

writings of Nenadović, which together give us his recollections of the crucial decade 1804–14. One has to read only the famous opening pages to realize that the great master of the Serb language found a worthy translator in Edwards. Nenadović speaks to us from these pages, yet he does so in clear and excellent English. Admittedly drawing on the work of the well-known Serb historian, Vladimir Čorović, Edwards has written an introduction which gives us not only a very good short biography of Nenadović but also a fine account of the events described in the memoirs, ending with a short survey of the bibliography dealing with his hero. Both introduction and translation are footnoted with the needed translations of Turkish and Serb terms, and explanations of historical events, local customs, and the special significance of certain localities. A glossary at the end of the volume supplements these footnotes; regrettably, an index is lacking.

Students of East European history and literature owe Mr. Edwards their sincere thanks for this well-done volume.

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SVETOZAR MILETIĆ I NARODNA STRANKA: GRADJA, 1860–1885. KNJIGA II, 1870–1875. Edited by *Nikola Petrović*. Sremski Karlovci: Isto-rijski arhiv autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine, 1969. 779 pp.

This second volume of documents relating to the National Liberal Party founded by Svetozar Miletić contains three sections. The first, entitled "The Defeat of the Clerical Party," includes, among other things, a report showing that Miletić was in the pay of the St. Petersburg Slavophiles in 1871. The second section covers events in the Vojvodina during the years 1872–74, but does not fully illuminate the problems that disrupted the party during these years. More informative annotation and commentary would have been welcome in this section. The last part, covering 1875, is potentially the most intriguing, but unfortunately it adds little to our understanding of the crisis of 1875. Translation of all documents into Serbo-Croatian makes the collection useful to those who do not read Hungarian, but this advantage is partially offset by the lack of a good map.

Nikola Petrović, the editor of the Miletić papers, maintains that the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878 by Austria-Hungary proved that the left-liberals and radicals were correct in advocating armed seizure of Bosnia, and that Prince Michael and the regimes that followed him were wrong in following more moderate and diplomatic policies on behalf of Serbian unity. The moderates feared the masses, Petrović claims, and could not adopt a progressive, revolutionary position. Therefore, they lost Bosnia.

The question of Prince Michael's preparedness for action in Bosnia is one of the oldest in Yugoslav historiography, and Petrović's opinion has not gone unchallenged in his own country. Prince Michael did not reject revolt in Bosnia out of hand. He planned to foment an uprising in 1867, for example, but abandoned the scheme for many good reasons. The Serbian army was very weak, as one document in this collection demonstrates; all the major powers, including Russia, opposed his plans; and Michael's experiences in 1862 and 1866 with potential guerrilla supporters were not reassuring. Michael and his successors rejected an uprising because they had, as the opposition had not, considered the possibility thoroughly. Does anyone believe that Serbia, inspired by revolutionary élan, could have defeated Turkey, and possibly Austria too, in 1867 or in 1872?

On balance, this volume is disappointing. Many of the most important documents have appeared in print before, and several others simply restate data repetitiously. Let us hope that some of the new documents which could have been included have been held out for publication in the forthcoming volume concerning the Omladina.

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HRVATSKO-UGARSKA NAGODBA 1868. GODINE. By *Vasilije Krestić*. Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. Posebna izdanja, vol. 428. Odeljenje društvenih nauka, no. 65. Belgrade, 1969. 424 pp. 155 new dinars. Paper.

Vasilije Krestić's study of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868 is in a sense a history of Croatian weakness at mid-century. Krestić believes that the solution of the economic problems facing Croatia in the 1860s, which included lack of credit and insufficiently thorough land reform, depended on creating an equitable political relationship between Croatia and Hungary. In his thoroughly documented discussion of Croatian political struggles with Austria and Hungary during the sixties, Krestić shows in detail how the Croats failed to achieve this agreement in 1868. He identifies one source of Croatian weakness as a failure of political leadership, showing, for example, how Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer often misjudged the political situation.

The irony of the problem the Croats faced in the sixties, however, was that political impotence made it impossible to solve their economic problems, but at the same time economic weakness was a major source of their political impotence. Krestić convincingly argues that the inability of the Croatian middle class to support an independent political movement was a basic cause of Croatian political failure. He explains that this inability was brought on not only by structural problems of the Croatian economy but by the coming of the railroads and by deliberate Austrian policy in the fifties. Thus, whereas the major portion of this study concerns political history, perhaps the most important part of the book is the introductory section of almost one hundred pages, in which Krestić thoroughly analyzes the decline of the Croatian economy from 1848 to 1868.

The final fifty pages of the book are important also, because in them Krestić discusses Serbo-Croatian relations during the sixties. He shows how Prince Michael hoped to use Croatian help to obtain Bosnia for Serbia, and how these plans weakened Croatian resolve to resist the Hungarians in the critical year between the Ausgleich of 1867 and the Compromise of 1868. Krestić exaggerates the duplicity of Count Gyula Andrassy's offer to help Michael in this effort, but his analysis shows that even at this relatively early date Bosnia divided Serbs and Croats. Bishop Strossmayer's turn from federalism to support of Serbia, and then to Yugoslavism, is well depicted in this section.

Advocates of economic rationality in contemporary Yugoslavia will be interested to note that this paperbound volume sells for \$12.40. Fortunately, it is worth it.

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