

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 56

April 2004

No. 3

CONTENTS

- Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and
Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania *Edward Miguel* 327
- Testing Novel Implications from the
Selectorate Theory of War *Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,*
James D. Morrow,
Randolph M. Siverson,
and Alastair Smith 363
- Explaining Capital Account Liberalization
in Latin America: A Transitional
Cost Approach *Sarah M. Brooks* 389
- REVIEW ARTICLE
The Micropolitics of Social Violence *Charles King* 431
- Organizing Interests and Coalitions
in the Politics of Market Reform in
Latin America *Ben Ross Schneider* 456
- The Contributors ii
- Abstracts iii

THE CONTRIBUTORS

EDWARD MIGUEL is an assistant professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a faculty research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research aims to apply credible econometric identification methods to central economic development questions and focuses primarily on (1) the political economy of development, with an emphasis on the role of social divisions in development and the causes and consequences of violence, and (2) estimating causal links between health, education, and labor productivity in less developed countries. He has conducted fieldwork in Kenya and Tanzania since 1997.

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA is a professor of politics at New York University and a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution. His books include *The Logic of Political Survival* (with Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, 2003), *Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions* (2000, 2003), *Predicting Politics* (2002), *The Trial of Ebenezer Scrooge* (2001), *Governing for Prosperity* (edited with Hilton Root, 2000), *Red Flag over Hong Kong* (with David Newman and Alvin Rabushka, 1996), *European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons* (edited with Frans Stokman, 1994), and *War and Reason* (with David Lalman, 1992). He also has two books forthcoming, *The Strategy of Campaigning: Lessons from Ronald Reagan to Boris Yeltsin* (with Kiron Skinner, Serhiy Kudhelia and Condoleezza Rice) and *Dissolving Boundaries* (edited with Suzanne Werner and David Davis). His current research includes studies with George Downs of how institutional change and foreign intervention influences human rights, democratization, health care, and economic growth; and studies with Alastair Smith on how institutions shape who gets and who gives foreign aid.

JAMES D. MORROW is a professor of political science at the University of Michigan. His books include *The Logic of Political Survival* (with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, and Randolph M. Siverson, 2003) and *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (1994). He is currently working on a book about when during times of war the laws of war are observed or violated.

RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON is a professor of political science and director of the International Relations Program at the University of California, Davis. His books include *Change in the International System* (edited with Ole R. Holsti and Alexander George, 1980), *The Diffusion of War: A Study of Opportunity and Willingness* (with Harvey Star, 1991), *Strategic Politicians, Institutions and Foreign Policy* (edited, 1998), and *The Logic of Political Survival* (with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, and James D. Morrow, 2003). He is currently studying the effect purges on the foreign policy behavior of authoritarian states.

ALASTAIR SMITH is an associate professor of politics at New York University. His books include *The Logic of Political Survival* (with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, 2003) and *Election Timing* (2004). His current research focuses on leader-specific punishment strategies and their implications for foreign aid giving, trade, and interest rates. Together with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, he is also working on corporate governance and securities fraud.

SARAH M. BROOKS is an assistant professor of political science at Ohio State University. She is completing a book manuscript on the politics of pension reform in Latin America.

CHARLES KING is the chair of the faculty and Ion Ratin associate professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, with a joint appointment in the Department of Government. His most recent book is *The Black Sea: A History* (2004).

BEN ROSS SCHNEIDER is a professor of political science and chair of the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America* (2004) and coeditor (with Blanca Heredia) of *Reinventing Leviathan: The Politics of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries* (2003).

ABSTRACTS

TRIBE OR NATION?

NATION BUILDING AND PUBLIC GOODS IN KENYA VERSUS TANZANIA

By EDWARD MIGUEL

This article examines how government policies affect ethnic relations by comparing outcomes across two nearby districts, one in Kenya and one in Tanzania, using colonial-era boundary placement as a “natural experiment.” Despite similar geography and historical legacies, governments in Kenya and Tanzania have followed radically different language, education, and local institutional policies, with Tanzania consistently pursuing more serious nation building. The evidence suggests that nation building has allowed diverse communities in rural Tanzania to achieve considerably better local public goods outcomes than diverse communities in Kenya. To illustrate, while Kenyan communities at mean levels of diversity have 25 percent less local school funding than homogeneous communities on average, the comparable figure in the Tanzanian district is near zero. The Kenya-Tanzania comparison provides empirical evidence that serious reforms can ameliorate social divisions and suggests that nation-building should take a place on policy agendas, especially in Africa.

TESTING NOVEL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE SELECTORATE THEORY OF WAR

By BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, JAMES D. MORROW, RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON, and ALASTAIR SMITH

The authors tested five novel hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of war with data for up to about 140 states and spanning the years 1816–1993. The hypotheses point to subtle differences in selection effects across regime types that should operate during crises that fall short of war and also during wars. Leaders who rely on a large coalition (such as democrats) to remain in office are shown to be more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to fight wars when the odds of victory are not overwhelming. They are also more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to take part in disputes that fall short of war when the odds are not exceptionally favorable. However, they are less selective about this form of participation than they are about war. Small-coalition leaders show no such selectivity in their preparedness to engage in disputes short of war or in war as a function of their odds of victory. These results hold whether the odds of victory are assessed continuously or whether they are based on a specific threshold. The authors also find, in keeping with the selectorate theory, that if a war fails to resolve quickly, democrats try harder than autocrats to win. And when the war is over, democrats demobilize much more slowly than autocrats.

EXPLAINING CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

A TRANSITIONAL COST APPROACH

By SARAH M. BROOKS

In the past three decades governments around the world have lowered barriers to international capital flows. This movement is widely attributed to the forces of globalization, as developed nations moved toward relative convergence on international financial openness. Yet developing nations with much to gain from openness to foreign investment moved only hesitantly and inconsistently in this direction. Analysis of two decades of capital account liberalization in Latin America and the OECD reveals that nations in Latin America with weaker domestic financial sectors face higher risks of transitional dislocations following liberalization and move less aggressively toward openness. In the OECD, by contrast, financial weakness is associated with greater movements toward capital account opening, as transitional costs are lower and governments are better equipped to ameliorate them. Examination of the transitional costs of liberalization thus helps to explain how market pressures may impede, rather than promote, market-oriented reform in Latin America.

THE MICROPOLITICS OF SOCIAL VIOLENCE

By CHARLES KING

The debates of the 1990s over the causes of and responses to substate conflict were significant and wide ranging; there is now a sizable literature on ethnic conflict and civil war. But this literature makes few connections to long traditions of scholarly theorizing about collective violence in political science and in allied fields. This article examines two recent books by Mark Beissinger and Ashutosh Varshney that help turn mainstream theorizing about mass violence back toward its roots in problems of social order, state-society relations, and group mobilization. They break down the intellectual wall that has grown up between the study of something called "ethnic" or "nationalist conflict" and a long line of work on collective action in political sociology and cognate disciplines. These books are part of a new micropolitical turn in the field: a concern with uncovering the precise mechanisms by which individuals and groups go about trading in the benefits of stability for the inherently risky behavior associated with mass killing. The final section of the article assesses what such a turn might mean for research methods and theory making in comparative politics and international relations as a whole.

ORGANIZING INTERESTS AND COALITIONS IN THE POLITICS OF MARKET REFORM
IN LATIN AMERICA

By BEN ROSS SCHNEIDER

A recent wave of deep empirical research provides a solid basis for a comparative reassessment of the role of coalitions in the politics of market reform in Latin America in the 1990s. This research confirms earlier findings that interest groups and distributional coalitions were not major protagonists in either antireform or proreform coalitions. The new research goes further empirically into analyzing the origins of interests, especially business interests, and finds them to be much more ambiguous and dynamic than assumed in earlier studies. Consequently, other factors, especially organizations and the evolving macroeconomic context, were stronger influences on preferences regarding reform. Given the relative weakness of interest group coalitions, the article provides a typology and preliminary analysis of other kinds of coalitions—electoral, legislative, and policy—that have become more central to reform politics. These other types of coalitions still require further theoretical elaboration and empirical investigation in order to determine how they can best be deployed to illuminate reform politics.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of \$3.25 per article is paid directly to CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. 0043-88 71/94 \$03.25