CHILEAN UNIVERSITIES UNDER THE JUNTA: Regime and Policy*

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While universities in several South American nations are experiencing the effects of redemocratization, Chilean universities have entered their second decade under military rule. Exploring Chilean higher education in the first decade reveals much about the fate of a major political, economic, and social institution and also sheds light on theoretical concerns that have attracted substantial scholarly attention.

The most general theoretical concern addressed here is the relationship between regime and policy. By the late 1960s, as political scientists and political economists increasingly turned their attention to policy outputs, they dealt harshly with conventional assumptions that policies are largely determined by the nature of regimes. A growing comparative literature complemented a sizable U.S.–oriented literature on the limited policy impact of different forms of state government.[1] Among the factors cited to explain the limited regime impact were international constraints, persistent class interests and conflicts, power struggles within regimes and among their supporters, historical barriers and traditions, and limited knowledge, technology, and resources. Moreover, few regimes have even attempted to shape every policy, and in any case, particular areas of policy have frequently presented idiosyncracies that are not easily reoriented.

Before long, however, the literature minimizing the regime's role came under attack. Regarding educational policy, critics decried a tendency to build large cross-national data bases upon noncomparable in-

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dices, categories that are meaningless in some countries, and unreliable figures. Additionally, the drive to study what could be quantified often did not coincide with what needed to be learned. In many policy fields, studies obscured the regime's role by their "aggregate and undifferentiated" approaches, grouping together dissimilar regimes (such as various types of military regimes) and dissimilar outputs (such as expenditures on different kinds of education).[2] Also criticized was the tendency to subordinate politics and process to supposedly "bottom-line" measures of socioeconomic outputs. In short, critics argued that while there surely are constraints on regimes' abilities to shape policy, significant effects are much more likely to be found where authors study their cases intensively rather than superficially.

Consistent with such critiques, this article hypothesizes that regime characteristics will emerge as powerful determinants of policy when analysts focus intensively on a particular regime in a historical context, comparing it to preceding regimes, and when they focus on discriminating quantitative and qualitative indicators of policy processes and outputs.[3]

Turning first to the independent variable, the regime characteristics in question here have been identified by various scholars of "bureaucratic authoritarianism"—a concept that has attracted enormous interest in comparative studies, especially in Latin American studies. Various valid summaries exist, but Guillermo O'Donnell's well-known elaborations of "defining characteristics" have proved to be useful for constructing an operational summary that lends itself to policy analysis.[4] O'Donnell includes the following characteristics: first, political demobilization; second, "corporatist encapsulation" and limited representation to the detriment of independent and democratic action; third, substantial extension of repressive state power, but also the "privatization" of state institutions; fourth, the reduction of the state's role in the economy, at least in the areas of social welfare expenditures and subsidies for consumers; fifth, technocratic as well as some ideological free-market perspectives on how to manage sociopolitical problems in order to "cure" the system and build a new society; sixth, a nationalism associated with a strong nation and government but having a tendency to internationalize for efficient modernization; and seventh, economic policies that indefinitely postpone popular sector aspirations and favor the upper bourgeoisie. Thus when focusing on bureaucratic authoritarianism, this article focuses on something more specific than all dictatorial, military, or authoritarian regimes.

To be sure, the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism itself has been amply criticized. But to discuss much of the criticism, such as that concerned with the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism or in what ways bureaucratic authoritarianism is a new phenomenon, would

take this article too far afield. Some of the criticism, such as that concerning the ambiguity and breadth of the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism, has policy corollaries: for example, policy does not differ clearly between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and other types, and it varies greatly among bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.[5] On the first point, doubts have been raised about whether bureaucratic authoritarianism is really strong and cohesive enough to defy most of the previously cited constraints that regimes face in setting their own distinctive policies. On the second point, an apparent consensus exists that policy indeed varies among differing forms of bureaucratic authoritarianism and within specific instances of bureaucratic authoritarianism over time, and this consensus has pushed debate toward arguing the causes and extent of variation.[6] In any case, critics do not deny the impact of bureaucratic authoritarianism on policy, especially with regard to political (as opposed to economic) aspects. As is the case with the literature on the relationship between regime and policy in general, such criticisms underscore the need for detailed analysis within historical contexts. Indeed, such a call marks another point of consensus in, for example, the Remmer-Merkx critique and O'Donnell response published in *LARR* and echoes Collier's emphasis on "the importance of monitoring policy change quite closely." Specific policy studies have been sorely lacking in comparison with studies on other concerns about bureaucratic authoritarianism, such as its emergence.[7]

This article will attempt to provide a useful policy study while remaining sensitive to criticisms of assumptions about bureaucratic-authoritarian policy as well as the relationship between regime and policy in general. Consequently, this analysis will neither deduce policy from posited characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism nor assume these characteristics to be major determinants of policy. Instead, it will identify salient policies and then explore the question of how consistent they may or may not be with these characteristics. Do the characteristics orient and deepen the analysis of policy? Confirmation of hypothesized consistency between regime and policy would not prove a causal link, of course, much less that only one set of policies is possible for a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. In fact, it has already been shown that higher education policy differs among cases identified as bureaucratic-authoritarian.[8] But rather than assuming that all regimes commonly labeled bureaucratic-authoritarian effect similar policies, the seven-part operational summary provided above allows one to study impacts on policy specifically "in terms of the characteristics that have been imputed" to a regime.[9] For example, Chilean policy on higher education might be understood in terms of the listed regime characteristics even if Brazilian policy in this area might not be. Additionally, suggestions of a link between regime and policy in Chile may be com-

pelling if it is found that pre-1973 policies not consistent with Chile's post-1973 bureaucratic-authoritarian rule abruptly gave way to a decade of policies that are consistent.

In thematically analyzing the relationships between regime and policy, this article will consider two related issues. One is closely tied to the question of whether policy under bureaucratic-authoritarian rule is distinct from policy under rule that is not bureaucratic-authoritarian. It is the historical depth of policy change. Those policies consistent with the characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism clearly represent dynamic departures from the years immediately preceding the coup. Do they reverse only the policies of Unidad Popular (UP) from 1970 to 1973, or also those of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) between 1964 and 1970, or even previously established policies?

The second issue considered is the possible tension between pursuing central authoritarian control and decentralized market economics. This issue will receive less systematic attention than the other concerns, partly because I have found little evidence of the marketplace pushing aside the central apparatus. But the tensions between "politics" and "markets," long-standing concerns in political economy, remain significant in the literature on bureaucratic authoritarianism. For example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso points to basic dilemmas between public and private emphases while O'Donnell identifies clashes as well as compatibilities among key actors and policies associated with bureaucratic authoritarianism's "two great tasks" of imposing order and normalizing the economy.[10] Thus one general hypothesis holds that bureaucratic authoritarianism will emphasize central control, expanded state power, imposed coordination, restricted societal autonomy, and nationalism. A conflicting hypothesis suggests that bureaucratic authoritarianism will emphasize decentralized market economics, a limited state, competition, private initiative, and economic internationalism. A third hypothesis proposes that central authoritarian control and market economics will prove more compatible than contradictory.

THE CASE OF CHILEAN HIGHER EDUCATION

The core theme of the impact of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes on policy as well as the related issues of policy change and the juxtaposition of politics and markets have been presented thus far in a general context, but their practical and theoretical significance in Chile is clear. First, Chile has endured one of the longest periods of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule and has been a major focus of the literature on bureaucratic authoritarianism. Country specialists have affirmed the relevance of the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism, notwithstanding debates on particulars. Second, Chile's unusually marked re-

gime changes have drawn special attention to the impact of regimes on policy and to the extent of policy change across regimes.[11] Third, no other example of bureaucratic authoritarianism has been monitored as closely for its free-market rhetoric, and heated debate has ensued over the role of its advocates, the so-called Chicago Boys.[12] The free-market approach has been associated with controversial policy initiatives in such fields as education (at all levels), labor relations, social security, health care, and pensions. Tensions between authoritarian politics and markets run throughout the regime's proclamations. Its *Declaration of Principles* pledges "free initiative in the economic field" *and* a "system of national planning," "decentralization of power" *and* "the principle of authority."

Conclusions about the themes raised here for Chile and beyond obviously depend on studies of various fields. My rationale for focusing on higher education policy is twofold. The first reason concerns factors not particular to higher education. Chilean universities have been significant not as ivory towers with interesting anomalies but for the insights they provide into broader phenomena. The campuses have been intimately involved in the pivotal struggles waged in Chilean national politics, and university antagonists have expounded conflicting notions of what proper policy on higher education should be. Consequently, higher education is a useful field in which to explore issues of consistency between regime characteristics and actual policy as well as policy change across regimes. For example, the wide-ranging Reforma Universitaria of the late sixties, basically supported by the left and the center, provides a good benchmark for assessing junta policies.[13] Concerning the relationship between politics and markets, continual conflicts have raged within the junta's education ministry between "statists" and their superiors, with the former sometimes undercutting the policies of the latter.[14] Even if it would not concede democratic participatory freedoms within the universities, free-market economics might at least imply institutional initiative, relative autonomy, and the distribution of increasingly private resources through competition rather than the central allocation of overwhelmingly public resources.

The second reason for focusing on higher education concerns factors that are particular to higher education. For one thing, as shown below, Chilean universities have received about 5 percent of the total national budget. Moreover, they have not only been intimately involved in national politics but have helped shape national politics. The PDC developed largely in the university incubator—a veritable "school of civic life"—and both the PDC and the Communist party have long drawn on major strongholds there. The universities have also constituted crucial channels of political and social mobility and have been importers of influential foreign ideas. At the same time, higher educa-

tion has been historically *the* dominant institution in developing national philosophy and ideology as well as research.[15] Finally, because of its middle-class base, higher education may be a crucial arena of support or opposition, even for a regime that harshly represses popular sectors.

Before exploring university policy, a brief sketch of the higher education system may be helpful. Like most national universities in Latin America, the Universidad de Chile was established (in 1842) according to the European model of a single public university to serve as the state's sole representative of higher education and as supervisor of the entire educational system. That monopoly was not broken until the Universidad Católica de Chile was created in 1888, followed by five more private universities and the Universidad Técnica del Estado (founded in 1947). But despite the subsequent proliferation of regional colleges affiliated with the major universities, the Chilean system of higher education remained notable for its limited number of institutions and the comparative lack of differentiation among them (perhaps facilitating a degree of centralized coordination despite persistent isolation among faculties within universities). More than anywhere else in Latin America, private universities in Chile resembled the public universities, and all eight universities maintained reputable academic standards. Institutional autonomy received significant boosts in 1931 and 1967, suggesting possibly increased insulation from regime changes.

Higher education policy can be disaggregated into subpolicies to facilitate analysis. The four areas chosen here are admissions policy, appointments policy, academic policy (participation and content), and financial policy. No accepted categorization exists in the literature on higher education, and alternative formulations could be equally valid. But these four provide reasonably extensive coverage of the policy field and can encompass empirical testing of the hypotheses about regime-policy consistency, policy change, and central authoritarian versus market approaches. One limit to my coverage, however, is the focus on systemic changes, rather than interinstitutional variation.[16] Another limitation is that the discussion sometimes concentrates on the period between 1973 and 1981. In 1981 the junta began to implement sweeping new legislation (which will be discussed in terms of the subpolicies) to move the system increasingly toward a market model.[17] But by 1982 and on into 1983 and 1984, severe economic (and political) crises created a backlash against market approaches, as reflected in continual cabinet reshufflings that included the education ministry. Although the 1981 legislation has had noteworthy effects, it should therefore be analyzed tentatively.

Admissions Policy

Admissions policy is crucial in determining the size of the higher education system and who shall comprise it. The most significant feature of admissions policy under the junta has been the sharp reversal of the sustained rapid growth fostered by preceding regimes. This reversal is consistent with the bureaucratic-authoritarian preoccupation with demobilizing politically active institutions and reducing social welfare costs. Tough standardized testing fits technocratic perspectives of a rational system not obligated to gratify popular-sector aspirations. This reorientation of admissions policy has been implemented through centralized political mandates, although resulting cost reductions obviously complement the regime's economic goals.

The first quantitative indicator under consideration here is total enrollment. Under both the PDC and UP regimes, enrollment grew dramatically, from less than forty-two thousand in 1965 to nearly seventy-seven thousand in 1970 to more than one hundred and forty-five thousand in 1973, an average annual gain of 13 percent under the Partido Demócrata Cristiano and 24 percent under Unidad Popular. But from 1973 to 1975, growth decreased to 0.1 percent per year, and from 1975 to 1980, it declined by 4 percent per year, bringing enrollments down to some one hundred and twenty thousand, below the 1972 mark.[18] Sharp declines in 1976 and 1980 underscored that policy change had not ceased. Then the 1981 legislation divided the eight existing universities (particularly the two public ones) into some two dozen institutions, adding several new private institutes and universities; the legislation simultaneously diluted the meaning of *higher education* by bringing numerous private technical training centers into the system. Figures most comparable to the prelegislation period suggest enrollment stagnation from 1980 to 1982, possibly followed by modest growth.[19]

A more sensitive measure of regime policy for the early years is the number of first-year openings (*vacantes*) offered. Because most previously enrolled students remained enrolled despite purges, the regime could best establish its own policy by controlling new admissions. After an 88 percent jump from 1970 to 1973, vacantes fell 30 percent (from forty-seven thousand to not quite thirty-three thousand) between 1974 and 1980. Stabilization finally ensued between 1980 and 1983 (at perhaps thirty-two thousand), although comparisons are not easy for these years. Another measure, the ratio of vacantes to enrollments, declined steadily between 1973 and 1977.[20] But obviously, after several years of rule, the regime's admission record could be gauged well by enrollments.

The enrollment cuts are powerful indicators of bureaucratic-au-

thoritarian influence. Probably no other South American nation (except Argentina) has suffered a serious enrollment decline, at least since 1955. But the extent of policy change from preceding regimes goes beyond raw figures to the denying of admission for those already in the "access pipeline." UNESCO projected 1975 Chilean enrollments at two hundred thousand (instead of fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand) and posited 1977 enrollments of perhaps double the actual enrollments. Schiefelbein and Grossi characterize the vacante decline between 1971 and 1977 as "strangulation," given that the number of secondary school graduates more than doubled. In 1981 only one in two (half of the sixty-four thousand) applicants was accepted, even though the number of applicants had nearly halved since 1973.[21]

Therefore, whereas a simple look at enrollment or even vacante figures might show a restoration of the situation prevailing before Unidad Popular came to power, an analysis of trends defies that conclusion. This generalization does not deny the priority attached to undoing the perceived excesses of the UP period. The UP legacy unquestionably affords an easy stereotype to attack. For example, the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria) proclaimed that admissions were a political matter rather than a technical or educational problem: doors could swing open if the university would become a catalyst for social change instead of a factory for the existing system. Consequently, the military regime has repeatedly proclaimed its opposition to the infamous idea of the *universidad para todos*, even while using the phrase as a cover for attacking far less radical policies.[22] The current regime argues that both UP and the PDC fundamentally misunderstood the university's proper preoccupation with academic excellence in a community of the academic elite. The regime regards UP excesses as the logical extension of Chilean party politics practiced by the Christian Democrats and other groups.

The junta has effected policy changes through stringent standardized aptitude tests consistent with the technocratic management of issues that others define at least partly in political, social, and ethical terms. Notwithstanding scandals involving personal favoritism, the regime's basic policy has been nominally objective. In contrast, the two previous regimes were explicitly committed to broadening the socioeconomic base, primarily through admitting far greater numbers and partly through "affirmative action" policies geared to help underrepresented groups. Perhaps the most impressive such policy, now undone by the junta, involved agreements among the central labor union, technical schools, and the Universidad Técnica del Estado.[23]

The technocratic approach can have regressive socioeconomic ramifications, given highly unequal life and school opportunities. For example, wealthy students disproportionally attend expensive private

schools, which in turn are disproportionally represented in university admissions.[24] Also, wealthy students can avail themselves of tuition-charging institutions specializing in preparation for the standardized university admissions exams. Nevertheless, although the leading empirical account of shifts in socioeconomic status under the junta contends that marked *elitización* is occurring, I would interpret the data more cautiously. Reliable comparisons cover only the period from 1976 to 1981; they do not contrast periods before and after the coup. Yet diverse, if scattered, sources confirm that the university became an overwhelmingly middle-class institution by the sixties, a characterization never questioned seriously since that time.[25] When focusing on the study of the period from 1976 to 1981, one might as easily perceive data continuities as data changes. The percentage of entering students whose fathers had a primary education or less decreased from 30 to 26 percent, while the figure for fathers with at least some university education increased from 20 to 24 percent. The figures for fathers' occupations show that in both years, only 7 percent were blue-collar workers and laborers. To be sure, greater shifts between 1976 and 1981 are found in more discriminating subcategories, such as student backgrounds in the most prestigious fields of study or the proportion of public employees and white-collar workers as opposed to executives and entrepreneurs. Moreover, my guess is that pre-1976 and post-1981 data would show that the modest trends found between 1976 and 1981 are part of a broader pattern. In any case, policy change is surely more profoundly reflected in the reversal of trends than in raw numbers, and restrictive admissions frustrate previously mobilized working-class and lower-middle-class sectors that were just beginning to make inroads into university admissions.

Paradoxically, however, a moderately more regressive higher education system may be consistent with a more progressive educational system overall because higher education inevitably serves the privileged classes. Thus the junta proudly proclaims a reorientation toward lower levels of education, a progressive response to social needs rather than political pressures. But at least two other reasons exist, based on bureaucratic-authoritarian preoccupations, for hypothesizing that other educational levels would be less subject to junta policy reversals in admissions (and other subpolicies). First, these levels rarely represented the antithesis of junta principles as did university admission policies because the lower levels were neither as politicized nor as autonomous from the state. Second, enrollment reductions in higher education translate into the greatest financial savings because of per capita expenditures. Additionally, higher education is much more susceptible to policy manipulation in that it is a privilege for a minority, not a fully accepted right for all.

The data confirm that higher education enrollments have suffered much more than enrollments at any other level, but that other levels have also been affected. Only the small preschool level has fared well. Primary enrollments, which grew every year from 1965 (1,699,100) to 1970 (2,039,185) to 1973 (2,314,283), abruptly declined in 1974 and continued to decline at least until 1982 (2,092,597). Secondary enrollments, which grew rapidly from 1965 (148,444) to 1970 (302,100) and then to 1973 (445,862), slowed markedly from 1973 until at least 1982 (565,765). The reversals are even starker if one focuses exclusively on the public schools. Moreover, primary enrollments under the junta actually decreased in the "coverage" of the age cohort. Indeed, allowing for an exception in the midforties, the formal education system had grown in both absolute terms and coverage in every year since at least 1935—until 1973. Moreover, researchers have shown that reversals of enrollment trends (let alone coverage trends) cannot be explained away with demographic data.[26]

Appointments Policy

Appointments policy is crucial to insuring that policies consistent with bureaucratic-authoritarian goals will be pursued. In practice, a decidedly hierarchical power structure headed by rectors and ultimately by the regime itself has dominated Chilean universities since the coup. Appointments policy can best be understood in terms of such bureaucratic-authoritarian characteristics as repression, encapsulation, and increased state power, all employed to reverse long-standing norms of community control and election from below that were inconsistent with technocratic and authoritarian approaches. The following discussion suggests little evidence of a market approach to institutional autonomy, competition, or private-sector choice producing desired leadership. As in admissions policy, however, authoritarian means may serve both political and economic ends, as when dismissals simultaneously quash dissent and curb public expenditures.

Professorial appointments are more at the mercy of university rectors and the regime than before. It is difficult to gauge the number of expelled professors because figures are scarce and because only some professors were dismissed outright. Others either left before they could be purged formally or simply preferred to leave, given the new circumstances. Still others were demoted to part-time status, and many of these devoted increased time to private professional practice. The severity of the purges varied greatly among universities and among faculties within universities, depending on larger patterns, such as prior politicization, as well as idiosyncratic factors, such as the disposition of particular rectors or deans.[27]

Most of the initial purges were fundamentally political but were linked with mammoth financial cuts. The cuts themselves derived in part from the regime's zeal in diminishing public expenditures. Administrators could then make the requisite personnel cuts according to political criteria. For example, the 1976 financial crisis at the Universidad Católica de Chile led to personnel cuts that slashed the budgets of social science institutes. This example clearly shows how the regime's penchant for political control meshed conveniently with its penchant for economic conservatism.

Such political-economic policy has inevitably occasioned a severe brain drain. Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and more developed nations have received Chilean talent. The exodus has been more marked among young and middle-aged groups than among their older colleagues, who were often less involved in university reform or less prepared to emigrate. The regime's concern has been sporadic, partly due to a feeling (similar to that in Cuba in Castro's early years) that bad blood could be let, although some within the regime argued that "nationalism" requires skilled human resources, even if it means compromising on expenditure cuts and political allegiance. In the early eighties, the regime opened the door a bit for exiles to return to Chile, yet the danger of renewed clampdowns remained (and was demonstrated in 1983), and chances for reemployment in the university remained remote.

Professors might get by with political indifference or inactive opposition, but more allegiance is demanded of administrators. The bluntest illustration of a repressive policy of appointments is the designation of military officers (some retired, some in active service) as rectors. Within two weeks after the coup, the regime replaced all the elected rectors, pushing aside the rectors' unanimous proclamation that a reconstituted Council of Rectors should direct the reorganization.[28]

One can only speculate as to why the regime has persisted so long with central authoritarian procedures that so blatantly violate legitimate university norms, when like-minded civilians could be found. Indeed, some observers predicted that the 1981 university legislation might combine professorial with junta choice, and some moves were made toward governing boards like those in U.S. universities. These proposals were heralded as prudent alternatives to government authority, as promotors of efficient nonpolitical competition. But market-oriented decentralization was more apparent than real, at least in the years immediately ensuing. For example, boards were tied to the repressive hierarchy, and civilian rectorships were limited to some of the new institutions, with the exception of only one of the eight still-dominant preexisting universities (as of 1984). Perhaps the junta feared a loss of control or even that a gesture would provide an opening for the

church to reassert its authority over rector selection at the Universidad Católica de Chile. Although the university's Gran Canciller, the Archbishop of Santiago, "suspended" his university role after the coup, appointing a *pro-gran canciller* to substitute, the church declared its intention to regain power over rector selection at "its" university.[29] The gap between the church and "its" university was repeatedly highlighted by heated exchanges. The military rector stated, "I believe that the ecclesiastical hierarchy has adopted and demonstrated an antigovernment position." Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez declared, "I do not believe that such an unjust, false, and disrespectful evaluation of the Church of Chile has ever been made by any rector of our university."[30]

Although corporatist personnel appointments are consistent with bureaucratic-authoritarian characteristics, they have not guaranteed loyalty. For one thing, the appointment of civilian pro-rectors immediately beneath the military rectors has provided a degree of academic continuity. Similarly, academic councils of deans, not to mention individual professors, have had some latitude in decision making. Even the military rectors sometimes seem to "don the uniform" of their own university. Most have tried to maintain or improve the relative position of their universities within the system, and most are influenced by their deans and professors. Beyond such institutional ties, some rectors may have maintained identities as officers of particular branches of the armed forces and thereby felt less subordinate to the education ministry, although the military institution per se has not become a major influence, and Pinochet's authority has been unassailable.[31] In any case, proponents of making policies more "rational" have decried the continuation of petty politics within the universities—now practiced by military rectors.

A revealing case study of the regime's early quest for control over both administrative and professorial personnel concerns the Universidad de Chile. Initially, rightists gained ascendancy, seeking a "mutual nonagression pact with the government."[32] Soon, however, even this circumscribed autonomy became untenable. Friction between the air force, which ruled the Universidad de Chile, and the army, which became increasingly dominant in the regime, played a role. Overall, however, even staunchly anti-Marxist university personnel, including the first two rectors, opposed certain junta policies like the drastic financial reduction of 1976.[33] On the other side, *Patria y Libertad*, an extremist group on the right, pressed for *depuración*. The regime imposed as rector a tough army general, who arrived with hatchet in hand. Up to this point, the university had mandated relatively few changes in its non-Marxist personnel, but hours after he assumed office, the new rector demanded wholesale resignations. Many felt that a majoritarian anti-

UP movement had been betrayed: "Unfortunately, today only certain minority sectors are considered genuine and faithful patriots."[34]

A comparative, but temporary, easing of tensions ensued in higher education after 1976 (in part because nonautonomous institutions could be more trusted by the regime), but it did not last beyond the late seventies.[35] In December 1979, extensive new purges began at universities throughout Chile, including demotions to part-time status. Political motivations were especially clear in that these purges were not accompanied by the drastic financial cuts seen earlier. The two most publicized cases involved Manuel Sanhueza, purged after thirty-two years as professor at the Universidad de Concepción, and noted philosopher Jorge Millas at the Universidad Austral.[36] Sanhueza was president of the "Grupo de 24," then the chief national forum of democratic opposition to the regime. Millas was initially stripped of his administrative responsibilities and later felt it necessary to resign his teaching position as well. Firings (including semivoluntary retirements) were part of a hard-line reaction to the growing independence (or *apertura*) of 1978 and 1979, with *universitarios* characteristically in the forefront. These purges proved that repressive higher education policy in Chile was not simply a one-stroke backlash as part of the immediate aftermath of the coup.

In sum, the junta's policy changes in university admissions and personnel have gone well beyond purging UP and even PDC partisans to purging independents and conservatives. Despite the regime's efforts to institutionalize itself in coalition with the university's independent right (or even right and center) by drawing on the expertise and legitimacy of these groups within the universities and despite examples of continuity and initiative toward "responsible" civilian alternatives, the regime has relied on a martial hierarchy to a degree unprecedented in Chilean history.

Academic Policy: Participation

Academic policy lies at the heart of a university's endeavors. In discussing policy inputs or formation, academic policy refers here to participation (mostly by students but by professors as well); on the output side, academic policy refers here to academic content. Consistent with bureaucratic-authoritarian approaches, the military regime has supplanted participation and independent action with demobilization, encapsulation, and expanded state power to reshape curriculum and fields of study to conform to its nationalist and restrictive ends. Political struggles over increasing resources have given way to technocratic management of diminished resources. Until at least 1981, these trans-

formations were achieved mostly through command politics with only marginal consideration given to effecting rational policy through competition among individuals pursuing job-market and other self-interested goals.

Demobilization represents an especially sharp policy change because participation had reached levels unmatched in Chile's history. The extreme came in the last precoup years, when Allende himself, despite his admonishments to students to study more and protest less, could not control even his supporters, a situation paralleling uncontrolled worker activities.[37] But as with admissions policy, the military regime insists that the UP period was only the logical extension of long-term irresponsibility.[38] The Reforma Universitaria had greatly expanded student representation in university bodies while encouraging free speech and dissent. Looking back to the prereform years, student politics had lasting impact, as proved by its role in national politics. Consequently, an enduring history of Chilean—even Latin American—student activism was reversed following the coup.

To end what the junta perceived as the unwarranted politics of constant electioneering, strikes, community action, meddling in national politics—in short, the attitude that the students' role should go beyond academic study—the junta initially banned existing forms of student expression. Meetings could not take place without authorization. Students could not prepare, publish, post, or distribute written materials.[39] Left unrestricted, and even officially encouraged, were purely social activities like dances, concerts, and sports events, which were billed as student participation. Former student "organizations" sometimes gave way to student "social centers." Predictably, leadership selection followed certain corporatist practices. Precoup elected leaders lost their posts and were replaced by students named on the basis of trustworthy moral attributes. The rector selected student leaders directly or chose them from lists proposed by vice-rectors or previously chosen student leaders. Only through these designated leaders were students to communicate with university administrators, although in practice rectors have differed in how strictly they have dealt with students.

The junta also tried to build new student structures with certain corporatist features. Some such structures were created soon after the coup, but in the late seventies, in tandem with controversial official efforts to construct new *sindicatos* for workers, these efforts were intensified. One view held that the regime was reacting to emboldened activity from below, that it saw risk in action but more in inaction; another view asserted that the regime was building upon a secure position.[40]

Focusing on one university reveals that the institutionalizing initiatives took the student body of the Universidad Católica de Chile by

surprise in 1978. The departing student president there praised a "perfect system of indirect democracy" that combined representative democracy and *despoliticización*. Unlike the precoup student union, it would avoid the divisive pitfalls of "petty politics"; apolitical but anti-Marxist, the new system would give students a voice but no vote: "participación sí, co-gobierno no." Opponents replied that the new student organization was imposed on the universitarios, that it treated students as objects rather than subjects.[41] The organization continued to depend on the academic vice-rector, although more latitude may have crept in for student officials to select other student officials.

As in labor relations, however, less effort went into creating an official organization at each university than into repressing the old organizations and fragmenting them. Thus the regime made a free-market argument: students could enjoy a "liberty of association" instead of being forced to join a single central organization. Dissident students saw the parallel to the regime's policy of divide and conquer, which was denying sindicatos the strength achieved through organizational solidarity. Besides, continued repression mocked any posturing about a marketplace of open choices. Another restricted free-market parallel came in 1981, with the regime's initiative to break the monopoly of *colegios*, the traditional unit for each of many professions that represented university graduates, by transforming them into competing *asociaciones gremiales*.[42]

But efforts to control students encountered problems, including bold protests. After the coup, student activity initially tended to identify with cultural symbols from the precoup era, but organized opposition surfaced as early as 1975 and certainly by 1977–78. Many students expressed their outrage actively at the regime's institutionalizing efforts. For example, "lightning" demonstrations at the Universidad Católica de Chile caused administrators to denounce "delirious gatherings," expel students, and gain the backing of most student centers.[43] But nationwide opposition thrived by 1979, when for the first time in six years Chilean students were permitted to elect some of their own representatives—and over 70 percent explicitly rejected the official student association candidates tied to the university administration. Whatever successes the junta could boast in national plebiscites, it was embarrassed by university voters (and by voters within professional and even some business associations). The depth of student opposition was repeatedly displayed, with mobilization increasing in 1980. As occurred in appointments policy, however, the regime intensified its repression. The 1981 legislation removed some key centers of student activity from the universities. But the resultant quieting of dissent proved short-lived, with students participating conspicuously in the monthly demonstrations against the regime in 1983 and carrying their protest against

dictatorship—national and university—on through 1984. Students also continued to elect antiregime leaders.[44]

In sum, the junta's repression of participatory politics has been brutally extensive but not always effective. Institutionalized alternatives based on less direct repression and more voluntary support have made little progress. Even the 1981 legislation basically formalized repressive policies on participation, gratuitously reminding all that universities could not be "extraterritorially" independent and that students must not engage in politics nor in the selection of university personnel. Reflecting its mission, the twelve-member commission that prepared the legislation included only three university representatives, none of whom had been selected by students or professors.

Academic Policy: Content

In evaluating the content of educational policy, one quantitative indicator is the distribution of students by field of study. The junta immediately declared that universities should be reoriented toward the emerging political-economic model and toward national needs, doing away with careers that "deceive" youth by encouraging disruptive political ideology or offering little prospect of gainful employment.[45] For example, a greatly diminished welfare sector could be expected to reduce the demand for social scientists engaged in research or practice aimed at state-directed reform. Conveniently, authoritarian and market rationales reinforced one another insofar as fields associated with student political activism were increasingly those not associated with job opportunities, although centrally mandated restrictions defied faith in "consumer choice."

Hypothesizing about policy change on the basis of regime characteristics, one might therefore expect substantial transformations in field distributions. As shown in table 1, however, such changes have not occurred. Between 1974 and 1980 (the last year in which the system maintained its basic structure and with which previous data can be safely compared), no field's share of total enrollments varies by even 2 percent, and only two of nine fields vary by more than 0.5 percent. If 1973 is chosen as an alternative baseline to check for major changes immediately after the coup, the only notable change is that social science declined from 14.9 to 12.7 percent in 1973–74, but it fell no lower than 12.5 percent by 1980. (Nor does a 1972 baseline, as a check against 1973 purges, suggest any profound transformations.) More change can be perceived if the comparison is stretched to 1982 (notwithstanding doubts about comparability). Most striking and apparently consistent with junta goals are the continued decline of education, along with art and architecture, and the continued rise of engineering and the natural

sciences. But contrary to reasonable hypotheses, the social sciences and the law have not declined, and the humanities have actually increased. Moreover, as data from the 1967 baseline suggest, continuities stretch back at least to the reform; indeed, these continuities contradict junta images of a radical precoup breakdown with massively undesirable shifts. Credible denunciations of both precoup and postcoup changes consequently must be based on something more than proportional field shifts.

How can such counterintuitive results be reconciled with hypotheses derived from posited regime characteristics? One good answer is that empirical evidence can disprove hypotheses. Policy similarities emerge despite regime changes.

But other measures underscore major changes since the coup. First, stability in enrollment shares should not obscure the salient fact of total enrollment reversals; even proportionally favored fields can suffer. Second, following suggestions from the regime-policy literature, one can disaggregate the dependent variable (field of study). Consider the regime's assault on social science. Whereas certain kinds of economics and related fields of "commerical engineering" (business administration and accounting) were favored, political science and sociology were nearly obliterated.[46] Chile's major political science center (at the Universidad Católica de Chile) was destroyed in 1975, although some political studies programs (such as that in international relations at the Universidad de Chile) were carefully reconstructed in the eighties. At the Universidad de Concepción, economic and administrative studies were transferred from the area of social sciences to the area of physics, chemistry, and natural sciences, while the sociology and journalism schools, which were strongholds of the radical MIR, were simply eradicated.[47] On the other hand, the regime repeatedly expounded market-oriented notions favorable to commercially relevant social studies in order to meet needs defined by private enterprise and employment opportunities.

Again taking a cue from the regime-policy literature, qualitative indicators can be included as well as quantitative indicators. Possibly the most significant changes in academic policy produced by the change to bureaucratic authoritarian rule have involved curricular and pedagogical concerns, especially in ideologically sensitive fields. Social sciences can refer to courses with heavy doses of patriotism and nationalism based on support for the regime and anti-Marxism. Thus the Universidad Católica de Chile still teaches "sociology," but not as it did before. The Universidad de Chile's economics faculty, once split along ideological grounds, now demands allegiance to free-market models, and the university's law school has closed its department of social science as part of a move back toward a prereform plan of studies empha-

TABLE 1 *Percentage of Students Enrolled by Field of Study, 1967–1982*

Field of Study	1967 %	1972 %	1973 %
Social Sciences	16.2 (8,943)	14.1 (17,912)	14.9 (21,889)
Law	5.4 (2,953)	2.7 (3,373)	2.4 (3,544)
Humanities	2.4 (1,313)	2.0 (2,498)	1.9 (2,775)
Education	26.9 (14,787)	27.5 (34,890)	27.9 (40,895)
Engineering	23.0 (12,667)	31.0 (39,338)	29.2 (42,753)
Agronomy	5.3 (2,915)	5.5 (6,977)	5.7 (8,386)
Natural Sciences and Mathematics	2.0 (1,124)	2.3 (2,903)	2.4 (3,459)
Health Sciences	11.0 (6,054)	10.6 (13,382)	11.2 (16,340)
Art and Architecture	4.9 (2,706)	4.4 (5,556)	4.4 (6,410)
Total	100.0[a] (55,069)[a]	100.1 (126,830)[b]	100.0 (146,451)

Sources: Calculated from Universidad de Chile, *Antecedentes e informaciones universitarias* (Santiago: 1975), 124–31; Consejo de Rectores, *Anuario Estadístico 1977* (14), *1980* (28), *1982* (18) (published in Santiago, 1978, 1981, and 1982). A few slight discrepancies exist in annual data from different sources even though most sources ultimately draw on data from the Consejo de Rectores.

[a]Excluded from the table are 587 students listed in *Antecedentes* under the Chilean National Health Service, rather than under any of the eight universities. Included in the table's 1967 total are 1607 students (2.9 percent) listed as unspecified by the Universidad de Concepción and therefore not readily identified with any of the nine fields.
[b]Includes one student listed as unspecified by the Universidad del Norte.

sizing assimilation of factual material over the development of critical abilities.[48] Networks of university extension courses and activities have also been terminated, including the noteworthy joint programs between the Universidad Técnica del Estado and the central labor union. Critics charge that the "Universidad Comprometida" has once again become the "Universidad Ajena." At the same time, if some areas have been especially hard hit, others obviously have remained less affected. For example, the natural sciences have maintained more continuity than the social sciences.

Regarding qualitative dimensions such as pedagogy, the "no-frills" approach to university education demands discipline. Emphasis

1974 %	*1977* %	*1980* %	*1982* %
12.7	12.5	12.5	13.4
(18,329)	(16,380)	(14,831)	(15,623)
2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4
(3,607)	(3,283)	(2,757)	(2,764)
1.7	2.8	3.0	3.3
(2,527)	(3,711)	(3,598)	(3,849)
30.1	28.7	28.4	25.0
(43,635)	(37,538)	(33,810)	(29,164)
28.7	29.1	29.8	33.0
(41,528)	(37,980)	(35,508)	(38,459)
6.0	5.0	4.8	4.4
(8,651)	(6,572)	(5,770)	(5,149)
2.4	3.4	2.8	3.7
(3,508)	(4,490)	(3,381)	(4,303)
11.8	12.0	12.3	11.2
(17,023)	(15,701)	(14,613)	(12,987)
4.2	3.8	4.0	3.6
(6,053)	(5,021)	(4,710)	(4,194)
100.1	99.8	99.9	100.0
(144,861)	(130,676)	(118,978)	(116,474)

is placed on memorization and exams, high attendance rates, and required tracks instead of reforms aimed at making curriculum more flexible and relevant to student interests. By the late seventies, many claimed to see the toll on student character, with harsh requirements breeding docility. Others talked of a new generation of students, untraumatized by either precoup turbulence or postcoup repression, who were critical of excessive rigidity and who searched for new meaning and morality.[49]

Concerning the depth of policy change, some see the reemergence of a "professionalist university" (*universidad profesionalizante*). Universities have been rededicated to a conservative society, to the for-

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mation of elites in professional faculties, to traditional pedagogy, and to narrow training rather than critical reflection in free, innovative, and interdisciplinary settings.[50] As fewer professors devote full- or even half-time to teaching, reemphasizing instead their professional practices, the university community loses some of its distinctive character.[51]

Other critics maintain that the junta's university is a reversion to the "modernizing university." By the 1950s, they argue, research had become a major activity, university functions had expanded, and the university was no longer simply professionalist. Universidad de Chile Rector Juan Gómez Millas energetically adapted "modern" policies from the more developed world, with the enthusiastic support of the U.S. government and organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank.[52] Many of the newly trained modernizers became prominent during the PDC era and then watched in dismay as order eroded under Unidad Popular; at least initially, some supported the junta's reorientation toward modernization within the context of capitalist development.

In fact, Chilean universities have reverted to certain characteristics of both the professionalist and modernizing forms, but they have also blended these forms into something new. Both previous forms, and of course, the reformed universities flourished with much more autonomy, openness, and flexibility in academic policy-making than have the universities since the coup.[53] Academic policy in the postcoup universities represents a far more drastic change than simply undoing perceived precoup excesses.

Financial Policy

Major changes in the policies considered thus far obviously have important implications for financial allocations.Based largely on cuts in enrollments, personnel, and programs, the junta's financial policies strikingly curtailed public expenditures. Relatedly, if more fitfully, the junta has made universities more dependent on private sources of income. Such moves should be viewed chiefly in terms of the bureaucratic-authoritarian preoccupation with diminishing the state role in subsidizing social welfare activities. Both economic and political goals are served, and here especially both central authoritarian and decentralized market means of achieving these ends are considered. The central allocation of public subsidies persists but has yielded ground to self-financing through tuition and other means left to increasingly privatized and competitive institutions.

Beyond elaborating grand rationales for cutting public expenditures generally, such as curbing inflation, the Pinochet economic team has elaborated many corollary reasons for curtailing subsidies to uni-

versities. One was that these subsidies proved inefficient, that only self-financing could breed competition, thrift, and responsibility. Official economists claimed, for example, that one-fourth of all courses served no more than ten students, while nearly another fourth had only eleven to twenty.[54] Waste allegedly reached its peak under UP but had been inherent in Chile's long developing "socialism." Unique in Latin America was the fact that not only the public but the "private" Chilean universities were financed more than 90 percent by the government. Moreover, complained the Chicago Boys, even military rectors would not crack down on waste unless forced to do so by tight budgets. Similarly, students would be more responsible and likely to finish their degree requirements on time if they were paying for their own studies. The notion of responsibility thus provided a convenient link between cutting public expenditures and diminishing political activity.

A final rationale was that substituting tuition for subsidies would make financial policy fairer. This argument sought to legitimize the often unpopular task of curtailing expenditures. It harked back to arguments favoring curtailing enrollment. It also complemented two views held by progressive experts not tied to the regime: first, the absence of tuition is in effect a subsidy for privileged classes, in Chile and beyond; and second, Chile's political development has often given power to middle-class groups that have exercised it in ways not conducive to equitable socioeconomic development. Thus higher education's privileged constituency accounted for an astounding share (over 40 percent) of the national education budget before the coup. University students had not only been spared tuition but had received many recreational and welfare services, such as housing, food, and mental and physical health care. "Chile no es Brasil," some Chicago Boys maintained when asserting that their concern over social stratification was genuine.[55]

But while the regime resolutely cut subsidies, it did not resolutely implement tuition. Most arguments against tuition referred predictably to state responsibilities, fairness, and alternative ways of gauging the benefits yielded by expenditures. More striking was the source of the opposition. Middle-class students found strong support among many professors previously active in the anti-Marxist struggle who regarded public subsidization as perfectly valid for the sober academic institutions reemerging after the coup. In a stunning paradox, the regime's own rectors often sided with their internal constituencies. At least one rector at the Universidad de Chile resigned in part over the tuition issue.[56] Such opposition became feasible because the regime itself lacked consensus. While market-oriented approaches were favored in ministries like education and finance, more statist-oriented groups (mostly from the army) opposed tuition, as did Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, a significant figure in the junta's early years. Although the

first group held most of the top government positions in educational policy in the seventies, Pinochet often followed his tactic of remaining somewhat aloof from certain internally divisive issues, and tuition did not become a sufficiently high priority to warrant the political costs.

Consequently, the regime stumbled over its "self-financing" policies for universities. In 1974 the finance ministry announced that public subsidies should be cut 60 percent in 1975 and discontinued by 1976. A joint university-government commission was formed to promote the effort, and in 1976, Pinochet himself renewed the push for university self-financing. But officials soon claimed that "self-financing" had never been the goal. They retreated successively to self-financing only for teaching costs, a gradual implementation program, student loans to defray tuition, exemptions for those students in fields leading toward poorly remunerated government employment, and finally to a simple call for much greater self-financing than hitherto practiced. Economist Miguel Kast, often identified as the originator of the self-financing policy, claimed that the politicians had misrepresented his idea as full self-financing, a claim having some validity. But many official proclamations had called for the extreme, and the regime had repeatedly promoted something close to it. One secret in-house document elaborated a detailed plan for full self-financing based on a tuition-loan scheme.[57] But the purpose here is not to determine exactly what the regime originally proposed but how far its policies have gone.

In the late seventies, changes in financial policy appeared to have peaked. Many hoped that privatization had been a one-shot reaction against perceived excesses, a reaction since overtaken by nationalistic concerns about quality in training and research and by technical and political constraints on tuition policy. In fact, however, the regime did not resign itself to incremental normalization. As the seventies ended, the regime reiterated its position that universities should be self-financed, and it translated words into deeds via the 1981 legislation. Institutional proliferation raised the prospect of higher education for profit, given that only universities were legally required to be nonprofit. The legislation's greater immediate impact came from freezing total public expenditures at their 1980 levels. By thus restricting the resources of existing institutions, the regime proposed to stimulate their search for private income as well as the growth of new and truly private institutions that would be privately financed. In practice, many private institutions were created, but as of 1984, they included only three universities (whose impact could not be safely predicted).

Furthermore, the freeze (inflation-adjusted in principle but soon not so in fact) was to cut direct subsidies 50 percent over a five-year period. The difference between the 1980 level and the new levels would form a fund for indirect subsidies. These indirect subsidies were not

committed to any particular institutions but were reserved for a separate pool and allocated proportionally to those attracting first-year applicants ranked (by standardized tests) in the top twenty thousand. Consequently, indirect subsidies depended on competition among institutions (initially intended to include all institutions, old and new). Although direct subsidies were distributed according to 1980 proportions, the traditional universities had to share them with the institutions forcibly created from within. In several ways, then, policy change went beyond curbing state expenditures and moved toward market decentralization.

The tables soon turned, however, at least partly. The nation's economy collapsed, tarnishing the image of market economics and profoundly affecting the financing of higher education. Consider the indirect subsidy. The regime reversed its decision to include new (private) universities in the competition, contributing to the collapse of highly publicized plans to open at least two universities tied to influential business groups. In fact, Pinochet responded to lobbying by the military rectors of the two traditional public universities. They argued that powerful economic groups (so associated with free-market rhetoric) should not receive public subsidies while public universities were suffering from financial stringency at the precise time when they would have to compete with the prospective universities. Next, the regime retreated from its policy regarding the competition for the top twenty thousand students. Finally, the regime reconsidered its higher education financial policies and promised new proposals.

Although the regime's policy shifts make projections hazardous, a decade's records exist for comparison with precoup policies. Four related measures are shown in table 2. Because multiple sources are used, however, care must be exercised in reading the first three columns when moving from 1980 to 1982, and even from 1965 to 1970. The PDC era witnessed an increased government commitment to higher education, although allocations increased more slowly than education allocations overall. The UP era also saw marked increases, this time with higher education leading the way. Military rule then delivered a heavy blow, heaviest on higher education, and most heavily in 1976.[58] The relative stabilization that ensued suggested that initial backlash policies would be eased once immediate precoup threats and excesses were removed. But leaving aside measures dependent on the enrollment reversal, it can be seen that the military reversed expenditure trends that existed before Unidad Popular came to power.

Data on tuition corroborate major policy change. In this regard, however, quantitative change was modest in the first few years. Amid confusion and debate, tuition was raised to only a few hundred U.S. dollars per year. But even this small increase represented a critical ideo-

TABLE 2 *Regime Expenditures on Higher Education*

Year	Higher Education as % of GNP	Higher Education as % of National Budget	Higher Education as % of all Educational Expenditures	Subsidy per Student Index[a]
1965	0.9	3.9	29.6	100
1970	1.2	5.1	29.1	121
1974[b]	2.0	6.2	47.5	137
1976	1.2	4.3	32.9	102
1978	1.3	5.3	33.0	146
1980	1.0	4.2	27.5[c]	
1982[d]	0.8	3.2	19.6	

Sources: For 1970–1980, columns 1–2, Carmen Luz Latorre, *Recursos asignados al sector educación*, a working paper published by the Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones en Educación (PIIE) (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), t. 1 and app. 1. Latorre lacks 1965 data for higher education. For 1965, cols. 1–3, and 1965–1978, col. 4, Ministerio de Hacienda, *Análisis financiero de la educación superior* (Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1978), pp. 6, 8, 10. For 1982, Alejandro Jara and Héctor Contardo, *La reforma educacional neo-liberal*, a PIIE working paper (Santiago: PIIE, 1983), pp. 51–53. No single consistent data source exists for 1965–1982.

[a]The Ministerio de Hacienda used the 1965 subsidy per student as the base of 100 for the index. This agency's data set ends in 1978 and the Jara and Contardo data set begins in 1979; the latter set shows a large decline between 1979 and 1982.

[b]I chose the year 1974 instead of 1973 because the figures for 1973 are erratic and because most sources show that higher education's budgetary shares peaked in 1974, based on UP allocations. Latorre notes the 1973–74 issue, *Recursos asignados*, t. 1. Data vary between that in Latorre's t. 1 and that in Ministerio de Hacienda, *Análisis financiero*, pp. 5–8.

[c]Estimated.

[d]Because Jara and Contardo use a slightly different data base from that of Latorre, I have modified their 1982 figures according to the ratio between the two sources' figures for the latest overlap year (1980). Except for 1982, I work with *gasto fiscal* rather than *gasto público* data. Basically, the latter involve all public funds whereas the former refer to the centralized ministries. But the gasto fiscal is more commonly used and allows slightly better longitudinal coverage. Almost always, the data trends run parallel. There are no exceptions for col. 1. For col. 2, the gasto público would not fall as sharply as the gasto fiscal after 1974 but then would fall more steadily. In col. 3, the gasto público would fall much less precipitously in 1976, although both the gasto fiscal and the gasto público subsequently recover somewhat before falling again.

logical change because it overturned a long tradition of free public higher education and paved the way for accelerated quantitative change. In 1978 the Universidad de Chile decreed that no student should pay less (in real terms) than he or she had paid in the last *colegio* year. By 1980 the university drew roughly one-tenth of its income from fees, and by 1982, some 18 percent, based on student payments of thirteen hundred dollars per year. Similarly, the public technical university raised its 1982 fees 25 percent over the previous year, charging a

fixed fee exceeding one hundred dollars per year plus an additional five hundred to twelve hundred dollars, depending upon the field of study.[59] These unprecedented tuitions paled when compared with those charged in the new private sector, which reached five thousand dollars a year by 1982. The traditional universities at least employed such criteria as teaching costs, job prospects, national needs in fields of study, student needs, and academic abilities to provide ameliorating measures like exemptions, reductions, and low-interest loans. The regime, however, did not fulfill its promises to implement loan plans to help needy students pay their tuition.[60]

CONCLUSIONS

The central hypothesis proposed here concerning regimes and policy has been supported substantially by analyzing four subpolicies in higher education: for at least one nation at one time in one policy field, bureaucratic-authoritarian characteristics appear to have had a powerful impact in shaping policy. Whether these results add up to "bureaucratic-authoritarian policy" depends partly on how bureaucratic authoritarianism is defined, but great consistency has emerged between policy and the seven-point description of bureaucratic authoritarianism presented at the outset of this article.

The conclusions of this analysis will be summarized in relation to the seven characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism. First, political demobilization has been pursued mostly through purges and restrictions on both admissions and student activities. Second, controlled student organizations and administrative appointments illustrate corporatist encapsulation and hierarchy tied to official circles as well as minimal free participation. Third, increased state powers have been evident in almost every policy examined, as in setting the size of the higher education system, restricting curriculum, or appointing rectors; the process of privatizing state institutions has been less pervasive, as seen in the partial substitution of tuition for public subsidies. Fourth, the state has obviously reduced its role in the economy by cutting social welfare expenditures, such as subsidies for the restricted number of students, as well as by purging and otherwise limiting staff size. Fifth, free-market cures for sociopolitical problems have included tuition (to promote student responsibility) and other self-financing measures (to promote administrative responsibility), while technocratic cures have included competitive, standardized admissions exams, the replacement of elections by appointments, and forced reductions in the critical social sciences. Sixth, the technocratic policies have meshed well with identifying nationalism as strong and unquestioned government pursued through tight controls on matters such as curriculum; yet there is a

"drastic contraction of the nation" as a "prohibition of appeals to the *pueblo*" contrasts with the enthusiastic adaptation of selected international (mostly U.S.) practices.[61] Seventh, several policies, including tuition and especially restrictions on admissions, have frustrated popular sector aspirations, although exactly which classes are favored remains somewhat unclear.

These findings lend support to scholars who have criticized studies minimizing the impact of regimes on policy.[62] Whatever an extensive cross-national statistical study of educational policy under military regimes might show, an in-depth analysis focusing on more specific variables (bureaucratic-authoritarian characteristics and multiple aspects of four higher education subpolicies) shows major impacts, although it obviously occasions the problems typically found in moving from a case study to generalizations. Notably, some of the quantitative indicators alone suggest great impact (as in total enrollment trends), and others show moderate impacts (as in raw enrollment figures and tuition), but still others show little impact (as in distributions of students by field of study). Qualitative and process variables, like the content of social science curricula and the appointment of rectors, show more consistent regime impacts on policy. Similarly, more economically oriented indicators (for example, higher education's share of the GNP) show impact less powerfully and consistently than do more politically oriented indicators (like student activism). Also, the disaggregated indicators often reveal policy changes not evident in aggregate categories, as seen in greater proportional declines in sociology enrollments than in social science enrollments overall.

The close association of policy with bureaucratic-authoritarian characteristics obviously relates to the issue of policy change posed in connection with the theme of the relationship between regime and policy: higher education policy under Chilean bureaucratic-authoritarian rule differs enormously from policy under preceding regimes that were not bureaucratic-authoritarian. Perhaps some policies, such as tightened admissions or tuition, could have been introduced by a regime that was not bureaucratic-authoritarian, but it is doubtful that any of those policies would have been pursued in the same way or to the same degree. Other policies, such as the purges and the continuing appointment of military rectors, would be improbable under most regimes and unimaginable for the junta's predecessors.

The changes in each of the four subpolicies can be summarized. Admissions policy has been based on a new order. Rather than stopping with a one-stroke retrenchment and allowing renewed growth for a remodeled system, the regime has instituted an elite alternative based on restrictive and competitive admissions, thereby reversing the expansionary policies of many decades. Appointments policy has overhauled

the administrative strata. "Soft-liners" have often been replaced by hard-liners uncompromisingly dedicated to a new order. The degree of hierarchy, highlighted by the appointment of military rectors, is unprecedented. Meanwhile, repeated purges of professors belie images of a single backlash aimed only at UP extremes. In academic policy, officials have gone beyond their immediate assault on participatory procedures to establish very different procedures and organizations. They have insisted on new pedagogy and curricula, although only time will tell how many of these changes will endure. In any case, extraordinary repression has characterized both the participatory and content sides of academic policy. Last, financial policy (like admissions policy) went beyond early cuts to repeated cuts and a reversal of many decades of expansion. Privatized policy has been implemented beyond anything previously contemplated in Chilean history, despite the confusion and unpredictability since 1982. Moreover, in terms of class, policies such as restricted admissions, purges, tuition, and the general assault on participation, freedom, and autonomy have reversed middle-class confidence—built over decades under different regimes—in expanding universities as great vehicles of expression and mobility.[63]

Clearly, then, basic policies analyzed here have reversed not only policies of Unidad Popular but those of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano and other predecessors as well. As in many policy areas, junta policy on higher education has been a sobering experience for Chileans who initially hoped for a simple undoing of perceived UP excesses. In fact, UP policy on higher education more often represented continuation or acceleration than redirection of policy. In a related manner, university autonomy was an obstacle to greater regime impacts on policy until the junta roundly assaulted autonomy. Thus the present emphasis on policy change across regimes is closely focused on the transformation from non–bureaucratic authoritarianism to bureaucratic authoritarianism.[64] In policy after policy, the junta has attacked practices associated with the Reforma Universitaria and even with prereform traditions. Consequently, junta policies have not restored the status quo of 1976, 1970, 1964, 1950, or any other year because never before did the Chilean state so repressively control higher education policy. Policy changes have a magnitude characteristic only of truly revolutionary or counterrevolutionary circumstances. Chilean higher education does not fit those cases where policy analysis reasonably emphasizes the predominance of policy continuity or incrementalism across regimes.

This conclusion is not meant to deny policy continuities despite bureaucratic-authoritarian rule. Relevant examples include persistent distributions by field of study, the refusal of some new administrative personnel to identify fully with regime ideology (to the extreme of military rectors being partly "captured" by their university communities),

as well as the greater nonallegiance or even opposition of faculty and students (including the difficulties of replacing independent student representatives with corporatist ones). Again, some indicators dealing with quantitative dimensions, raw figures, economic outputs, and aggregate categories suggest less change than other indicators do. The balance between continuity and change also depends on the fate of free-market initiatives not launched until after nearly ten years of junta rule. To date, the limits on transformations into a market model mark limits on policy change across regimes.

Similarly, the fate of those market initiatives—from self-financing to intensified competition for students, to the creation of private institutions, to the division of singular professional colegios—is obviously crucial in responding to the final question: to what degree is bureaucratic-authoritarian policy made through central authoritarian politics, through decentralized market economics, or through some fusion of the two? In practice, compatibility has been found repeatedly where policies diminish social-welfare expenditures and demobilize areas of political activity, as with enrollment cuts, purges, and tuition. Compatibility has also been found in the fracturing of the previously dominant student-union structure and in attacks on academic subjects attractive to student activists and unattractive to conservative employers. But conflict has surfaced, for example, with debates between the military (including its rectors) and the economic team over many issues—central subsidization versus tuition and institutional self-financing, the question of whether to promote the proliferation of private institutions, indeed over many of the 1981 initiatives. As these examples suggest, market approaches have sometimes made partial headway. On the other hand, the regime was slow to launch the major market initiatives, as it was in several other social policy fields. More important, with the possible exception of financial policy, such initiatives have never advanced in instances where they might jeopardize the regime's control. Even the 1981 legislation, for all its free-market zeal, scarcely attempted to undo the repressive mechanisms regulating higher education since 1973. In short, authoritarian means have often served both the economic and strictly political ends of bureaucratic authoritarianism, but those means have given little ground to market approaches.

Further suggestions from the case at hand about the central politics approach and the market are speculative, indicating some of the difficulties in drawing conclusions about policy motivations. Where conflict occurs and the market approach is subordinated, does one conclude that policymakers have chosen between two desired approaches or that one is largely a legitimizing ideology to package the real approach? My belief is that the market approach to higher education policy has been serious but sporadic, qualified, and therefore secondary

when compared with the barely compromised drive for centralized political control. Additionally, policy has not been set fully by any one group of policymakers in a coherent way at any one time. Instead, a continual struggle has taken place among different personnel.[65]

To conclude, higher education policy under the junta is fundamentally consistent with posited characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism. When juxtaposed with precoup policy, this consistency highlights, at least in one policy field, substantial differences between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and other regimes as well as an extensive degree of policy change. Finally, the changes have been effected far less through decentralization, voluntarism, and competitive markets than through centralized control, imposition, and martial politics.

NOTES

1. Among comparative works, see Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 17–32; Harold L. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); Frederic Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (Nobleton, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey, 1968); Philippe Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950–1967," in *On Military Intervention*, edited by Morris Janowitz and J. van Doorn (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), 425–506. Among U.S. sources, see Thomas Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).
2. The quoted phrase comes from Dwight Y. King, "Regime Type and Performance: Authoritarian Rule, Semi-Capitalist Development, and Rural Inequality in Asia," *Comparative Political Studies* 13, no. 4 (1981):479. On education, see Joel G. Verner, "Socioeconomic Environment, Political System, and Educational Policy Outcomes: A Comparative Analysis of 102 Countries," *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 2 (1979):165–89; and Alfred Diamant, "Editorial Correspondence," *Comparative Politics* 12, no. 1 (1979):123–24. On Latin America, see Karen Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," *LARR* 13, no. 2 (1978):39–54; and Robert L. Ayres, "Political Regimes, Explanatory Variables, and Public Policy in Latin America," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 10, no. 1 (1975):15–36. On the United States, see, for example, Ira Scharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (1969):867–78.
3. Recent analyses of regime impacts in Latin America include Thomas John Bossert, "Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis? or, the State and Health Policy in Central America," *Comparative Politics* 15, no. 4 (1983):419–41; and Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel Morley, "An Overview of Political Regimes and Economic Performance in Latin America," in *Latin American Political Economy: Financial Crisis and Political Change*, edited by Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel Morley (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986).
4. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *LARR* 13, no. 1 (1978):6; and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, edited by David Collier (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 291–94. Collier observes that different "checklists" for characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism exist. See his essay "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research," in Collier, *New Authoritarianism*, 365; see also his glossary, 399–400. I cannot here summarize the debate on whether bureaucratic authoritarianism is best conceived as a regime, a state, a political system, or an approach to policy-making.

5. Another major critique relevant to policy treats the effects of the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism on subsequent policy. See, for example, Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," *LARR* 17, no. 2 (1982):3–40; and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reply to Remmer and Merkx," *LARR* 17, no. 2 (1982):41–50; also Collier, *New Authoritarianism*, especially the second part.
6. On the first point, see Collier, "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," 392; and Hartlyn and Morley, "Political Regimes"; on the second, see Remmer and Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," 3–40; and O'Donnell, "Reply," 41–50.
7. Phrase from Collier, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," 369, 365; see also Remmer and Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," 27; and O'Donnell, "Reply," 41; also O'Donnell, "Reflections," 6.
8. Daniel C. Levy, "Comparing Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Insights from Higher Education Policy," *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 1 (1981):31–52. In Argentina and especially in Chile, policy has been more "rationalized, exclusionary, and coercive" than in Brazil and Mexico; the comparison was made before Chile's policies in the early eighties pushed toward greater rationalization. The contrasts among four nations are interpreted partly in terms of "timing" and social class.
9. Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact," 50.
10. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in Collier, *New Authoritarianism*, 52; O'Donnell, "Tensions," 299. For a general definition of the political-economic question, see Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
11. On the pertinent characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, "The Chilean Political Process, 1973–1980," in *Chile under Military Rule: Dictatorship and Opposition*, edited by Arturo Valenzuela and Samuel Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). This volume will include several articles relevant to points made in this article. For an earlier application of the "demobilization" concept to Chile, see Karen L. Remmer, "Political Demobilization in Chile, 1973–1978," *Comparative Politics* 12, no. 3 (1980):275–302. On policy change across Chilean regimes, see Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958–1973* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 154–205; and on education, Kathleen B. Fischer, *Political Ideology and Educational Reform in Chile 1964–1976* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1979).
12. The Chicago Boys clearly have important university roots. Not all actually studied in the economics department of the University of Chicago, but they are united in their strong belief in limited public expenditures and great leeway for markets to work their wonders.
13. Carlos Huneeus, *La reforma en la Universidad de Chile* (Santiago: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, 1973).
14. José Joaquín Brunner, *Ideologías universitarias y cambios en la universidad chilena*, FLACSO working papers series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1981), 108. I also interviewed scholars of contemporary Chilean higher education, including Brunner, Manuel Antonio Garretón, Iván Lavados, and Luis Scherz in Santiago, May 1982.
15. Quotation from Edgardo Boeninger, "Reflexiones sobre la universidad chilena," *Estudios Sociales* 42 (1984):21. On ties to national parties, see Patricio E. Chaparro, "University Student Activism and Leadership in Two Chilean Universities," Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1975; and Ben Burnett, *Political Groups in Chile* (Austin: University of Texas, 1970), 80–84. On ideology, see Iván Jaksić, "Philosophy and University Reform at the University of Chile: 1842–1973," *LARR* 19, no. 1 (1984):57–86. On research, see Igor Saavedra, "Proposiciones acerca del plan de desarrollo nacional basado en la ciencia y la tecnología," *Estudios Sociales* 43 (1985):131.
16. On interinstitutional variation, see Daniel C. Levy, *Higher Education and the State in Latin America: Private Challenges to Public Dominance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 66–113. Although Chapter 3 deals with a long history of civilian rule, the sections on military rule focus on attempts to differentiate across institutions and private and public sectors.
17. The phrase "1981 legislation" is used here to refer to a series of decrees considered since 1979 and issued beginning in December 1980 but concentrated in 1981. Reports and analyses of junta policies on higher education in the early years include Galo

Gómez, *Chile de hoy, educación, cultura y ciencia* (Mexico City: Casa de Chile, 1976); Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Universidad y política en los procesos de transformación y reversión en Chile, 1967–1977*, FLACSO working papers series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1979); Michael Fleet, "Academic Freedom and University Autonomy in Chile," *Newsletter of the Latin American Studies Association* 23, no. 2 (1977):23–38; Richard Fagen Ernesto Schiefelbein, *La investigación sobre la universidad chilena en 1977–81*, FLACSO working papers series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1982). On the 1980s, see a fine source (published too recently to be incorporated into this article): *La educación superior en Chile: riesgos y oportunidades en los '80*, edited by María José Lemaitre and Iván Lavados (Santiago: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, 1985).

18. Calculated from data in Rafael Echeverría, *Evolución de la matrícula en Chile: 1935–1981*, PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), 114.
19. For the eight traditional universities and the institutions created from them, Alejandro Jara and Héctor Contardo show a total of 120,178 students enrolled in 1980 and 122,755 in 1982. See Jara and Contardo, *La reforma educacional neo-liberal*, PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1983), 66. *El Mercurio* reported 118,000 for 1982 and 127,353 for 1984, plus 3,686 for the new private universities (not including the training centers); see Guillermo E. Martínez, "Educación superior privada," 16 Oct. 1984.
20. The figures on vacantes come from Schiefelbein, *La investigación*, 66; Consejo de Rectores, *Anuario estadístico 1980* (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1981), 11, and *Anuario estadístico 1982* (1982), 13. After 1980, vacantes for the entire reconstituted system of higher education increased. Ratios of vacantes to enrollment are found in the *Anuario estadístico 1977* of the Consejo de Rectores (Santiago, 1978), 7–8; and in the Consejo's *Boletín informativo interno* (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1974), 2.
21. On South America, see Levy, *Higher Education*, table 1.1, based on five-year periods but lacking data on Uruguay after 1977. The UNESCO projections are cited in Gómez, *Chile de hoy*, 52, but they rely unduly on linear regressions (whereas secondary school growth would slow). Similarly, Angel Bate Carter projected a figure exceeding five hundred thousand by 1980 in "El sistema educativo chileno," in *Universidad e integración andina* (Santiago: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, 1974), 303. See Ernesto Schiefelbein and María Clara Grossi, "Análisis de la matrícula escolar en Chile," a CIDE working paper (Santiago: Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación, 1978), 20–21. For the 1981 data, Carmen Ortúzar, "En busca de un título," *Hoy*, 25 Feb.–3 Mar. 1981; the data on applicants came from the Consejo de Rectores and the Universidad de Chile.
22. According to PDC leader and former rector of the Universidad de Chile Edgardo Boeninger, the phrase *universidad para todos* was a demagogic slogan never taken seriously by university policymakers, but one that contributed to a perceived threat. A widespread belief existed that the number of "nonacademic" students increased significantly during the UP era. Interview, New York City, June 1982.
23. Enrique Kirberg, *Los nuevos profesionales: educación universitaria de trabajadores, Chile, UTE, 1968–1973* (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1981).
24. Adriana Abalos reports that in 1980, 45 percent of the graduates of private secondary schools entered universities but only 17 percent of the public school graduates did so. See "Universidades," *Ercilla*, 6 Aug. 1980, p. 15.
25. The empirical account is Guillermo Briones, *Las universidades chilenas en el modelo de economía neo-liberal: 1973–1981*, PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), 45–53. The student body at the Universidad de Chile in 1966 was 8 percent upper class, 82 percent middle class, 8 percent lower class, and 2 percent undetermined; as late as 1969, only 2 percent of the students had worker or peasant origins. See Kirberg, *Los nuevos profesionales*, 63, 67, which uses figures based on averages from several faculties for 1966. I have not found comparable figures for the years 1970–1975, but no evidence suggests anything other than middle-class dominance at that time. I thank Enrique Kirberg for his help on assessments of socioeconomic status.
26. Figures from Echeverría, *Evolución de la matrícula*, 27–29, 42, 44, 72, 98, 119; and Jara and Contardo, *La reforma educacional*, 80, 85, 93, 105; on the demographics, see Echeverría, 27–29, and Schiefelbein and Grossi, *Análisis de la matrícula*, 2, 20–21, 33.
27. Fleet notes in *Academic Freedom* that estimates on purges "vary widely," 30; Ignacio

González cites a figure of 25 percent for the teaching staff in the immediate postcoup period (10–15 percent for nonacademics and 18 percent for students), "La universidad en ebullición," *Hoy*, 8–14 July 1985. Also see Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas (CISEC) del Centro Bellarmino, *Sector universidad* (D6), 6, 19. This publication is one of the Estudios Sectoriales de la Estructura Social Chilena 1978.

28. "Universidad: la drástica reorganización," *Ercilla*, 20 Oct. 1973. Similarly, the regime named military officers as directors of every school district; see Fischer, *Political Ideology*, 129.
29. The Universidad Católica de Chile was finally turned over to a civilian rector in 1985. On the long-frustrated church intention, see "Universidades: tensa calma académica," *Hoy*, 20–26 June 1979; also, personal correspondence from Enrique D'Etigny, 18 July 1984. On the general conflict over the Universidad Católica de Chile, see Levy, *Higher Education*, 98–99. Protected by the church, several research institutes have maintained substantial autonomy. Some were formed in response to the regime's 1976 crackdown. The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, legally part of the church, holds various programs together. Its original purpose was to provide transitory employment and scholarship until universities regained their autonomy. Based on an interview with Enrique D'Etigny, then president (and now vice-president) of the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano in Santiago, January 1982. Also see Hugo Fruhling, *Nonprofit Organizations as Opposition to Authoritarian Rule*, a Program on Non-Profit Organizations working paper, Yale University, forthcoming.
30. "Universidad católica: crisis con la jerarquía," *Hoy*, 13–19 June 1979.
31. Arturo Valenzuela, "The Political Crisis of the Pinochet Regime," *LASA Forum* 14, no. 2 (1984):18.
32. Gómez, *Chile de hoy*, 15. But "true universitarios" of the civilian right were soon at odds with uncompromising loyalists to the regime, who continually tapped mediocre and opportunistic replacements for the fallen defenders of university values.
33. Luis Alvarez Baltierra, "Definiciones," *Ercilla*, 21 Jan. 1976.
34. Statement of René Orozco Sepúlveda, interviewed in Santiago, November 1978. On into the eighties, this oscillating pattern continued between rectors at the Universidad de Chile who were more and less loyal to their own university personnel when confronting the regime.
35. Based on interviews with Boeninger and others with former or continuing ties to the Universidad de Chile, such as Ricardo Lagos and Francisco Cumplido, in Santiago, November 1978. Some PDC partisans suggest that a similar trajectory (initial repression–reinvigorated repression–relative relaxation) can be discerned at the Universidad de Concepción. Based on interviews at the Center for Research and Cultural Development in Concepción, November 1978.
36. Malú Sierra, "La renuncia de Jorge Millas," *Hoy*, 17–23 June 1981; see also two good accounts by Ignacio González, "Otra etapa dura," *Hoy*, 30 Jan.–5 Feb. 1980, and "Golpe a la cátedra," *Hoy*, 9–15 Apr. 1980. For an analysis of how "neutrality" became decreasingly tenable, see Iván Jaksić, *Chilean Philosophy under Military Rule*, Occasional Papers in Latin American Studies, no. 10 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford-Berkeley Joint Center for Latin American Studies, 1985).
37. On Allende's admonition, see Fleet, *Academic Freedom*, 25; on the workers, see Henry Landsberger and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970–1973," *World Politics* 28, no. 4 (1976):502–41. Thus academic freedom was threatened by an uncontrollable politicization and challenge to ideological diversity and tolerance even though, as Patricia Weiss Fagen emphasizes, Unidad Popular took little direct action against university autonomy, whether for lack of desire or merely lack of power. See Fagen, *Chilean Universities: Problems of Autonomy and Dependence* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), 19–20, 40–41.
38. For example, the leadership of the Universidad Técnica del Estado elaborated this position clearly in "Informe comisión de estudios de proyecto de organizaciones estudiantiles universitarias," mimeo, 1979. Also based on interviews with Oscar Garrido, who was first director of planning at the university, then a top higher education official at the education ministry, Santiago, Nov. 1978 and May 1982.
39. CISEC, *Sector universidad*, 26.

40. These are the respective views of the former rectors of the Universidad de Chile (Edgardo Boeninger) and the Universidad Católica de Chile (Fernando Castillo), both interviewed in Santiago, November 1978.
41. Quotations from Patricia Verdugo, "Pasos a la apertura," *Hoy*, 15–21 Nov. 1978, and "FEUC impulsa nuevo sistema," *El Mercurio*, 18 Nov. 1978. On opposition, see CISEC, *Sector universidad*, 25–26. Also see Odette Magnet and Jaime Moreno, "La nueva institucionalidad estudiantil," *Hoy*, 3–9 May 1978.
42. This initiative reflected Milton Friedman's thesis about the economically and politically stultifying effects of guildlike monopolies even when disguised as modern professional organizations, and even when staunchly defended by middle-class groups. See the editorial in *¿Que Pasa?*, 12–18 Feb. 1981. Complementary legislation limited the professions requiring university degrees to twelve, another blow to many colegios. See Levy, *Higher Education*, 76, 376 n.34.
43. On the rising student activism, see Maria Isabel Valdés, "El movimiento estudiantil en la Universidad de hoy," *APSI*, 3–16 Aug. 1982.
44. On the plebiscites, see Odette Magnet, "Después de seis años," *Hoy*, 2–8 May 1979. Additionally, many students apparently declined nomination to official leadership positions. Magnet and Moreno, "La nueva institucionalidad." Also, see Daniel C. Levy, "Contemporary Student Politics in Latin America," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 14, no. 2 (1981):365. On the trends since 1980, see María Isabel Valdés, "Universidad prohibida," *APSI*, 18–31 Oct. 1983; and Valdés, "El movimiento estudiantil." For an updated account on variations in student organizations and opposition by universities, see Miguel E. Correa and Susan Lagudis, "Chilean Universities under Military Rule: 1973–1984," paper given at the Latin American Studies Association, 18–20 Apr. 1985, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 13–15.
45. The views are those of the first military rector of the Universidad de Chile, as quoted in "Nueva reorientación," *El Mercurio*, 2 Nov. 1973.
46. Briones, *Las universidades chilenas*, 38. Like admissions policy, the number of vacantes is a good indicator of policy intention in the early years whereas enrollments probably provide a more accurate measure after that because vacante figures may vary more erratically from year to year and give no hint about differential dropout rates by field. While Briones sees significant change between the 1973 and 1980 vacante figures (p. 37), I would emphasize the similarities. None of the nine fields changed by more than 4.4 percent and only two changed by more than 2.2 percent. Most of all, important vacante transformations would have made larger impacts on enrollment data. Also, comparing 1983 vacantes with 1982 enrollments suggests further continuity; see Consejo, *Anuario Estadístico 1982*, 14. The private training centers create uncertainty in drawing conclusions about continuity versus change.
47. CISEC, *Sector universidad*, 30, 39. Also see División de Admisión, *Informativo no. 2*, Universidad de Concepción, 1977, 18; and Consejo, *Anuario Estadístico 1977*, 8.
48. Simón de Asés, "El decaimiento de la Universidad de Chile," *Mensaje*, no. 248 (1979), p. 174. Also see Manuel A. Garretón, *Las ciencias sociales en Chile al inicio de los 80*, FLACSO working paper series (Santiago: FLACSO, 1981), 28 and passim.
49. On the dire effects, I cite Máximo Pachecho, PDC education minister, whom I interviewed in Santiago, Nov. 1978. On revitalization, see the interview with Pablo Huneeus, "Los universitarios están inquietos," *Hoy*, 12–18 Mar. 1980.
50. On the rigidity, see Garretón, *Universidad y política*, 47–48. On changes in a particular profession see Jaksić, "Philosophy and University Reform," 57–86. Also, on the *profesionalizante* label, see CISEC, *Sector universidad*, 53.
51. Some images of a professionalist university were shaken, however, by the 1981 legislation on professional monopolies, cited above.
52. Based on my interviews with such key actors as Juan Gómez Millas and Fernando Molina (former vice-president of the Universidad Católica de Chile) in Santiago, Nov. 1978, and Viña del Mar in Nov. 1979. For more on the modernization process and dependency, see Edmundo Fuenzalida, "The Reception of 'Scientific Sociology' in Chile," *LARR* 18, no. 2 (1983):95–112; and Fagen, *Chilean Universities*.
53. On the probably lesser, but still significant, changes in academic policy-making at other educational levels, see Fischer, *Political Ideology*, 128–29. Research policy would

also corroborate basic findings on changes in process, control, and output. To cite just one example, market-oriented preferences for comparative advantage and the purchase of frontline knowledge reinforced motives of political control in attacking the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología.

54. Based on my interview with Jorge Claro, a top Chicago Boy advisor on education, Santiago, Nov. 1978, and on the data he provided.
55. According to interviews with Miguel Kast, head of the Oficina de Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN), and Jorge Claro, Santiago, Nov. 1978. Also see "Universidades: ¿cómo financiarlas?," *¿Qué Pasa?*, 9 Aug. 1974. But the term *university* covered a good deal more ground in Chile than elsewhere. No nonuniversity technical institutes of higher education existed until 1981. Many subprofessional careers were taught at the university, national research was concentrated there, and "extension" programs (including those via television) were significant.
56. Gómez, *Chile de hoy*, 67.
57. Ministerio de Educación, "Borrador de anteproyecto para la operación de un sistema de cobro," Santiago, Nov. 1976, mimeo.
58. I found it difficult to calculate the ratios of education allocations in the budget because of data discrepancies, such as those between the Ministerio de Hacienda's "Análisis" (p. 8) and Carmen Luz Latorre, "Recursos asignados al sector educación," PIIE working papers series (Santiago: PIIE, 1981), table 1 and appendix 1. Generally, however, all sources indicate these trends: increases before the coup, declines associated with it, subsequent recoveries by 1977, and relative stagnation for a couple of years thereafter. Jara and Contardo show a slight increase between 1980 and 1982, following a fall in 1979–80. See *La reforma educacional*, 53. It appears that education other than higher education has more or less held its own, sustaining neither junta claims about the redistributive effects of its crackdown on higher education nor some critics' claims about across-the-board cuts.
59. On military rule at the Universidad de Chile, see Schiefelbein, "La investigación," 6. The figures on tuition are drawn from several newspaper articles, such as "Rectora de universidad," *El Mercurio*, 12 Jan. 1982. Fees varied more across fields than from institution to institution, according to "Aranceles 1983 en universidades," *El Mercurio*, 14 Jan. 1983. But numerous newspaper stories in 1983 told of a startling obstacle to policy change through tuition: perhaps half the students were simply not paying! Meanwhile, plans to charge tuition at public secondary schools were neither implemented nor removed from the agenda.
60. A last measure of policy change is the percentage of private income for the higher education system. Using a generous definition of *private* (including tuition, fees, contract research, and international aid), the PDC-UP average was 12 percent; the 1976–1978 average was 22 percent, and that was before tuitions jumped and the subsidy freeze plan was initiated. See Levy, *Higher Education*, 80, 99.
61. Quotation from O'Donnell, "Tensions," 294. Admittedly, I touched on only a few aspects of internationalism.
62. Notes 2 and 3 above identify some of these scholars.
63. On the middle class, see Levy, "Comparing Authoritarian Regimes," 45–48.
64. Referring back to note 11, an obvious point is that researchers are less likely to emphasize policy change when they compare Chile's two last non-bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes than when they compare those two with bureaucratic authoritarianism. Stallings uses the first approach whereas Fischer uses both.
65. Jara and Contardo are less reserved than I about seeing a shift from state to market regulation, although they find that neoliberal institutionalization for education did not make much headway until 1979, and although they too note that implementation lags behind rhetoric (*La reforma educacional*, 2–4, 114, 130). For the decade as a whole, my conclusion is consistent with Alejandro Foxley's view on general economic policy that only small decisions were left to a free and decentralized market. See Foxley, "Chile: perspectivas económicas," *Mensaje*, no. 301 (1981):414–15.