

cursorily and frequently hortatory. Unfortunately, there are also signs of hurried editing: errors in dates of major events, such as the Glassboro meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin in 1967 and the conclusion of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin in 1971; and other factual slips (the Twenty-fifth Party Congress was the third, not the second, CPSU congress held after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964). And while the book contains a brief bibliography, the frequent quotations from Soviet materials are often inadequately referenced. These technical flaws apart, the book presents some able argumentation for a skeptical view of the prospects for enduring cooperative relations between East and West.

*National Security and Détente*, in addition to General Goodpaster's thoughtful essay on the ambiguities of the American-Soviet relationship, contains seventeen separate contributions by members of the faculty of the Army War College and its subordinate departments. They range widely over geographical and functional aspects of contemporary international politics. Perhaps it is paradoxical that a book originating at a military institution should contain only one technical chapter—General Atkeson's discussion of the potential of precision-guided munitions for Western defense. Unfortunately, for a reader in 1978, this competent assessment antedates the controversy over cruise missiles which has complicated the SALT negotiations since 1975, and the controversy over possible deployment of the neutron bomb. As of early 1975, General Atkeson seemed to see some merit in notions of denuclearizing central Europe because of the enhanced feasibility of conventional defense; it would be interesting to see an updated judgment of this possibility.

The volume contains a brief but instructive historical review of phases of détente in Great-Power relationships during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most of the phases turned out to be relatively short-lived, but this was not necessarily disadvantageous for the parties concerned. The three authors of this contribution wisely warn against oversimplified conclusions from the past, and their own final caution—that in any détente process adaptable policies are constantly called for—is a sensible one.

For the Soviet specialist, the Army War College volume contains few new insights into Soviet policies and motivations, but it provides a stimulating cross-fertilization with other specialties and disciplines. It brings home the fact that the study of U.S.-Soviet relations in our time must be interdisciplinary, historical as well as forward-looking, concerned not only with the objectives of the actors but with the results of actions and interactions, and conscious that the purposes of the superpowers are increasingly subject to influences beyond their control.

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MOSKAU UND DIE EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION. By *Eberhard Schulz*.

Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, vol. 38. Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1975. 267 pp. DM 59.

The establishment of a European Community in postwar Western Europe, and its subsequent sporadic but consequential development, has been followed with watchful concern in the Soviet Union. It is likely that the precipitant formation of a political union or of an integrated defense community possessing independent nuclear capability would have provoked a stern Soviet response. Instead, with gradual neofunctionalist integration in the economic sector, Moscow has learned to coexist peacefully and even to entertain notions of collaboration.

Eberhard Schulz, associate research director of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn, has traced the development of the Soviet response—from initial militancy to current limited association with prospects for the development of broader cooperation between the European Community and the Soviet-sponsored Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)—and thus has written the standard work on the relationship between the Soviet Union and the European Community. Schulz not only presents an exhaustive bibliography of Soviet and East European views on the developing European Community, but also relies heavily on discussions held with associates of the international affairs institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and others involved in Soviet policy making. He draws on these sources to demonstrate important nuances and inherent contradictions between the espoused ideology, that supranational integration reflects the increasing monopoly of multinational trusts under the later stages of capitalism, and the more pragmatic orientation of certain Soviet and Comecon policymakers who have ultimately countenanced the development of relations with the European Community.

Stern Soviet diplomatic notes accompanied the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Following the initial marked success of the economic community (and the re-vamping of Comecon), Khrushchev, in 1962, warned that such a development could not be ignored and signaled the possibility of limited cooperation between the two regional groupings. With the advent of détente and improved relations with the West Germans, Brezhnev (in a conciliatory effort to ensure passage of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties in the West German Bundestag) formally announced Soviet recognition of the institutional existence of the European Community in the spring of 1972. Schulz effectively demonstrates, however, the limited subordination of the ideological thrust with the mounting of Soviet strategic offensives aimed at dividing the Community—strategies that were to prove unsuccessful—only underscoring the dilemma inherent in the contradictory Soviet approach. The Soviet-inspired “Gesamteuropa” strategy, embodied in the Helsinki and follow-up conferences, provided a catalyst for a common West European approach. Since de Gaulle, no member of the European Community has succumbed to the enticement of a special entente with the Soviets at the expense of relations with other states within the Western alliance. By focusing on the internal components of policy making in the Soviet Union, Schulz perhaps underestimates (though he takes into brief account) the role of external components on the evolving Soviet approach to the European Community: the attempt to improve relations (and consolidate hegemony in the intervening territory) with the West in the wake of Chinese border hostilities; the professed willingness of Euro-Communists to work within the institutional framework of the European Community; and, of course, the overall umbrella of superpower détente.

A marked increase in Soviet-West European trade in the early 1970s (particularly with the Federal German Republic, as the tables in the book attest) prompted speculation that the Soviet Union and the Comecon nations would seek to define preferential trade terms prior to the institution of mandatory common trade agreements by an expanded European Community, and prior to the announced target date (1980) for monetary unification. It is against this backdrop that Schulz develops variant scenarios of future Soviet-European Community relations. With the benefit of elapsed time it is evident that the stagnation of efforts toward a monetary union, and the attendant reassertions of nationalism, have rendered the fulfillment of these predictions unlikely indeed—at least two years hence. Until the threshold of joint nuclear collaboration (with the specter of West German involvement) is achieved, there would be, in Schulz’s opinion, no Soviet intervention in the affairs of the European Community.

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