

issues as well as international relations overshadows that of his relative, Philip IV of Spain.

The comparison between Charles V's government, rooted in the service of a desired universal catholic monarchy, and the aims of Philip II, torn between religious zeal and homebred Spanish imperialism, is stimulating. Yet the evaluation of Ferdinand II, on which further deductions are largely based, as an "amiable, music-loving spendthrift and indolent mediocrity" is misconceived. Ferdinand may have been an intellectual mediocrity (that he was amiable is questionable), but certainly he was not indolent. This goes for his rule as a young man in Inner Austria as much as for his subsequent wider role as emperor. The Ferdinand of the first half of the seventeenth century may indeed be considered the purest type of champion of the Counter Reformation, with widespread ideological aims somewhat similar to those of Charles V. Added to these features were elements of the new pattern-forming type of princely absolutism. This has been well recognized, among others by Sturmberger, Wandruszka, and long before them by Moritz Ritter, but not by the author of these interesting and thoughtful essays. In short, the weakness of the book lies in its lack of balance in the evaluation of Western and Eastern Habsburgs in the later counterreformatory era.

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KRIEGSABENTEUER DES RITTMEISTERS HIERONYMUS CHRISTIAN VON HOLSTEN, 1655–1666. Edited by *Helmut Lahrkamp*. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, vol. 4. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1971. 93 pp. DM 18, paper.

The value of this book, as Professor Hellmann, the editor of the series, points out in his postscript, does not lie in any new historical information or reinterpretation of the events described, but in the fact that Captain von Holsten tells "what he saw." Probably he had "no concept of what it was all about" (p. 74), and thus the book is essentially a contribution to the *Sittengeschichte* of the age.

Von Holsten was a soldier of fortune who rose from low rank to become eventually a captain. He cared little whether he fought for or against Swedes, Poles, the Bishop of Münster, Danes, or Dutch, and he changed sides whenever it was advantageous. His interest lay in booty, but the reader gets the impression that despite all hardships he also fought for the joy he derived from war (see his description of the shock he once received when peace was negotiated). Although essentially he describes battles (historically much of this is unreliable, though interesting as a document of the time), he provides us also with a number of sidelights: some judgments of people and nations; some impressions of the peasantry, who in desperation occasionally made furious, and successful, attacks with their scythes on the marauding soldiers; some observations on the divisions among the Poles; and some additional insights into the state of mind of the people. How merrily he speaks of unspeakable betrayals and cruelties, of the Walachians who cut off the ears of captured women, or of several hundred Poles blown into the air like *Krammetsvögel* (fieldfare): "This was great fun to behold. . . . That same day, out of viciousness, the Poles killed 600 Jews in the town" (p. 16). Yet after all the raping, how sentimentally he describes his attachment to his Polish fiancée, who had suddenly died.

The text of the memoirs, which fills about seventy pages, is annotated. Lahrkamp gives adequate references (to English works, such as C. B. O'Brien's *Muscovy and the Ukraine, 1654–1667*, and to numerous Polish works, including the contemporary memoirs of J. C. Pasek). He also gives identifications and information, but the apparatus could have been more comprehensive. The introduction, which gives biographical data on von Holsten and a few remarks about the manuscript, might also have been usefully expanded—possibly to include comparisons with other materials and discussions of broader social or economic issues raised by the vividly written and informative manuscript.

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DIE PROTOKOLLE DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN MINISTERRATES, 1848–1867. EINLEITUNGSBAND: MINISTERRAT UND MINISTERRATS-PROTOKOLLE, 1848–1867. By *Helmut Rumpler*. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1970. 144 pp. DM 82.

In 1966 the Hungarian State Archives edited and published the records of the Austro-Hungarian Ministerrat for the war years, 1914–18. By 1968 Austrian and Hungarian scholars had agreed, with the support of their governments, to publish in full all the existing protocols from 1848 to the time of the monarchy's demise. The Austrians have responsibility for covering the Ministerrat to the year 1867, and the Hungarians will prepare the volumes for the period of Dualism, including a new edition of the deliberations during World War I.

Rumpler's introductory volume describes the problems facing the editors. Scholars should note that the committee will include only those protocols actually submitted to Franz Joseph. Supplementary documents, which often form an integral part of the protocol, will appear as a result of admittedly difficult editorial decisions. Quite correctly, Rumpler raises the issue of interpreting statements attributed in the protocols to individual ministers. Summarizations of discussions by the Protokollführer undoubtedly softened the impact of disagreement. No one can be sure of procedures relating to the invitation of specific ministers, the order of business, or the mode of voting. Fuller accounts of maneuvering before and after the sessions will depend on memoirs and letters. Despite such limitations, scholars will welcome the series. The protocols of the "common" Ministerrat after 1867 should be more rewarding, if this reviewer remembers correctly what he surveyed for the years 1879–93.

Rumpler, thanks to his close study of the meetings between 1848 and 1867, offers an excellent analysis of Franz Joseph's stubborn fight to reduce his ministers to complete subservience. By 1851 he had taken over the chairmanship of the Ministerrat and had warned Schwarzenberg that this council was responsible to the throne, not to any other political authority. He rejected his strong minister's proposed definition of the Ministerrat's sphere of authority with a denial that it was a *Behörde*. Complaints and petitions were to come directly to him. After 1852 lesser men challenged the ruler occasionally by making disclosures to the press. By 1865 the necessity of compromise with Hungary ended the struggle for a division of power between dynast and advisers.

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