RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES

URBANIZATION, RACE, AND CLASS IN BRAZILIAN POLITICS*

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Late in 1982, elections were held in Brazil for governors, congressional representatives in both houses, state legislators, mayors, and city council members. According to many observers, they were the first truly free elections in twenty years, the first unhampered by the ominous presence of an institutional act that had overridden the Brazilian constitution.[1]

The 1982 elections presented to the voters five parties no more than three years old. In theory, none of the parties had ever competed in an election; in practice, however, this was not the case. A direct connection existed between the new government party, the Partido Democrático Social (PDS), and the old government party, the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA). Most observers viewed the PDS as simply ARENA with a new name. The military regime had prohibited the use of labels from the two-party system, but the major opposition party bypassed it, and the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) became simply the Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), to the despair of the military regime's political engineers.[2]

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Added to the two major parties were three smaller ones: the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), which (despite its name) drew on a young constituency in Rio de Janeiro largely made up of college students; the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), which tried unsuccessfully to revive a popular party label from the democratic period before 1964; and the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), led by former President João Goulart's brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola. At first, Brizola sought to use the old PTB label, but he lost the right to use it in the courts to another group and had to settle for the PDT. These smaller parties were created from scratch after the two-party system was disbanded by the military regime in 1979.

Brizola was the only governor elected in 1982 who belonged to neither the government's party (the PDS) nor the major opposition party (the PMDB). His election raised many questions about electoral dynamics in Rio de Janeiro. The state of Rio de Janeiro has sixty-four *municipios,* and Brizola's share of the vote was very unevenly distributed among them.[3] He drew less than 2 per cent in twelve municipios but more than 40 percent in three, a far greater variation than his closest competitors.[4]

The purpose of this research note is to analyze the great variance in the Brizola vote from one municipio to another. Three "classic" variables that have been important predictors in past studies of voting in Brazil will be employed: urbanization, social class, and party organization (Soares 1982; Fleisher 1984). Two additional variables that will be utilized are race and metropolitization, the latter used to ascertain the influence of the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro beyond that of the urbanization variable.[5] The explanatory power of race vis-à-vis the variance in the Brizola vote is secondary but deserves attention because of its sociopolitical significance. Finally, the widespread belief in Brizola's charisma and his seemingly endless capacity to win elections—regardless of party organization and socioeconomic determinants—appears to have motivated the military's refusal to permit direct presidential elections, despite overwhelming popular pressure (Dimenstein et al. 1985). This popular perception requires a detailed analysis of the concept of charisma and how it relates to our data.

COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR BRIZOLA'S ELECTORAL SUCCESS

Brizola's unexpected election as governor occasioned many attempts at explanation. In view of his weak party base, political analysts were initially puzzled by his sudden rise in the polls and the widespread variation in his support from municipio to municipio.

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The Charisma Factor

The favorite explanation is Brizola's alleged charisma, largely inspired by his electoral record. Brizola was elected Governor of Rio Grande do Sul in 1958 with 670,000 votes (55 percent) and was easily elected to congress in 1962 from the state of Guanabara (the city-state of Rio de Janeiro before it merged with the state of Rio de Janeiro). These results, combined with his 1982 election, convinced many military conservatives that Brizola would surely win any presidential election, and they therefore refused to permit direct presidential elections. Thus the belief in Brizola's charisma may have engendered severe political consequences for Brazil. A corollary of this belief was the view that parties would be irrelevant when it came to voting, that the population would simply vote emotionally in response to equally emotional appeals by the candidate, that political parties faced widespread distrust. Charisma-based explanations have always implied that for most Brazilians, voting is not a rational choice but an emotional reaction.[6] Thus the term *charisma* has a particular meaning in Brazilian political analysis, suggesting that a candidate's overriding individual ability is met by an emotional response from voters.

Charisma is a popular concept in Brazilian political journalism and political science. But its use in this context diverges from the original Weberian meaning. According to the Brazilian usage, the charismatic leader is part of a dyad that requires a recipient population with a marked propensity for accepting charismatic leaders. Charisma is assumed to be a nonideological (some would say preideological) political phenomenon plaguing only "politically immature" societies. Yet abundant data have refuted explanations depicting Brazilian voters as emotional, unpredictable, and lacking in party loyalty (Reis 1978; Soares 1965, 1973, 1983a, 1984b).

The concept of charisma as a personality attribute (which a few possess and most do not) fails to explain why some individuals respond positively to charisma while others do not. But viewing charismatic politics as a relationship between individual traits and structural traits offers new insights because charisma is no longer an unpredictable individual trait, subject to personality whims, but a relationship that can be predicted according to the structural attributes of the voting population.

We do not interpret voting in general, and voting for Brizola in particular, as unpredictable but as a predictable structural relationship. In this sense, we use structural variables as predictors in a deliberate attempt to show that the 1982 election results can be adequately explained by structural theories of electoral behavior.

Furthermore, not all electoral success necessarily results from personality variables. Surveys have shown a remarkable overlap between party preferences and votes for individual candidates in Brazil. Thus a charismatic relationship would be one in which the votes received exceed what is expected according to a candidate's institutional support, particularly party support. If a candidate's votes simply reflect party preference, then little influence can be credited to individual effects. In the sixties, Carlos Lacerda, a conservative candidate, was reputed to be a charismatic leader. But data from each socioeconomic stratum established that his votes nearly equaled the combined voter preferences for the parties supporting him. Only in the top socioeconomic groups did Lacerda fare better than expected; in the lower groups, he received fewer votes than his party support indicated. Thus charismatic appeals may be redefined in a social class context, and negative charisma may also be discerned (Soares 1965). Unfortunately, the same criteria cannot be applied to the 1982 official electoral results because voters were required to cast a straight ticket vote.

The Disenchantment Factor

Another favorite explanation is that Brizola and the PDT would have monopolized opposition to government at both the state and federal levels. High inflation and unemployment, colossal internal and foreign debt, and negative growth rates in the economy were consistently blamed on gross mismanagement of the economy by the federal government. These factors were the legacy of a harsh, authoritarian military regime, which had curtailed Brazilians' civil and political rights. The incumbent governor, Chagas Freitas, was formally affiliated with the major opposition party (the PMDB) but had taken a cooperative stance vis-à-vis the military regime; and the polls indicated that the state government had even poorer ratings than the federal government. Political analysts stressed the fact that Chagas Freitas received the lowest ratings of all Brazilian governors evaluated (Soares 1983b). Brizola was thus the outstanding opposition candidate, "against both federal and state governments." Gallup polls published by *Isto É* show that Brizola was perceived as the major relevant opponent to both federal and state governments and that his popularity increased with the respondent's opposition to government on either level (Soares 1984a).[7] Nevertheless, Chagas Freitas, after two terms as governor of Rio de Janeiro, had managed to establish a clientelistic machinery that assured his candidate, Miro Teixeira, substantial voter support in the slums and particularly in the outskirts of the city of Rio (Diniz 1982).

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The Marxist Interpretation

Orthodox Marxism provides yet another, "classical" explanation: Brizola was the candidate who would have appealed to working- and lower-class voters dissatisfied with a highly exploitative regime that had exacerbated income inequality to an unprecedented degree.[8] But why would Brizola, among all five candidates, win these preferences? According to some, Brizola was the only viable choice. PTB candidate Sandra Cavalcanti held a cabinet post in the very conservative government of Carlos Lacerda and was tainted by her stance on removing slumdwellers as well as by suspicions that beggars were being killed by Lacerda's police. Moreira Franco, former Maoist and subsequent MDB member, was automatically disqualified because he was the government party's candidate. Miro Teixeira was the governor's candidate, which may have cost him many working-class votes as well as massive rejection by the middle class. The fifth candidate, Lysaneas Maciel, represented only a small intellectual party in Rio, the PT, although he had impeccable political and ideological qualifications. As it became evident that he had no chance of winning, many of his votes were channeled to Brizola.

THE IMPACT OF METROPOLITIZATION, PARTY ORGANIZATION, AND THE PDT'S PLATFORM AND CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Metropolitization

Because the Rio metropolitan area contains a substantial proportion of the total state vote and the governor is elected statewide, the PDT's campaign concentrated on the area that would yield the highest voting returns for the money and effort. This area accounts for a high proportion of all televisions, radios, and newspapers in circulation.

Party organization also affects electoral results. In elections at the municipio level, a party cannot run candidates without a local party organization. Therefore, if a party is not legally registered in a given municipio, it cannot run candidates for mayors and city council members. Votes for local, state, and federal offices correlate and also reinforce the truism of Brazilian politics that in rural areas, local preferences predominate over state and national preferences. Local candidates for mayor or council member would influence choices of state and federal candidates, not the other way around. Following this assumption, the military government imposed a mandatory straight-ticket voting rule. Consequently, in areas where a small party did not run candidates, voters had to choose between losing their local votes or voting for another party's straight ticket.

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The present multiparty system was established only two years before the elections. The two major parties (the PMDB and PDS) inherited a great deal from the parties of the two-party era while the three other parties had no previous organizational network to rely on. Consequently, the smaller parties, including Brizola's PDT, were clearly disadvantaged, particularly outside the Rio metropolitan area. Their organizational and interpersonal network was not only recent but insufficient. Indeed, the PDT resembled not so much a party as a political movement led by one man. Detailed data on the PDT's organization were not available, but judging from the fact that organizational differentials among the parties were less relevant and narrower in the Rio metropolitan area, we expected the PDT and Brizola to do better there than elsewhere in the state.

The PDT's poor organizational network is not the only reason for analyzing the Rio metropolitan area separately. First, it dominates the state in demographic, electoral, political, and economic terms. Historical and institutional reasons also suggest that the Rio metropolitan area has separate parameters. Foremost is the fact that until 1975 Rio de Janeiro and vicinity formed the state of Guanabara, not to be confused with the state of Rio de Janeiro. During the democratic period (1945–1964), politics in Guanabara were marked by bipolar partisanship, with labor's PTB and the conservative União Democrática Nacional (UDN) accounting for nearly all the votes. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, the rural-based, conservative Partido Social Democrático (PSD) was a major party, with the UDN and PTB significantly weaker there than in Guanabara. The loyalties and allegiances of this period were not totally dissipated even after eighteen years of military rule; surviving remnants of the old parties included local social and political networks and relationships with mass media.

The PDT gambled heavily on the large metropolitan vote, successfully using media, particularly television debates, and the gamble paid off. In only one month, Brizola increased his popularity rating by twenty-five percentage points.[9] We therefore deemed it advisable to analyze the Rio metropolitan area, with its fourteen municipios, separately from the remainder of the state.

Urbanization

Although the metropolitan area thus defined is far more urbanized than the remainder of the state, urbanization alone does not account for all the institutional, historical, and political differences between the two areas. Nevertheless, urbanization is a time-honored predictor of political behavior and is considered one of the main cleavages in Brazilian elections (Soares 1973, 1982, 1984b; Ferraz 1976;

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Reis 1983; Fleischer 1984). Furthermore, Brizola's brand of populism is charcterized in its Latin American meaning as having a nonrevolutionary character and involving class alliances (Di Tella 1965; Roberts 1980; Weffort 1973, 1978), with particular appeal to the urban poor of rural origin (Germani 1969, 1971, 1978).[10] These authors view populism as reproducing in an urban setting traditional rural clientelistic political practices. Given the variance in urbanization within the Rio metropolitan area and in the remainder of the state, we decided to include urbanization as a factor in the analysis.

Ethnic Factors

Race is seldom used as a predictor of political behavior in Brazil because national pride and ideology tend to deny the existence of racial consciousness and discrimination. This view has permeated the writings of conservative sociologists. Thus, to demonstrate that race makes a difference is relevant because it overturns standard sociological interpretations. Race was also politically crucial because Brizola won by only 178,000 votes (3 per cent) over Moreira Franco. Had nonwhites voted in the same patterns as whites, Brizola's election would have been seriously jeopardized. We wondered whether Brizola's *socialismo moreno* and the PDT's effort to attract nonwhites actually exerted a special appeal for morenos. Personal observations suggested that they did. Amaury de Souza, using data from a survey of the 1960 elections, showed that dark skin correlated positively with voting for the labor party (the PTB), even after controlling for class identification. That is, contrary to many a theory, ethnic consciousness was not reduceable to class consciousness (Souza 1971). But among Brazilian intellectuals, this position violates mainstream interpretations, Marxist as well as non-Marxist. These older interpretations have been so influential that we judged it advisable to elaborate on them.

The mainstream literature on race relations in Brazil is congruent with prevailing social values in stressing the absence of racial conflict. The existence of substantial income and educational differences among races without open racial conflict has caused social scientists to propose numerous theoretical explanations for this otherwise unexplained phenomenon. Although basically assimilationist in character, these explanations differ as to the mechanisms that allow assimilation of the nonwhite population (Hasenbalg and Huntington 1982).

The classic work is Gilberto Freire's 1933 treatise on Brazilian plantation society, *Casa Grande e Senzala*, which viewed assimilation as resulting from widespread miscegenation. According to this perspective, intense interbreeding indicates a positive view of the nonwhite group by whites and also prevents racial identification, thus minimiz-

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ing the chances of discrimination. A necessary conclusion from Freyre's work is that because race in Brazil is a continuum, discrimination tends to be moderate and incremental. A bipolar, black or white distribution of racial identities would be impossible, as would conflict based on polarized racial consciousness.

Pierson (1942) contributed to this view, stressing that every degree of miscegenation is identified as a color unit and receives a separate label. Therefore, attitudinal color differentiation is so complex that broad-based group consciousness, such as black or white, cannot develop. A common argument for this point is that Brazilians have dozens of different words for slightly different racial types, that attitudes vary toward each type, and that Brazilians do not develop broad color identifications.

Along this line, Marvin Harris (1964) observed that racial identity in Brazil was not governed by a rigid descent rule. His research in a fishing village in the state of Bahia elicited no less than forty different racial denominations to describe nine portraits in a sample of one hundred respondents. These results led Harris to conclude that "without a method of clearly distinguishing between one group and another, systematic discrimination cannot be practiced" (Harris 1964, 54).

Another theory is partially derivative. It asserts that mulattoes are clearly differentiated from blacks and therefore have better prospects for social mobility. Accordingly, "whitening" would create a new channel for nonwhite mobility, encouraging the conformity of nonwhites, who would envisage some possibility of ethnic and socioeconomic upward mobility within the existing system.[11] This "mulatto escape hatch" has been cited as a major difference between race relations in Brazil and in the United States. Carl Degler defends this position:

. . . in the United States the definition of a Negro became anyone of African ancestry, and this definition is unqualified by criteria of class. On the other hand, in Brazil, as in Latin America in general, this simple, biological definition of the Negro never developed. Instead a special place was reserved for the mixed blood—the mulatto—a development that opened up much wider possibilities for social mobility. The fact is . . . the man who is neither black nor white can be taken as the symbol of the differences between the race relations of the two countries. (Degler 1971, 203–4)

Skidmore (1976) diverges significantly in emphasizing the existence of harsh stereotypes and prejudices toward nonwhites, views shared by many nonwhites. Obviously, nonwhite acceptance of a demeaning image would lead either to denying one's own race in favor of an alienated, "whitened" identity or accepting one's identity and subjugated socioeconomic and political role in society.

Anthropological currents also underlie the role of racial consciousness in Brazil. The "inheritance of poverty" interpretation is

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among the most sophisticated (Duncan 1969). It postulates that "non-whites are poor because they are poor." Stunned by Freire's depiction of Brazilian society as a racial paradise, in obvious contrast with the United States, several scholars undertook research during the 1940s and 1950s on this contradictory reality. UNESCO helped sponsor some ground-breaking surveys (for example, Azevedo 1955; Wagley 1963). Not surprisingly, these studies uncovered a far less benign Brazilian reality of conspicuous prejudice and broad socioeconomic inequalities.

But the contrast was still apparent between relatively smooth race relations in Brazil and sharp racial conflict in other societies, the United States being a favorite example. This contrast led most analysts to reject the explanations put forward in societies where racial conflict was open. Some reached unexpected conclusions: for Harris, the obvious prejudice against blacks in Brazil had no behavioral implications: "as far as actual behavior is concerned races do not exist for the Brazilians" (Harris 1964, 64). Others asserted that because blacks preponderate in the wretchedly poor, lower-class stratum, discrimination would be based only on class, not on race. This differentiation could be explained by the absence of social mobility in Brazil's traditional society. Assimilation of minorities and gradual erasing of their characteristics was thus to be expected. As Pierson observed, "The most characteristic tendency of the Bahian social order is the gradual but persistent reduction of all distinguishing racial and cultural marks and the fusing, biologically and culturally, of the African and the European into one race and one common culture" (Pierson 1942, 337).

Capitalism, Social Classes, and Race

More recently, Brazilian sociological literature has concentrated on analyzing race relations during the transition from a slave society to a modern class society. The integration of the black population has been studied in the context of competition with white immigrants for the same jobs. In this competition, former slaves and their descendants were at a disadvantage because they lacked the skills to become modern workers and consequently could not compete with better qualified white European immigrants. According to this view, nonwhites lacked the elementary social techniques (such as systematic savings, home-ownership, and a stable family organization) that maximize social mobility opportunities. In a telling, albeit reductionist, statement, Florestan Fernandes concludes:

The economic, social and cultural isolation of the Negro, with all its unquestionably harmful consequences, was a natural result of his relative incapacity to feel, think and act in the social milieu as a free man. In rejecting him, society

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was thus rejecting a human factor that bore within himself a slave or a freed-man. . . . [I]t should be kept in mind that in sociological terms this rejection would be specifically racial in character only if the Negro continued to be rejected once he had acquired these characteristics. The data presented suggest the opposite. To the extent in which the Negro acquired the rudiments of those characteristics or showed some capacity to do so, he found the road open and could fit in socially. (Fernandes 1971, 52–53).

In this approach, industrialization and capitalist development are viewed as incompatible with manifest forms of discrimination, which are considered a mere cultural survival of the slave past. This view perhaps reveals an omnipotent view of capitalism and industrialization and a perception that capitalism has a "functional" need for nondiscriminatory practices (Hasenbalg 1979). Oddly enough, in the most industrialized capitalist society, the United States, discrimination is considered blatant. Socioeconomic differentials are interpreted as resulting from the relative disadvantage that blacks and mulattoes suffered at the start. Their present poverty would simply reflect the still-unfinished process of social mobility.

A prevalent view in the Brazilian literature on race relations reduces all race-related inequalities—financial, educational, or other—to class inequalities. This perspective stems largely from an orthodox variety of Marxism, which is reductionist in claiming that, in the last analysis, all relevant conflicts reflect class conflicts. This position is well stated by Octavio Ianni, a fairly orthodox Brazilian Marxist:

. . . In the vast process of mystification of the true basis of human relations, racial ideologies play the role of social techniques for governing the behavior of individuals or groups, by dividing them or throwing them together, in the same way as, for example, religious or political ideologies; and often they are bound up with racial ideologies.

To sum up, we may say that discrimination, barriers and stereotypes, which go with racial ideologies, operate as recurrent and active features in a social system which, in accordance with the power structure of the day, "must" be preserved. Distinctions and divisions, among groups which are defined as different on racial grounds, are manifestations which will express, in a confused way, the domination-subordination relationship which stemmed originally from appropriating the products of society's labor—and, for that matter, the products of men themselves, as commercial agents. Crystallization on the level of social relations has the effect of legitimizing particular hierarchical distributions of human beings. (Ianni 1972, 248)

But if all inequality is class-based and none is derived from race, political action based on racial inequality would be either improbable or operating on a false premise. Thus these theories have serious political implications. If racial discrimination is present (a theoretical improbability), it would still be mystification of the "true" source of inequality, the class structure.

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Race, Class, and Politics

If racial identity is fragmented along dozens of irrelevant headings, racially based political action would also tend to be fragmented, making broad-based racial political action difficult. If racial identities, chances for mobility, and occupational opportunities differ sharply for blacks and mulattoes, shared political action by these groups becomes difficult, if not outright impossible. Conventional political sociology would predict that mulattoes would behave politically more like whites than blacks; some would assume that mulattoes would actually be politically closer in their views to whites than to blacks. Theories of overidentification and anticipatory socialization go even further in predicting that a substantial proportion of mulattoes would emulate whites in their politics.

Such speculations, however, are alien to the overwhelming majority of Brazilian social scientists, for whom race is a negligible political factor. In reviewing forty years of empirical research, we found only two articles dealing with racial politics (Souza 1971; Soares 1984a). Several surveys specifically designed to study the social determinants of political behavior failed to include a single question on race, and of those that did, only one had the data on race and politics analyzed and published. While it is true that various color labels exist, the relative socioeconomic distances separating these groups are unknown. The existence of dozens of different racial labels does not imply that all the resulting types are valued differently, with varying rewards and degrees of discrimination.

What about the impact of social classes? Many studies using a variety of approaches and methodologies have documented the impact of social class on political behavior. The PDT's appeals were directed toward the poor, the dispossessed, and the working class, but so were the appeals of other parties. In contrast to the PT, the PDT neither stressed the industrial working class nor attracted large numbers of young, college-educated Marxist ideologues.

In the Brazilian literature, class—variously defined—has been found to correlate with voting in different states. Given the links of Brizola and many PDT politicians to the old labor party, the PTB, on the one hand, and between the PTB and the working class, on the other, it was more than plausible that an association between the two would be found.

More complex were the relations between race, class, and politics. This issue is made polemical by a strong current of Marxist reductionism in Brazilian social science arguing that racial differences in political behavior are due to class differences between the races. Our initial hypotheses asserted that both class and race have had powerful

TABLE 1 Color Designation by PNAD Categories, 1976

Color Self-Identification	PNAD Color Categories				Percentage Total (Number)
	Branco	Pardo	Preto	Other & Missing Data	
Branco (white)	96.7	2.1	0.1	1.1	100 (34,612)
Claro (light-skinned)	84.7	10.0	0.5	4.8	100 (2,055)
Moreno claro (tan)	51.6	39.9	2.5	6.0	100 (2,307)
Moreno (brown)	22.0	66.1	8.3	3.6	100 (28,427)
Pardo (brown)	2.6	94.0	2.6	0.8	100 (6,234)
Preto (black)	2.0	8.0	89.3	0.7	100 (3,658)
Other	36.6	28.0	17.2	18.2	100 (4,367)
Missing data	10.0	6.9	3.2	79.9	100 (917)
(Total number)	(44,544)	(28,083)	(6,679)	(3,271)	(82,577)

Source: Silva (1981), 393.

Note: Color categories were those used in the 1976 Brazilian household survey, the Pesquisa Nacional de Amostragem por Domicílios (PNAD).

independent effects on political behavior. We also believed that the intensity of these effects is not a constant but varies from election to election and place to place.

METHODS

Three sources of data are included. Cross-tabulations are based on the 1976 Pesquisa Nacional de Amostragem por Domicílios (PNAD). All other data are aggregate, with the units of analysis being the sixty-four municipios of the State of Rio de Janeiro. Electoral data employed are the official results of the 1982 gubernatorial elections obtained at the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (Regional Electoral Court) in Rio de Janeiro. Population, urbanization, and literacy data were taken from the 1980 census reports.

Different possibilities existed for the nature of the relationship between the independent socioeconomic variables and the dependent political variable. If a vote for Brizola, a populist leader under an au-

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thoritarian military regime, is interpreted as an expression of hostility toward the system, one might expect a power function to provide an optimal description on the basis of experimental results dealing with aggression-interference-response theories. Empirical support for such interpretations was provided in an analysis of Chile's 1962 presidential elections (Soares and Hamblin 1967, 1053–65).

But voting for a populist leader need not be interpreted as an act of hostility toward the regime, particularly not as class-based hostility. Actually, if Brizola is a populist leader, as defined by the Latin American political science literature, then a vote for him should not be interpreted as an expression of class conflict but rather as a substitute behavior that obscures class conflict. Populism thus defined is based on paternalism and interpersonal relations, not on class conflict.

Because the meaning of the Brizola vote remains open to question, no compelling a priori theoretical reason requires looking at the vote as a power function or as a simpler, linear one. We therefore decided to take an empirical stance and adopt the form that yielded the best results. The linear model provided a good fit, but powerful interactive effects resulted.

Statistically, our approach was to build progressively more complex models. The metropolitan area and urbanization variables were entered first because they are particularly important in avoiding the anomalies of grouping that cause aggregation biases and the known problems associated with ecological inference.[12]

THE FRAGMENTATION OF RACIAL IDENTITY: EMPIRICAL DATA

In 1976 the Brazilian household survey, the Pesquisa Nacional de Amostragem por Domicílios (PNAD), included two items designed to assess individual self-identification regarding color. The first item was an open-ended question asking respondents to state in their own words how they would define their color. The second question asked respondents to classify themselves in one of four precoded color groups: *branco* (white), *preto* (black), *amarelo* (yellow), or *pardo* (brown). Cross-classification of the answers to these two questions is presented in table 1.

The open-ended question elicited more than 190 labels, confirming Harris's (1964) finding about the extraordinary variety of racial terms used by Brazilians. But just 7 of the 190 accounted for 95 percent of all answers. These seven included the four standard labels in the precoded question plus *claro* (light-skinned), *moreno* (brown), and *moreno claro* (light brown or tan). Moreover, two of the designations, branco and moreno, accounted for 76 percent of all answers.

Thus most racial labels used by Brazilians to describe their own

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TABLE 2 *Education and Income Percentages by Color in Rio de Janeiro, 1980*

Color	Earning 1 minimum-wage or less	Earning 5 minimum-wages or more	3 years of Education or less
Branco (white)	26	19	32
Pardo (brown)	40	5	45
Preto (black)	47	3	54

Source: Soares (1984b).

Note: One minimum wage equaled roughly $100 in 1982.

race (183 out of 190) either describe statistically small categories or derive from individual idiosyncrasies and thus do not amount to a social phenomenon with possible political significance. We therefore rejected the hypothesis of the theory of racial identity fragmentation holding that race cannot have significant political consequences in Brazil.

Class and Race: Empirical Data

The racially peaceful character of Brazilian society is intriguing, mainly because Brazil, like all multiracial societies, is stratified along racial lines. Data on socioeconomic differences consistently indicate the importance of race. Even in areas where it is claimed that relatively favorable conditions exist for the nonwhite population (like the Rio metropolitan area), sharp contrasts exist among people of different racial origins. For instance, the proportion receiving monthly incomes equal to or exceeding five minimum wages is 19 percent in the white population but only 4 percent in the nonwhite population.

Using the minimum wage (roughly one hundred dollars a month in 1982) as the absolute poverty line, 26 percent of whites earned the minimum wage or less, but 40 percent of pardos and 47 percent of blacks fell into this category. This finding is hardly news. Silva (1980) showed that whites, pardos, and blacks are clearly differentiated in Brazil with regard to education, occupation, and income. Although pardos occupy an intermediate position, they rank closer to blacks than to whites (see table 2).

Similar findings result from using the factor of "functional illiteracy," operationally defined as three years of schooling or less: 32 percent of whites, 46 percent of pardos, and 54 percent of blacks were functional illiterates in 1980. The point is that Brazilian society exhibits strong income, educational, and occupational differentials by race, even where the conventional wisdom has expected none.

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The Effect of the Rio Metropolitan Area on the Brizola Vote

Our first step included only the Rio metropolitan area as a "dummy 0–1" predictor. The results justify its inclusion because this variable alone explains over 57 percent of the variance in the total valid Brizola vote. These results are all the more impressive because the metropolitan area–nonmetropolitan area is a dichotomous variable, thus allowing considerable variance within each of the categories.

The Effect of Urbanization on the Brizola Vote

We tried to rescue some of the variance lost with the high aggregation of the first analytical step. Urbanization proved a useful additional predictor; it increased the explained variance by approximately 11 percent, which is highly significant ($<.01$). The direction of the coefficient shows that the Brizola vote is positively associated with urbanization, thus reinforcing the conclusions that led to separating the Rio metropolitan area from the rest of the state (see table 3).

The Effect of Race on the Brizola Vote

In accordance with our theoretical assumptions, we introduced the ethnic factor at this point, with the moreno (nonwhite) population as a percentage of the total population as our indicator. The residuals left unexplained by the previous step have a substantial correlation ($+.58$) and an adequate fit with the percentage of morenos in the Rio metropolitan area. Outside the metropolitan area, the relationship is much weaker, the correlation being only $+.19$. Both visual inspection of the plots and correlational analysis recommend adding the percentage of nonwhites in the population to our predictive equation. The results show an increase in the explained variance of 3 percent, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The three variables included so far explain approximately 72 percent of the variance, a result seldom achieved in this kind of research.

Coefficients for the two previously included variables—metropolitan area and urbanization—remain significant and in the expected direction. Morenos have a statistically significant coefficient (at the 5 percent level), in the predicted direction: the higher the proportion of nonwhites, the higher the vote for Brizola.

The Effect of Education and Social Class on the Brizola Vote

Given the limitations of secondary data analysis, the best available indicator of class situation was literacy. Previous research showed

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TABLE 3 *Ecological Determinants of the Brizola Vote in Rio de Janeiro, 1982*

Parameter	Model 1 Metro Area	Model 2[d] + Urban	Model 3 + Morenos
Metropolitan Area (MA)	20.737[a]	15.582[a]	14.037[a]
Percentage urban		0.186[a]	0.191[a]
Percentage morenos			0.222[b]
Literacy rate			
Percentage pardo			
Percentage preto			
(MA) (Percentage urban)			
(MA) (Percentage pardo)			
(MA) (Percentage black)			
Constant	5.392	−5.310	−13.954
R-squared	0.574	0.688	0.718
(F)	(83.428[a])	(67.166[a])	(50.818[a])

[a]Significant at 0.01 level.
[b]Significant at 0.05 level.
[c]Not significant at 0.05 level.
[d]The lack of zero and negative values for urbanization and its high values in some of the municipios have affected the slope, resulting in a negative constant.
[e]To compensate for the much higher average level of urbanization within the Rio metropolitan area, the coefficient for the latter becomes negative when an interaction term involving both variables is included in the equation, as is model 6.

that in Brazil sheer literacy correlates highly with occupation, income, and other standard indicators of socioeconomic status. It provides a significant cutoff point at a low level on the stratification scale.

Our hypothesis that socioeconomic status was a major influence on the Brizola vote had been shattered by the results of a preelectoral survey conducted in the city of Rio, which showed that Brizola's support in various social classes was undifferentiated. Thus we did not expect to find a significant increase in the predictive power of the explanatory matrix with the inclusion of this variable. The results sustain these expectations: no significant increase occurred in the F-value nor was literacy's contribution significant at the 5 percent level, using Student's t-test.

Literacy correlates highly with urbanization, and its inclusion negatively affects the significance of the coefficient between urbanization and the Brizola vote, but it fails to affect the coefficient between morenos and the Brizola vote. Although one could argue that urbanization is also a proxy for literacy, it cannot be argued that ethnic and racial effects are reduceable to class effects. Taking the empirical results at

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Model 4 + Literacy	Model 5 + Blacks & Browns	Model 6[e] (Interactive)
13.707[a]	12.621[a]	−29.553[a]
0.137[b]	0.180[a]	0.112[a]
0.242[a]		
0.191[c]		
	0.323[a]	0.175[a]
	−0.018[c]	−0.128[c]
		0.297[a]
		0.701[a]
		−0.201[c]
−24.632	−11.785	−2.957
0.724	0.727	0.809
(38.609[a])	(39.353[a])	(33.808[a])

face value, literacy should not be included in the predictive equation. Taking the set of empirical evidence available, which includes the aforementioned survey, social class (as measured in conventional sociology) was not a relevant factor in the vote for the PDT and Brizola. As such, this finding contradicts a vast Brazilian literature, both theoretical and empirical, that links class and politics.

Specifying the Moreno Vote

Testing the mulatto escape-hatch theory, we built another equation in which morenos were broken down according to census categories into blacks and pardos, ignoring the handful of Orientals (amarelos). The results suggest that pardos supported Brizola and thus add to the explanation, whereas blacks did not. Statistically, there is no substantial gain, considering that the coefficients of determination are similar, but there is reason to remove black identity as an explanatory variable because the t-test is close to zero.

The predictive power of the three variables retained is close to 73 percent, which stems from a multiple correlation coefficient of .85, high enough to grant the model predictive usefulness. Nevertheless, the fact remains that no evidence was found that blacks supported Brizola, unlike pardos. Theoretically, this finding raises some interesting questions and speculative answers. Why did mulattoes (pardos) favor Brizola whereas blacks did not? At least four different explanations are suggested.

The first suggestion is that the social and ethnic distance be-

tween Brizola and the PDT elite, on the one hand, and blacks, on the other, was greater than blacks would accept. Because the PDT elite is comparatively rich and its majority is white, it would be rejected as a party that could speak for blacks, but it possibly could speak for mulattoes. This hypothesis assumes a maximum social and ethnic distance between party leaders and followers beyond which leadership is not accepted. Given the relative socioeconomic status and skin color of the mulatto and black populations, the distance—both racial and socioeconomic—would be smaller for mulattoes but beyond the acceptable threshhold for blacks.

A second explanation suggests that because Brizola and the PDT campaigned for *socialismo moreno* and not for black socialism, those blacks who misread the party slogan as reflecting a racial intention and who consistently identified themselves as blacks, rather than morenos, may have felt excluded. A third argument asserts that proportionately more blacks live outside the Rio metropolitan area, where the party's organization is much weaker. All kinds of access to voters (television, newspapers, roads, party organization) are more difficult, politicization and participation are lower, black illiteracy rates are much higher, and relatively few blacks register and vote. Consequently, blacks do not influence electoral outcomes in these areas. A fourth explanation is that the mulatto socioeconomic escape hatch would result in political participation, whereas black socioeconomic immobility would result in political apathy.

Interactive Effects

The first five analyses used simple, additive models. Inspection of residuals, however, suggests strong interactive effects in the sense that the gains derived from introducing urbanization and pardos as factors largely obtained within the Rio metropolitan area. Another model was therefore constructed to include interactions between each predictor and the metropolitan dummy variable.

An interactive model is a significant improvement over simple, additive ones: explained variance increases from 73 percent to 81 percent; the multiple correlation coefficient reaches .9 in the expected direction, thus showing the predictive power of that model. The interactive effects suggest that the original predictors, urbanization and the percentage of pardos, are particularly effective in predicting the Brizola vote in the Rio metropolitan area. For each increase of 1 percent in the proportion of pardos in the metropolitan area, an increase of 0.88 occurred in the percentage of the total Brizola vote. In contrast, in the fifty municipios outside the Rio metropolitan area, each 1 percent increase in the proportion of pardos generates an 0.18 increase in the percentage of the total Brizola vote.

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When several predictive variables were combined in a single predictive matrix, both forward and backward stepwise regression analysis led to the same surviving set of variables included in our final interactive analysis. Thus, using both our theoretical orientations and allowing t-tests to make the selection produced the same results.

STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS AND BRIZOLA

As noted, Brizola received far more votes than his weak party base would have suggested. The effect of the October television debates is documented by time-series polls (Souza, Lima Junior, and Figuereido 1984). Yet the Brizola vote was highly predictable on the basis of some of the standard structural variables from political sociology. Multiple correlations of .90 and above with electoral results are very unusual, even in ecological analyses.

We are aware that variance is artificially controlled: we are dealing with one phenomenon in one state in a given year; in different states and at different times, the explanatory matrix would be different. Nevertheless, even considering the narrow parameters, multiple correlation coefficients of this magnitude are unusual. Thus we may justifiably conclude that, while admitting the existence of Brizola's charisma (votes for him went far beyond what might be expected from the backing of a recent party lacking adequate organization), voters' response to charisma as well as to party-liners is structurally determined.

The Rio metropolitan area is a different political system from the remainder of the state. Its many differences—historical, institutional, and organizational—are difficult to measure but add up to a different polity with significant electoral consequences. Urbanization, colinear with metropolitization, nevertheless exerted a substantial independent effect on voting, thus confirming the results of plentiful prior research. Social class failed to help explain variance in the Brizola vote. This vote may have been peculiar to that period of Brazilian history, when redemocratization took precedence over socioeconomic consideration. In the campaign for direct elections, observers could not detect significant class differentials in attitudes toward that issue. Thus we expect social classes and socioeconomic issues to retake their leading role in the 1986 elections. Race turned out to be a statistically significant factor, as we expected. Our prediction is that as racial consciousness takes hold in Brazil, its influence in elections and politics will tend to increase. Together, these variables point to the structural predictability of what may seem to be unpredictable political phenomena. Leonel Brizola, a successful populist leader, is not above social determinations.

NOTES

1. Other elections took place between 1964 and 1982 that were relatively free and in which the opposition did extremely well, particularly in 1974 and 1978. In several elections, however, press censorship, prohibited use of television campaigning, and the ominous presence of legislation such as Ato Institucional 5 (which made the military government unaccountable for its own acts) circumscribed campaigns narrowly.

2. The party reform that changed a two-party system to a multiparty system was intended not to modify the government party but to split the opposition and to shed a tainted government party label.

3. Brazil contains some four thousand municipios. The closest U.S. approximation to the municipio is the county, although municipios tend to be smaller. In addition, elections to the federal congress and to state offices are statewide, not by districts or by municipios. Only mayors and city councillors (*vereadores*) are elected on a municipal basis.

4. The skewness of the Brizola vote becomes apparent in comparing his mean and standard deviation with those of his main opponents: Brizola's mean was 9.9, the standard deviation was 11.4; Moreira Franco's mean was 35.9, the standard deviation, 9.5; Miro Teixeira's mean was 35.8, his standard deviation, 12.8.

5. Mean urbanization for the Rio metropolitan area is 85.1 and the standard deviation is 23.5; for the fifty other municipios, the mean is 57.5 and the standard deviation, 20.1.

6. Several explanations of Brazilian voters as volatile, unpredictable, and lacking in serious party allegiances were formulated by defenders of authoritarian solutions with a taste for economic policies favoring elites. These views are more the expression of elite prejudice against the working classes than the result of judicious research.

7. *Isto É*, "Caça ao Indefinido," 8 Sept. 1982, 30–33.

8. Much to everyone's surprise, however, an electoral survey taken in 1982 in the city of Rio showed little or no relationship between preference for Brizola and socioeconomic status (Souza, Lima Junior, and Figueiredo 1982; Soares 1984a, 72).

9. Until a few months before the elections, Brizola ranked low in the polls. The favorite candidates were Sandra Cavalcanti and Miro Teixeira, followed by Wellington Moreira Franco, the government party candidate. As late as July, Brizola ranked a distant fourth. On 8 September, Brizola received 15 percent of the total preferences in the city of Rio, the same as Miro Teixeira, compared with Wellington Moreira Franco's 12 percent and Sandra Cavalcanti's 22 percent. By 24 September, Brizola had gained thirteen points, jumping to 28 percent, and on 9 October, he reached 40 percent (Souza, Lima Junior, and Figueiredo 1984). Thus in one month, Brizola's popularity increased by twenty-five percentage points. Lost in the aftermath of the election was the fact that his closest competitor, Wellington Moreira Franco, achieved a similar increase. The cause of such marked increases seems to have been the excellent performances of Moreira Franco and Brizola in the televised debates.

10. Populism, thus conceived, has little to do with definitions used by analysts of European social and political movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

11. *Whitening* is defined here as the process by which nonwhites acquire white characteristics; in a narrower definition, *whitening* applies only to nonwhites who are redefined as whites because of their higher socioeconomic status.

12. Because spatial grouping, or areal delimitation, is often a major source of aggregation bias, aggregate models seeking inferences about individual behavior must include variables theoretically relevant at the individual level, as well as variables to overcome the bias caused by grouping (Goodman 1959; Kmenta 1971; Langbein and Lichtman 1978). Because municipio formation in Brazil is closely linked with urbanization, we believe that the aforementioned requisites are filled by urbanization.

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