

strategy. He wrote this book during a one-year leave, having been awarded an International Affairs Fellowship by the Council on Foreign Affairs. In the book, he sets out to prove his theory that the three major wars in the Middle East, in the less than two decades since the Politburo decided to supply arms to that area, have all ended with threatened Soviet military intervention, and that in each case a sort of super power confrontation erupted. He has made his point well. Russian arms sent to foreign countries mean war, the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union being to foment trouble abroad to the embarrassment of Western governments. If it were not so, the Soviet Union would send tractors and civilian development aid instead. The Soviet difficulty lies in trying to control and direct the hostilities it provokes, when its clients come up against better trained, mainly American armed, Israelis.

Glassman examines the strategy behind the Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East, and the motivation, which he traces through the Arab-Israeli wars, cataloging all known information on this matter. After an introductory chapter, "Detente and Local Conflict," he goes on to consider "The 1956 Suez War," "The Soviet Union and the Six Day War," "Prelude to Yom Kippur," "The October War," and ends with a summary, "The Soviet Union and the Three Wars," in which he shows how Soviet arms were a constraint upon or inducement to the Arabs to make war. His comment that "Moscow will continue to play an important political-military role in the region," is a sound one.

Although the author, in the preface, denies that his views are in any way official ones, he tends to give the conventional United States government "party line," and he also acknowledges his debt for "information" from the Tel Aviv and Hebrew Universities in Israel, which, at times, gives an Israeli slant in the direction of overstatement. He says, for example, that "some 25-40 of the Kelt stand-off missiles were launched from TU-16s," when in fact only one was fired by the Egyptians during the October War. He also asserts "that the US possessed ECMs (electronic counter measures) to foil the SAM-6," which was not so then, and most probably is not so now, because the Israelis failed to capture a "directional guidance" apparatus (the six SAM-6s seized had been gutted of all radar equipment by the Arabs before being abandoned). Despite this slight gilding of the lily, the book, which has been painstakingly researched, is interesting and instructive, and well worth reading by any student of Middle East and Soviet affairs.

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**SOVIET NAVAL POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS.** Edited and compiled by *Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell*. Published for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. xxvi, 663 pp. \$32.50.

Here in 660 pages one finds the gratifyingly well-integrated contributions of twenty-seven British, Canadian, Australian, and American authors that make marked progress toward the stated goal of the Second Dalhousie University (Halifax, Nova Scotia) Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments (where most of the thirty-four papers which comprise this book were delivered), to raise the level of informed analysis and debate on the subject. Marshall Shulman sets the foreign policy context in the first chapter with his understanding of "a long-term Soviet commitment to

a policy of low tension abroad" while continuing the ideological struggle and developing "a global presence and influence commensurate with its status as a great power." Malcom Mackintosh and Matthew Gallagher discuss the Soviet military's influence on foreign policy and the military role in Soviet decision-making, respectively. John Erickson provides a potpourri on the meaning of Admiral Gorshkov's long series of articles in *Morskoi Sbornik* in 1972-73 and identifies five naval "interest groups." By way of providing the economic context, John Hardt suggests that the "economic disaster of 1972" is likely to have made this an unpropitious time for Admiral Gorshkov's demands for a much larger navy even though the naval service may well win increased allocations within a relatively stable defense budget. The eight papers in this first part of the book, focusing on foreign policy, military, and economic context of Soviet naval policy, and the ensuing discussion by the large number of participants in the seminar are ably summarized by Ken Booth of University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. His summaries of the three major parts of the conference are combined with excellent editing to give the symposia unusual coherence and readability.

Part 2 is comprised of nine chapters, eight of which are concerned with case studies on Soviet policy in the Third World and the ninth covers the Soviet position at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Soviet-Egyptian relations since 1967 are treated by Alvin Rubinstein, while Uri Ra'anan covers Soviet activities in the Middle East from 1969 to 1973. George Dragnich has contributed a well-researched study of the Soviet quest for Egyptian naval facilities. Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean are discussed, respectively, by Oles Smolansky and Geoffrey Jukes. Part 3 contains miscellaneous but significant analytical material of interest mainly for the specialist: ten years of expanding Soviet naval operations by Robert Weinland, including several interesting pages on political applications of naval power by the USSR and examples from 1967-72. Part 4 has articles on "deterrence" and "defense" in Soviet usage and on Soviet strategic weapons policy from 1955 to 1970. The fifth and last part, titled "Aspects of Soviet Naval Policy," leads off with a solid study by Michael MccGwire covering 1960 to 1974 in Soviet decision-making on naval policy. A useful inquiry into the wartime missions of Soviet naval general purpose forces is provided by Bradford Dismukes. A fruitful discussion of Soviet views on the key concept of command of the sea is provided by Peter Vigor and MccGwire. An exceptionally original and stimulating contribution in this final part is the article on naval arms control as an aid to the arms race by Professor Franklyn Griffiths of the University of Toronto.

This volume is the second of a trilogy stemming from the five-day Dalhousie conferences held in 1972, 1973, and 1974. The first volume, *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*, and the just-published *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions*, when taken together with the book under review, provide a unique source of the latest developments concerning the Soviet Navy. Professor MccGwire, organizer and host for the three conferences and chief editor and contributor, has wisely suspended the conferences pending significant new developments.

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