

The book, however, has a number of shortcomings. Agricultural output during the Civil War did not, as the author maintains, decline "almost to zero." Moreover, the drop in agricultural production (to about 40 percent of prewar levels) resulted more from the seizure of peasant surpluses and the lack of consumer goods than from the inefficiencies of small-scale production. In addition, although the author treats the local soviets (particularly of Tambov province) in proper detail, her discussion of workers' control is too sketchy, and in general her treatment of industry is less satisfactory than of agriculture. The book, unfortunately, is rather loosely organized, and the lack of proper chapter headings makes the line of argument harder to follow than it need have been. The research is also somewhat dated, because it does not go beyond the early 1960s, and some of the most valuable Soviet works on the subject have been published since then. Yet despite its limitations this is an interesting attempt to deal with actual working people and how their attitudes and behavior have influenced government decisions. All in all, it is a useful if modest contribution to our knowledge of early Soviet history.

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AMERICANS AND THE SOVIET EXPERIMENT, 1917–1933. By *Peter G. Filene*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 389 pp. \$7.95.

THE PILGRIMAGE TO RUSSIA: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGNERS, 1924–1937. By *Sylvia R. Margulies*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. xi, 290 pp. \$7.50.

AMERICAN VIEWS OF SOVIET RUSSIA, 1917–1965. Edited by *Peter G. Filene*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968. xviii, 404 pp. \$3.50, paper.

During the first few years after the October Revolution it was thought amusing to ask, "Who was the first Bolshevik?" The answer was "Peter the Great." A few years later the question was "Who is responsible for socialism in Russia?" The answer, "Lenin, Stalin, and Henry Ford." Neither Professor Filene nor Professor Margulies is especially concerned in the books under review that a modernization revolution is not a new thing in Russia or that the instigators of such revolutions sought aid from and encouraged visits by foreigners who for the most part were ideologically unsympathetic.

The Petrine and Leninist revolutionaries imported implements and skills from technologically more advanced countries—at first to be able to defend themselves against hostile neighbors, and later in order to expand to fulfill a mission at the expense of the benighted. Any apprehensions the exporters of skills may have felt about putting potentially dangerous implements into the hands of political barbarians seem to have been outweighed by their expectation of profits and their confidence that the recipients would never catch up with—much less surpass—the suppliers.

All three books deal in different ways with aspects of American-Soviet relations. Filene discusses American attitudes toward the "Soviet experiment" (as distinguished from opinions about it) during the period of revolutions, "war communism," civil war, intervention, and the New Economic Policy, and briefly during the first Five-Year Plan. He supplements these analyses of attitudes in a second volume, which contains sixty views of Soviet Russia (1917–65) by persons from different walks of life. In her book Miss Margulies is concerned, in a sense, with attitudes

that influenced Americans to make a pilgrimage "over into the future." She is especially interested in how their attitudes were affected by exposure to the stratagems and manipulations used by the Soviet ruling circles to persuade visitors that the future that Lincoln Steffens had envisioned was actually coming to pass. These three books appear to have been thoughtfully and carefully done. They are interesting and useful supplements to those studies of American-Soviet relations that concentrate on political and economic matters.

A number of the attitudes analyzed by Filene seem to me to have been the result of inaccurate reports. In the chapter "Two Revolutions and a Betrayal" the favorable American attitude toward the Provisional Government might be attributed to reports underestimating both the economic difficulties and the war-weariness of the Russian people and to overoptimistic accounts of the Provisional Government's success in dealing with these problems. Reports of the disastrous July offensive and the failure of political groups to join in a national effort did not prepare foreign attitudes for what followed. After the Bolshevik seizure of power and the negotiation of a separate peace, it was easy for Americans to accept the explanation that Russian withdrawal at a critical period of the war was the work of wild radicals, who for German gold had betrayed the Russian people, their allies, and the cause of democracy.

The initial public approval of President Wilson's reluctant decision to send American troops to Russia seems also to have been due to reports about the importance of protecting from the Germans the munitions sent to North Russia and the need to rescue the Czechoslovak Legions (who proved to be quite capable of taking care of themselves). After Germany's surrender the American troops were not immediately withdrawn, but found themselves with some Allied troops in an undeclared war to help "good" Russians in the White forces save Russia from the "bad" Russians in the Soviet forces. The specter of the Red Peril that was invoked to justify continued intervention failed to check the increasing popular and Congressional opposition. The troops were brought home, and for some years the fear of undeclared war contributed to the revival of the traditional American isolationism.

Examples of the kinds of misinformation and propaganda that influenced American attitudes during the revolutions and the intervention were to be found in the *New York Times*—not in any classified papers that were published but in the news about Russia which, because of its unreliability, was not really fit to print. Two young editors of the *New Republic*, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, went through over a thousand issues and examined between three and four thousand items about Russia—all that the *Times* had printed between March 1917 and March 1920. These investigators selected the *Times* for their study not because they considered it a bad newspaper but because they regarded it as one of the great newspapers of the world. After checking the news reports of several definite and decisive events for which there was no longer any dispute over what had really happened, Lippmann and Merz concluded that "on every essential question the net effect of the news was almost invariably misleading." (See Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, with the assistance of Faye Lippmann, *A Test of the News: An Examination of the News Reports in the New York Times on Aspects of the Russian Revolution of Special Importance to Americans, March 1917–March 1920*, supplement to the *New Republic*, August 4, 1920, 42 pp., and "More News from the *Times*," *New Republic*, August 11, 1920, p. 499.)

In the period of the NEP, as Filene points out, some Americans assumed that

the abandonment of "war communism" meant that the abandonment of communism itself had begun. Later, after several governments had recognized the Soviet government, some business groups argued that recognition by the United States would benefit our national economy.

In the same year that Lenin persuaded his comrades to adopt NEP, the Harding administration approved Hoover's "treaty" with the Soviet Union (see Benjamin M. Weissman, "Herbert Hoover's 'Treaty' with Soviet Russia: August 20, 1921," *Slavic Review*, June 1969, pp. 276–88), and Congress voted \$18.6 million to support the operations of the nongovernmental American Relief Administration in providing food and medical relief for the most widespread of the many famines in Russian history. (Many other groups and agencies, including the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, contributed funds for this work.) Filene notes certain paradoxical circumstances in this matter: (1) The U.S. government approved a relief agreement—which a Soviet specialist in international law said was actually, in substance, a treaty—with a regime that U.S. Secretary of State Colby had declared (the year before) was based on "the negation of every principle of honor and good faith" and whose aim was to promote "Bolshevist revolutions throughout the world." (2) The head of the relief organization, Herbert Hoover, declared his belief that in the immediate postwar period (1918–19) food relief had checked the spread of Bolshevism in Central and Eastern Europe. He also opposed diplomatic recognition of the government with which he had made a "treaty." Filene says that this paradox was more apparent than real, for "in Hoover's opinion, then, the ARA would succeed where Allied armies had failed in rescuing Russia from the Soviets" (p. 78). (The views of E. A. Korovin and others on the "treaty" question are discussed in J. F. Triska and R. M. Slusser, *The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties*, Stanford, 1962, pp. 191–92, and by Weissman, p. 288. Filene includes the Colby note in his *American Views of Soviet Russia*, pp. 43–46.)

Some liberals and radicals opposed the enterprise, because they believed that Hoover was more interested in rescuing the Russians from the Soviets than from starvation. Some hard-line anti-Communists opposed the enterprise for the opposite reason—because it would strengthen the Bolsheviks in their godless conspiracy. But the prevailing attitude was favorable. (Several years later, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan Possony wrote that by strengthening the Soviet government the relief was responsible for more human suffering than it prevented. See their *International Relations in the Age of Conflict Between Democracy and Dictatorship*, New York, 1950, p. 559.)

In March 1921 Lenin feared that unless there was a harvest that year the Soviet government would perish (Weissman, p. 277). There was no harvest. Some Americans feared that if Hoover's ARA was allowed to bring relief to Russia, the Soviet government would perish. The ARA did bring relief, and the Soviet government survived. After twenty months of varied relief activities during which, at the high point, over ten million persons were being fed daily, the ARA operation ended with a Soviet-American shower of mutual congratulations for a job well done. The Sovnarkom presented to the chief of the ARA Russian Unit, Colonel Haskell, a resolution "expressing before the whole world" thanks to Herbert Hoover and the members of the ARA for saving the lives of "millions of people of all ages" and "entire districts and even cities" from a horrible catastrophe. The people of the USSR, said the resolution, would never forget the help given by the American people. (A photograph of the resolution and an English translation are in H. H.

Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919–1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration*, New York, 1927, p. 398. A later account of this operation is Mr. Weissman's regrettably unpublished "The American Relief Administration in Russia: A Case Study in Interaction Between Opposing Political Systems," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1968.) The CPSU later revised history, as it has frequently done, and described the ARA as an organization of spies and its relief work as insignificant.

Miss Margulies, in her last chapter, "Continuity and Change, 1924–1965," notes a certain continuity of objectives, as well as of form and method, in the Soviet Union's treatment of foreigners. Although from time to time there have been changes in policies toward foreigners, she believes that fundamental changes are unlikely as long as the USSR remains a closed society. Filene observes retrospectively that diplomatic recognition in 1933 was "an endorsement by the United States" not of the devil but "a humble acknowledgement that two missionaries inhabited the world and that the conflict of their doctrines would not be settled by the swift expiration or surrender of the Soviet" (p. 284). Although reason has not had much effect on the severity of this conflict of doctrines, there seems to be some recognition that both societies have many problems in common (some of which cannot be controlled by either society alone). Both have problems of maintaining or enlarging executive authority over economic and intellectual activities ostensibly in the name of true democracy. Both also have problems of polycentrism, problems of trying to develop technology while preserving an environment essential for human survival, and above all problems concerning the security of life on this planet against destruction by the weaponry in the hands of the missionaries of both sects of democracy—American and Soviet.

A pilgrim of sorts to Russia long ago believes he sees some signs of a political ecumenicalism being forced on the two great centers of doctrine and power by the dreadful efficiency of those implements which they devised for security, but which have become a threat to survival.

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RUSSES ET UKRAINIENS. By *Roger Portal*. Paris: Flammarion, 1970. 142 pp. Paper.

ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE UKRAINE. By *Serhii Mazlakh* and *Vasyl' Shakhrai*. Edited and translated by *Peter J. Potichnyj*. Introduction by *Michael M. Luther*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970. xxxiv, 220 pp. \$8.95.

TWO YEARS IN SOVIET UKRAINE: A CANADIAN'S PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF RUSSIAN OPPRESSION AND THE GROWING OPPOSITION. By *John Kolasky*. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1970. xii, 264 pp. \$6.95, cloth. \$3.95, paper.

The brief survey by Professor Roger Portal, holder of the chair of the history and civilization of the Slavs at the Sorbonne, is in the *Questions d'histoire* series edited by Marc Ferro and follows a specific format. In eight chapters the author seeks to outline the principal stages in Ukrainian history and in the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations. A separate section consists of excerpts from documentary sources, including the terms of the Pereiaslav Treaty, excerpts from the *Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People*, the Program of the Revolutionary