Bureaucratization and Social Control: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation

Mathieu Deflem

I employ a theoretical framework developed on the basis of the writings of Max Weber to analyze historical developments in the formation of international police organizations. I rely on a comparative analysis of selected cases of international police networks and centrally focus on the most famous and enduring of such structures, the International Criminal Police Commission, the forerunner of the organization since 1956 known as "Interpol." Using a Weberian perspective of bureaucratization, I maintain that the formation of international police organizations was historically made possible when public police institutions were sufficiently detached from the political centers of their respective states to function autonomously as expert bureaucracies. Under such circumstances of institutional autonomy, police bureaucracies fostered practices of collaboration across the borders of their respective national jurisdictions because and when they were motivated by a professionally defined interest in the fight against international crime. In conclusion to this analysis, I argue for the value of sociological perspectives of social control that are not reductionist, but that instead bring out the specific socially and sociologically significant dimensions of control mechanisms.

Ours is not a political but a cultural goal. . . . It only concerns the fight against the common enemy of humankind: the ordinary criminal.
—*Vienna Police President Hans Schober, 1923*

They don't know what we are doing. . . . We do the work.
—*New York City Police Commissioner Richard Enright, 1923*

A steady road leads . . . to the current position of the policeman as the "representative of God on earth."
—*Max Weber*

Mathieu Deflem is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Purdue University. His research areas include the sociology of law and social control, criminology, sociological theory, and comparative-historical sociology. Recently published work deals with comparative criminal justice, abortion, discourse theory, and democracy and justice. He conducts a website campaign, "Free Education Now!," against commercial lecture notes companies. He is editor of *Habermas, Modernity, and Law.*

Introduction

In this article, a study in the sociology of social control, I use a theoretical model based on the work of Max Weber to account for the development of international police organizations from the middle of the 19th until the early 20th century. Although much sociological research has been devoted to the study of police (e.g., Bittner 1970; Black 1980; Marx 1988; Skolnick 1966), it remains a truism, as Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) argue, that many dimensions of police and policing remain conspicuously understudied by sociologists. It is remarkable that political sociologists have, for the most part, neglected to study police institutions, especially when we consider that Max Weber related his famous conception of the state explicitly to the institutionalized means of force. Recall that Weber defined the state as "that human community which within a certain territory . . . claims for itself (with success) a monopoly of legitimate physical coercion" ([1919]:506; see also Weber [1922]:514–40, 566–67, 815–68). And when Weber specified the functions of the modern state, he explicitly included "the protection of personal security and public order (police)" ([1922]:516).

Yet, despite Weber's reference to the institution of police, sociologists have mostly been interested in the state as the center of power over a territory, rather than in the bureaucratic apparatuses of legitimate force the state has at its disposal. I demonstrate that it makes sound sociological sense to study police as a force in and of itself, even though it is not unrelated to other dimensions of society.[1] Specifically, I investigate dimensions of the internationalization of police, defined as that institution formally charged to lawfully execute the state's monopoly over the means of coercion (Bittner 1970; Manning 1977:105). Hence, this analysis is not about the police (in the plural) as a force of law-enforcement officials, but about police (in the singular) as an institution sanctioned by states. Specifically, I undertake a historical study of several international organizations of police that were formed since the middle of the 19th century.

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[1] Relatedly, the gradual delineation of social control as a separate theme of reflection has been the central development in sociological theorizing on the matter over the past decades (Coser 1982; Deflem 1994; Liska 1997). Although the 19th-century concept of social control was virtually synonymous with social order, since the 1950s it has come to be conceived more narrowly in relation to deviance and crime. Social control has become a mainstay in the more-restricted meaning, referring to social processes and structures that—corresponding to the three dominant sociological theory groups—redress, create, or reproduce more than crime and/or deviant behavior (see Cohen 1985; Cohen & Scull 1985; Marx 1981).

International dimensions of police have been of growing concern in recent years (e.g., Deflem 1996a; Huggins 1998; Marx 1997; McDonald 1997; Nadelmann 1993; Sheptycki 1995). From a sociological viewpoint, the internationalization of the police function is particularly puzzling because public police agencies are central organs of national states that claim and are willing to protect at large costs their jurisdictional sovereignty. Cooperation among public police institutions at an international level, therefore, seems to be inherently paradoxical to their nation-bound function, acutely posing the question of why police nonetheless cooperate across national boundaries.

The centerpiece of my analysis is the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), the forerunner of Interpol, which, founded in Vienna in 1923, is among the most enduring, and in this sense successful, international police organizations. The origins of the ICPC provide a useful case that can be comparatively examined in relation to other international police initiatives that for various reasons were not successful. Of these, I discuss the Police Union of German States, formed in 1851; the First Congress of International Criminal Police, organized in Monaco in 1914; and the International Police Conference, held in New York in 1922.

On the basis of Max Weber's theories of bureaucracy, the central argument of my analysis is that international police organizations with broad international representation could only be formed when police institutions were sufficiently autonomous from the political centers of their respective national states to function as relatively independent bureaucracies. When this structural condition of institutional autonomy was fulfilled, I further maintain, police institutions would collaborate across the borders of their respective national jurisdictions on the basis of a shared system of knowledge concerning the development and enforcement of international crime. In the discussion, I focus on the theoretical implications of this analysis and bring out the merits of a Weberian perspective of social control.

International Police and Bureaucratization

Weber's theories of bureaucracy have not been very influential in the sociology of social control. Studies of police bureaucracies mostly focus on only one organization or aspect of policing (e.g., Ethington 1987; Ng-Quinn 1990; Theoharis 1992), while other studies criticize the Weberian preoccupation with formal rationality (e.g., Herbert 1998; Heyman 1995). Relatedly, studies of social control that use a bureaucracy perspective tend to emphasize the dangers involved when state agencies operate without sufficient democratic control (e.g., Benson, Rasmussen & Sollars 1995; O'Reilly 1987; Gamson & Yuchtman 1977; Useem

1997). The relevance of these studies cannot be denied, but based on the notion that critique cannot be constitutive of analysis, I follow a different route and develop a Weberian framework to empirically uncover historical developments of police. Let me first briefly repeat the key elements of Weber's perspective of bureaucracy.[2]

Bureaucracy and the State of Police

Corresponding to Weber's suggestion that societal rationalization has gone in the direction of an increasing reliance on principles of efficiency in terms of a calculation of means ([1922]:514–16), he considered the modern state bureaucracy to be the quintessential expression of formally rationalized societies (551–79). In fact, Weber went as far as to equate bureaucracy with modern power: "domination (*Herrschaft*) is in everyday life primarily administration (*Verwaltung*)" (126). As institutions in charge of implementing policies decided upon in the polity, state bureaucracies operate on the basis of an organizational design that includes that they are: subject to a principle of jurisdiction; hierarchically ordered; operating on the basis of files; separated from private households; relying on specialized training; employing a full-time staff; and guided by general rules (551–54). Most critically, Weber observed, the modern bureaucracy operates on the basis of a "formalistic impersonality" oriented at employing the most efficient, and only the most efficient, means, given certain goals (128). Efficiency and specialization also enhance bureaucratic knowledge, including technical know-how (expertise) and information (accumulated in the exercise of official business) (Weber [1918]:352–54).

Among the social consequences of bureaucratization, Weber found most significant the trend toward bureaucratic autonomy; that is, the gradual formation of a bureaucratic machinery that is relatively autonomous from political and popular control. Weber discussed the societal conditions under which bureaucracies were formed ([1922]:556–66), but he argued that such external influences were "not indispensable" preconditions and that they could not account for bureaucratic activity (558). Instead, it was the technical superiority of the bureaucracy "without regard for the person" that Weber regarded as "the decisive factor" for the spread of bureaucracy as the most dominant form of organization (562, 561). The sole regard for a purposive-rational execution in the modern bureaucracy is what Weber argued to account

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2 My reading of Weber's perspective of bureaucracy relies on the relevant sections from the posthumously published *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Economy and Society) (especially Weber [1922]:551–79, 815–37) and some additional writings on bureaucracy in Germany ([1918]) and the political profession ([1919]). English translations can be found in Weber 1958, 1978.

for the drift of bureaucracy toward independence beyond and possibly even against political control (Weber [1919]:541–42).

Rationalization processes have historically influenced a bureaucratization of the modern police function across Western societies (Bayley 1985:23–52; Manning 1977:41–71).[3] Notwithstanding national variations, police development has gone in the direction of the creation of a specialized bureaucratic apparatus, in both functional and organizational respects (Bayley 1985:12–14; Manning 1977:109–11; Skolnick 1966:235–39). Functionally, public police institutions have gradually come to be responsible for order maintenance and crime control, tasks for which police can legitimately resort to force. Organizationally, police bureaucratization is reflected in characteristics that closely follow Weber's typology: police bureaucracies are hierarchically ordered, with a clear chain of command (discipline); agents are formally trained experts who, as full-time appointed officials (professionalization), perform specialized duties (division of labor); and policework follows set rules and procedures (professionalism) and is driven toward the use of technically efficient means, such as secrecy and force (purposive rationality).

Before I elaborate a bureaucratization model of international police on the basis of Weber, I wish to acknowledge that a similar perspective is founded in Michel Foucault's theories of discipline and governmentality ([1975], [1978]). These studies conceive of social control as the management of a depoliticized society of living subjects (e.g., Simon 1988; Stenson 1993). Such a Foucauldian model can usefully bring out aspects of a technology of policing and its internal dynamics, but it has also been criticized because it cannot satisfactorily deal with the ambivalent developments of law and social control in terms of justice as well as coercion (Habermas 1985:279–343) and because it neglects the embeddedness of punishment and control in a broader societal context (Lacombe 1996). Although there may be debate on the validity of these criticisms against Foucault (Deflem 1997; Garland 1990, 1997), these concerns were of key significance to Weber, for his perspective took into account the external conditions that favored the bureaucratization process without neglecting its internal logic (Albrow 1970:45–49; Page 1985:162–71). Thus, although a Foucauldian perspective can surely be complementary to a Weberian analysis, the hypotheses I advance in this article take advantage of Weber's theory to focus attention on the dynamics that work toward bureaucratic autonomy without neglecting the external contexts in which bureaucratization takes place.

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3 Weber himself introduced the conception of police as bureaucracy when he discussed as a condition favorable to bureaucratization "the increasing need, in a society accustomed to pacification, for order and protection ('police') in all areas" ([1922]:561).

A Weberian Model of International Police Cooperation

Applying Weber's perspective of bureaucracy, I outline a two-layer model of international policing that differentiates between structural conditions and operational motives. Structural conditions ensure that national police agencies are in a position to move beyond the confines of their respective national jurisdictions. These conditions are necessary but insufficient for police agencies to engage in international cooperation. When structural conditions are met, international police organizations need an additional motivational basis to become operational. Relying on Weber, I specify the structural conditions and operational motives of international policework in terms of two aspects of bureaucratic autonomy: (1) As a structural condition for cooperation across national jurisdictions, police institutions must have gained a sufficient degree of independence as specialized bureaucracies from their respective governments; and (2) International policework can be actualized when police institutions share a system of knowledge and expertise on international crime.

My first hypothesis relates to the necessary conditions that need to be fulfilled to create a structural opportunity for international policework. Sociologist Peter Blau ([1964]:64–68) has specified conditions for exchange among collectivities by suggesting that interorganizational exchange can occur when organizations are interdependent in terms of tasks or objectives. Absent supranational enforcement duties, police bureaucracies cannot be interdependent in terms of a functional division of labor. However, given similarity in the institutional position of police bureaucracies across nations, formal congruence in positions can be considered a condition for interorganizational cooperation across national jurisdictions. In other words, police institutions can engage in cooperation with similarly bureaucratic police agencies from other nation-states, because of their comparable autonomy relative to the political centers of their respective states. If such autonomy is not achieved, police cooperation will remain limited in scope of international participation and cannot extend beyond the confines of politically akin states, i.e., national states that resemble one another in ideological respects and/or entertain close ties in international relations.

The introduced notion of autonomy does not imply an absolute independence or detachment of police from the state. On the contrary, public police institutions are always agents of state control, and as public police institutions they can derive their legitimacy only from states. Autonomy of police, therefore, remains a matter of degree relative to the (historically variable) control from national governments. Yet, with these qualifications in mind, the conditions of police autonomy from the political

powerholders of the state relate to the fact that police bureaucra-
cies rely on a means-ends rationality to employ what are held to
be the technically most efficient—not necessarily the politically
most opportune—means, given set goals. The irony is that police
institutions can then perform state-sanctioned enforcement du-
ties in a manner that is no longer bound to the state. My first
hypothesis, then, can be stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: *The greater the extent to which national police insti-
tutions have successfully gained a position of institutional independence
from their respective political centers, the greater is the chance that those
institutions are in a position to engage in international cooperation.*

An alternative way of formulating this hypothesis is that po-
lice institutions are in a position to cooperate internationally
when they have gained bureaucratic independence from the po-
litical centers of their respective states (formal bureaucratic au-
tonomy). Or, conversely, a lack of institutional autonomy will im-
pede the formation of international police structures. Police
institutions that remain tied to the political centers of their states
will either insulate themselves from international duties to stay
within the boundaries of their national jurisdictions, or will en-
gage in transnational activities that are intimately related to na-
tional tasks. International activities under these circumstances
will not go beyond unilaterally conducted policework abroad,
temporary bilateral cooperation for specific duties, or limited
multilateral forms among police of politically like-minded states.

Beyond favorable structural conditions, police agencies must
also develop certain operational motives to form a new field of
activities that transcends the borders of national jurisdictions. In
this respect, I rely on Meyer and Rowan's (1977) suggestion that
the operational rules of bureaucratic organizations function as
"myths" that define problems and specify solutions in terms
framed by and for the bureaucracy. It is useful to call these cul-
tural systems of knowledge myths, not to convey the notion that
they are empirically false but that it is not primarily relevant
whether they are. Together with the level of organizational effi-
ciency, these myths influence the organization's legitimacy, activ-
ities, and resources, while minimizing external inspection and
control.[4] The organizationally defined myth that motivates inter-
national police collaboration is provided by a professional con-
ception and interest in the control of international crime. The
reason police can lay claim to, define, and offer solutions to the
international crime problem relates to the fact that police institu-

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    [4] This statement resonates with a central theme addressed in the work of organiza-
tional theorists. Mary Douglas (1986), for instance, argues that an institution acquires
legitimacy by showing how its own rules and practices are the only answer to a problem it
had itself formulated. In the case of police bureaucracies, Jerome Skolnick (1966:238)
similarly speaks of "organizational interests" and "official innovation" to indicate the ten-
dency of modern police to set its own agenda of activities.

tions, as Weber ([1918]: 352–54) argued about bureaucracies in general, can accumulate specialized knowledge, including official information about the extent of, and expertise to deal with, international crime. Such systems of knowledge have operational consequences across national jurisdictions to the extent that they are shared among national police institutions.

Hypothesis 2: *The greater the extent to which national police institutions can rely on a common organizational interest in the fight against international crime, the greater is the chance that those institutions will collaborate in international policework.*

Alternatively formulated, this hypothesis states that international cooperation of police can be achieved when police institutions have established specialized systems of expert knowledge related to the fight against international crime (operational bureaucratic autonomy). Or, conversely, international police cooperation is unlikely to succeed—even despite favorable structural conditions—when participating agencies do not share an agenda on international crime.

In the next sections, I analyze selected cases in the history of international police cooperation on the basis of the suggested hypotheses. The centerpiece of my investigations is the International Criminal Police Commission, but I expand the case of the ICPC with cross-sectional data on three relatively unsuccessful attempts to formalize international policework from the middle of the 19th century onward to show how conditions and outcomes combined under varying historical circumstances. Since the history of international policing is relatively unknown, I first present a brief descriptive sketch of the development of international policework from the 19th century onward.

The Internationalization of the Police Function and the Origins of Interpol (1851–1923)

The formation of the International Criminal Police Commission in 1923 is historically rooted in a long series of efforts aimed at fostering police cooperation across the jurisdictions of national states. Among the antecedents of international police cooperation are various forms of international policework throughout the 19th century, particularly in Europe, that were designed to protect established autocratic political regimes (Bayley 1975; Busch 1995:255–64; Fijnaut 1979:107–45). These international forms, indeed, primarily concerned political police activities, as the targets of such initiatives were typically the presumed opponents of conservative governments, such as anarchists, social democrats, and the growing labor movements. Most of these cooperation efforts were not formally structured in a permanent international organization but occurred on the basis of specific needs and would be terminated once those needs were met. Yet,

at times, steps were taken to create more organized and permanent organizational structures of international police. The Police Union of German States, formed in 1851, was such an organization, bringing together police from various German-speaking states to control political activities. Similar plans of a political nature would still be taken during the latter half of the 19th century. As late as 1898, for instance, Italian authorities organized the "Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome," which was attended by representatives of 21 European countries, in an attempt to formally structure the international policing of the anarchist movement (Jensen 1981; Fijnaut 1979:930–33). Although a follow-up meeting was held in St. Petersburg in 1904, these efforts yielded few practical results.

In the early decades of the 20th century, the number of international police initiatives sharply increased. Most of the these plans were not successful, but the remarkable increase in attempts to structure international policework clearly manifests a more general globalization in cultural and organizational respects that took place in various institutional domains (Boli & Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). At this time, also, international police cooperation gradually depoliticized in terms of goals and became more formalized in organizational respects. The first 20th-century initiative to organize international enforcement against crimes of a non-political nature was taken at the First Congress of International Criminal Police in Monaco in 1914. Such attempts to formalize multilateral police organizations were dominated by police from Europe and rarely extended beyond the Continent.

The main counterpart to European police cooperation in the early 20th century originated in Latin America, where (unsuccessful) plans to establish international police cooperation were voiced at international police conferences in Buenos Aires in 1905, in São Paolo in 1912, and in Buenos Aires in 1920 (Marabuto 1935:26–27). U.S. police agencies were at this time more concerned with the federalization of police in matters of interstate commerce. In the United States no international police cooperation plans were initiated until the International Police Conference in New York in 1922. Clearly, then, when the International Criminal Police Commission was founded in Vienna in 1923, it represented the culmination of an internationalization of police that had been set in motion since at least the 19th-century consolidation of national states. Unlike many of its predecessors, moreover, the ICPC was successful in establishing an enduring structure with wide international representation, the conditions of which I analyze in the following sections.

Institutional Autonomy and the Structural Conditions of International Police Cooperation

The Police Union of German States (1851–1866) and the Failure of an International Political Police in 19th-Century Europe

My first hypothesis states that police agencies must be in a sufficiently autonomous position from the political centers of their states for there to be a structural condition under which police cooperation across national jurisdictions becomes possible beyond the confines of politically akin national states. The negative case of this hypothesis is presented by the failure of 19th-century attempts to forge police cooperation by means of a more or less permanent organization on a European-wide basis. Indeed, most international police efforts in 19th-century Europe were not of a cooperative kind; furthermore, initiated cooperative forms were limited to temporary arrangements and/or to organizations with relatively restricted participation by police of politically similar or unified national states.

In 1848, various outbursts of popular unrest across Europe aimed to overturn the dictatorial rules of autocratic governments. Established regimes responded harshly and, in consequence, also strengthened their police institutions (Fijnaut 1979:107–45; Liang 1992:18–82). This response led to reforms of various national police powers, which brought about a factual harmonization of police organizations across Europe. Additionally, the revolutionary year 1848 also served as a catalyst for the internationalization of the police function, leading to an increase of international police activities with distinctly political objectives.[5] These international political police activities occurred in the form of intelligence work abroad and/or by means of increased cooperation for shared purposes of political suppression (Fijnaut 1987:33–35). Covert political policework abroad was by its very nature typically unilaterally instigated without the knowledge of police or other authorities of the country in which the activity took place. Unlike this transnational policework, international police cooperation involved bilateral and multilateral efforts to organize information exchange, either through establishing contacts between police officials (the so-called personal correspondence system) or through the distribution of printed information on wanted suspects (published in search bulletins). Whereas the correspondence system was initiated ad hoc by a particular police institution on the basis of a specific need for

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[5] In the period before 1848, there had also been attempts—largely unsuccessful—to structure European-wide systems of international political policing. Mention can be made of attempts to organize European police systems during the Napoleonic reign in France and the Metternich regime in the Hungarian-Austrian monarchy (Fijnaut 1979:798–43; Liang 1992:18–19, 33–34).

assistance (e.g., following an assassination attempt on a monarch or statesman), the system of printed bulletins represented a more permanent form of international information exchange (Deflem 1996b). For example, beginning in the 1850s the Viennese police published a biweekly "Central Police Bulletin" (*Central-Polizei-Blatt*), which provided information on wanted suspects (Deflem 1996a:41–42). From the 1860s onward, copies of the Austrian bulletins were regularly sent to police in Prussia, and, by the 1880s, they were distributed throughout Europe (Liang 1992:32).

In the middle of the 19th century, among the most ambitious attempts to formalize international police cooperation was the Police Union of German States, which was founded in 1851 by police of Prussia, Austria, and the German territories of Sachsen, Hanover, Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria (Deflem 1996b). The Union established various modes of direct information exchange, particularly police meetings and a system of printed magazines. The Union, operative until 1866, was conceived in opposition to individuals and organizations that were thought to threaten the stability of the established political regimes of Europe's national states. Because some political dissenters (especially Communists) were believed to be conspiring from London, Paris, and other capital cities in Europe, the Union particularly devoted efforts to enhance international cooperation among police.

However, despite various efforts to formally structure international policework throughout the 19th century, these attempts by and large failed and were operative only temporarily or on a restricted international basis. The majority of these international police operations remained unilaterally transnational (without foreign cooperation), or of a cooperative kind that was limited in functional respects (initiated for a specific purpose and terminated after it was achieved) and/or limited in international scope (bilaterally or multilaterally among police of politically akin states) (Fijnaut 1979:798–843; Liang 1992:18–19, 33–34). The widespread practice of transnational and limited cooperative policework testifies to the critical concerns over sovereignty in 19th-century Europe and the related antagonism and fragile coalitions that marked the international relationships among states. Such sociopolitical conditions also influenced the fact that efforts to establish international cooperation among police on a broader multilateral basis failed. The Police Union is in this respect no exception, for the organization remained very limited in international appeal, with a restricted membership of police from seven German-language states that were united in the German Confederation, a federal political union that existed from 1815 until 1866. The Union could not count on the support of police from France, Italy, and other European countries, even

though they were often as committed to maintaining conservative rule through the policing of politics. And Union agents stationed abroad were mostly involved in secretively conducted transnational operations (Deflem 1996b:48–49). National differences in political-ideological respects combined with sovereignty concerns to make political police cooperation with broad international representation impossible. Therefore, it is also no surprise that, with the rise of Bismarck and his uncompromising foreign policy, the Police Union's activities gradually began to decline, until the Union was finally disbanded when war broke out between Prussia and Austria (the Seven-Weeks' War of 1866).

In sum, reflecting the dynamics of national and international political conditions, police institutions during the 19th century were intimately related with the quest of national autocratic governments to consolidate conservative political rule. As such, it is clear that, although police agencies were institutionally separated from the military, they were closely aligned as the two central organs of state coercion (Fijnaut 1979:127–30). The relevant conclusion is that police institutions during the 19th century remained intimately linked to the political dictates of national-state governments and had not yet sufficiently developed as bureaucratic expert institutions that could claim independence from national (and international) political affairs.

The First Congress of International Criminal Police (1914) and the Rise of European Police Culture

Although 19th-century international political police operations were dominated by the dictates of national governments, they contained the origins of a bureaucratic autonomy of police that would characterize later developments of international policing beyond state control. The main reason for this peculiar development is that, although political police objectives were determined by the autocratic governments of national states, police agencies were charged with arranging and executing all necessary measures independently. As a result of this autonomy granted to police at the administrative level, police officials cooperating across national borders would gradually also begin to develop a common culture that would further cement and build international relations among police institutions regardless of the dictates of political governments.

In the second half of the 19th century, strong political antagonism and nationalist sentiments still hindered efforts to organize international police cooperation. Indicative is the failure of the participants of the anti-anarchist conferences of Rome and St. Petersburg to set up a central intelligence bureau and to have appropriate legislation enacted in the various participating countries (Jensen 1981:340). Ideological differences and political an-

tagonism among the countries of Europe, then, not only pre-
vented legislation being passed at the national levels but also
posed limits to international police cooperation for political pur-
poses.

Nevertheless, the various efforts taken in international police
matters since the middle of the 19th century did lead to the grad-
ual formation of a European police culture that, by the begin-
ning of the 20th century, matured into a non-political system of
shared values, oriented at fostering cooperation across national
borders.

In the first instance, the administrative autonomy granted to
police involved the elaboration of appropriate means of
policework. This elaboration involved primarily the institution of
various modes of information exchange, such as the bulletin and
correspondence systems. These systems, besides transmitting in-
formation for investigative purposes, also enabled police to estab-
lish and cement relationships on a personal level across national
jurisdictions. In fact, as early as 1851, when von Hinckeldey in-
vited police across Europe to form the Police Union, he had al-
ready envisioned a conference of "men . . . who in their difficult
profession know one other as reliable and have learned to appre-
ciate one another" (in Beck & Schmidt 1993:5). Similarly, at the
anti-anarchist conference of Rome, a British representative of
Scotland Yard acknowledged that the meetings were beneficial
"by forming reciprocal friendships leading to greater coopera-
tion" (in Jensen 1981:332). These professional contacts for inves-
tigative purposes were further enhanced by courtesy visits among
police officials that were conducted for reasons of training and
professional diplomacy (Liang 1992:151–55).

During such moments of contact, the professionals of polic-
ing began to recognize one another as fellow experts of law en-
forcement and, in consequence, formed "a fraternity which felt it
had a moral purpose, a mission, to perform for the good of soci-
ety" (Fijnaut 1997:111). From then on, a shared police culture
based on professional expertise in matters of the proper means
of policing could be extended to also include the appropriate
objectives of policing. The development of a depoliticized crimi-
nological knowledge was nurtured and found much favor in the
modern institutions of police (Deflem 1997).

As one important element of these new sciences of crime,
there would also be expressed, time and time again from the
mid-19th century onward, the idea that international crime was
on the rise as a consequence of a general modernization of social
life. For instance, in 1893, the German criminologist Franz von
Liszt expressed the idea that criminals specializing in monetary
crimes had begun to roam the world and that the police re-
sponse against them should be internationally coordinated
(Marabuto 1935:15). Because of these circumstances of a devel-

oping police culture it would become possible for police authorities to independently organize international police cooperation on a multilateral basis.

With the development of a European police culture in mind, it will become clear why the First Congress of International Criminal Police (*Premier Congrès de Police judiciaire internationale*), held in Monaco in 1914, would fail in instituting an international police organization. At the Congress, 300 magistrates, diplomats, academics, and police officials from 24 countries decided to establish and enhance means to improve international police cooperation, including the organization of international police communications by telegraph and telephone (Roux [1914]). A next meeting was to be held in Bucharest in 1916, but the beginning of World War I prevented any practical implementation of the measures discussed at the Monaco Congress.

Despite the fact that the outbreak of World War I effectively meant the failure of the Monaco Congress, I argue that the effort could not have succeeded at any rate because the Congress attendees' conception of the organization of international policework did not take into account developments in police bureaucratization; instead, they still relied on an out-dated model of international policing inherited from the 19th century. Although, as I earlier described, by the early 20th century police experts had already developed a common culture on the means and goals of professional policing, the Monaco Congress was still rooted in principles of national politics and formal systems of law.

From its inception, the Congress was not an undertaking organized by police officials; the initiative to organize it was taken by Albert I, Prince of Monaco. The meeting may have been the Prince's attempt to enhance Monaco's international prestige in world affairs (Bresler 1992:18–20), or it may have been inspired by his awareness of the status of the principality as a resort for the wealthy, posing particular issues of property crimes (Walther 1968:11). Regardless of the Prince's motives, and despite the Congress's explicit focus on criminal and not political police tasks, however, the plan was not instigated by police bureaucrats. And even though the Congress explicitly focused on cooperation among police, most of its attendees were magistrates and government representatives, not police officials. Furthermore, because of the overrepresentation of legal experts and diplomats at the Congress, the discussions largely took place within a legal framework and included debates about the formal arrangements of international law, such as extradition procedures, and proposals of using police measures only for that function. The Congress devoted attention to international measures of policing, but only as one (and the least-discussed) of four conference themes (Roux [1914]:66–198). The Congress thus worked on the basis of a

model of formal systems of law that could only mirror the many differences that existed among the various national jurisdictions.

Having recognized existing variations among national legal systems across Europe (and the world), the attendants at the Congress suggested that all participating countries should adopt one national police system, *in casu* that of France, to be used in all international policework. Relatedly, the influential criminalist R. A. Reiss of the Police-Technical Institute at Lausanne suggested the creation of an international police bureau that would not only collect information about international criminals but also have at its disposal an international mobile police force. Although Reiss's suggestion was not approved, other participants at the Congress spoke very favorably about instituting French systems of criminal identification and investigation at the international level. Eventually, the Congress decided, for example, that the Paris criminal identification service would serve as central international bureau and that French was to be used in international police communications (Roux [1914]:200–01). These arrangements evidently placed the French participation in international policework center stage. Not surprisingly, the French delegates at the Congress by far outnumbered the representatives of other nations (Roux [1914]:4–5). Although French-speaking delegates attended the Congress as official government representatives, the governments of other countries, including, most notably, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and the United States, did not send official representatives (delegates from these countries were privately present as observers and did not take part in the discussions).

The negative implications of the international design suggested at the Monaco Congress are particularly manifested in the critical reactions the meeting received from the two German attendants (Finger 1914; Heindl 1914a, b). The German delegates bemoaned the fact that the Congress was primarily an affair of "Latin" countries and, relatedly, that it had decided to adopt the anthropometric system of identification in international policework (Finger 1914:268; Heindl 1914a:649). These criticisms betray deep-seated German-French antagonism of police technique and administration, because the anthropometric Bertillon system of criminal identification (measuring characteristics of the body) was nationally implemented in France, whereas the dactyloscopic system (of fingerprinting) was used in Germany. Therefore, the choice over which identification system would be adopted at the international level was not a mere technical matter, but would necessitate the reorganization of other participating national police systems. At the root of the problem, the German delegates argued, was the intent of the Congress to establish a supranational police instead of instituting a cooperative network among police institutions that would preserve their respec-

tive national traits. A decade later, when the ICPC would success-
fully establish such a cooperative model, one of the German
attendants again dismissed the Monaco meeting as "dangerous
dreams! Congressional fantasies! Springtime ravings at the Côte
d'Azur" (Heindl 1924:20).

In sum, the failure of the Monaco Congress to establish an
international police organization can be attributed to the fact
that the meeting did not take into account the development of
police bureaucracies and their attained level of autonomy from
the political centers of national states at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury. The Congress was still conceived on the basis of a model of
formal law and politics that was rooted in 19th-century concep-
tions of sovereignty and national jurisdiction. It thereby con-
flicted with police institutions that were already prepared for the
20th century by having developed conceptions of the expert
means and goals of policing, nationally as well as internationally.
As discussed earlier, evolved European police culture had devel-
oped conceptions of the proper means and goals of policing in
terms no longer based on legality but on professional expertise
and knowledge. This situation also implied a mutual recognition
among police officials that the only viable form of international
police cooperation with broad participation could not have polit-
ical objectives and could not aim to institute a supranational po-
lice but instead must be designed as a cooperative criminal po-
lice organization.

Such a non-political and cooperative structure was precisely
what the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) suc-
cessfully introduced in 1923. It was no coincidence, therefore,
that the organizers of the meeting that founded the ICPC did
not conceive it as a reorganization of the Monaco Congress. And,
even though the ICPC would also go through the turmoils of a
world war and other periods of international political antago-
nism, the organization would remain in existence until today.

The ICPC and the Organization of "Purely Technical Matters"

The International Criminal Police Commission was founded
in 1923 to provide mutual assistance among national police insti-
tutions within the frameworks of the laws of their respective
states on matters of ordinary crime, i.e., violations of criminal law
(Internationale Kriminalpolizeiliche Kommission [hereafter
IKK] 1923). The Commission's headquarters were established in
Vienna, and in the years to come, the ICPC gradually expanded
its membership and organizational facilities. The membership
grew from 22 representatives at the time of the Commission's
founding to 58 members by 1934. Almost all European countries
were represented, as were police from Egypt, China, and Japan.
The United States became an official member of the Commis-

sion in June 1938 when President Roosevelt enacted a bill to that effect.

The ICPC headquarters in Vienna became strategically important for the centralization of information on a variety of police matters, especially notices of wanted criminals received from the participating police institutions. In addition to the establishment of its headquarters, the ICPC used various means to enhance direct police-to-police communication, which constituted its most important achievement in its formative years. These measures included coded telegraphic communications, a radio network, printed publications, and meetings. The Commission's most tangible realizations were the monthly periodical *International Public Safety* (*Internationale Öffentliche Sicherheit*), containing data on international crime and information on wanted suspects, and the international meetings, 14 of which took place in various European capitals before World War II.

In relation to my first hypothesis on the necessary conditions of international police cooperation, a variety of circumstances surrounding the formation of the ICPC indicate that a condition of institutional independence was achieved and explicitly relied upon. First of all, the ICPC was formed at a meeting convened independently by police officials, not as the result of a diplomatic initiative. It was but five years after the end of World War I that the Congress to establish the ICPC was organized by Johannes Schober, the Police President of Vienna, who became the first President of the ICPC in 1923 and remained so until his death in 1932. At the Vienna Congress, Schober stated that he had first developed the plan to establish international police collaboration about a year after the end of the war (IKK 1923:8–10). But, because it was so soon after the fall of the Hungarian-Austrian empire, Schober felt that Vienna would not be suitable for such an important task and that the initiative should be left to Police Captain M. C. van Houten, from the "neutral" Netherlands (IKK 1923:8). Van Houten (1923) of the Dutch criminal police had indeed, as early as December 1919, contacted police across Europe to establish an international police office. But, so soon after the war, van Houten's initiative did not produce the desired results. Four years later, Schober still realized the boldness of the plan but nonetheless hoped that "even in the midst of oppositions between the nations of the earth" the Vienna Congress would unite police "above the political battle," for police cooperation, he argued, was "not a political but a cultural goal" (IKK 1923:1, 9, 2).

The delayed gathering of the Vienna Congress after World War I demonstrates that the degree of institutional independence of police bureaucracies is affected by broader societal developments. Indeed, the immediate political implications of the war were obviously considered too weighty to allow for interna-

tional police cooperation. But by 1923, circumstances had changed. The period of relative tranquility and pacification in world affairs that had set in after World War I is among the conditions that then favored police institutions to take advantage of their acquired formal bureaucratic autonomy. Of course, as history would dramatically show, this condition of stability was more presumed than real, but it was nonetheless of sufficient reality in perception that it effectively enabled police institutions to expand and take advantage of structural conditions that allowed them to engage in international cooperation.

Importantly, the acquired independence of police institutions participating in the ICPC did not imply a surrender of national sovereignty. On the contrary, the ICPC was explicitly set up (and, as Interpol today, still operates) not as a supranational force but as an international network of national systems of police (Anderson 1989:168–85). As ICPC President Schober emphasized, the Commission would not strive for "something [as] impossible" as "supranationality" and instead would "hold on to the national individuality of all participating states" (in Archiv für Kriminologie 1925:72). Sensitivity about nationality questions was also reflected in the composition of the ICPC executive committee, assembled so that the various posts rotated from one country to another. The only imbalance in terms of nationality was the placement of the ICPC headquarters in Vienna and the appointment of a President of the Commission who was affiliated with the Viennese criminal police.

This Austrian advantage was acceptable among the ICPC membership because the Austrian police systems and organization were particularly well advanced, especially in technical respects. As I indicated before, the Austrian police indeed had a long-standing history of collecting files on, and specializing in the fight against, international criminals, particularly in developing systems of information exchange (Liang 1992:18–34). In fact, dating back to the days of the Habsburg dynasty, Austrian authorities had initiated several attempts to establish a European police system. Throughout the 1860s, for instance, they attempted to expand the membership of the Police Union and form a European-wide police organization (Liang 1992:151–53). Similarly, after the assassination of Empress Elisabeth of Austria in September 1898, the Austrian Foreign Minister called for the creation of an international police league (Liang 1992:160). Although these plans were unsuccessful, they do indicate Austria's special preoccupation with international policework.

By 1923, then, the acquired expertise, means, and technical prowess of Austrian involvement in international policework could be put to good use, especially for criminal (not political) police matters. The technically dominant position of the Viennese police in the ICPC was also accepted because police from

the smaller European countries lacked the necessary resources to maintain an international office. Police from Germany and France, though participants in the ICPC, were unacceptable in any leadership position, given their antagonistic positions during and after World War I. Moreover, to secure the sovereignty of the individual nationalities, the Vienna headquarters were designed so that they enabled participation of national police systems without amalgamation. The headquarters only collected information forwarded by participating police institutions and passed on requests from one national police to another. As such, the headquarters did not initiate any investigations but functioned as a mere facilitator of police communications among national systems (Anderson 1989:168–85). International communication technologies by radio and telegraph likewise facilitated interaction among police, as did the meetings, without the formation of a supranational force.

Perhaps most clearly indicating an independence from politics is that the ICPC was established without the signing of an international treaty or legal document. All ICPC activities were planned (mostly at the meetings and through personal correspondence) and executed by and for participating police without input or control from their respective governments. In fact, the Commission had no internationally recognized legal status, and no legal procedure was ever formalized to acquire membership in the ICPC. The Commission did strive for governmental and legal recognition of its established structures, and it appealed for formal sanctioning from the League of Nations, inviting representatives of the League to the ICPC meetings (Palitzsch 1927; Skubl 1937). But, importantly, this appeal for political-legal approval occurred after the Commission had been developed and its structures were already in place, for, as van Houten expressed, the League of Nations was not considered capable of handling "such purely technical matters" (van Houten 1923:46).

As a non-governmental organization, the ICPC was never very successful in having its activities formally sanctioned by the League of Nations, in part because the League independently organized various aspects of policework, especially in matters of white slavery, narcotics, and falsifications of currencies, themes on which the League held several meetings and passed international resolutions throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Marabuto 1935:113–49). More successful, however, was the ICPC's pursuit of approval from the national governments of the various participating police agencies. This condition was specified in one of the resolutions at the Vienna Congress as a desirable goal of cooperation (IKK 1923:201), and by the 1930s nearly all ICPC members were officially sanctioned by their respective governments and could often rely on additional funds and personnel to set up specialized offices (the so-called National Central Bureaus) needed

to maintain international communications with the Vienna head-
quarters. As such, what we see is an international police network
seeking to obtain legal and governmental approval after the or-
ganization had already been established and elaborated indepen-
dently on the basis of professional police conceptions and with-
out regard for political and legal considerations.

The Myth of International Crime and the Motives of International Police Cooperation

The International Police Conference (New York, 1922) and the Limits of International Crime

My second hypothesis states that once structural conditions
of institutional independence are fulfilled, international police
cooperation can become operational when participating police
agencies have successfully developed a common organizational
interest in the fight against international crime. The negative
case of this hypothesis is presented by the International Police
Conference (IPC), the first effort that was taken to formalize in-
ternational police cooperation after World War I. The Interna-
tional Police Conference was organized at a meeting of police in
New York in September 1922 (International Police Conference
[hereafter: IPC] 1923; Enright 1925; Welzel 1925). Although the
meeting attracted only five foreign delegates, it established the
International Police Conference as a permanent organization to
promote and facilitate international cooperation among police.
However, in terms of membership and operations, the Confer-
ence was to be a predominantly American organization. It mostly
promoted a coordination of local U.S. law enforcement agencies,
with some additional participation from Canadian law enforce-
ment.

The most tangible attempt to make good on the interna-
tional aspirations of the Conference occurred when a joint meet-
ing was organized with the International Criminal Police Com-
mission in Paris in 1931. There, participants decided to set up an
international police bureau in the United States and to discuss,
at the next joint meeting, the creation of a "World Organization
of Police." But the international bureau was never established
and no additional joint meetings were held. In 1932, the IPC was
brought under the direction of Barron Collier, a wealthy retired
businessman who cultivated a keen interest in international po-
lice cooperation (Nadelmann 1993:90–91). Collier tried to put
new life in the organization, but apart from meetings in Chicago
in 1933 and in Montreal in 1937, the organization eventually
ceased to exist.

Although the International Police Conference was not a suc-
cessful organization, it was created under structural conditions

favorable for international cooperation. The Conference was independently organized by police agencies, especially the New York City Police and its commissioner, Richard Enright, which were sufficiently professionalized to operate independently from governmental control. As Enright remarked at the IPC founding meeting, police professionals were in charge of "the work" in law enforcement, whereas the politicians were unknowledgeable (IPC 1923:341). The IPC also sought to establish police cooperation without the signing of a legally binding document, although the Conference did strive for legal-political recognition once formed. The Conference's plan to establish a central bureau, in particular, was to be approved through appropriate federal legislation, and bills to that effect were (unsuccessfully) entered in U.S. Congress in 1922 and 1923 (National Archives, Record Group 165, 2045-739/3).

Structural conditions for international cooperation were, in terms of formal bureaucratic independence, as favorable in 1922 in the United States as they would be a year later in Europe when the ICPC was formed. Yet what the International Police Conference missed was a practical playing field on which to effectively organize the fight against international crime. The self-stated motives of the organizers of the IPC were clear: the organization had to reach beyond national jurisdiction because "the enemies of society, organized or otherwise, are international in their scope" (Enright 1925:89). The internationalization of crime, furthermore, was believed to have been brought about by the rapid social changes after World War I (IPC 1923:14–15; Hart 1925:54). However, an internationalization of crime with sufficient implications for the development of a professional myth that would justify the creation of an international police organization was at this time still missing in the United States.

To be sure, U.S. law enforcement to some extent had been involved in international tasks for many years (Nadelmann 1993:15–102). Early on, since the founding of the Union, for example, a high premium was placed on customs regulations and the revenue that could be derived from their enforcement. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Customs Service was among the first federal U.S. police forces to be created, in 1789, and Treasury agents were among the first to work internationally by cooperating with foreign police or by being stationed abroad (Nadelmann 1993:22–31). Because of the geographical distance between the United States and Europe, and in the absence of a well-developed federal police, law enforcement agencies in the United States remained relatively insulated from the rest of the world. Also, until the mid-20th century, technological means of communication and transportation were not sufficiently developed for there to be any real concern of international criminality between the United States and Europe. Police tasks that related to an in-

creasing mobility in social life (e.g., the policing of immigrant groups) were handled locally or remained mostly restricted to interstate matters (e.g., white slavery). From the late 19th-century onward, these duties were handled by federal U.S. law enforcement agencies, especially the investigative force of the U.S. Justice Department, which, since 1935, has been called the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Why then was it that the IPC was nonetheless established with the intent of fostering cooperation across national states? Rather than viewing the formation of the International Police Conference in terms of an organizational myth responding to an internationalization of crime, the IPC should be considered in terms of certain internal police developments in the United States, particularly the police reform movement that sought to fight off political partisanship and corruption and enhance professionalism in policework (Walker 1977). This increasing quest for professionalism also entailed an effort to improve police relations, primarily with the public, but also with police of other nations. Publicly, the IPC presented itself as "the premier police association of the world" (Hart 1925:55) and promoted international cooperation, but not so as to respond to any growing concern over an increase in international crime. In fact, there is no empirical evidence that any international investigation ever originated from the IPC. Striking also is that, between May 1924 and October 1925, the IPC published a monthly periodical, the *Police Magazine* (later renamed *Police Stories*) that covered several articles on foreign police systems but provided no investigative information of any kind. Instead of being oriented toward fighting international crime, the IPC served as an organizational "presentation of self" relative to other professional police forces across the world, especially in Europe. For this reason, it was important for founder Enright to argue that the IPC brought together police from all "civilized nations, states, and municipalities of the world" (IPC 1923:15), even though an overwhelming majority of the organization's membership was from the United States (Deflem 1996a:152). As a professional association, the IPC could not compete with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), an organization that, since 1893, had contributed to advance professionalism among local U.S. police agencies (Deflem 1996a:68–70; Nadelmann 1993:84–91). There was in fact some competition between the IPC and the IACP, as the result of interagency conflict between the New York City Police, which founded the IPC, and local and federal law enforcement agencies in Washington, D.C., which controlled the IACP. Having positioned itself explicitly as an advocacy group, the IACP could make good on its ambitions of professionalism much more readily than could the IPC on its aspirations to fight international crime. The fate of the IPC was sealed in the absence of any

significant concerns over an internationalization of crime that would justify a transatlantic police organization. In terms of concerns over interstate crimes within the United States, as well as with respect to the forms of international crime that at this time occupied U.S. law enforcement, however, the IPC could not compete in any significant way with expanding federal police agencies of the United States, in particular the FBI. Especially during the 1930s, under direction of its famed Director, J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI would indeed successfully gather the means, personnel, and budget to virtually monopolize all international law enforcement duties emanating from the United States (Deflem 1996a:187–89).

The ICPC and the Fight Against "The Common Enemy of Human Society"

Whereas the International Police Conference in the United States could not successfully develop a myth of international crime, in this respect the International Criminal Police Commission in Europe was successful. The motivational basis of the ICPC in the first instance was provided by a cross-national rise and internationalization of crime, which police officials argued had taken place after World War I and which they saw as necessitating expanded control across national borders. This operational myth for international cooperation was formed on the basis of a specialized knowledge about the internationalization of crime, as well as the professional means to deal with it. Moreover, knowledge and skills were justified in terms of an expertise that sidestepped legal arrangements and focused not on violations of a political nature but on the ordinary or common criminal (IKK 1923:1).

Regardless of whether the view of a spectacular crime wave at the end of World War I is empirically valid, the notion that it had occurred and that it should serve as a catalyst for international police cooperation corresponds to the self-declared motives of participating police. To some extent, police knowledge on the development of international crime was surely founded in actual developments, but the vigor and intensity with which the notion was defended betrays a reality different from what statistics could support. First, there was the widespread and consequential idea among police authorities that the level of crime had increased dramatically after the war. The Dutchman, Captain van Houten (1923), had already expressed the notion of a spectacular influx of crime in many nations at war's end to justify his initiative in 1919, and Schober had reiterated the theme at the Vienna Congress (IKK 1923:8–10). The reports and statistics that officials from participating nations had provided at the Congress confirmed the necessity of an adequate police response and the com-

monality of the task among European police. Second, there was also believed to have occurred an epidemic spread of a new class of criminals who abused the modernization of social life and the increase in mobility after the war. They were the money swindlers, the passport, check, and currency forgers, the hotel and railway thieves, the white slave traders, and the drug traffickers (IKK 1934:82–129). With the latest technologies of communication and transportation at their disposal, these criminals had in common a unique capacity to transcend the boundaries of time and space in disregard of the national jurisdictions police institutions were traditionally subject to. The ICPC's preoccupation with these technologically influenced crimes is well demonstrated in that, at its first meeting, it had created a separate division concerned with falsification of currencies; at later meetings, the ICPC continued to have separate discussions on these and other typically modern crimes (Deflem 1996a:120–26).

Thus, police officials organizing the ICPC, to justify collaboration across national borders, argued that a new class of criminals was appearing in all countries that were undergoing rapid social change and technological progress, including, particularly, mobile criminals who were transcending nation-state borders. The adequate police response was conceived as a well-organized international network that would foster cooperation as an efficient means of enforcement. That these conceptions of international crime and their proper enforcement were not just a matter of discourse among police officials is clear from a closer look at the organizational innovations the ICPC introduced.

Primarily, the ICPC was concerned with a coordination of investigative information, as well as of technical know-how, through a variety of newly instituted means of information exchange. The Commission established new systems of technologically advanced means for international communication, specifically, a telegraphic code and a system of wireless (radio) communications (Deflem 1996a:129–30). Additionally, printed publications and annual meetings served to function as efficient means of direct international cooperation, unhindered by legal procedure and diplomatic formalities. The ICPC publications contained information and identifying data on wanted criminals and suspects and various articles on the latest police techniques, written by police professionals in the various participating states. The meetings were likewise planned and attended by police officials and criminalistics experts, rather than by political dignitaries or judicial administrators. The primary concern for an efficiency of means in international policework is also well reflected in the organization of the international headquarters at Vienna. By 1934, the headquarters included specialized divisions on the falsification of passports, checks, and currencies, on fingerprints and photographs, and on fugitives from justice and "Persons Danger-

ous to Society" (Deflem 1996a:126–31; Marabuto 1935:91–101).
The organization of the ICPC headquarters, in other words, was
based on expert police knowledge, not on categories of criminal
law, and reflected technical know-how on the goals and means of
policing, not on procedures of international law or politics.

Perhaps most clearly exemplifying the impact of a profes-
sional understanding of international policing beyond politics
and legality were the criticisms among ICPC members against ex-
isting political-legal controls of international crime, the most pro-
totypical expression of which was extradition. Extradition was in-
deed by far the most-addressed issue the ICPC dealt with in its
formative years. The many formalities involved with, and the
slowness of, official extradition procedures were particularly criti-
cized. At the Vienna Congress in 1923, the Commission had al-
ready decided that participating police should develop measures
to expedite extradition procedures and that, under some circum-
stances, police could exchange suspects without formal govern-
mental approval (IKK 1923:200–01). At later meetings, the Com-
mission   members   similarly   lamented   extradition   as   an
inadequate tool in the fight against international crime (Deflem
1996a:121–25). The procedure was not criticized in terms of ju-
risdictional sovereignty but because of its inefficiency in fighting
international crime, which, as an ICPC resolution of 1928 de-
clared, had been developing "in a manner alarming to mankind
as a whole" (IKK 1928). At an ICPC meeting in 1930, the Com-
mission eventually determined to bypass extradition procedures
altogether, deciding that ICPC members could make provisional
arrests of suspects on the basis of information in the ICPC peri-
odical, even in the absence of an international treaty that sanc-
tioned this provision (Deflem 1996a:136–37). The ICPC, lament-
ing extradition as an inefficient tool of international police work,
in its place suggested various expert police means to efficiently
tackle the international crime problem. As the resolutions at the
Vienna Congress specified (IKK 1923:197–202), the facilitation
of direct police-to-police communications and a swifter exchange
of information were the primary tools for cooperation across na-
tional borders. Considerations of efficiency dominated in the
choice of adequate police techniques, not concerns over legality
or justice. Instead of trying to construct an internationally valid
legal definition of crime and international crime, the ICPC or-
ganized the international headquarters in Vienna on the basis of
practical matters of crime detection, international policework,
and sophisticated means of police technique and identification,
such as fingerprints and photographs. For similar reasons, the
ICPC also instituted communication systems through telegraph,
radio, and printed documents and organized meetings for police
to interact on a person-to-person basis.

In sum, the ICPC membership understood, in expert terms, the increase in international crime and, on the basis of a purposeful-rational efficiency, professionally conceived the means to handle the problem. Technological developments, ironically, were instrumental both in stimulating concerns over international crime and in enhancing the means of the enforcement of law. Even though technological progress brought about increasing opportunities for cross-border criminality, it also led to a growing expertise in the means of policing and criminalistics. Thus, technically sophisticated means of crime detection were important factors that enabled police bureaucracies to effectively develop a myth of international crime that went beyond a mere discourse among experts.

Bureaucratic Autonomy and the Internationalization of Police

I have explained the formation of the International Criminal Police Commission in 1923 and the failure of other attempts to organize international police cooperation since the middle of the 19th century on the basis of a model of bureaucratic autonomy inspired by Max Weber. I argued that police institutions must have attained a degree of separation from their respective governments so that a structural condition of institutional independence was created. Furthermore, an organizational myth of international crime had to be developed among police of different nations to function as a motivational basis around which to crystallize cooperative work. In this discussion I wish to move beyond the historical-empirical evidence on the immediate cases at hand and argue for the sociological relevance and strength of a Weberian perspective of social control.

The Politics of Police

In terms of my first hypothesis, I argued for the relevance of the structural condition of formal bureaucratic autonomy of police institutions participating in international efforts. In the case of the ICPC, formal bureaucratic autonomy is most clearly evinced from the fact that the organization was established independently at the initiative of police officials. Earlier 19th-century efforts to organize police cooperation could not rely on police institutions sufficiently detached from their respective political centers and therefore remained restricted in terms of international scope and participation. The Monaco Congress of 1914 did not take accomplished developments in the bureaucratization of the police function into account and was doomed to fail because the initiative was taken by politicians and magistrates who relied on dated models of legality and international law. Pos-

iting the relevance of the structural condition of institutional in-
dependence, I did not deny the significance of external factors
on the development of police institutions. On the contrary, like
Weber suggested with respect to the bureaucratization process in
general ([1922]:556–66), certain societal presuppositions had to
be met for police institutions to become detached from their po-
litical centers. In the case of the ICPC, I mentioned political con-
ditions of pacification that enabled the trend toward bureau-
cratic autonomy of police in the interbellum decades of the
1920s and 1930s. The model of bureaucratization I developed
from Weber as such takes into account the influence from socie-
tal conditions that may enable or impede police institutions to
acquire independence.

My thesis on formal bureaucratic autonomy underscores the
argument that structural differences in independence from polit-
ics accounted for the fact that some national police systems could
and others could not participate in international police organiza-
tions such as the ICPC. This fact suggests that formal bureau-
cratic autonomy is a determining factor of police international-
ization, regardless of the political ideologies of the nations
involved and the nature of their relationships in matters of for-
eign policy. This thesis contradicts perspectives that suggest that
the ICPC and other international police organizations are to be
explained primarily as efforts to advance the political goals of
certain powerful states. Authors defending such perspectives
have, in the case of the International Criminal Police Commis-
sion, alluded to the ideological persuasion of the police officials
who founded and participated in the ICPC and, relatedly, to the
political objectives the ICPC was to accomplish under the guise
of crime control (Bresler 1992:21–52; Busch 1995:264–74; Greil-
samer 1986:21–52).

Political motivations can be most clearly revealed in the case
of Johannes Schober, the initiator and first president of the
ICPC, who was also Chancellor of Austria on two occasions, in
1921 and 1929, and who served as Austrian Minister of Foreign
Affairs from 1930 to 1932 (Hubert 1990). Given Schober's ambi-
tions in matters of international politics, it has been suggested
that he founded the ICPC as an instrument of Austrian foreign
policy, particularly, as a tool to revive Austria's international pres-
tige, since the country had been left in a state of instability after
the war. Relatedly, some argue that the ICPC served as an organi-
zational bastion to fight the spread of communism, the fear of
which had taken hold of political elites in Europe (and in the
United States) since the Russian Revolution of 1917 (Bresler
1992:21–26). The fact that police from Russia and, later, the So-
viet Union did not participate in the ICPC is advanced as the
strongest indicator of this perspective.

However, evidence indicates that such political perspectives have serious flaws in accounting for the formation of the International Criminal Police Commission. Specifically, what a state-centered approach cannot explain is that not only did the ICPC explicitly dealt with criminal, not political, activities but also that any preoccupation with political issues at this time actually prevented various efforts to foster police cooperation across national borders. Indeed, during much of the 19th century, police institutions were representative of conservative political regimes and, hence, international police cooperation, especially in Europe, was primarily targeted at the politically suspect opponents of established governments (Bayley 1975; Liang 1992). But, by the early decades of the 20th century, such political ambitions were delegated to separate intelligence forces and no longer guided the international organization of bureaucratic police institutions. It is true that in the years between the two world wars there were still attempts to foster international policework with explicitly political goals—especially with the purpose of controlling Communist movements—and that some of these political ideals were also defended among certain members of the ICPC (Fijnaut 1997). Yet, strikingly, these political policing efforts were never successfully implemented in an international organization. For instance, at a 1920 meeting in Munich, Germany, police from the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria discussed but failed to establish a joint police intelligence network for the suppression of communism (National Archives, Record Group 165, 10058-L-36/1-3). In the late 1930s, other international police meetings with explicit political objectives—including efforts to establish anti-Communist police cooperation organized by police from South America, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy—were likewise not successful (National Archives, Record Group 242, 21/2525789). The only international police efforts with a political motive that were successful in the first half of the 20th century were instigated unilaterally by national police institutions operating secretively abroad or involved cooperation that remained at a bilateral or restricted multilateral level.

Against state-centered interpretations of international police, therefore, I suggest that certain police institutions, including those of Communist Russia, could not cooperate in the ICPC not because of any political motivations among the membership of the ICPC—no matter how real their political antagonism was at the level of national governments—but because of the structural condition that these non-participating institutions remained too closely linked to their respective political centers. Not the ideological nature of the political regime, but the formal separation of police bureaucracies from their governments (whatever their ideological disposition) enabled police bureaucracies to cooperate in international organizations. This situation suggests that po-

lice from Russia did not take part in the ICPC because of their strong attachment to the Communist dictatorship, but also that police from other nations could and did participate in a common structure, although they too were not closely akin in ideological respects and entertained anything but amicable political relationships. The strongest evidence supporting this argument is the cooperation in the ICPC of police from France, England, Italy, and Germany—countries that were also politically hostile during the here-considered years.

Political processes, then, cannot be considered constitutive of international policework, although the structural condition of bureaucratic autonomy is influenced by historically variable circumstances. And, indeed, political conditions are often seen to impede police from attaining or maintaining formal bureaucratic independence. Most clearly, in the case of the ICPC, severe difficulties in upholding professional police relationships mounted by the late 1930s, especially after the Nazi invasion of Poland signaled the prelude to World War II and, even more so, when the United States joined the war effort. Under the extreme condition of warfare, a bureaucratic independence of police cannot be maintained. Hence, international cooperation between police of hostile states was virtually non-existent during the war, although the practical implications of the wartime ICPC—the headquarters of which had fallen under Nazi control—are not entirely clear (Deflem 1996a:248–58).

That police institutions are in a position to cooperate internationally once they have gained formal bureaucratic autonomy implies that cooperation can take place among police of national states that may be very different in political, legal, and other respects. The strength and the survival of the ICPC in this respect is remarkable, considering the great political and cultural heterogeneity that marks the European Continent, dividing the region for hundreds of years. But, putting aside any divisive issues, national police institutions participating in the ICPC could cooperate because of shared professional standards and objectives beyond state politics. This absence of state control only refers to a formal separation of police from the governments of states and is not meant to imply that police institutions are not related to the power and might of states. On the contrary, formally sanctioned with the tasks of order maintenance and crime control, police institutions are arguably the most visible and concrete expression of the state's legitimate monopoly over the (internal) means of coercion (Bittner 1970; see generally, Melossi 1990). In that sense, they are always related to power and force and, as such, are political (Reiner 1985). In fact, the proclaimed reliance of police institutions and other bureaucracies on principles of efficiency and their presentation in strictly professional terms are

themselves important strategies of domination (Weber [1922]:122–30).

My point here, therefore, is not to argue that the state and public institutions of social control are not related, nor that formal bureaucracies of social control are not a critical component of state power, but only that the structures and mechanisms of (international) police organizations are not exhausted with reference to the ideological dictates of the political center of states. An alternative perspective could hold that the formation of the ICPC was enabled by agreements among states over the politically recognized utility of an international police organization, but evidence shows that such agreements only came after police experts had already formed such an organization with means and goals they had decided upon without political control.

The thesis of bureaucratic independence harmonizes with Weber's observation that bureaucracies can keep on functioning regardless of whether a society is organized along capitalist or socialist lines and regardless of the nature of the political regime ([1922]:128–30, 560–79). Indeed, as this analysis shows, once a police institution is sufficiently independent from its political center, it can function as an expert apparatus that can engage in collaborative work with other, likewise independent, police bureaucracies. Institutional independence accounts for the fundamental irony of international police cooperation: that police institutions transcend national jurisdictional competence and move beyond the function assigned to them by their respective political centers.

The Laws of International Police

With the structural conditions for police cooperation fulfilled, the motivational basis that operationalized international policework in the case of the ICPC was a professional myth of a cross-national rise and internationalization of crime since the end of World War I. Accompanying the expert conceptions of the goals of international policework, the means to deal with the problem of international crime were likewise subject to professional police judgment. With its emphasis on technically sophisticated means of policing, exemplified by the functionally specialized headquarters and instituted mechanisms of police-to-police communications, the ICPC—unlike the International Police Conference—so accomplished what Weber, with a witty snap at Marx, once called a "concentration of the means of administration" ([1922]:567).

Based on the myth of international crime, the elaboration of the ICPC implies a rationalization as a systematic organization in terms of instrumental efficiency (Smelser 1998:2). However, as there has been some confusion on the issue of efficiency in the

reception of Weber's work (Clegg 1994:66–67), as well as the ideal-typical status of Weber's terminology (Albrow 1970:61–66), my analysis implies no conclusions on whether rationalized policework is more efficient or effective. I do not argue that the ICPC was a more efficient instrument in the control of international crime, but instead that it was motivated by, and explicitly designed to accommodate, a professional conception of efficiency. In fact, evidence indicates that the ICPC was not very effective in terms of handling international crime.

Based on the minimal evidence available, the ICPC possessed some 7,000 fingerprints between 1922 and 1927, and the International Bureau in Vienna had, by 1936, reportedly collected information on 3,724 suspects (Bresler 1992:40; Leibig 1936:266). These numbers are not impressive compared to the information collected by most other participating and comparable national police systems at the time. The FBI, for instance, already possessed over 1 million fingerprints as early as 1926 (and about 5 million in 1935). The relative ineffectiveness of the ICPC in investigative respects harmonizes with Weber's insight that the actual power of a bureaucracy in influencing the social structure it acts upon is empirically variable ([1922]:572). Instead of its effectiveness in investigations, the fostering of professional relationships among police officials, especially through the meetings, may well have been among the ICPC's most concrete realizations. These personal contacts, moreover, may also have fueled additional bilateral cooperation among police, complementary to the structures of the ICPC. The notion that the ICPC primarily enhanced cooperation through personal contacts parallels Peter Blau's (1955) famous study of informalism in organizations.

Regardless of its effectiveness, however, it is significant that the organizational structure of the ICPC was developed on the basis of systems of knowledge shared by police professionals. Weber recognized very well the relevance of knowledge for bureaucratic power and ultimately even defined bureaucracy as "domination through knowledge" ([1922]:129). Foucauldian studies of crime control and police, similarly, have indicated the relevance of expert knowledge cultures in terms of a tripartite relationship among theory (criminology), empirical knowledge (criminal statistics), and the instrument of control (police) (Foucault [1978]; see also Deflem 1997). Recent scholarship on police cooperation has also argued for the relevance of knowledge systems for the diffusion of police objectives and police technique in international partnerships (e.g., Deflem 1996b; Nadelmann 1993; Sheptycki 1995). James Sheptycki (1998a, b) has usefully described these shared knowledge systems in terms of a transnational occupational subculture that police across nations have come to develop through information exchange and practical arrangements of cross-border policework. Sheptycki ar-

gues that such cross-border arrangements among police defy clear-cut categorization, particularly when one is assessing the rise of transnational policing in terms of a diminishing or strengthening of state power. However, increased complexity in the internationalization of policing need not imply that its historical antecedents cannot be empirically traced and its various components unraveled in terms of a theoretically founded comprehensive approach.

Thus, the bureaucracy perspective reveals that the cultural forces of expert police myths concerning international crime fostered international cooperation practices, demonstrating that bureaucracies are significantly driven by internal dynamics related to organizational strength. Structural conditions of bureaucratic autonomy may furthermore have been strengthened by cultural developments of the expert knowledge systems regarding international crime, dialectically reinforcing developments originally enabled by the condition of institutional independence.

Sociologists of formal organizations have argued in similar terms for the relevance of these developments in the broader context of societal bureaucratization. Comparative sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt ([1956]:69), for instance, explains the drift toward bureaucratic independence from political rulers in terms of the officials' expertise and successful claim to a "professional morale." Wolfgang Mommsen (1989:112) likewise speaks of an "inherent dynamism of bureaucratic institutions" that results in a "self-propelling process," which further accelerates what Henry Jacoby ([1969]:156) calls the bureaucratic "will to do everything." Indeed, it was because of an organizationally developed system of knowledge about the cross-national rise and internationalization of crime that the ICPC could found and expand its organizational structure and facilities, despite the fact even that among the Commission members no clear-cut definition of international crime was ever attained. What did matter and what did operationalize the ICPC was the notion—undisputed among police—that crime was on the rise across the world and that it was more and more of an international nature. This idea entails no functionalist argument that international police cooperation is necessitated by an internationalization of crime, for it is not relevant whether these views on the nature and level of criminality were empirically accurate, but that they were accepted to be valid by police officials and that they therefore effectively motivated international cooperation. In the case of the ICPC, a myth of international crime enabled police institutions to form an international network based on professional expert conceptions, regardless of political and legal concerns and without prior government approval. For as Blau and Meyer (1971:50–59) argue, bureaucratic myths not only mobilize members around organizationally

defined causes, they also insulate the organization from control and criticism. This also confirms, as Weber maintained, that state and market do not determine the relative strength of the bureaucracy versus the political rulers ([1922]:128–30, 615). Instead, it is the level of technical expertise attained by the officials that can propel the bureaucracy to take on a course of its own. The functioning of the ICPC on the basis of professional expertise harmonizes with Weber's view of the bureaucratic apparatus as an "almost unbreakable formation" that functions "as a machine" and is "capable of universal application" ([1922]:570, 561, 126). Importantly, this does not mean that international police organizations can totally insulate themselves from concerns over legality and rights. On the contrary, as much as I argued that the development and presentation of international police practices in terms of professional expertise is itself political, so I should note that international policing is subject to criticisms in normative terms, especially with respect to finding new ways to guarantee human rights and democratic accountability in the global age (Deflem 1999).

Expert systems of police knowledge emphasize a particular conception of, and an efficiency to control, international crime in extra-legal terms. In fact, police officials in the International Criminal Police Commission criticized legal conceptions of crime and existing arrangements of international law, because these concepts and systems remained bound to national jurisdictions and were time-consuming and inefficient. The members of the ICPC instead emphasized developments in crime influenced by societal factors (modernization, technological progress), not violations of formal legal systems. In terms of means, also, it was a strong emphasis on efficiency in the Weberian sense of purposive rationality that led to the establishment and elaboration of the ICPC's organizational facilities and accelerated its progression, regardless of legal arrangements and without supervision from political authority. This fact confirms the Weberian viewpoint that, relative to the expertise and know-how of the bureaucrat, the political officeholder is always in the position of "a dilettante" (Weber [1922]:572). Hence, Weber ([1918]:32) argued that "in the modern state real authority . . . rests necessarily and unavoidably in the hands of the bureaucracy." The ICPC facilities and activities were indeed planned to be as technologically sophisticated as were the feats of their targets. And only after the structures of international policing were already in place were appeals made to sanction what expert police bureaucracies had already established. The case of the ICPC thus illustrates Weber's ([1922]:128–29) argument that control of a bureaucracy is "only limitedly possible for the non-specialist: the specialist is in the long run frequently superior to the non-specialist in getting his will done."

Conclusion

I have relied on the sociology of Max Weber to defend a perspective of social control that accounts for the formation of international police organizations on the basis of a two-fold model of bureaucratic autonomy. I argued that the fact that national police institutions have acquired institutional independence creates structural conditions favorable for international cooperation, regardless of whether the states of those police institutions approximate one another in political, legal, or other respects. This perspective recognizes the embeddedness of police institutions in broader societal contexts without surrendering to all-too-readily-accepted assumptions about the explanatory powers of state and market. I thus am led to a rejection of such state-centered and/or neo-Marxist arguments, not a priori, but because of their clear shortcomings with respect to empirical adequacy requirements. For, although certain societal preconditions were significant in influencing bureaucratic police autonomy, they cannot be considered constitutive of the dynamics of international policework. Instead, expert knowledge systems about a cross-national rise and internationalization of crime provided the motivational basis for an operationalization of international policework.

The paradoxical implication of my theoretical model, then, can be summarized as follows: certain social preconditions favored a trend toward a bureaucratization process, which itself implied increasing police independence on the basis of specialized skills and expertise. As such, in this article I have empirically grounded a Weberian perspective of international policing that is not reductionist in terms of developments of state politics and formal law, for what my analysis has shown is that international police organizations were not reflective of political and legal developments and did not target international criminals as political opponents or legal subjects. On the contrary, the cross-national rise and internationalization of crime as the central motivator of international policing was constructed beyond, even against, national politics and law. Only after police officials had established professional structures and facilities of international policework did they appeal to national and international bodies of government to formally sanction what had already been created under conditions of bureaucratic autonomy.

I have in this study strengthened the empirical foundations of my theoretical arguments by broadening the scope of investigation to research comparatively several instances of international police cooperation, but my perspective needs further corroboration from additional studies. In terms of the internationalization of social control as a broader phenomenon, I have focused on selected historical instances of international collaboration among public police institutions and have not con-

centrated on the manifold contemporary dimensions of international policing. My conclusions may need to be qualified when one considers other aspects of social control besides those involving public police institutions and late-20th century-developments of international police cooperation that may be qualitatively different from their historical antecedents. Although, elsewhere, I have applied the Weberian model to aspects of current international police institutions (Deflem 1999), other scholars have defended competing theoretical models in their research on punishment (e.g., Goldstone & Useem 1999; Hochstetler & Shover 1997), the police use of force (e.g., Jacobs & O'Brien 1998; Jacobs & Helms 1997), and dimensions of today's international police (e.g., Dunn 1996; Gilboy 1997; Huggins 1998). The intention of my study, however, was to show that, for certain developments of social control, *in casu* the historical origins of international police organizations, a Weberian model of social control may be more valuable. This model would offer support to the notion that, as some experts have argued (Marx 1995:329; Nadelmann 1993:466), the theme of international police is too wide and varied to be captured by one simple proposition. Parallel to observations on the multidimensional nature of international processes in general (Kettner 1997), international policing covers many different dimensions—from bilateral and temporary practices to multilateral and relatively stable organizations; from developments during the 19th-century formation of national states to the present high-tech age of cyberspace—that may defy a single propositional explanation.

I hope that this analysis has demonstrated the value of a sociological approach that transcends narrow perspectives of police in terms of the enforcement of laws or the control of crime. Gary Marx (1981) once astutely described such legalistic outlooks as "trampoline-models" that view social control exclusively in reaction to violations of formal laws and that thus fail to account for the many sociologically relevant complexities of social control. Whereas much of Marx's work unravels the ironic nature of social control in terms of the characteristics of the situational interaction between rule-violator and rule-enforcer (e.g., Marx 1988), the study presented here argues for a similarly inherent dynamic at the organizational level of police institutions and the relationships among them. The bureaucratic model of police that I developed in this article shows that international police cannot indeed be viewed primarily in terms of an enforcement of legal norms. On the contrary, the international police organizations I reviewed relied on expert systems of knowledge, formulated beyond the realm of state-proclaimed laws. A theoretically founded approach beyond formal legality is precisely, I believe, what should be emphasized by sociological perspectives of police and social control. Such an approach is readily counterintuitive to an

everyday understanding of police (as law enforcement) and rectifies scholarly accounts that are dominated by such a misconception. The task for sociologists of social control is to develop and test theories that are analytically rooted in the sociological imagination in order to show the specific role played by police institutions in the reproduction of social order.

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