

these diseases are not seen on a regular basis in modern facilities. Diagnosis of these diseases would normally be the remit of the facility veterinarian. Although the zoonotic potential of these diseases is mentioned in passing, a section on the concept of zoonotic diseases would have been more useful. Furthermore, an introduction to health monitoring schemes would have added considerably to the usefulness of the book, as many of the health monitoring programmes will be run by veterinary technicians and laboratory animal technicians under the direction of the veterinarian.

I am not a great fan of black and white photographs; however, they can be very effective if they are clear. Although obtaining good photographs of individual diseases can be difficult, there is very little excuse for poor quality 'set piece' photographs, such as the one of a mouse being 'scruffed' on page 95. However, many of the photographs are excellent and show important husbandry issues, such as the de-gloving injury that is common when gerbils are handled badly. In modern laboratory animal husbandry, it has become customary to expect animals to be handled with gloves, both for hygienic purposes and, mostly, as an additional safeguard to prevent contamination of specific pathogen-free animals within a barrier environment; photographs should reflect this practice. Within the book there is an inconsistent approach to the practice of handling animals with gloves. Some of the standard procedures mentioned, such as toe clipping for blood sampling and identification, would not be regarded as standard within Europe. Husbandry specifications differ between Europe and the US, so for a European reader some of the references to cage sizes etc should be cross checked against European Guidelines.

The third section concentrates on learning programmes for handling and performing common procedures. These are very useful exercises, but other than handling exercises, they are effectively practicing procedures on living animals, which would not be permissible within the UK except under a project licence. But within these constraints they are a useful aid to teaching handling and techniques, and use a common check list to ensure training had been achieved.

In conclusion this is a very useful addition to a library, but I would not have considered it my first choice of book in this subject area.

Peter Nowlan

Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

Do Animals Have Rights?

A Hills (2005). Published by Icon Books Ltd, The Old Dairy, Brook Road, Thriplow, Cambridge SG8 7RG, UK. 256 pp Paperback (ISBN 1 84046 623 5). Price £7.99.

Despite its title, this book deals with more than the philosophical question of whether animals are holders of rights. In an accessible language and a manageable format, the author addresses the question of how humans ought to treat other animals. The author is a lecturer in philosophy at Bristol University, and her own position in the animal ethics debate is made clear in the introduction; she defends a

moderate view (p 2) and argues for a moral status for all sentient animals (p 4).

The book has three different sections. The first two sections, 'Animal Minds' and 'All Animals are Equal...?', deal with the fundamental questions of which aspects qualify for which type of moral consideration, and to what extent we know whether non-human animals possess these qualities. The third part, 'How Should we Treat Animals?', is an attempt to bring the ethical position arrived at in the previous chapters to practical decision-making. The author uses four examples: factory-farming, fox-hunting, animal-based research and friendship with animals.

The first chapter, 'Animal Rights in all Times', starts with a brief overview of how animals and humans lived together in ancient time, and then sketches the development of the view on animals in the western world, from ancient Greek thinking, through Christian dogmas, to the Darwinian revolution. The author also gives an overview of the legal status of animals. The view on animals as essentially property is contrasted with two alternative views: the Buddhist wheel of life and Singer's arguments about equal consideration of interests.

The second chapter, 'Animal Minds', goes from René Descartes to Don Broom in a very clear reasoning about whether non-human animals have subjective experiences. This question is addressed from both the biological viewpoint (discussing the existing evidence and the strength of the evidence that animals feel pain/fear/distress) and from the ethical viewpoint (how should we act facing differing amounts of evidence of sentience in different animals). Up until this point, the lack of references, which certainly makes the reading easier, has not been troublesome. When a coherent chain of logical reasoning is presented to justify the conclusions, it matters less that the author was not the first to arrive at these conclusions. But the statement that the "best guide to animal distress is how well the animal is coping with the environment" really requires a reference to Broom — it is neither an undisputable fact nor a consensus conclusion of a reasoning presented in the text.

The fourth chapter, 'Can They Reason?', takes us into the realm of experimental psychology. Again, the philosophical discussion of what it is to have a belief is exemplary in its clarity and logic. However, when addressing issues of animal learning, the author's limited background knowledge becomes apparent. A minor inconsistency is in the reference to a rat, which will continue to bar-press for food even when the reward schedule is changed so that food is no longer delivered when the bar is pressed (p 52). This is not because the rat "has reacted instinctively" — over time it will learn that the response it had first learned (to press the bar for food) no longer produces the desirable food reward. (And a human being with acknowledged high cognitive capacity will react rather similarly; if the bus has arrived at your bus stop about 7.45 every morning for the last year you will probably stay looking for the bus until well after 8.00 before assuming that the driver is on strike and that you'd better

find an alternative means of transport.) More disturbing is the repeated statement that through careful observation of animal behaviour, we should be able to tell if some animals have beliefs, but without any clear suggestion of what sort of observation would give us the evidence that could not be contested with reference to complex learned responses. The question is one of the most difficult for both philosophy and animal behaviour research, and is addressed again in the following chapter, 'Intelligence and Human Minds'. The author discusses the possible capacity for language, tool-making, culture, mirror recognition and understanding of false belief in non-human animals, and concludes that each of these tests seem to have been passed by some animal at some time. This chapter ends with a discussion of autonomous action and morality. The capacity to "reflect on our desires, to assess whether we have genuine reasons for them, and to choose whether or not actually to act on them is our capacity to be *autonomous*", a capacity that is, argues Alison Hills, uniquely human.

A consequence of the unique human autonomy is that only human beings can be morally responsible. However, the limits to moral responsibility are not necessarily the same as the limits to moral status, which is the central question in the second part of the book 'All Animals are Equal...?'. The introduction to this part presents the concept of legal versus moral rights, and defines two important aspects of the moral rights of humans: moral status and the right to life. The author also presents the three features that she argues are the grounds of moral status: membership of a moral community, sentience and the possession of needs that must be satisfied for life to be successful.

Chapter seven, 'The Moral Community', introduces the reader to the moral theory of contractualism, according to which morality is a set of rules defined by a community of individuals driven by self-interest, where only those that can abide by the rules can be members of such a moral community. After concluding that animals cannot be members of a moral community, the author discusses alternative reasons for contractualists to consider animals, even though these are not members. Even though some such alternatives are possible (animals may be more useful if treated well, cruelty to animals is inaeesthetic, and how people treat animals may have consequences for how people treat people), they are unsatisfactory for the author who concludes that because 1) what makes painful treatment of humans wrong is the pain they experience, and 2) many animals can feel pain, at least some animals have moral status, and so we must reject contractualism.

In 'Pains, Pleasure and the Value of Life', the author goes further to discuss the grounds for ascribing moral status — more in particular, whether moral status should be based on sentience only or on something more/else. Additional qualities that are considered are reverence for life, whether an organism possesses needs that can be satisfied or frustrated, and whether an organism can flourish or do badly — all of which would grant moral status to all living beings. Against the idea that all living beings have moral status, the

author argues that the question of "thriving or doing badly" is an ambiguous decision that depends on which standards one compares with. By now it is rather obvious where the author is heading: towards a moral status for all living beings that have a point of view, which are sentient. But it is not obvious that all sentient beings should be treated similarly, as further discussed in 'The Right to Life'.

The chapter starts by discussing (and refusing) the common argument that animals cannot have rights because they cannot have responsibilities: "Rights and responsibilities always come in pairs, but notice that it is not always the same person who has both the right and the responsibility.... Though it is true that there cannot be a right without a responsibility, the right can be mine, the responsibility yours". As the heading suggests, the 'right' focused on is the right to life, and the author addresses the question by asking why death is bad for a human being, and analysing to what extent the same concern applies to non-human animals. To the extent that death is painful is certainly as much a problem for an animal as for a human being. The loss experienced by others, who may mourn the dead, on the other hand, is in the author's view an almost exclusive human problem; animals seem to have little notion of the death of others. But the principal evil is neither pain nor sorrow, it is the fact that death deprives an individual of the life they would have had. With that in mind, is there a difference between how death affects humans and non-human animals? Here Alison Hills agrees with John Stuart Mill, in assuming that it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Based on the human capacity for engaging in complex social relations and planning for the future, she concludes that humans "can take pleasure in a much greater variety of activities than can animals, and so are deprived of more by an early death". Having recognised this, the obvious consequence is that "Death is likely to be worse for the more intellectually developed animals, including the higher apes, than it is for other creatures".

But another important distinction remains between the right to life and the wrongness of killing. There is something more to the right to life than the evil of death, namely the respect for an individual's own decision over his or her life. Humans make such decisions and usually do not consent to being killed; as far as we know animals, on the other hand, lack the capacity for abstract reasoning necessary for making such decisions, and so they can neither give nor refuse their consent. In discussing this issue, the author confronts the animal rights position that because animals cannot give their consent, humans should not kill them. Disagreeing with that, the author concludes that because animals cannot have a view on their own death "we are not failing to respect their own assessment of what to do with their life because they cannot make that assessment". After a brief discussion of humans who cannot make decisions about their own life, the chapter ends by concluding that although non-human animals have moral status, they do not hold the right to life.

The last chapter of this section, ‘All Animals are Equal...?’ addresses the question of when we are justified to give preferences to groups that are in some way or another closer to us.

While the two first sections deal with issues of a more fundamental, philosophical nature, the third part, ‘How Should we Treat Animals?’, attempts to apply the principles of human-animal relationships in the real world. This is done through four practical examples: large-scale animal production for food (“factory food”), foxhunting, the use of animals in research, and friendship with animals. Even though Alison Hills does better than many of her philosophy colleagues in describing the reality in which animals live, this section is the book’s weakest. Making a proper ethical assessment of a practical issue is a difficult task. I would even dare to argue that it is a task that a philosopher should not try to deal with on his or her own: it requires an insight into and understanding of the reality in question that only somebody working in the area has. (This obviously is just as true for animal welfare scientists writing about ethics as for ethicists writing about animal welfare.) If insisting on handling the assessment without input from animal welfare scientists, veterinarians and other specialists, the philosopher ought at least to be careful to include comprehensive and unbiased reviews as a basis for the work and to ensure that all relevant issues are considered. When writing about foxhunting, Alison Hills does just this: she relies on a report from the UK government. Why then does Hill choose Peter Singer, Roger Scruton and the Vegetarian Society as informers about animal production when there is the Farm Animal Welfare Council? Questions of international market pressure and the role of farm animals in maintaining the landscape are not included in the discussion of farming, and the statement that “we can eat dairy products without harming animals” seems a naïve oversimplification of the issue, which is otherwise reasonably correctly addressed.

As for the chapter on animals in science, the author is up to date on the methodology used in safety testing, correctly describing the substitution of the controversial Draize and LD50 tests. The conclusion that “often the animal suffering outweighs the benefits to us, and so in most cases new

consumer products should be tested using alternatives to animal testing, or should not be released at all” does not seem very controversial. But when seen in the light of present market economy politics, it is in fact rather radical, and a few words on the difficulty on bringing this principle into reality would have been welcome. (A good example — not included in the book — is the controversy over the amendment to the Council Directive 76/768/EEC on cosmetic products that would ban the use of animal testing for cosmetic products in the European Union. A political discussion over many years preceded the Directive 2003/15, which introduces a progressive ban on the use of animals for cosmetic testing, as well as the marketing of animal-tested products. Even after the decision, the Directive was challenged by France, where most of the European cosmetics industry is situated; however, the Court of Justice of the European Communities rejected the French request in May 2005.) References to the Three Rs are clear and correct, although there is no discussion of whether the principle is really implemented. A more general criticism against the third section of the book is that a utilitarian principle is applied throughout the discussion, without that principle ever being neither openly stated nor critically discussed.

Overall, this is a very readable book and potentially useful as an introduction to the animal issue in ethics, which does not require a prior knowledge of ethical theory or philosophical methodology. Unfortunately, readability is sometimes achieved through simplification, and for a really good introductory text, I would ask for a bit more modesty, and the recognition that other views may have merit. For someone who works with animals and who is interested in getting a straight-forward, no-nonsense introduction to the ethical discussion, this book is not a bad choice (in particular for a reader who’s not up to profound challenges of a relatively anthropocentric worldview!). For a reader who is interested in animal ethics, but knows little about the practical reality, I would rather recommend Mike Appleby’s “*What Should We Do About Animal Welfare?*”.

Anna Olsson

Institute for Molecular and Cell Biology — IBMC, Portugal