explain this persistence. In particular, while earlier work had discussed the role of families as transmission mechanisms for pre-communist education and ideas, Lankina shows that families were also crucial in shaping the demand for education, thereby facilitating the reproduction of pre-communist elites. Furthermore, the discussion of social networks and professional incorporation strategies is an important and original contribution to explaining the remarkable ability of pre-communist elites (and ideas) to withstand decades of communist social engineering efforts.

Of course, any work of this scope and theoretical ambition is likely to raise a number of questions. In terms of internal validity, I primarily wondered about two issues. First, I am not sure how to think about the primary dependent variable: Russian democracy. Even leaving aside the dramatic deterioration of the last two decades, post-communist Russia was at best a hybrid regime. And while things looked better in a few sub-national enclaves, I am not sure whether the quantitative indicators used in Chapter 7 really capture democracy in the Russian context. The two main indicators—the effective number of candidates and the Vanhanen Index—capture competitiveness, which is essential for democracy. But given that these indicators are based on the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, in which Yeltsin's main competitor was the Communist Party candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, and where two of his main challengers—Alexander Lebed and Vladimir Zhirinovsky—relied on authoritarian and nationalist appeals, it is unclear that a closer local-level result really means an endorsement of democracy, or simply more competitive authoritarianism. The one genuinely liberal democrat in that election—Grigory Yavlinsky—received only 7.5% of the vote, and his party (Yabloko) never topped 8% in successive parliamentary elections, and while this support was higher in areas with high historical shares of "educated estates," it nevertheless suggests that support for liberal democracy in Russia was consistently below the population share of the educated estates (roughly 13.5%). This gap suggests that even among the educated and entrepreneurial descendants of the former Czarist elites, democratic support was not particularly high, and raises the possibility that such elites may provide the basis for greater inter-elite competition rather than genuine democratization. A second internal validity question arises from the ambiguity of the *meshchane* category, which combines occupational elements, education, and urban residence. While Lankina acknowledges and addresses this ambiguity, and the statistical tests attempt to disentangle some of these strands, it would have been useful to test explicitly the relative importance of occupational categories versus the related but distinct factor of pre-communist education/literacy.

As with any single-country study, the question of scope conditions/generalizability looms large. The book partially addresses this issue by comparing Russia to two other (ex) communist countries (Hungary and China) in Chapter 10, which broadly confirms the correlation between the resilience of pre-communist elites and post-communist regime patterns. However, such cross-national comparisons also raise many other questions. For example, how would this theoretical framework account for the more democratic regime trajectories of Moldova compared to Russia, despite the lower pre-communist literacy and the greater decimation of Moldovan elites after the communist takeover? Similarly, how do we account for the significant recent democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, two countries with the strongest and most resilient pre-communist educated elites in the region?

That being said—and this final point is admittedly personal and highly impressionistic—I found that the book's primary theoretical and empirical argument, which focuses on the survival strategies of pre-communist elites after the communist takeover, "travels" very effectively beyond the Russian context. From the emphasis on education investments as a way to compensate for the loss of material capital, to the emphasis on family reunions and belonging to a "good family," and even all the way to museum employment as a haven for marginalized former educated elites, the book brings to life in a theoretically fascinating and personally moving fashion, an important and often ignored dimension of life under communism. But while these stories are part of the personal baggage for many of us, Lankina's book tells them at a larger scale, and shows how they help us to understand important aspects of post-communist politics.

The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance, and Mutiny in the Age of Sail. By Steven Pfaff and Michael Hechter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 352p. $39.99 cloth.

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This wonderfully written and expertly researched book from Steven Pfaff and Michael Hechter is an example of historical sociology at its very best. It addresses an important question that is relevant beyond the specific context at hand: how do we comparatively understand why rebellions against authority break out here and not there? It is empirically rigorous by clearly defining the universe of cases—mutinies in the British Royal Navy from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century—and by combining and triangulating between different methods. These include narrative exploration of particular cases of mutiny as well as the statistical analysis of a variety of original datasets: on the organizational structure and governance practices on mutinous and non-mutinous ships; the grievances articulated by sailors and the personal characteristics of those who led or joined an uprising; the

characteristics of ships that stuck to and those that abandoned a multi-ship mutiny; the evolution of corporal punishment over time; and the naval court decisions reached on individual mutineers.

The book offers an empirically saturated, theoretically complex and yet reasonably parsimonious answer to the core question it poses. In a nutshell, the authors, both very accomplished and well-respected students of political insurgency and rebellion, argue that mutinies happened where customary expectations regarding seamen's living standards and proper treatment by superiors were violated routinely and where, in addition, a particularly egregious episode of such violations led the seaman to overthrow a ship's command. Most of these grievances resulted from bad governance by the officer corps: importantly, their excessive use of corporal punishments (usually in the form of public flogging with leather leashes); the failure to maintain a healthy environment on board through effective quarantining of sick seamen; problems with the provision of water, food, and rum; and withheld payments or broken promises to delist.

Grievances caused by bad governance need to combine, however, with the seamen's ability to organize a rebellion and, even more importantly, to sustain it. Somewhat surprisingly, though, the usual social capital explanations do not hold here—perhaps the consequence of the particular social organization of ships, where tightly knit crews can function both as a tool of social control helpful in detecting insurrectionary moods early on as well as the organizational backbone of mutiny. Shifting to the question of individual participation in mutinies as ringleaders or as common supporters, dense ties to other seamen from previous service, however, combine with personal grievances (such as having experienced corporal punishment recently or serving involuntarily in the navy) to make seamen more rebellious. Sustaining a rebellion—meaning avoiding individuals or whole ships jumping the cause and shifting sides—is mostly a matter of control, they find, including the ability to control what information about alternative courses of action (such as accepting a royal pardon) were made available to ordinary mutineers. In short, the authors offer a moral-economy argument, well known from the historiography of the British working class and subsequently applied to peasant communities from around the world, and modify and enrich it with a variety of arguments of a more organizational nature centered on the idea of social control.

This argument unfolds in a more or less systematic way over the course of the chapters. Each is introduced with a detailed narrative of a mutiny. These sections are all written in superb prose and draw the reader into the lived everyday worlds of navy ships in the age of sail—true gems of historiographical story telling. The first chapter sets the stage, summarizes the argument, relates it to the larger literature on protest and rebellion, and gives an overview of the book. The second chapter offers a fascinating tour through the social organization of a typical ship—the military hierarchy, the social boundaries between crew members of various skill levels, the spatial layout of the ships, and so forth. It sets the stage for understanding the more detailed arguments of how social organization and control affected rebellions on ships.

The third chapter details exactly this dynamic: how the internal hierarchy among commoners (led by petty officers and able seamen), the dense ties of solidarity woven into everyday routines of cooperation and codependence, and the commitment devices such as oath-taking made it possible for seamen to overcome the massive deterrents to rising up in mutiny—the prospect of facing a court martial and its very likely outcome of being hanged. The fourth chapter is perhaps the core of the book (previously published as an article in the *American Sociological Review*), as it analyzes some of the impressive datasets that the authors have assembled, toiling through detailed information on hundreds of ships and individual seamen. It supports the main arguments of the book in perhaps the most straightforward way. Chapter 5 is dedicated to an analysis of two mass mutinies in 1797, and to understanding why one soon collapsed while the other was sustained and largely victorious, thus allowing the authors to zoom in on some of the more specific processes at work. Chapter 6 moves beyond the general framework of the book's main argument to understand the macropolitical and macrohistorical forces that influence discipline and insurrection on British ships. It shows how the threat of insurrection—sparked by the French revolution—led British naval officers to resort to corporal punishment much more frequently than before, because they feared that insubordination of seamen would eventually undercut the estate order of British society and thus their own social standing. The seventh chapter asks if mutinies were effective in improving the welfare of seamen. Overall, it seems that they did improve the conditions of employment over time, if only in a piecemeal fashion and mostly due to the mass mutinies of 1797 mentioned above. The final chapter concludes and asks interesting questions about the scope conditions that may or may not make mutinies in the Royal Navy a special case compared with other cases of rebellion.

Overall, the achievement of the book—an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of rebellion in a specific social and historical setting—are remarkable and put the book at the very top of my list of recommended readings for students of rebellion, protest, or insurrection. The insights, especially into how grievances spark rebellion, are empirically rich and theoretically sophisticated. The specificity of the case of the Royal Navy obviously also indicates the limits of its generalizability, some of which the authors discuss in the concluding chapter: how far

does the logic of insurrection uncovered by the authors apply to cases where superiors have less than total control over subordinates—in the form of the threat of legally unlimited and arbitrary corporal punishment, not unlike under slavery—or in less closely knit communities? After all, ships rarely comprised more than 700 individuals who were crammed together onto a tight space and made codependent on each other. Similarly, how might these dynamics operate under less formalized social hierarchies—with a noble officer corps formally in charge of commoners of often very low social status? Or, remaining within the limits of the time period and the specific organization that the authors are interested in, what made British navy ships less mutinous, on average, compared with their French or Spanish counterparts, and what was it about the way British ships were organized that secured the supremacy of Britain at sea and thus its dominance in world politics for roughly two hundred years?

Making Gender Salient: From Gender Quota Laws to Policy. By Ana Catalano Weeks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 300p. $99.99 cloth.

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Electoral reforms tend to come in waves, and in the late 1990s and early 2000s the reform to ride was the gender quota. Whether implemented voluntarily by individual political parties, through legislative reform, or by constitutional amendment, more than 160 countries adopted some form of gender quota, mandating power sharing across the sexes. Depending on the level of government at which the quota is implemented, the numerical floor for representation it specifies, and the incentives and sanctions that it imposes to induce compliance, the impact of quota laws on women's numerical representation varies from marginal to immense, but it has never been zero or negative. For many card-carrying feminists, this is a win in and of itself, regardless of what the women installed in office accomplish thereafter. But scholars and advocates have wondered whether getting women into positions of power matters for the nature of governance, for policy making, and for the lives of women citizens. Ana Catalano Weeks's thoughtful, readable new book argues that it does.

Making Gender Salient analyzes the impact of quota laws—quotas that are adopted nationally and applied evenly to all parties—on the representational connection between women in politics and gendered policy domains. Weeks argues that quotas can impact policies in three ways. First, by getting more women into power, quotas can give a coalition of women legislative leverage to push or approve legislation. Second, since parliamentary election is generally a precondition for higher levels of leadership, increased representation of women can put more women in line for ministerial positions where they can wield real power. Finally, since quota adoption itself is often predicated on arguments that women can and should represent women, debates surrounding quota policies can make space to put gender-specific issues on the political table. Weeks argues that together, these three factors—leverage, leadership, and mission salience—make quotas matter for gender equality.

In OECD democracies, the site of Weeks's investigation, most national-level quota laws were adopted after some parties (generally from the left) had already implemented party-level quotas. Mechanically, then, the biggest gains in women's representation from national-level quota-law adoption take place within more conservative, and Christian Democratic, parties. Weeks argues that this distributional consequence of quota-law adoption leads to a theoretical expectation about which types of policies are most likely to be affected by the increase in women's representation: quotas should be most influential in policy areas where there is a gender gap in preferences and where some consensus exists among women across party lines. When such consensus exists, women legislators can work across their aisles to draw attention and devote legislative time to policies that their male counterparts might not have considered.

Identifying which issues are important to women across parties is no easy feat. Drawing on multiple sources of survey data from the mid-1980s until 2012, including three waves each of the International Social Survey Programme's Role of Government Survey and its Family and Changing Gender Roles Survey, as well as three waves of the European Values Survey, Weeks identifies consistent, and growing, gender gaps in a variety of domains. These include the long-standing area of spending (women want more spending on health, retirement, unemployment, and education than men), government intervention in the economy (women are more supportive of price-control measures intended to reduce inequality), and women's social roles (women think working mothers can be warm toward their children, that women do not prefer the home, that it is not strictly a man's job to earn money, and that preschool children do not suffer if a mother works). The most persistent of these gender gaps in public opinion is related to survey questions that ask whether children suffer if mothers work. In all countries but Italy—with the Nordic countries in the lead and Spain and Japan at the tail—women are likelier to disagree with this statement than men. Across parties, women typically think that women can work and not harm their children by doing so. The policy domain related to work–family policies is therefore ripe for producing the kind of reform predicted by Weeks's conceptualization of the impact of quotas.

To take one example, in Belgium before quotas, the various parties did not agree on the need for gender-neutral parental leave or paternity leave. Some left parties