

the Caucasus, and Social Democracy for the publication of this minor but still interesting work.

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SUOMI VIHOLLISENA JA YSTÄVÄNÄ, 1714–1967. By *V. V. Pohlebkin*.
Translated by *Natalia Pienimäki* and *Aaro Majanen*. Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1969. 402 pp. 26 Finnmarks.

This is a remarkable book. Its author is a leading Soviet specialist in North European affairs, but the book has been published—so far at least—only in Finnish, by the largest Finnish commercial publishing house, and one not previously known for its sympathy toward Soviet views at that. The title of the original Russian-language manuscript is *Finliandiia i vostochnyi sosed*, but the title of the Finnish-language book is “Finland as Enemy and Friend, 1714–1967.” This latter title is quite misleading, since it makes the book sound much more sensational in tone than it is. Commercial publishing considerations perhaps explain the peculiar translation of the title, and it is noteworthy that this book has been a best seller in Finland, in spite of an overwhelmingly hostile critical reaction from Finnish newspapers. It is not likely that every copy purchased has been closely read. Many parts of the book induce sleep, for which the author can fairly be blamed. It hardly seems fair, however, to blame the author for the Finnish-language title, since his knowledge of the Finnish language appears—to put it mildly indeed—minimal.

The Finnish title is also misleading in its chronological coverage. Very little of the book deals with Russo-Finnish relations before 1809, when Finland became a Grand Duchy of the Russian emperor. For all practical purposes this book is a study of Russo-Finnish relations since 1809. The chronological coverage ends with 1967, perhaps because the author conceived of the book as a kind of personal tribute to the fiftieth anniversary of Finnish independence in that year. He goes so far as to remark in passing that “the question of Finnish independence was decided” in 1917. Before too many Finns jump to the premature conclusion that continued Finnish independence is guaranteed regardless of the future course of Finnish foreign policy, they should remember 1939. At the beginning of the Winter War the Soviet Union recognized as the legitimate government of Finland the Kuusinen “government,” which was purely and simply a Soviet fiction. Pohlebkin does not even mention this crucial fact. Even if the Soviet leadership has since mended its ways, Pohlebkin’s optimism concerning the future of Finnish independence may be excessive. His book is that of a Finnophile, too much so, in fact, in many respects for this reviewer’s taste. He argues, for instance, that traditional Finnish anti-Russian sentiments originated in Sweden, and therefore were not authentically Finnish. This argument is ridiculous, even though it is undeniably useful to make this claim if one wishes to assume that good relations between Russia and Finland are the natural state of affairs. In the judgment of this reviewer, this assumption makes much more sense than has been conceded by most earlier authors writing about Russo-Finnish relations, but Pohlebkin glosses over the very real and very passionate hatred of everything Russian by many Finns. This hatred still exists, even in the age of the “Kekkonen line” in Finnish foreign policy, and it is highly probable that Finnish political leaders since 1944 have been much more rational in their attitude toward Russia than most ordinary Finns have been. Whether J. K. Paasikivi was completely successful in his attempt to restructure Finnish public

opinion in this respect is highly doubtful. Pohlebkin's account of Soviet-Finnish relations since 1944 sounds like an after-dinner speech, not an incisive analysis of political realities. He is much more successful in demonstrating, however, that Finnish hatred of Russia was not always justified. Finland does, after all, owe its independence to the October Revolution. When he argues that imperial Russian expansion was essentially eastward into Asia rather than westward into Europe, Kremlinologists will doubtless take note.

It should also be observed that in all likelihood Pohlebkin is not a very good party man, and therefore may not be representative of official opinion. Lenin's statements get occasional *ex cathedra* exposure, but otherwise Pohlebkin pays surprisingly little attention to official Soviet statements on Finland. Indeed, his general analysis is often not markedly Marxist. The only instance in which he relies heavily on Marxist historiography is when he explains post-1899 Russification as the attempt of expanding Russian capitalism to take over the Finnish economy. This is an interesting hypothesis, but Pohlebkin talks in purely general terms about Russian capitalism without presenting any evidence whatsoever on the specific case of Finland. It may well be true that Russian capitalists acted as an effective pressure group in the making of imperial policy toward Finland after 1899, but Pohlebkin does not prove that contention. Furthermore, the greater part of the Russification imposed on Finland had to do with purely political rather than economic matters. In his attack upon anonymous turn-of-the-century Russian capitalists, Pohlebkin comes perilously close to eulogizing the earlier Finnish policy of the nineteenth-century emperors.

Such praise from Pohlebkin is not surprising. He is in many respects a traditional Russian nationalist. For him the years 1809–99 are clearly the good old days of Russo-Finnish relations. He argues persuasively that imperial intentions toward Finland between 1809 and 1899 were honorable, and that the Russian military interest in Finland was compatible with Finnish autonomy. During the nineteenth century Russia and Finland honored their obligations to each other, and the benefits were real and mutual. The Russian authorities did not have to worry very much about a military threat to St. Petersburg, and Finland flourished. Now that Finland was no longer merely the "last province" of the Swedish kingdom, it developed its own political institutions. Economic growth was enormous, and Pohlebkin is quite correct in emphasizing the role played in this growth by Finland's preferential position in the Russian empire. Finnish, the language of the large majority of Finns, gradually gained a position of legitimate dominance over Swedish, which had never been possible before 1809. Above all, Finland enjoyed a century of peace, after centuries of war, and was even permitted to remain neutral in the Great War. All this Pohlebkin depicts accurately and in magnificent detail. His chapters on the nineteenth century alone justify the existence of his book, and make it required reading for anyone seriously interested in either Russian or Finnish history. With all its flaws, Pohlebkin's book is one of the half-dozen most significant books ever published on Finland, as well as being the most extensive study of Finland by a Soviet scholar. Those who believe in the possibility of agreement by scholars of widely divergent backgrounds will be heartened to learn that there is relatively little in this book which would not have received the hearty assent of J. K. Paasikivi, who was Finland's most distinguished historian as well as its greatest statesman.

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