice (Torres-Saillant 1998). Extensive intermixing has helped to attenuate both the degree of solidarity among in-category members and the degree of conflict with out-category members—two tenets of group-specific approaches.

5. It should be noted that voters do not necessarily support candidates of their own race because of racial considerations (Howell and Perry 2004).

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Racial Democracy Thesis

The racial democracy thesis and the pigmentocracy literature can also help generate predictions about the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on elections in the DR. Neither of these approaches, however, was developed to explain voting behavior.

Based on the region's patterns of intermixing and porous ethnoracial categories, scholars writing in the mid-twentieth century often portrayed Latin America as a racial democracy that stood in contrast to the institutionalized racial domination in the United States (see Pierson 1942; Tannenbaum 1947; Freyre 1946; Harris 1964; Degler 1971). Latin American states, too, touted their mixed societies and purported racial egalitarianism. This allowed states to project progress and rebut race science's gloomy predictions about intermixing (Helg 1990; De la Fuente 1999; Andrews 2004; Loveman 2014).

Most evidence-based scholars in the region have abandoned claims that Latin America is a racial democracy due to evidence of widespread racial marginalization and inequality. Hernández (2013), for instance, demonstrates that Latin American states historically enforced unwritten, customary laws to structure race relations and subordinate Afro-descendants. Telles and Bailey (2013) show that most Latin Americans acknowledge discrimination and attribute stratification to structural rather than to individual explanations. This is true whether they self-identify with dominant or subordinate ethnoracial groups. Nevertheless, a strand of the literature on race in the DR by Núñez (1990) and Henríquez-Gratereaux (1994), among others, makes claims that overlap with the racial democracy thesis. These scholars attribute the absence of social organization and conflict around race to racial mixing patterns.

The racial democracy thesis assumes that *mestizaje* has largely eliminated racial discrimination and that race is relatively inconsequential in the region. Its proponents would presumably expect that race would play little to no role at the ballot box, as expressed in this hypothesis:

H_2: Neither the ethnoracial identity of the candidate nor the ethnoracial identity of voters will have much bearing on voters' evaluation of candidates.

The Colorism Thesis

Contrary to the claims of the racial democracy thesis, the literature on pigmentocracy has suggested not only that there is social inequality in Latin America but also that inequality is stratified along ethnoracial categories and skin color gradations (Telles 2014, 4). Recent survey-based and experimental studies have found evidence of pigmentocracy. Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer (2001), for instance, find clear patterns of group-based hierarchy on the basis of phenotypes in the DR. They conclude that there is a "clear and consensually structured racial hierarchy" (845) in which Dominicans with European phenotypes enjoy greater status and power than Dominicans with African phenotypes. Sawyer (2006) finds evidence of a similar skin color hierarchy in Cuba. Recently, Telles and his colleagues (2014)

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found that skin color closely predicts socioeconomic status in Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia.

The pigmentocracy literature has not made specific claims about the weight that individuals might place on skin color in elections. It seems reasonable, however, that individuals in pigmentocracies might use the same color-based hierarchy that privileges whiteness to evaluate candidates. Various studies have shown that individuals in Latin America attach value to whiteness and tend to associate positive attributes with whiteness (Sheriff 2001; Telles and Flores 2013). It is also evident that dark-skinned individuals in the region frequently self-identify with superordinate categories, such as white, rather than with subordinate categories, such as black. The colorism thesis would therefore predict the following hypothesis:

H_3: Voters will favor white candidates over black and mixed candidates.

There is reason to question predictions from the racial democracy and colorism theses, however. Although Latin American societies may be pigmentocracies, the masses may reject the pigmentocratic ordering of a society and may not privilege European phenotypes at the ballot box. Moreover, while Dominicans impute higher social status and power to lighter racial phenotypes, they may not find these qualities as desirable in a political candidate.

WHY ETHNORACIAL STRATIFICATION MAY UNDERMINE ELECTORAL PREFERENCES

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that ethnoracial cleavages are not necessarily salient at the ballot box in societies that are ethnoracially diverse, even those that are stratified. Ethnoracial stratification may actually deactivate ethnoracial identity in elections. Stratification often generates ethnoracial prejudice and unequal resource distribution. Prejudice and inequality lead individuals to avoid identifying with subordinate ethnoracial categories rather than to protest their marginalization by voting for ethnoracial parties or candidates.

While ethnoracial stratification can discourage individuals from identifying with marginalized ethnoracial categories, it does not alone explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. Ethnoracial stratification is more likely to undermine ethnoracially based political behavior where ethnoracial group identity is unconsolidated and individuals are not loyal to any single ethnoracial category. Inchoate group identity obstructs group consciousness and collective action based on ethnoracial grievances. By contrast, individuals are more likely to engage in ethnoracial political behavior when they feel loyalty toward their ethnoracial group. I employ McClain and colleagues' (2009, 474) definition of group identity as an attachment to a group "based on a perception of shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other group members."

My argument draws on Hirschman's (1970) insights about how consumers respond to poor performance and quality in organizations. Hirschman suggests that customers are unlikely to voice their dissatisfaction with an organization when they have exit options and are disloyal. Specifically, he suggests that prom-

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ising consumers and those who are most likely to rise to leadership are most likely to exit. Although Hirschman's model deals with transactional relationships within organizational frameworks (i.e., client-patron, workers-employers, state-citizens, etc.), it may also apply to the relationship between ethnoracial identity and political behavior.

In Latin America, acute prejudice and disparities in collective rights, access to social services, and economic resources (Hooker 2005) have largely undermined Afro-descendants' sense of loyalty to ethnoracial categories. Most Afro-descendants have not identified as such to avoid further marginalization. Weak feelings of loyalty have made "exiting" from marginalized ethnosomatic categories less costly and more appealing than "voicing" ethnoracial grievances.

Granted, ethnoracial classification in Latin America is not entirely fluid. State institutions, sociodemographic characteristics, and visible attributes can limit individuals' exit options. Telles and Paschel (2014) point out that classification varies from lacking correspondence between external categorization and self-identification to being determined by skin color. Despite this variation, however, intermixing has provided exit options to many Latin Americans who identify with multiple and overlapping ethnosomatic categories.

As figure 1 illustrates, the confluence of inchoate group identity and high ethnoracial stratification explains why there is a limited supply of ethnoracial voters and entrepreneurs in Latin America. It also explains why ethnoracial boundaries have been of low electoral salience, especially in predominantly Afro-descendant countries. Whereas ethnoracial stratification incentivizes individuals to avoid identifying with subordinate ethnosomatic categories, inchoate group identity affords individuals viable exit options that lower transaction costs.



Figure 1 Causes of the low electoral salience of ethnoracial cleavages in Latin America

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Extensive intermixing and nation-building processes beginning in the nineteenth century in Latin America helped to discourage identification with a primary ethnoracial group identity (Bailey 2009). Intermixing allowed individuals to identify situationally with ethnosomatic categories. Hybrid and situational identification generated ethnoracial boundaries with low degrees of boundedness or social closure, as Weber put it (Loveman 1999, 896–897). Ethnoracial boundaries have not strictly delineated ethnoracial distinctions, nor have they enforced the type of in-group/out-group juxtaposition that Barth (1969) initially theorized.

Nation-building processes in the postindependence period in Latin America also did much to undermine ethnoracial group identities and repress race-based political mobilization. Political elites across the region recruited white immigrants to modernize the state and redefine national identities. Where they could not recruit white immigrants to displace black laborers or assimilate (or exterminate) native populations, they resorted to lionizing mestizaje. Elites also obfuscated ethnoracial representation. In Brazil, they intermittently excluded a racial identification question from the census until 1980. And elites in Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela omitted the racial identification question from the second half of the nineteenth century until the 1990s or 2000s (Hernández 2013; Loveman 2014). In the DR, we shall see, the ruling class excluded Afro-descendants in varied ways while also strategically enacting some policies of social integration (Martínez-Vergne 2005). This mix of policies helped to disarticulate ethnoracial demands and advance elites' political and economic interests.

INCHOATE GROUP IDENTITY AND ETHNORACIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Together, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and ethnoracial stratification help to explain why ethnoracial cleavages are of low salience in elections in the DR. Historically, Dominicans have had little reason to affirm ethnoracial group identity (Torres-Saillant 1999). Early and rapid black-white admixing (*mulatez*) beginning at the apogee of the sugar trade in the 1520s, discouraged strong ethnoracial affinities. The mixed population constituted over three-quarters of the newly formed republic at independence in 1844 (Moya Pons 1992).

Less rigid labor and class structures during the colonial period also stunted Dominicans' allegiance to a primary group identity. By the end of the sixteenth century, cattle ranching had replaced sugar production, and the exodus of colonialists led to sweeping poverty and depopulation on the island. As a result, freed blacks and mulattos vastly outnumbered slaves and whites over the next two centuries and ascended to positions of power (Larrazábal 1975; Derby 2003). It is noteworthy that freed blacks and mulattos appointed to the bureaucracy commonly self-identified as *blancos de la tierra*, or "whites of the land" (Fennema and Lowenthal 1987).

A mix of nation-building policies similarly stifled the formulation of an Afro-descendant group identity. Inclusive policies, such as the immediate abolition of slavery and the gradual inclusion of black migrants from the British West Indies, were especially detrimental. The abolition of slavery within days after indepen-

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dence from Haiti impeded solidarity around distinct cultural symbols. It also prevented Afro-descendants from undertaking collective action to achieve group-based rights. Likewise, the inclusion of British West Indian laborers, who were initially spurned when they migrated to staff modern sugar mills between the 1880s and 1920s, contributed to Afro-descendants' inchoate group identity and weak sense of linked fate. Their inclusion also diluted ethnoracial differences among nonwhite immigrant groups and hindered organization along those lines.

Exclusionary policies such as *indigenismo* (nativism) and racialized anti-Haitianism, meanwhile, aimed to dissociate blackness from the national identity and differentiate the DR from Haiti, which became the first black independent republic in 1804. In lockstep with political elites across the region, the Rafael Trujillo regime institutionalized nativism and mestizaje in the 1930s to bind the nation and consolidate the state. It designated *indio* (indigenous) and *mestizo* (mixture of indigenous and white) as official census categories in 1935 and 1950, and it reclassified many blacks as mestizos in the 1950 and 1960 censuses (Simmons 2009).

But unlike nations in the region with large indigenous populations, the DR was overwhelmingly mulatto, not mestizo. It had been largely devoid of indigenous peoples since the 1520s. From an estimated peak of three hundred thousand, approximately three thousand remained in 1519 (Moya Pons 1992). Institutionalized indigenismo codified ethnoracial ambiguity and disrupted the development of ethnoracial group identity by offering Afro-descendants a type of "mulatto escape hatch" (Degler 1971).

High levels of indio self-identification and classification underscore ethnoracial ambiguity in the DR. In my 2011 survey of Santo Domingo, 47 percent of respondents self-identified as indio (of which 90 percent also identified with the three lowest income categories), and nearly 70 percent of the sample was classified as indio on their national identification cards. Furthermore, over 45 percent of respondents to a closed-ended question stated that Dominicans were primarily of indigenous ancestry, relative to 25 percent and 29 percent of respondents who stated that Dominicans were primarily of European or African ancestry, respectively. Other surveys have similar results. In the 2010 and 2012 AmericasBarometer (AB) surveys, the percentage of respondents who self-identified as indio exceeded 60 percent.

Attitudinal data on low levels of group solidarity and linked fate are consistent with weak ethnoracial group identity in the DR. In my survey, 42 percent of self-identified black respondents agreed when asked "whether they identified most with persons that share their same skin color." And only 29 percent of black respondents agreed with the notion that their individual success was linked to the success of persons that share their same race. Moreover, respondents in only half of the ethnoracial categories (self-identified whites, indios, and *morenos*, or dark-skinned individuals perceived to have slightly less negroid features than blacks) gave significantly higher evaluation marks to in-category members than to out-category members.

Results from questions about race-based solidarity and linked fate in the United States provide some perspective on the weakness of ethnic group identity in the DR, although they are not analytically comparable to results based on questions about skin color in the DR. The General Social Survey (1993–2004) found that

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78.9 percent of black respondents "felt close to other blacks" and an even larger proportion of blacks, 87.5 percent, expressed this sentiment in the National Black Politics Study (1993) (Hochschild and Weaver 2007, 656). Moreover, the 1993–1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality found that a little over 70 percent of black respondents agreed that their fate was linked to that of other blacks (Hochschild and Weaver 2007, 654).

Anti-Haitianism, too, has obstructed ethnoracial group identity formation in the DR. Although anti-Haitianism was articulated well before independence from Haiti in 1844, it was likely ethnoracialized at the popular level in the second decade of the twentieth century, when Haitian migrant laborers displaced British West Indians and became associated with low-wage cane cutting (Derby 2003). British West Indians avoided a similar ethnoracialization in large part because they protested working conditions through labor strikes and enjoyed the protection of the British Crown (Inoa 1999).

Dramatic episodes since the peak of Haitian migration in the 1910s have helped to institutionalize anti-Haitianism in the DR. In 1937, the Trujillo regime massacred thousands of Haitian and Dominico-Haitian laborers as part of a broader strategy to enforce ethnoracial and territorial boundaries with Haiti (Vega 1988). The 1990, 1994, and 1996 presidential campaigns of José Francisco Peña Gómez, candidate and leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), also helped to institutionalize anti-Haitianism. The incumbent Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) colluded with segments of the opposition, including the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD), to wage mudslinging attacks on Peña Gómez, who was purportedly of Haitian origin. These campaigns also heightened existing anxieties over future Haitian migration (Sagás 2000). Peña Gómez, the front-runner in 1994 and 1996, lost both elections by a narrow margin, although the 1994 elections were sullied by evidence of electoral fraud. More recently, several landmark judicial rulings since 2004 have also institutionalized anti-Haitianism. They have aimed to limit or roll back claims to citizenship and legal status by Dominicans of Haitian origin.

Public opinion data make clear that anti-Haitianism endures as the primary sociopolitical cleavage in Dominican society. This is so despite historical alliances between the two states, moments of solidarity, and routine commercial exchanges between the people of Hispaniola. In my 2011 survey, for instance, a little over half of respondents expressed either very negative or negative impressions of Haitians relative to some 35 percent of respondents who expressed positive or very positive impressions of Haitians. In no other ethnoracial group evaluation, including that of blacks, morenos, mulattos, indios, *jabaos* (light-skinned individuals perceived to have more negroid features than whites), and whites, did more than 17 percent of respondents express either very negative or negative impressions.[6]

Similarly, 35.8 percent of respondents in the 2012 AB survey reported having

6. One exception was the negative evaluations of *cocolos*, which reached nearly 42 percent. This may be a spurious finding, however. Focus group sessions revealed that there was a tendency among some respondents to conflate the term "cocolo," which has historically referred to descendants from the British West Indies, with Haitians.

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witnessed acts of discrimination against Haitians, and 31 percent did not want Haitians as their neighbors. Findings across other issue items suggest that anti-Haitian attitudes remain deep-seated.

In concert with inchoate group identity, ethnoracial stratification helps explain the low political salience of ethnoracial cleavages in the DR. Ethnoracial stratification worsened in the DR with the resurgence of large-scale sugar production in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Sugar production bifurcated labor and spawned two enduring social classes: a black, low-wage underclass largely from the British West Indies and Haiti, and a bourgeoisie comprised of foreign sugar producers and merchants (Hoetink 1970; Derby 2003). The neosultanic rule of Ulises Heureaux between 1882 and 1899 and the migration of Haitian labor during the US occupation from 1916 to 1924 further exacerbated ethnoracial stratification (Hartlyn 1998; Howard 2001).

The extent and meaning of ethnoracial stratification in the DR is slippery (Howard 2001). High levels of intermixing and elastic ethnoracial boundaries complicate discrete understandings of white and black social categories. Likewise, comparisons along a white/black binary or even along a white/mixed/black schema do not provide clarity on issues where stratification unfolds along a plural ethnoracial order (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Such a white/black binary also risks essentializing or reifying distinctions between blacks and whites (Loveman 1999). Moreover, it is unclear how varying kinds (i.e., vertical, horizontal) and degrees of stratification should be weighed against each other (Bonilla-Silva 2009).

Nonetheless, various survey-based studies (including my own) have found that black Dominicans lag behind white Dominicans across a number of socioeconomic indicators, including income. In the 2012 AB survey, self-identified black respondents had lower mean scores than white respondents when asked whether their income was sufficient (1.96 to 2.19), when asked to characterize their financial situation (2.56 to 2.76), and when asked to identify their social class (1.85 to 2.55). The scores represent the average placement of respondents on each answer scale. The difference of means was statistically significant both for self-identified and ascribed measures of ethnoracial identification. My 2011 survey yielded similar findings with respect to personal income. The difference of means in the personal income of black and white respondents was statistically significant across ascribed ethnoracial identification, skin color self-identification, and ethnoracial self-identification measures, though the latter was at a 0.10 level.

Black Dominicans also appear to fare worse than white Dominicans with respect to access to food, education, and infrastructure. Forty-three percent of self-identified black respondents in the 2012 AB survey reported not having food at home sometime in the last three months, compared to 31 percent of self-identified whites. The difference of means in going hungry between black and white respondents was statistically significant both for ascribed and for self-identification measures, though the latter was at a 0.10 level.

A study by Telles and Steele (2012) from Princeton University's Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) found that dark-skinned Dominicans had lower levels of education. Controlling for class, gender, and urban/rural residence, dark-skinned respondents averaged nearly two years of schooling less

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than light-skinned respondents. Data from my survey and from the 2012 AB survey corroborate these disparities. In my survey, the difference in means in level of schooling for black and white respondents were statistically significant across ascribed, skin color self-identification, and ethnoracial self-identification measures, though the latter was at a 0.10 level of confidence. Similarly, there was also a difference in means in education for black and white respondents in the 2012 AB survey. The mean scores of black respondents were lower than those white respondents for self-identification (8.98 as opposed to 9.64) and ascribed measures (8.15 to 9.19). Those findings were not statistically significant, however.

Although Dominicans increasingly acknowledge that socioeconomic inequalities are structured along ethnoracial lines, they have not articulated ethnoracial grievances or demanded ethnoracial parties and candidates. One reason is that most Dominicans do not primarily attribute the struggles of Afro-descendants to ethnoracial discrimination. In a study by Telles and Bailey (2013), a slightly higher percentage of respondents (44.2 percent) attributed minority poverty to work ethic, intelligence, and culture than to discrimination (42.4 percent), though they preferred structural reasons overall. Reluctance by most Dominicans to attribute stratification to discrimination might account for low levels of ethnoracial conflict and for the endurance of the myth of racial democracy. This reluctance has also prevented the emergence of what Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius (2004, 109) refer to as asymmetric patriotism, where "asymmetries in racial status quo . . . reflect asymmetries in national attachment."

Afro-descendants in the DR have responded to ethnoracial stratification and prejudice by avoiding identification with marginalized ethnoracial groups. My survey indicates overall flight away from identification with dark racial categories and identification with lighter or hybrid ethnosomatic categories. Cross-tabulations show that interviewers classified as white only 30 percent of the respondents who self-identified as white. Similarly, they ascribed a darker category to 34 percent of self-identified indios. In addition, interviewers classified as black 48 percent of respondents who self-identified as moreno and 6 percent of respondents who self-identified as mulatto. Interviewer error and discrepancies in ethnoracial classifications between interviewers and respondents do not explain these inconsistencies. The 2012 Americas Barometer survey also found that Dominicans tend to identify with lighter ethnoracial categories. Interviewers in that survey used a more "objective" eleven-point skin color palette to categorize respondents.

DATA AND METHODS

To test my claims and those of competing approaches, I carried out an in-person survey experiment in the province of Santo Domingo, home to an estimated one-quarter of the national population. I used this strategy in order to gain access to a sample of people with varying socioeconomic (and ethnoracial) backgrounds. A laboratory or Internet-based experiment in the DR would have yielded a sample that was disproportionately of high socioeconomic status. A random probability sample was generated using a stratified, multistage technique. The province of Santo Domingo was divided into seven municipalities. Over seventy neighbor-

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hoods were drawn at random from these municipalities but still reflected the economic strata of the 2010 national census of Santo Domingo (measured by the type of home flooring).[7] In the absence of ethnoracial self-identification census data, economic stratum is a good proxy for ethnoracial identity in the DR. As I have shown, the two are strongly correlated. The selection of municipalities was followed by a randomized selection of streets, households, and adult individuals. A total of 694 voting-age Dominican citizens participated in the study.[8]

Through a process of sequential randomization, participants were exposed to a single campaign sheet from a total of twelve fictional campaign sheets or conditions. Each campaign sheet in the treatment group consisted of four items. First, they included the complete name of the candidate. Second, they included one of three different photographs to represent white, mixed, and black ethnoracial candidates. The photograph used to represent the black candidate was also used to represent the candidate of Haitian origin. The distinction was denoted using a French creole as opposed to a Spanish surname. I conducted four two-hour-long focus group sessions in Santo Domingo to ensure that the photographs of the fictional candidates aligned with Dominican ethnoracial parameters and were comparable across all other dimensions (i.e., friendliness, attractiveness, age, etc.).[9]

Third, campaign sheets included a short biography in bullet point form, including age, occupation, class, marital status, and education. I only varied the level of education in these biographies (i.e., the sheets either stated that the candidate had completed university-level studies or made no reference to education). Last, the sheets included a generic statement about the candidate's policy position on uncontroversial domestic issues, such as crime, education, electrical shortages, corruption, and employment. Policy positions remained constant across all fictional candidates. I excluded the party membership of candidates from this wave of the experiment to prevent potential associations or previous information from interfering with the evaluation of the campaign sheets (Aguilar-Pariente 2011).

The materials used were comparable in design and content to those used by Dominican politicians. Because the experimental campaign sheets would be viewed in one-shot sessions, the material included greater detail about candidate background and policy positions than is the norm. Actual campaigns are more likely to present the same information piecemeal across different media, including television, prints, and radio.

The control group, which accounted for four of the twelve campaign sheets, excluded photographs of candidates. However, in two of the campaign sheets in the control group it was explicitly stated that the candidate was of Haitian origin. Details on the treatment and control groups are provided in table 1.

Respondents answered several candidate evaluation questions, as well as a ques-

7. Participants selected their "home flooring" from among the following options (ranging from least to most expensive): dirt, wood, cement, ceramic, mosaic, granite, and marble.

8. For the candidate evaluation questions, I included a probability weight to correct the oversampling of women and balance experimental conditions. The probability weight did not significantly change the results.

9. Focus group sessions comprised eight individuals each varying in age, gender, and social class. They also helped to pretest the experimental treatments and the postexperimental survey.

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Table 1 Treatment and control group conditions across campaign sheets

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Treatment												
Photo and implicit reference to Haitian origin	•	•										
Photo of black candidate			•	•								
Photo of mixed candidate					•	•						
Photo of white candidate							•	•				
High education	•		•		•		•		•		•	
No education reference		•		•		•		•		•		•
Control												
No photograph of candidate									•	•	•	•
Explicit reference to Haitian origin									•	•		
Number of assigned respondents	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	57	57

tion about how likely they were to vote for a candidate. Candidate evaluation questions asked about the likelihood that candidates would improve the interviewees' economic well-being as well as the probability that the candidates would control undocumented Haitian migration. These two candidate evaluation questions and the voting question were coded as discrete variables and were measured on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 4 in which 1 is very unlikely, 2 is somewhat unlikely, 3 is likely, and 4 is very likely. Questions also asked about the capacity, trustworthiness, and physical attractiveness of candidates. These questions were also coded on a scale of 1 to 4 in which 1 is none, 2 is a little, 3 is some, and 4 is a lot.

A sixty-three-item survey section followed the experimental section. It asked a battery of questions about political knowledge, political and racial attitudes, and sociodemographics. The survey section sought to measure the respondent's level of social desirability (or the likelihood that respondents would adjust their answers to conform to social norms) using questions derived from Terkildsen's (1993) study. As I show in the next section, personality scales had very little interaction with the survey questions.

This study employed three different measures of respondents' ethnoracial identity: an ascribed ethnoracial measure, an ethnoracial self-identification measure, and a self-identified skin color measure. The ascribed measure asked interviewers to assign respondents to one of six ethnosomatic categories: white, jabao, indio, mulatto, moreno, or black. The ethnoracial self-identification question asked respondents to assign themselves to one of the categories. These categories resembled those used in Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer's (2001) pigmentocracy study in the DR. In the sample, approximately 5.7 percent self-identified as white, 9.5 percent as jabao, 47 percent as indio, 9.3 percent as mulatto, 20 percent as moreno, and 8.5 percent as black. Approximately 3.9 percent were ascribed as white, 14.2 percent as jabao, 38.4 percent as indio, 17.6 percent as mulatto, 7.1 percent as moreno, and 18.7 percent as black.

Ethnosomatic categories in the DR overlap (Telles and Flores 2013). In fact, cate-

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gories such as mulatto and indio cover nearly the entire somatic spectrum because they are not necessarily based on visible or objective markers. There is, however, a loose positioning of categories. For instance, jabao is typically viewed as being closer to white, though it includes Afrosomatic attributes, whereas moreno is closer to black, though it includes mixed somatic characteristics. Mulatto, like indio, is a mixed category but it is typically conceived as somatically darker than indio. The intervals between each category are not equally spaced (Sagás 2000).

I also included a number of traditional control variables in the analyses, including party identification, age, gender, income, and education. Political sophistication and social desirability were measured as indexes based on pooled questions.

I estimated the models presented here using ordered probit. The assumptions of the ordered probit model provide the most accurate method to test ordinal dependent variables, such as the aforementioned candidate evaluation questions (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975).

FINDINGS

There is only weak support for the assumption inherent in many group-specific approaches that voters favor candidates who share their ethnoracial identity. Table 2 shows that the interaction between the ethnoracial identity of candidates and respondents for the question on trustworthiness and controlling undocumented migration is positive and significant for self-identified whites. In addition, the interaction between the ethnoracial identity of candidates and respondents for the question on candidate attractiveness is positive and significant for self-identified blacks. In most cases, however, the interaction terms do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, indicating that Dominicans do not evaluate candidates from their own ethnoracial group more favorably. In the only other instance of statistical significance (the interaction between the ethnoracial identity of candidates and respondents for the question on competence for self-identified indios) the effect is negative.

Overall, these results held whether I use interaction terms with self-identified or ascribed measures (not shown) of ethnoracial identification. One exception was the interaction term between ascribed indio candidate and ascribed indio respondents, which had a statistically significant effect on the willingness to vote for that candidate. The interaction term was negative, however, which suggests that ascribed indios are less likely to vote for indio candidates. This is the opposite of what group-specific approaches would expect.

There is greater support for the colorism thesis. As results from ordered probit analysis in table 3 show, respondents were significantly more likely to say that they would vote for white candidates (at the 0.10 level). They were not, however, significantly less likely to say that they would vote for black candidates (versus the mixed reference category). Moreover, findings from the 2012 AmericasBarometer (AB) survey support the idea that Dominicans do not systematically discriminate against dark-skinned candidates. A combined 84 percent of respondents in this survey agreed or strongly agreed when asked whether dark-skinned individuals

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Table 2 Interactions between the ethnoracial identification of candidates and participants across candidate evaluation items ordered-probit analysis

	Willing to vote for candidate	Candidate is capable	Candidate is trustworthy	Candidate is likely to improve your economic well-being	Candidate is likely to control un-documented Haitian migration	Candidate is physically attractive
Self-identified white respondents * white candidate	0.58	0.82	1.15*	0.92	1.63**	0.90
	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.66)	(0.72)
Self-identified indio respondents * ascribed mixed candidate	−0.30	−0.46**	−0.17	−0.12	−0.12	−0.30
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Self-identified black respondents * ascribed black candidate	−0.25	0.56	0.56	0.64	0.49	1.21**
	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.51)
Ascribed black candidate	−0.10	−0.19	−0.05	0.01	0.15	−0.49**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Ascribed white candidate	0.10	-0.13	0.10	-0.03	0.16	0.44**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Dom-Haitian candidate (explicit)	−0.49**	−0.52**	−0.40**	−0.25**	−0.37**	Omitted
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	
Dom-Haitian candidate (implicit)	−0.14	−0.40**	−0.12	−0.26**	−0.25*	−0.58**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Candidates with high education	−0.12	0.09	−0.04	−0.14	0.05	−0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Self-identified white participants	−0.43**	−0.29	−0.51**	−0.26	−0.37	0.17
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Self-identified *jabao* participants	−0.04	−0.13	−0.24	−0.16	−0.21	−0.04
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Self-identified *indio* participants	0.06	0.04	−0.08	0.03	−0.14	0.22
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Self-identified mulatto participants	−0.08	−0.02	−0.17	−0.26	−0.44**	−0.26
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Self-identified black participants	−0.42**	−0.30	−0.41**	−0.29	−0.32	−0.09
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Observations	691	692	690	689	692	462

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$.

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make good leaders. In my own survey, 88 percent of the sample expressed their willingness to vote for a black candidate for president.

In addition, respondents did not give significantly more favorable evaluations to the white candidate or significantly less favorable evaluations to the black candidate for most questions. Although the sign of the coefficient for the white candidate is positive across the candidate evaluation questions, it is statistically significant in only two question items, the physical attractiveness of the candidate and the likelihood that the candidate would control undocumented Haitian migration. Meanwhile, the coefficient for the black candidate is negative in three of the candidate evaluation questions and statistically significant in only one of them.

Respondents in my experiment did rate the white candidate as significantly more attractive and the black candidate as less attractive than the mixed candidate reference category. But these differing assessments of physical attractiveness did not seem to translate into markedly higher scores for the white candidate (or markedly lower scores for the black candidate) on questions about competence, trustworthiness, and the likelihood that candidates could improve the respondents' economic well-being and control undocumented migration.

These results should not be taken as confirmation of the racial democracy thesis, however. The DR hardly resembles a racial democracy. As I have shown, ethnoracial stratification and prejudice are pronounced in the DR, and there is evidence that a swath of Dominicans acknowledge as much. In the 2010 AB survey, 54 percent of respondents believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were treated worse than white Dominicans, and nearly 9 percent believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were treated much worse. Moreover, a combined 42 percent of respondents stated that they had witnessed discrimination based on skin color either many times or sometimes. Similarly, 65 percent of respondents in the 2012 AB survey believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were poorer than other groups because they were treated unfairly, up from 42 percent in 2010. But it seems that these biases are not expressed systematically in candidate evaluation.

As my approach would expect, respondents were far more likely to oppose Dominico-Haitian candidates than they were to oppose black candidates. This was particularly true of the candidate explicitly identified as being of Haitian origin (EHO), but it was also true of the candidate who was assigned a French creole surname and thus implicitly identified as being of Haitian origin (IHO). Candidates of Haitian origin fared worse than other candidates (versus the mixed reference category) on virtually all of the candidate evaluation questions. These differences were statistically significant across all evaluation questions for the EHO candidate and in four of six questions for the IHO candidate.

These results hold whether or not I control for social desirability bias and sociodemographic variables, with some exceptions. After excluding sociodemographic variables, for instance, the likelihood that an IHO candidate would control undocumented migration remained negative but lost significance at conventional levels. Moreover, the evaluation of white candidates' trustworthiness and the evaluation of black candidates' likelihood to control undocumented Haitian migration gained significance at the 0.10 level. Similarly, the likelihood that an

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Table 3 The effect of candidate ethnoracial characteristics on candidate evaluation: Ordered probit analysis (standard errors in parentheses)

	Willing to vote for candidate	Competence	Trustworthy	Likely to improve your economic well-being	Likely to control undocumented Haitian migration	Physically attractive
White candidate	.225*	.033	.201	.048	.268**	.636***
	(.125)	(.127)	(.123)	(.123)	(.124)	(.145)
Black candidate	−.074	−.084	.000	.039	.184	−.311**
	(.125)	.127	(.123)	(.124)	(.123)	(.142)
Dominico-Haitian candidate (explicit treatment)	−.432***	−.396***	−.357***	−.225*	−.325**	n/a
	(.125)	(.125)	(.125)	(.124)	(.127)	
Dominico-Haitian candidate (implicit treatment)	−.060	−.274**	−.075	−.226*	−.210*	−.419***
	(.124)	(.126)	(.122)	(.124)	(.125)	(.143)
Candidate's high level of education	−.139*	.069	−.065	−.167**	.038	−.061
	(.083)	(.084)	(.082)	(.083)	(.083)	(.102)
PRD identification	.138	.263***	.206**	.267**	.163*	.300**
	(.095)	(.098)	(.094)	(.094)	(.095)	(.117)
PRSC identification	−.109	−.066	−.329	.090	.064	.054
	(.249)	(.243)	(.247)	(.245)	(.247)	(.319)
Income	−.031	−.113***	−.014	−.088**	−.127***	−.073
	(.037)	(.037)	(.036)	(.037)	(.038)	(.047)
Education	.037	.093**	−.001	.026	−.032	−.183***
	(.043)	(.044)	(.043)	(.043)	(.043)	(.056)
Observations	689	690	688	687	690	462

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$.

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

Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of willingness to vote for candidates

EHO candidate would control undocumented migration remained negative but gained significance at the 0.01 level.

Figure 2 presents predicted probabilities of voting for an EHO candidate (versus a candidate without any identifiable ethnicity) based on the ordered probit analysis in table 3. As the figure shows, only 16 percent of respondents were "very likely" to vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates compared to 28 percent for the control group. By contrast, 37 percent of respondents were "very unlikely" to vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates compared to 22 percent for the control group.

Of particular note is the fact that respondents rated the candidate with the French surname as significantly less physically attractive than the candidate with the same photo but a Spanish surname. Respondents, moreover, were quite willing to admit their bias against candidates of Haitian origin. Indeed, 74 percent of the sample stated that they were unwilling to vote for a candidate of Haitian origin for president. Ordered logit results (not presented here) indicate that respondents across the ethnosomatic spectrum were unwilling to vote for candidates of Haitian origin.

To some degree, reluctance to support a candidate of Haitian origin can be attributed to broad antipathy toward Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin. This is evident in anti-Haitian public opinion on residential and marital preferences, for instance. In a 1995 national survey on marital preferences, over 55 percent of the sample found it unfavorable for a close relative to marry a person of Haitian origin relative to 11.6 percent of the sample who found it favorable and 36.6 percent who expressed ambivalence (Dore Cabral 1995).

My focus group research suggests, however, that there is something specific about a public official of Haitian origin that generates anxiety. Respondents

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across focus groups perceived candidates of Haitian origin as being more likely to relax migration laws against Haiti and unify the two nations. This perception is reinforced by shopworn but effective scare tactics that are continually revived by ultranationalist sectors of Dominican society. Results from my experiment lend support to findings from the focus groups. As table 3 shows, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between a candidate explicitly identified as having Haitian origin and the perception that he would be likely to control undocumented Haitian migration.[10]

The results of my experiment and survey must be taken with caution given that it was carried out on a medium-sized sample in the province of Santo Domingo. It is possible that my estimation of variance could have been affected by the relatively small cell sizes of the twelve experimental conditions, which included approximately 58 observations each. Nevertheless, my findings with respect to candidate evaluation are consistent with those reported by Dore Cabral (1995) based on the aforementioned national survey on marital preferences. That survey concluded that Dominicans were more anti-Haitian than they were anti-black. My findings also jibe with the electoral history of the DR. As Howard (2001, 59) points out, "The Dominican Republic has had more negro or mulatto presidents than any other country in the western hemisphere." Not surprisingly, no candidate of Haitian origin has won the presidency since the nineteenth century (whether because of insufficient popular support or institutional obstruction or both), although José Francisco Peña Gómez was very nearly elected in the mid-1990s.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that ethnoracial cleavages are not necessarily salient at the ballot box in ethnoracially diverse societies, even where levels of stratification are high. In some cases, stratification may actually deactivate ethnoracial identity. Ethnoracial stratification generates ethnoracial prejudice and unequal distribution of resources, which discourages individuals from identifying with marginalized ethnosomatic categories. Whereas ethnoracial stratification incentivizes individuals to switch ethnosomatic categories, inchoate ethnoracial group enables it. My argument helps to explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America, particularly in Afro-Latin America.

Although ethnoracial stratification is widespread in Latin America and ethnoracial identities are often inchoate, the case of the DR is unique in some ways. Fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and racialized anti-Haitianism have shaped ethnoracial boundary making in the DR. This boundary-making dynamic has not been commonplace between neighbors in the region. The DR is the only country in the Americas that gained its independence from a black republic and that shares an island with that same country. Notwithstanding these particularities, my argument contributes important insights to the study of race and ethnicity outside of the island of Hispaniola.

10. The results did not change very much when the interaction term social class/party identification was included in the ordered probit analysis.

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First, it identifies a middle ground in the debate over how essential ethnoracial identity is to social organization in Latin America by examining the electoral side of social organization (see Bonilla-Silva 1997; Loveman 1999). It suggests that while ethnoracial markers and identities structure some dimensions of social organization, including the distribution of resources and access to institutions, they do not necessarily structure other dimensions of social organization, such as political behavior. Individuals may be subordinated by ethnoracialized structures and institutions but may not respond by engaging in ethnoracial politics.

The Dominican Republic is not exceptional in this regard. Evidence from recent studies on ethnoracial identity and candidate evaluation have found that ethnoracial identity does not always play an important role in elections even in societies that are otherwise structured by ethnoracial identity. Individuals may instead privilege class, gender, region, or even shared surnames over ethnoracial identity (Dunning 2009; Battle and Seely 2010; Ishiyama 2010; Dunning and Harrison 2010).

Second, my argument suggests that subaltern sectors may also use mestizaje/mulatez to their advantage. The race and ethnicity literature on Latin America has privileged studying the ways in which elites employ mestizaje/mulatez. They have argued persuasively that elites utilize mestizaje to create a false sense of national homogeneity and social equality. This in turn helps to demobilize subordinate groups along ethnoracial lines (Sawyer 2006; Telles and Flores 2013; Hernández 2013). I show, however, that subaltern groups have also exploited the ethnic fluidity created by intermixing. They have done so to reclassify their way out of marginalization. Wimmer (2008, 988) refers to this type of strategy as repositioning, whereby individuals "shift sides" rather than contest the ethnoracial hierarchy.

Finally, my argument suggests that national origin can sometimes be a salient consideration for candidate evaluation and that it may help to redirect ethnoracial cleavages. In migrant-recipient countries in the region, where candidates may identify with hyphenated national identities, voters may focus on the national origin of candidates more than on a shared ethnoracial identity or programmatic position. Future studies would do well to pay greater attention to the role that national origin plays in electoral behavior.

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