

that the section on the *doxa* also has its importance, it makes no sense, Mansfeld rightly observes, to consider it a completely autonomous part of the poem. Mourelatos is also convinced that Parmenides' physical doctrines cannot be regarded as entirely independent of his ontological doctrine. Nevertheless, Mourelatos recognizes that Parmenides plays an important role in the advancement of astronomical science in antiquity.

The bibliography cited in the volume is rich, although not entirely up to date. There is no trace, for example, of Timothy Clarke's recent monograph, *Aristotle and the Eleatic One* (Oxford 2019). Some of the theses presented in the lectures would have greatly benefited from a comparison (even a critical one) with a recently released work of mine (*The Presocratics at Herculaneum: A Study of Early Greek Philosophy in the Epicurean Tradition* (Berlin 2021)) which, for clear chronological reasons, the volume under review here could not take into account. In any case, I would like to point out how a systematic investigation of Presocratic reception in Hellenistic philosophies, especially in the Epicurean school, shows how from Plato to the Neoplatonic commentators, the connection between Parmenides and Melissus followed a precise doxographical strategy that finds confirmation in Aëtius and in his Peripatetic (not only Theophrastean) roots. Study of the Epicurean sources shows, for instance, how in the Hellenistic age there was a strong tendency, on the one hand, to 'Melissize' Parmenides and, on the other hand, to 'Parmenideize' Xenophanes, although traces of this tendency were already present in Aristotle. From this point of view, the attempt to recover Melissus in the Eleatic stream, without paying much attention to the problem of reception, runs the risk of unilateral and excessively speculative readings. However, this shortcoming does not alter the fact that in many cases Rossetti's theses are thought-provoking and original, although I must confess to feeling a certain embarrassment upon reading some formulas adopted in the lectures, that is, that Parmenides is a 'virtual' philosopher and Zeno a philosopher 'without philosophy'. Apart from the objections raised by the commentators, I believe that such an approach leaves a huge problem unresolved: that of Xenophanes and his place in the history of Presocratic philosophy. In the passage of Plato's *Sophist* mentioned above, Xenophanes is described as the ancestor of the Eleatic school (indeed, the Stranger says that the Eleatic *ethnos* had its roots in a period even earlier than Xenophanes!). It would be worthwhile in the near future to revisit this tricky issue. However, in a volume that seems to aim to defend, through innovative arguments, the (philosophical) unity of Eleatism, say, from Elea to Samos, the absence of a reference to the ideal (if not historico-philosophical) relationship between Colophon and Elea is puzzling.

CHRISTIAN VASSALLO

Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena / Università della Calabria
Email: christian.vassallo@uni-jena.de / christian.vassallo@unical.it

LOCKWOOD (T.) and SAMARAS (T.) (eds) **Aristotle's *Politics*: A Critical Guide** (Cambridge Critical Guides). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. ix + 259. \$93.99. 9781107052703.

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In their introduction to this terrific anthology, Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras suggest that this volume can be thought of as divided into three parts: (1) four initial essays on the pre-political analysis of *Politics* I–II, (2) four essays in the middle of the volume wrestling with the meaning of *politeia* in *Pol.* III–IV and (3) a final group of four essays dealing with Aristotle's recommendations for classifying and improving constitutions in *Pol.* IV–VIII. That is a perfectly reasonable way of thinking about this collection, and instructors and scholars will not go wrong by picking readings based on those divisions. However, by way of review, let me offer a complementary way of conceptualizing the contents of this book.

First, there are four essays whose main point is to show what Aristotle does *not* commit himself to in the *Politics*, despite common suggestions to the contrary. Jill Frank ('On logos and politics in Aristotle') emphasizes that Aristotelian political theory does not always revert to hierarchies featuring a ruling element exercising top-down control: it frequently recognizes and promotes two-way, interdependent communication. In 'The "mixed regime" in Aristotle's *Politics*', Ryan Balot argues that while the constitution described in *Pol.* IV.11 is a version of *politeia* (the type of regime that Aristotle classifies as correct rule by many), it is not based on a specific principle like other constitutions. Instead, it promotes an ethos of 'wholesome collective amnesia' about types (115), along with a readiness to enter open-minded discussions that transcends the accessible militaristic virtue that initially seems to characterize its citizens. In 'Little to do with justice: Aristotle on distributing political power', Eckart Schütrumpf argues that when Aristotle is making normative claims about how constitutions should be organized, what justice recommends is but one factor among many other practical considerations, rather than some decisive claim. In particular, none of his advocacy for including 'the many' in constitutions is grounded in claims of justice or, for that matter, civil rights. Christopher Bobonich's chapter ('Aristotle, political decision making, and the many') also emphasizes a negative point, but here the aim is critical: none of the famous *Pol.* III.11 arguments for the claim that 'the many' can be, or judge, better than virtuous people are strong. 'The many' are deeply mistaken about happiness and the value of virtue, and analogizing its collective capacity with, for example, a feast or a human with improved senses, cannot fully explain how such profound error is overcome.

Another group of essays is devoted to showing that apparently inconsistent claims in the *Politics* are not problematic once proper distinctions are made. Pierre Pellegrin ('Is politics a natural science?') explains how human beings can be political both in the biological sense of inheriting natural traits that ensure living in groups, but also in a distinct way by deliberating and choosing human organizations with ethical and pragmatical values. In 'Political rule over women in *Politics* I', Marguerite Deslauriers shows how Aristotle's belief that the rule of men over women is natural can be reconciled with his claims that such rule is also political and aristocratic. It is natural because both male and female are parts of a whole (the household), and the male is a superior part that aims to benefit the whole. However, because the female part does not metaphysically belong to the male part, but is rather ruled by it on the basis of merit, the relationship is aristocratic. J.J. Mulhern, in '*Politeia* in Greek literature, inscriptions, and in Aristotle's *Politics*', documents how Aristotle uses *politeia* in four distinct ways, showing how translators are doing readers a disservice by always rendering it as 'constitution'. We avoid much confusion by recognizing that Aristotle uses *politeia* to discuss citizenship (the right to hold office), the citizen body (the group of human beings who are citizens), constitution (the structure or arrangement of offices) and the regime (those who occupy the offices).

A final group of essays offers an interpretive key that explains what might otherwise seem to be Aristotle's disjointed thoughts. Thornton Lockwood ('*Politics* II: Political critique, political theorizing, political innovation') argues that *Politics* II is not a jumble of disconnected criticisms, or a survey of reputable opinions, but rather a sustained philosophical reflection on the benefits of political theorizing and the perils of innovation. In 'Aristotle and the question of citizenship', Thanassis Samaras shows that while Aristotle describes the regime-type *politeia* in four different ways (including as a 'first kind of democracy'), it is always rule by sociological upper-middles that Aristotle has in mind when characterizing this regime. Arlene Saxonhouse's 'Aristotle on the corruption of regimes: Resentment and justice' argues that because cities can never accomplish justice in any precise way that perfectly suits any given group, there is inevitably resentment among inhabitants. As a result, Aristotle's recommendations for cities should be understood as attempts to manage resentment enough to prevent outright war. Finally, both Pierre Destrée's 'Aristotle on improving imperfect cities' and Josiah Ober's 'Nature, history,

and Aristotle's best possible regime' argue that Aristotle's '*polis* of our prayers' holds the key to explaining the overarching argument of the entire *Politics* (Ober, 224). Destrée sees all of Aristotle's analyses and recommendations as a united attempt to show how any regime, even a tyrannical regime, can better approximate an ideal city insofar as the circumstances allow. Ober argues that the '*polis* of our prayers' is, for Aristotle, both the historical and teleological end of the natural development of the *polis*. Moreover, because this constitution avoids restricting active citizenship to a subset within a larger class of inhabitants who, by nature and with proper education, could fully participate in the *polis*, there's an important sense in which the teleological end of political life is democratic.

This anthology is a worthy addition to the literature on Aristotle's *Politics* and is certainly a resource for both scholars and students of ancient political philosophy.

STEVEN SKULTETY

University of Mississippi

Email: skultety@olemiss.edu

HENNIG (B.), *Aristotle's Four Causes*. New York: Peter Lang, 2019. Pp. x + 280. £84. 9781433159299

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Aristotle developed an account of four causes (or *aitiai*) to explain things and processes in the natural world. It is very common to explain this causal scheme with reference to a single example: given a statue, the material cause is the bronze out of which the statue was made; the formal cause is the form or shape which the statue came to have; the efficient cause is the source or maker of the statue (or, more specifically, the maker's craft); and the final cause is that for the sake of which it was made, its purpose. However, in his book *Aristotle's Four Causes*, a revised version of his *Habilitationsschrift* submitted to the University of Leipzig, Boris Hennig sets out to challenge this received understanding in significant ways. The result is a new and philosophically sophisticated account of Aristotelian causation, why there are four of them and how they relate to one another.

For Hennig the four causes form a system of two co-ordinated pairs. Put briefly, the material cause (or matter) of a natural thing is to potentially be this thing, while the formal cause (or essence) is what the matter potentially is, or what the natural thing becomes according to its typical course of development. Correspondingly, the efficient cause (which is the only one of the four causes to produce effects, and so be a cause in the modern sense of the term) of a natural process is that which potentially is this process, whereas the final cause of a natural process is the essence or limit of this process so long as all goes well. Material causes relate to formal causes roughly as efficient causes relate to final causes. Further, whereas material and formal causes are concerned with *things*, as opposed to properties which belong to things, efficient and final causes are concerned with *processes*, even though these processes can ultimately be reduced to things which (potentially or actually) change or act in a certain way.

Hennig's book consists of a general introduction, ten chapters and a conclusion. The ten chapters divide into five pairs of two chapters each, with the first ('Aristotle's Four Causes') providing a detailed summary of the book as a whole and the four remaining pairs of chapters being devoted to each of the four causes (chapters 3–4 on matter; chapters 5–6 on form; chapters 7–8 on causation; chapters 9–10 on teleology). Chapter 2 ('Two Epistemic Directions of Fit') discusses J.L. Austin's distinction between two 'directions of fit' ('How to Talk', ch. 6 of *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford 1979)) with a view to showing how, according to Aristotle, natural things must be approached in a certain way in order that