

to trade. The major exception is chapter 10, "The Comintern and the Communist Party of Canada," in many ways the most interesting chapter in the book. Professor Balawyder is at his best in this chapter and those sections in which he deals with domestic left-wing politics and Soviet influence, real or trumped up, such as the IWW episode and the Winnipeg General Strike, both covered in chapter 2.

The book suffers from its brevity and the author's failure to extract any patterns from his various themes. Readers will find it a useful reference work, but they will have to draw the implications of most of the material for themselves. The theme best developed is the emergence of Canada from Britain's direction of policy-making to define its own national interest and the best means to serve it. The trade patterns, interest group activities, domestic conditions in both countries, and the influence of the United States are all left underdeveloped. This reader was disturbed to read that Soviet foreign policy was formulated and executed by the combination of Narkomindel, the Foreign Office, and the Comintern (p. 82). Later the author states that the Comintern shifted tactics according to the changing policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (p. 172). The author also has an unfortunate tendency to infer Canadian public opinion without satisfactory evidence, though the information obtained from editorial opinion surveys is very interesting. To sum up, the book is not balanced and some themes are not adequately developed, but it is a valuable reference work.

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50 LET SOVETSKO-AFGANSKIKH OTNOSHENII, 1919–1969. By L. B. Teplinsky. Moscow: "Nauka," 1971. 237 pp. 84 kopeks, paper.

Afghanistan, the first state to offer recognition to Soviet Russia and the only neighbor from whom the USSR did not demand or acquire territory, has understandably attracted the attention of Soviet publicists and scholars. Nevertheless, before this work was published no one had made a systematic attempt to survey the history of Moscow-Kabul relations during the last half-century. L. B. Teplinsky's book contains a detailed analysis of political relations between the two countries as well as an excellent summary of Soviet (and satellite) economic, technical, and financial aid to Afghanistan, supplemented with details of scientific and cultural cooperation. Based on extensive research in Russian published and archival material (much of it made available for the first time), the volume constitutes an original and welcome contribution to the understanding of this complex problem. Unfortunately, however, this is not a definitive work, owing partly to circumstances beyond the author's control. Thus he is obliged to demonstrate the "nobility" of Soviet foreign policy: the USSR is "by its nature hostile to any imperialist aspirations," as evidenced by the repudiation in November 1917 of "all unequal treaties" secured by the tsarist government (p. 221). This assertion is belied by the author's own admission that one of the outstanding problems between Moscow and Kabul—the border along the Amu Darya (Oxus) River imposed on Afghanistan in 1873—had not been resolved until 1946 (pp. 121–23). Significantly, Teplinsky does not choose to discuss the real reasons for Stalin's generosity. In a similar vein, in stressing the alleged harmoniousness of Soviet-Afghan relations, he underplays Kabul's anxiety over Moscow's post-1917 reoccupation of Central

Asia and the instances of Afghanistan's subsequent determination to expand its territory at the expense of the struggling Communist state.

Equally annoying is the standard Soviet practice of omitting the names and failing to discuss the importance of current "nonpersons," among them Fedor Raskolnikov, the first minister to Afghanistan who chose exile in 1938, as well as Stalin, Khrushchev, and Bulganin. On the other hand, the work abounds with endless quotations from the accepted "classics" and the current leaders. These shortcomings significantly detract from the value of this otherwise useful volume.

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REVOLUTION UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK: ZUR KOMMUNISTISCHEN INTERPRETATION DER KAPITALISTISCHEN WELT, 1921–1925. By *Wolfgang Eichwede*. Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 8. Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1971. viii, 246 pp. DM 36.

This book is a dissertation prepared at Tübingen under the guidance of Professor Dietrich Geyer. The work deals with a period in the history of international communism already well studied in sound English-language publications, but it offers a somewhat different perspective. Wolfgang Eichwede has examined an extensive body of material published by the leading Bolsheviks in the early 1920s and has reconstructed their attitudes toward Western political developments and toward each other during that era.

Between 1921 and 1925 the Communist International accommodated its strategy and tactics to the facts of European diplomacy; it reacted rather than assuming the initiative. The revolution that had been so confidently predicted by Lenin and his followers in 1919 and 1920 seemed a remote possibility by 1921, and the evidence of the stability of capitalism could be seen in many of the developments of the subsequent years. The rise of fascism in Italy, the implementation of the Versailles decisions, the Genoa and Lausanne Conferences, and the Dawes plan proved challenging in different ways to the theoreticians and policy-makers of the Kremlin, and owing to the interregnum caused by Lenin's illness and death, there was indecision in the international Communist leadership. Eichwede has given careful attention to the attitudes of various high-ranking Communists as they were expressed in publications such as *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, and the Comintern publications. The articles by Radek, Zinoviev, and Trotsky receive much of the attention, since they were the men most actively involved in Comintern affairs. The material is for the most part treated topically.

We seem to have reached the point of diminishing returns in studies of the Comintern. Those familiar with the works of E. H. Carr, Werner Angress, and Warren Lerner will find much that is familiar here. The scholarly work is thorough, but the era will continue to appear as a period of indecision and adjustment in the history of international communism.

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