

latter are dissatisfied or disaffected; and the likely impact of various external events on the nature of Soviet rule. Since no one knows the correct assessment of all these elements, the best that anyone can do is to provide a reasonable analysis based on what is known or can be deduced. Each analysis is therefore open to debate and disagreement, and Breslauer painstakingly calls attention to the absence of supporting data, unlikely assumptions, and illogical arguments offered by each scholar. He is severely critical of scholars who predict instability based on the leadership's inability to handle multiple crises and of scholars who forecast incremental change despite increasing differentiation and polarization of interests as the likely future course. Moreover, he is unsympathetic to the theorists who anticipate a right-wing reaction—dictatorial in form, Russian nationalist and possibly militarist in content. (It is interesting that this view has been promoted primarily by Soviet émigrés and has not been embraced by respected Western analysts.)

On the whole, Breslauer's monograph is a useful, well-organized—though occasionally repetitive—review of the main contemporary lines of analysis regarding the probable evolution of the Soviet system. Discussions and debates on this topic have taken place for a number of years at dozens of scholarly conferences and at seminars conducted at the main centers for Soviet studies in this country and in Europe. They have also appeared in a number of widely circulated journals devoted to Soviet affairs. Thus, most interested scholars and observers are quite familiar with virtually all the arguments that Breslauer raises. His proposition (p. 2) that theorists, area specialists, and policymakers who read this short volume will acquire basic insights thanks to the methodology, classifications, analyses, and critiques included seems rather too ambitious. It is unlikely that many readers who are unfamiliar with most of the writings he analyzes will be inclined to peruse this monograph.

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CRISIS ON THE LEFT: COLD WAR POLITICS AND AMERICAN LIBERALS, 1947–1954. By *Mary Spering McAuliffe*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. xii, 204 pp. \$12.50.

This short, modest book is not so much about the Cold War itself as it is about American liberals' and leftists' political reaction to deteriorating Soviet-American relations. International events enter into Professor McAuliffe's history as events triggering the various shifts and splits which divided "the American left." The focus is on the division between popular front liberals and those who insisted on breaking with, and in some cases on an all-out attack on, the American Communist Party and its Soviet overseers. The main actors are such groups as the Progressive movement, Americans for Democratic Action, the American Civil Liberties Union, various labor unions, and liberal journals. If the book has a theme it is that "in response to grave international danger as well as attacks from the political right, the majority of liberals at mid-century became reluctant to defend the rights of the least popular left-wing minority." The author finds this "liberal failure" to be "explainable and even understandable," but her accusatory tone earlier in the book implies otherwise: she claims that the liberal failure "marked a loss . . . for the nation as a whole," but she does not really elaborate or defend this proposition (p. 147).

Crisis on the Left covers some ground which will be familiar to readers of earlier works, such as Alonzo Hamby's *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*. Perhaps most interesting for students of U.S.-Soviet relations is McAuliffe's treatment of an earlier counterpart to the current debate about Cold War and détente. The continuities and parallels between revisionist historians

and left-liberal critics on the one hand, and earlier supporters of Henry Wallace on the other, are striking. The "new conservative" critics of détente (Senator Henry Jackson, *Commentary*, and others) have their counterparts (indeed, some of the same people, such as Irving Kristol, were active then and still are) in the "Vital Center" of anti-Soviet liberals of the early Cold War years.

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THE SECRET WAR FOR THE OCEAN DEPTHS: SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY FOR MASTERY OF THE SEAS. By *Thomas S. Burns*. New York: Rawson Associates, 1978. xiv, 334 pp. \$12.95.

This book will satisfy completely neither the scholar nor the specialist on ocean science or maritime warfare. Despite some redeeming features, especially for the "hobbyist" on naval matters, *The Secret War for the Ocean Depths* must be classed as popular literature and not as a serious study of the "Soviet-American Rivalry for Mastery of the Seas."

There are a few insights in the book and some interesting discussion of the powerful personalities and the political and bureaucratic obstacles associated with the U.S.-Soviet underseas competition, but these insights are almost exclusively into the American side of the competition. Thomas Burns, who has some inside knowledge of U.S. underseas development, contributes by way of breezy narrative without documentation. The expert in these matters will find nothing new, but the uninitiated might enjoy the account of Western developments.

The treatment of Soviet naval matters is even less rigorous, although at times it makes for interesting reading. Again, there are no footnotes. Assertions such as "the Russians are not a peace-loving people" and "they have supported only rulers that have led them into battle" do little to engender confidence in the author's objectivity or scholarship. Also, while many of the assertions about Soviet naval development and priorities are not far off the mark, the bulk of the treatment of the Soviet navy is anecdotal in character.

There is a wide literature on the U.S.-Soviet naval competition. Anyone seeking to understand the nature of this competition would be best advised to consult the well-known books already available in both Russian and English. Only if one wishes to emphasize the problem of U.S. decision making in naval matters is he likely to be much informed by what Mr. Burns has to say.

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SOVIET AVIATION AND AIR POWER: A HISTORICAL VIEW. Edited by *Robin Higham* and *Jacob W. Kipp*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. London: Brassey's, 1978. xii, 328 pp. Illus. \$25.00.

Scholars interested in the development and contemporary nature of Soviet air power have recently been treated to a spate of book-length studies on the topic. The present volume is a valuable addition to that literature. For the specialist it offers much helpful analysis; for other interested Soviet area scholars it provides sound insights into what has become an especially high-priority Soviet effort.

Professor Higham's introductory essay sets a cautionary tone. He argues against treating Soviet air power with anything but cautious respect—either in terms of organization or equipment. The USSR has only rarely been out of step with world aviation trends, and to denigrate Soviet hardware as unsophisticated and therefore inferior is a substantial error.