

thoroughly examines the many approaches considered, debated, and often discarded by Bolsheviks on both the local and the national levels.

A review of this length can hardly do justice to the complexities of the subject treated by Massell, or the rich and varied insights offered by the author. Except for several typographical errors, I found little to mar the total effect of the work. I was, however, mildly surprised by the omission of sources in any of the Central Asian languages. It would be remarkable if Massell were able to conduct research in all of these languages, and one cannot fault him for his apparent inability to do so. Yet I wonder whether important published sources of information on native attitudes and aspirations—including the periodical press—are still to be explored, and whether their use might have some significant bearing on the subject. Based on my own observations with regard to the Tatars during the same period, I can attest to the existence of vitally important political and social commentaries that were never published in Russian, but nevertheless were often from the pens of Bolsheviks.

Despite this, what Massell has produced is a study of outstanding merit and quality on a subject that has never been treated previously with anything approaching the same depth, skill, or methodology. At the very least, this book belongs in the collections of all those interested in Soviet historical and political development, Soviet nationality policy, and the problems of modernization.

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LEON TROTSKY AND THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ISOLATION. By
Richard B. Day. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
 vii, 221 pp. \$10.95.

The author's basic goal in this work is to confront and destroy the historical myths that have surrounded Trotsky's program for economic development after the October Revolution. He has succeeded admirably in this task and in many others, producing a work that revises a number of important interpretations of this Soviet leader and of the various and constantly changing economic programs offered by the contenders for power in the USSR during the 1920s. The author convincingly demonstrates that after the Revolution and until 1925, having cast aside as irrelevant for the present situation his theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky preferred Russia's economic isolation, fearing dependence on concessions and credits from the capitalist West. He shows that even when Trotsky exchanged economic isolationism for integrationism (integrating the Russian economy into the world economy), he still did not—as is commonly argued—reject the possibility of building socialism in one country. Instead, Trotsky argued after 1925 that Russia's political isolation did not require its economic isolation and that building socialism in the USSR was quite compatible with—in fact, necessitated—the use of the technical skills of the capitalist West. Moreover, Trotsky's integrationist plan, favoring a balance between light and heavy industry and de-emphasizing internal capital accumulation, by no means coincided with that of Preobrazhensky. What Trotsky actually envisioned was that trade with Europe would prepare the way for Russia's later cooperation with a socialist Europe while benefiting Soviet industrialization. The integration of Russia's economy into the world economy through trade would both anticipate

and aid the world revolution. Thus, after 1925 and until his exile, Trotsky argued only that the building of socialism in a separate, economically isolated country was impossible. Its construction in a single country participating in the world economy was entirely feasible.

These and other carefully qualified revisions and reinterpretations are accompanied by a refreshing critical-mindedness toward Trotsky the politician. While recognizing the intermittent fertility of Trotsky's theorizing, the author correctly notes Trotsky's enormous ability to make the most foolish political misjudgments at exactly the wrong time. He also exposes Trotsky's own later attempts at myth-making about himself and his economic programs, thereby posing a needed challenge to the Trotsky-Deutscher image of Trotsky.

Thus although one might have wished for more explicit reference to the historians Professor Day is challenging in this book, this work is an important contribution to Soviet economic and political history. Any future analysis of the intraparty feud, of the industrialization debate, or of Trotsky himself must take account of this dense, well-written book.

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AGAINST STALIN AND HITLER: MEMOIR OF THE RUSSIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT, 1941-1945. By *Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt*. Translated by *David Footman*. New York: John Day Company, 1973. 274 pp. \$8.95.

Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt was the German officer closest to Andrei Vlasov during his "leadership" of the "Russian Liberation Movement" on the German side in World War II. A Baltic German, once a tsarist officer, later a businessman in Riga, he became an articulate advocate of a more decent and intelligent German wartime policy toward Russia. Strik-Strikfeldt has the reputation of an essentially apolitical man of integrity with good connections. His role has been dealt with sympathetically in several studies, such as George Fischer's *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Harvard University Press, 1952) and "Sven Steenberg's" *Wlassow: Verräter oder Patriot?* (Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968).

Against Stalin and Hitler is Strik-Strikfeldt's own version of his activities. It is a book whose time has passed. Had it been published twenty-five years earlier, it might have been revealing. Except for some details, there is nothing here that adds significantly to our knowledge or understanding. This is a revised version of a manuscript written at the end of the war from notes which had "no names and no dates." We are not told what was "revised" and why. Strikfeldt also repeatedly quotes at length from remarks by Vlasov and others—from memory.

Strikfeldt's view of the Vlasov crowd is benign and generous. He cannot be expected to provide a critical or balanced portrayal of men he identified with, in a volume which is not only a record but also a plea. He is bitter not only about Nazi stupidity but also about the moral obtuseness of the Americans, who after the war extradited the Vlasovites to Stalin.

Strikfeldt has his own blind spots. In 1941, he writes with regret, Hitler "had still the opportunity to refashion Europe on a basis of freedom, justice and equality. But, blinded by *hubris*, Hitler did not recognize this opportunity." With unshattered illusions about the potential attractiveness of his collaborators, he exclaims, "What might not Germans and Russians together have achieved even [after Stalingrad],