

ment into submission. The author rarely subjects his material to analytical scrutiny; the nearest he comes is to quote, from the archival material, the differing views of prominent officials on a particular matter. He rarely distinguishes tactical moves from underlying policies. His main difficulty is that having chosen a subject which involves the interrelation between finance and politics, he is a specialist in neither. However, the student of Russian history, the diplomatic historian, and the student of finance and monetary problems will find much of value in this carefully documented, fair, and lucidly written account of the vicissitudes of Russia's financial relations with her creditors.

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PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: THE PETROGRAD BOLSHEVIKS AND THE JULY 1917 UPRISING. By *Alexander Rabinowitch*. Indiana University International Studies. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1968. xi, 229 pp. \$8.50.

The biased approach of Soviet historiography, and the apogetics of émigré politicians for having missed a golden opportunity of getting rid of the Bolshevik danger, make a dispassionate and meticulous analysis of the happenings of July 1917 absolutely necessary for the advancement of our knowledge of the whole course of events in Russia in 1917. This task has been admirably carried out by Professor Rabinowitch. Basing himself firmly on a wide range of primary sources and critically exploiting secondary ones, he persuasively presents his answers to the main questions, without forcing his conclusions on the reader.

The main problem—whether the Bolsheviks had provoked and organized the July demonstrations—is answered clearly: Rabinowitch believes that a section of the Bolshevik party connected with the military organization and the Petersburg Bolshevik committee was systematically preparing the disturbances which broke out on July 3, while at the same time the central committee of the party did all in its power to create the impression of urging on the soldiers and workers of Petrograd restraint and peaceful methods of political struggle in the extremely permissive conditions under the Provisional Government. Not even when the central committee reversed its original resolution, and decided to lead the movement which it alleged had begun spontaneously, was Lenin's attitude toward the tactics of the committee clear. Nor is it clear whether the Bolshevik leadership ordered the laying down of arms by the mutineers when the movement collapsed. The concealments, ambiguities, evasions of official Soviet historiography on these points reflect, Rabinowitch tells us, a profound conflict inside the Bolshevik party, the admission of which would contradict the slogan of the monolithic unity of the party throughout its existence. Brilliant and straight as the methods of this author are, they fail to illuminate certain particularly dark corners of this drama. Whatever made the Deputy Minister of Justice Karinsky warn Lenin, through the latter's friend Bonch-Bruевич, of the imminent issue of a warrant for his arrest? Whatever made the same Karinsky draft such an aggressive—though inept—indictment of the Bolsheviks, both those imprisoned and those fugitive? What effect did the situation at the front have on the Bolshevik decision surreptitiously to foment unrest in Petrograd? How was this decision affected by the flow of German financial support, which began to reach the Bolsheviks a few weeks before the uprising? These questions will have to be inves-

tigated and (one hopes) resolved by researchers. But they will inevitably have to begin from this splendid pioneering work.

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CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH RUSSIA, 1918: THE FIRST YEAR OF THE VOLUNTEER ARMY. By *Peter Kenez*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971. vii, 351 pp. \$10.00.

The old adage that no one is interested in losers certainly does not apply to the Russian Civil War. While Western scholars and observers have written little about the winning Soviet side in that struggle, they have devoted considerable attention to the Allied and White Russian forces whom the Bolsheviks defeated. This is in part because extensive printed and unpublished sources for the anti-Soviet side are available in the West, primarily in the United States. Nevertheless, one wonders if this topic is not pretty well exhausted. This book, for example, is thorough and well written, but it has a narrow focus and offers little that is new.

Although Kenez provides a clear and interesting account of one year in the history of one anti-Bolshevik force in one region of Russia, the larger import of his work, if any, remains obscure. In his introduction he asserts, concerning the situation in south Russia, that "modern European history provides no better example of anarchy and its effects," but he never develops this intriguing hypothesis in the body of the book. The author also suggests that the Civil War, rather than the events of 1917, shaped the Soviet system, and that the struggle in south Russia was a microcosm of the whole Civil War. Yet the self-imposed limitations of the work make it impossible for Kenez to support either of these claims. By his own design he barely mentions the Bolshevik forces, or the role of the Volunteer Army in the Ukraine and the Crimea, and he treats only tangentially the German and Allied interventions. Thus his study can reveal little about the impact of the conflict on Soviet society or about the larger struggle in Russia between 1918 and 1921.

The author relies heavily on unpublished materials at Columbia University and the Hoover Institution. Despite this diligent "panning" of archival streams and lodes, precious few nuggets appear. We learn almost nothing novel about the Volunteer Army, the Cossacks, or the leaders of both. Such important issues as the original decision to turn south to the Kuban, the refusal to attack Tsaritsyn, and the stupid blunders of Denikin's relations with the Georgians are reviewed with precision and fairness, but no fresh insights or judgments are presented. Almost all of Kenez's findings have emerged in earlier memoir and secondary literature on the Russian Civil War. Moreover, because of its narrow focus, this study is probably less valuable than George Brinkley's *Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921*, or even such earlier general works as Chamberlin's *Russian Revolution* and Stewart's *White Armies of Russia*.

Yet this is a good monograph, with important uses. It is certainly the best study of the subject, and future writers on the Civil War will have to turn to it. Kenez makes a few minor mistakes, the maps are quite inadequate, and the book contains annoying typographical errors, but on its own terms the study cannot be faulted. It is well organized, impressively supported, and carefully presented. Helpful analysis and speculation are always prudently linked to a firm factual foundation. The author's conclusions are balanced and unobjectionable on the whole. He is