

what he calls the Byzantine Administration of Nixon and Kissinger, he shared Secretary Laird's view that disengagement was the only politically possible course for the United States, even in the face of blatant North Vietnamese violations of their agreements with us. In both areas, Zumwalt's book is a dazzling portrayal of the human and political forces always mobilized against rationality. As Cornford pointed out long ago, there is only one reason for doing something. All the rest are reasons for inaction.

Admiral Zumwalt is a passionate democrat. He understands that public opinion is the only legitimate source for policy in a democracy, and that wise public opinion must be based on public understanding. Nothing offends Zumwalt more than politicians, officials, or bureaucrats who refuse to tell the public the truth, but seek to manipulate opinion by playing up to what pollsters and other gurus tell them the public wants to hear. The most important data in Zumwalt's book are damning contemporaneous memoranda of conversations on this subject with Nixon and Kissinger. During a talk with Nixon in 1970 about the rise of Soviet naval power, for example, Nixon agreed with Zumwalt's gloomy evaluation of our chances of winning a naval war with the Soviets. "Isn't it, therefore, important that we tell the people?" Zumwalt asked. "No," Nixon replied. "I think we have first to nail down, through negotiations, our advantage which now exists in the strategic field, get ourselves out of the war in southeast Asia which is making defense expenditures so unpopular, and then, after the 1972 election, go to the people for support for greater defense budgets."

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MODEL OR ALLY?: THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By *Richard Lowenthal*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. xii, 400 pp. \$12.95.

Can states follow "purely" ideological paths? More precisely, can the USSR implement a "Communist" foreign policy? The poignancy of this question haunts every analyst who follows the tortuous ways pursued by the Kremlin in coping with the challenge posed by the "Third World" over six decades.

To be sure, Lenin moved realistically forward from the predominantly Eurocentric *Weltanschauung* that permeated the Communist Manifesto, the concept of the "Asian Mode of Production," Engels's famous letter to Kautsky in 1882, and other canons of the German fathers of the creed. Partly by default, he, and Stalin following him, concluded that the West, the principal adversary, might prove more vulnerable to attacks on "the weakest link in the chain," its rear echelon of "reserves," that is, the colonial and dependent areas, than to a frontal assault in Europe. However, the operational requirements of this assumption called for serious "sacrifices," at the expense, to be sure, of the Communist movement and not of the Soviet state. The natural ally in such an essentially diversionary strategy against the West, of course, had to come from the ranks of the nationalist elements in the "Third World," which were (and are) as varied in class origin as they remain eclectic in ideology. However, the Afro-Asian-Latin American national elites, almost without exception, strove above all for monolithic party and state structures; toleration of opposition from any quarter was rejected, especially from rival parties suspected of intimate links with foreign states, a definition that certainly included orthodox Muscovite (as distinct from home-grown, self-styled) Communists. From Lenin to Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership has attempted, without conspicuous success, to hide this sad fact from the more guileless adherents of the Communist Party under a variable flood of labels—from "National Bourgeoisie," "National Democracy," "New Democracy," and "Revolutionary Democrats," including the "Non-capitalist Path of Development," to even more exotic

terminology resuscitated under Khrushchev—all intended to demonstrate that Moscow's clients in the Third World were ideologically respectable, despite hard data that pointed to very different conclusions.

To be fair, this jargon by no means was lacking in subtle operational overtones, conveying directives, at least implicitly, to the *cognescenti*. However, the sad reality that was papered over semantically concerned the complete unwillingness of Third World national movements and/or governments to tolerate Communist organizations (even individual Communists) functioning autonomously on the spot. In the last resort, the Soviet leadership, whenever faced with a choice between “vibrating in harmony” with the military and security apparatus in a Third World state or coming to the rescue of local Communists, has hesitated very little before sacrificing the latter, frequently at the cost of their lives. Needless to say, the Kremlin has not been too eager to acknowledge this tendency, since it continues to make spasmodic efforts to assert its aspirations to remain the center of an international ideological movement, often paying a relatively high price politically in order to induce European and other Communist parties to attend a gathering in Moscow. One suspects that these attempts are fueled no less by the need of the Soviet leadership to prove its “legitimacy” domestically, in terms of ideological orthodoxy (as the tsars demonstrated theirs in religious orthodoxy), than by international considerations. In either case, Moscow hardly could admit that it regards foreign Communist parties essentially as human sacrifices to be offered on the altar of Soviet relations with one Afro-Asian state or another.

Professor Lowenthal's work is devoted to a number of variations of this central theme. Basically, it is an anthology of articles published by him on previous occasions, suitably updated and amended. Nevertheless, it is a remarkably coherent book. The chapters are written with the elegance and lucidity one has come to take for granted in Professor Lowenthal's work. Under the circumstances, it may seem churlish to nit-pick at some points made, particularly in the introduction. For instance, Professor Lowenthal stresses that, even at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin had recognized colonial revolutions “only as a major auxiliary.” How, then, is one to explain the fact that, at a prior date, Lenin took the bold step of changing unilaterally the slogan of the Communist Manifesto—“Workers of all countries, unite!”—by adding the operative phrase “and oppressed nations” (first printed on the masthead of the Soviet publication *The Peoples of the East*)? Clearly, this was no minor matter, and Lenin must have been confronted with considerable reservations on the part of his colleagues, for he confessed subsequently that he had made this move without approval from the Comintern's Executive Committee, knowing that it ran counter to the spirit of the Communist Manifesto, because current developments required such action.

In speaking of “Lenin's concept,” Professor Lowenthal refers to the “non-capitalist road.” In fact, the proposition that colonies might be propelled into the Soviet system “without having to pass through the capitalist stage” was adopted by Lenin from M. N. Roy who, in his Supplementary Theses, had challenged some of Lenin's “rightist” premises. Of course, Roy's intention in advancing the new concept was to indicate that leadership of the colonial revolutionary movements could be placed in the hands of the Communist parties from the very beginning, while Lenin was intimating that it did not matter if bourgeois nationalists remained at the head of these organizations, since Moscow, as their ally, would be able to push them in the desired direction sooner or later.

Professor Lowenthal repeats the old myth that, during Stalin's “last years,” the Soviet leadership believed the newly independent Afro-Asian states “could not be viewed as potential allies unless their governments were first overthrown.” Here it is necessary once again to draw attention to the much disregarded section of A. A.

Zhdanov's address to the founding meeting of the Cominform in 1947, in which he described two of these states as being not only truly independent, but "associated with" the Soviet camp (Indochina and Indonesia), and three others as having reached the stage where they "sympathized with" the Soviet bloc (Egypt, Syria, and India).

In dealing with the concept of "national democracy," Professor Lowenthal does not give sufficient emphasis to the fact that, both in the 1920s, when the operational significance of this term first was spelled out by G. I. Safarov, and during the Khrushchev era, Moscow was concerned with providing a cloak of ideological decency for a policy of intensive Soviet support of movements and states led by the "national bourgeoisie," while pretending that this did not hinder the longer term prospects of the local Communist parties.

Also in his introduction, Professor Lowenthal fails to point out that the slogan of "revolutionary democracies" was pushed forward by Khrushchev because of the failure of the "national democracies" to extend to the local Communists even the minimal organizational and propagandistic autonomy that the Kremlin had expected; consequently, rather than insisting upon this privilege, Moscow brought forward a new term under which colonial nationalist leaders were expected merely to give amnesty to *individual* Communists. In other words, the Soviet leadership reduced the price for its support to the absolute minimum.

On page 183, Professor Lowenthal does not explain that the Liu Shao-ch'i formulation, presenting China as a "model," was *not* reprinted in the Soviet press when it was first enunciated, but only subsequently, when Mao himself arrived in Moscow and had his traumatic encounter with Stalin. On page 186, there is a reference to "the arms supplied to Nasser's Egypt on the eve of the Suez conflict"; in fact, these weapons arrived at least fifteen months earlier, and their infusion into the region was one of the prime causes for the conflict. Despite these essentially cosmetic blemishes, it is evident that Professor Lowenthal's work will provide a most useful and readable text for all students concerned with this significant aspect of Soviet international policy.

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CHINA AND JAPAN: PAST AND PRESENT. By *M. I. Sladkovsky*. Edited and translated by *Robert F. Price*. Forum Asiatica, vol. 1. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1975 [Moscow, 1971]. xii, 286 pp. Tables. \$15.00.

Originally *Kitai i Iaponiia* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), this marks the latest addition to a growing list of English translations of Russian books on East Asia. Author Mikhail Iosifovich Sladkovskii, a septuagenarian corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was born in Krasnoiarsk, educated in Vladivostok, and studied in Shanghai during the 1920s. Since 1967, he has directed the Institute of the Far East, a Moscow think tank which emphasizes the analysis of contemporary China.

The book consists of nine chapters which compare China's and Japan's political, economic, and social development from the remote past ("Ancient China and Japan") to the near present ("China and Japan in the Sixties"). Each chapter also characterizes changing modes of Sino-Japanese relations. Particular attention is accorded to the years after 1917.

The translator states in the preface that *China and Japan* is designed to introduce Soviet views on the Far East to those who cannot read Russian. This objective is fulfilled insofar as Sladkovsky, an influential figure within the field of East Asian studies, faithfully reflects party positions. With some notable exceptions, the author does not deviate from paths laid down by Academician E. M. Zhukov in the 1940s and 1950s.