

RUSSIA AND CHINA: THEIR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TO 1728. By *Mark Mancall*. Harvard East Asian Series, 61. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. xv, 396 pp. \$12.00.

This is a rich and thoughtful book, of particular relevance to our own historic juncture. Professor Mancall did his prolonged and intensive research in Russian, Chinese, and Mongol at Leningrad, Taipei, and Tokyo among other centers. The omissions beyond his control were the depositories at Peking and such Russian data as Envoy Fedor Golovin's report on the Nerchinsk negotiations of 1689 now in the USSR's Central Archive of Ancient Acts and "unavailable to non-Soviet scholars" (the author had to use this document secondhand through quotations from it by a Soviet historian).

The pertinence to our time is in the pride of those old Chinese and Manchu rulers who viewed their Middle Kingdom as the world's center, to which all other peoples and states were but periphery and tributary. Mancall shows well the inability of the Russians, here acting as a Western power, to understand—less so to accept—this stand, and the Chinese-Manchu indignation at this inability. He delineates clearly the slow, hurtful process wherein both Peking and Moscow (later St. Petersburg) had to fit their disparate philosophies and state-styles to each other if the twain were indeed to meet. Peking shunned the meeting stubbornly and for many years successfully. When sparingly and reluctantly admitted, Moscow's envoys had to kowtow. Hopefully, with visions of trade, they brought gifts, but Peking took these as vassals' tribute. If any side was to bestow presents, they would be only from China to the Russians and other inferiors as indulgent recognition of their kowtows. The book's account of this is lucid and fascinating.

Still, the Muscovites pressed on, along the Amur as Cossacks and other marauders, and over the deserts to the Forbidden City as envoys and merchants. In the mid-seventeenth century, China was at a weak moment: the Manchus were then consolidating their fresh conquest of the Chinese and had neither time nor stomach for wars on the Amur. Later, the K'ang-hsi emperor's troubles with the Jungars and the Mongols hindered him. By 1685, however, he had enough muscle to fight and smash the Cossacks at Albazin. Yet he could not move farther west, against Nerchinsk, no matter how badly he wished to capture it. And so Nerchinsk stayed in Russian hands, as a springboard for the tsars' future inroads into China. In 1689 Nerchinsk gave its name, not to one more Chinese-Manchu victory, but to a treaty—China's first unwilling pact with a European power. The author's tale of this Chinese retreat is most perceptive.

Mancall demonstrates that the Nerchinsk document, although in some respects a compromise, was on the whole a Russian gain. But in time the K'ang-hsi emperor tried to curtail it by hampering Moscow's trade caravans to Peking, in their frequency, provisioning, and freedom of commerce, not too liberal even before 1689 but yet more limited afterwards. In such opposition Peking was often most ingenious. On one occasion of a Russian caravan's arrival, cited by the author, the Peking authorities "placed two hundred thousand sable pelts from the emperor's own stores at prices far below the caravan's," thus ruining the market for the furs brought by the Russians.

With the K'ang-hsi emperor's death in December 1722 (after a reign of sixty-one years!), and his successor's awareness that the Russians were now active also in Central Asia, Peking was in a mood for deals. Mancall depicts the Kiakhta Treaty of 1727, with its much wider freedom of Russian-Chinese trade, as an attempt by

Peking at conciliation: it would grant the Russians the commerce they wished if only they would halt their advance in Central Asia. Soon the Russians vastly expanded their trade by suspending those clumsy and costly caravans and boosting frontier deals at Kiakhta instead—but their Central Asian push continued, with well-known results.

As Mancall points out, the Kiakhta agreement worked for the Russians until 1860, by which time their attitudes as well as those of the West Europeans toward the nonwhite world had undergone tremendous changes, leading to far greater appetites and grabs. The book's conclusion, "An Hypothesis as Epilogue," is absorbingly interesting for the author's challenging views on the "new Western concepts of the intellectual order" and the "new technology by which the West was subjecting East Asia to its new concept of world order." His ideas of political history and social anthropology, coupled with his linguistic and research talents, lead us to hope that Mancall will produce at least two more books as brilliant as the one under review—for the periods 1729–1860 and 1861–1949.

One minor correction: Yury Krizhanich (Juraj Križanić), the exile in Tobolsk who in 1675 met and helped with information the tsar's China-bound envoy Nikolai Milescu or Spathary, was not "of Serbian nationality" (p. 77), an error all too often made in historical literature. He was a Croat.

To the sources on Krizhanich given by Mancall (p. 326), he should have added the latest Soviet publication of the Croat monk's *Politika* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1965), containing the original and its new Russian translation, and, above all, some thirty-five pages of illuminating comments by two Soviet scholars.

In the ample bibliography, to the journals of Adam Brand as issued in London in 1698 (and in French in Amsterdam in 1699) and of E. Isbrants Ides in London in 1706, Mancall would have done well to add the Russian translation of both, *Zapiski o russkom posol'stve v Kitai (1692–1695)*, published in Moscow in 1967 under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences: the corrections and comments by M. I. Kazanin, the Soviet translator, are exceedingly valuable.

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LA GRANDE COMMISSION LÉGISLATIVE, 1767–1768: LES CAHIERS DE DOLÉANCES URBAINS (PROVINCE DE MOSCOU). By *François-Xavier Coquin*. Preface by *Victor-L. Tapié*. Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Paris-Sorbonne. Série "Recherches," vol. 67. Paris and Louvain: Béatrice Nauwelaerts, 1972. ix, 258 pp.

The *nakazy* (instructions, *cahiers*) given to the deputies to the Legislative Commission of 1767 by their electors provide an inexhaustible source of information on mid-eighteenth-century Russia. To date they have been used to shed light on various aspects of cultural life (education, literacy, freedom of expression, and so forth) or on the demands of specific groups. Among the latter, pride of place has been held by the nobility, whose sociocultural physiognomy has been well delineated on the basis of the *nakazy* to its deputies. Curiously, however, the *nakazy* have not been adequately exploited with reference to the "free" peasantry or the urban classes. It is the latter gap that Mr. Coquin endeavors to fill.

In the first half of his book Coquin retraces in useful detail the procedures for the election of the deputies and the drafting of their *nakazy*. On the basis of his