ture. Information on role relationships and the life cycle, although present, is thin. Religion, magic, curing, art, and the use of language (as opposed to some specification of dialect type) receive scant or no attention. There is a section on value orientation devoted mainly to a critique of Foster's theory of limited good that might have been appropriate in what must have been the original dissertation but is a fifth wheel in this context. The book ends lamely on this subject, there having been no indication that this was to be the dénouement.

Even though the descriptions of economic and political interrelationships between the village and higher governmental levels, and between it and other lands through emigration, are clear, one misses a statement of the position of Slovenia in the Yugoslav federation, of the role of Slovene nationalism in the modern state, of the way the tax burden may fall on Slovene peasants precisely because they are in one of the more economically advanced republics. Neither does one find any explication of the obvious similarities in organization and ecological adjustment between the Slovene peasant and his montane cousins from the Bay of Biscay to the Carpathians, to whom he is closer in many ways than to his brethren to the southeast. In short, the book is parochial in its view, conditioned very much by modern political boundaries. It is also anthropologically unimaginative, utterly descriptive, failing to seize the theoretical bait so obvious in its economic and political data. It does not come up to the descriptive fullness of Halpern's work on Orašac, and does not at all achieve the penetrating insight of Fél and Hofer in their remarkable work on Hungarian peasants.

But there is no use complaining in terms of a book the author did not write, even if one would have preferred to read it. This is a community study of strong historical bent, typically unfocused theoretically, and rather selective in its descriptive emphasis. However, it has better data on economic relations, family history, and political and social differentiation than most, and it is a welcome addition to the literature for those restricted to works in English.

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THE EMBATTLED MOUNTAIN. By *F. W. D. Deakin.* New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1971. xvi, 284 pp. $9.50.

In May 1943, F. W. D. Deakin, the Oxford historian and literary secretary to Winston Churchill, parachuted into Tito's headquarters in the midst of the fierce battle of the Sutjeska River. Wounded by the same bomb that struck Tito and barely escaping death in the attack which killed Ivo Lola Ribar, he survived to report to Cairo by wireless that Tito was indeed "killing Germans," as Churchill put it. Deakin became convinced that Mihailović was collaborating with the Axis, and his reports to that effect were influential in turning British support away from the Chetniks and toward the Partisans.

Twenty-five years later Deakin began working on a broadly conceived history of the Sutjeska battle, but he found that memories of his own participation in it "bedevilled and blocked [him] at every turn." In *The Embattled Mountain* he describes his involvement in hopes of clearing his mind and opening the way for the comprehensive study which will follow.

The result, however, is not a memoir. Neither is it a history. Rather it is a

combination of the two—half personal and half scholarly. Perhaps because of the intensity of Deakin's experiences, his description of them, presented in the first part of the book "without benefit of hindsight," is a bit jumbled. The dramatic tension of the story is lessened as well by Deakin's constant awareness that he was in Yugoslavia as a representative of the British government. In part 2, however, when Deakin the historian takes over, he presents a detailed, professional, and sometimes vivid description of early British involvement in Yugoslavia during World War II. Deakin decided to publish the book before the relevant British archives were opened, and so he has not given the debates which went on in Cairo and London their due. Nevertheless, this account of the early liaison groups inside Yugoslavia is the fullest and most convincing that has yet appeared. The only question that arises is almost perverse, given the evidence Deakin presents and the weight of current scholarly opinion. Can it really be true that Tito's Partisans are always heroes, their opponents always villains?

Deakin accurately calls his book a prelude, a study in preparation for a larger canvas. But it is an excellent start, and now that he has done it perhaps his brush will move all the more surely and swiftly.

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LES EXPÉRIENCES YOUGOSLAVES D'INDUSTRIALISATION ET DE PLANIFICATION. By *Kruno Meneghello-Dincic*. Preface by *André Piatier*. Paris: Éditions Cujas, [1970]. 286 pp. Paper.

YUGOSLAV FOREIGN INVESTMENT LEGISLATION AT WORK: EXPERIENCES SO FAR. By *Miodrag Sukijasović*. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics. New York: Oceana Publications, 1970. 178 pp. $9.00.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: YUGOSLAV STYLE: THE EFFECT OF DECENTRALIZATION ON ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR. By *Ichak Adizes*. New York: The Free Press. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971. xxi, 297 pp. $9.95.

The Yugoslav economic system has long fascinated area specialists and economists alike, but there have been few adequate accounts of either its peculiar economic institutions or of economic policy and its results. In the last few years, however, a surprisingly large number of books have appeared, and for the first time our knowledge is both reasonably extensive and relatively up to date.

Meneghello-Dincic's book is principally concerned with economic development under planning and the particular strategy of industrialization. The first part provides a concise account of planning and development policy from 1947 to 1965, and the second evaluates the results of those first eighteen years. The author points to the achievements in national income, employment, capital stock, personal incomes, and living standards, but also notes that the strategies employed to attain those results—rapid growth, high investment, industrialization with special emphasis on heavy industry—had, as their consequences, disinvestment in agriculture and light industry, low standards of consumption in both the public and private sectors, deficit finance and inflation, a severe balance of payments deficit, and price distortions. In the early sixties the negative consequences began clearly to outweigh the