

about love. However, Scheler was an ethical thinker and phenomenologist, while Soloviev used love in a more systematic, ontological-metaphysical context. Such first impressions undergo radical revision on reading this tightly argued book. Dahm shows that—whether or not there was a direct influence of one on the other—there is a similarity in conceptual structure between these two thinkers, such that one is justified in talking about an obverse complementarity. The first chapter shows this for the basic notions of philosophy, the second for the nature of knowledge, the third for the relationship between religion and metaphysics, and the fourth for philosophy as system. The fifth chapter deals with some special problems—especially that of a direct influence of one on the other. The sixth chapter is a tightly knit conclusion.

In chapters 7, 8, and 9 Dahm comes to the most fascinating part of his enterprise. Having dealt in the seventh chapter with Russian philosophy from Soloviev to Shestov, he devotes the eighth to the Soviet image of Soloviev and the ninth to the Soviet view of Scheler. The upshot of all this is the suggestion that through a “Russian” return to Soloviev, “Soviet” philosophers are coming through Scheler to a real involvement with contemporary phenomenology. It is with phenomenology that the “new wave” in Soviet philosophy is dealing; it is with phenomenology that the “orthodox” feel themselves obliged to deal in their polemics.

This book is filled with fascinating suggestions. It represents creative history of philosophy in the best meaning of the term. For this very reason it is often hard to assimilate. But the richness of the material makes the effort well worth the while.

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USSR: A CONCISE HISTORY. By *Basil Dmytryshyn*. 2nd edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. xv, 585 pp. \$12.50.

Since this important textbook on Soviet history was not reviewed in this journal when it first appeared in 1965, publication of a second edition provides an opportunity to evaluate it briefly. Its distinctive feature is that the last third consists of forty-one appended documents, including in full such useful items as Lenin's “April Theses,” the 1936 Constitution, and Khrushchev's 1956 “secret speech.” Thus it serves particularly well the teacher who wants students to work through and savor some key primary sources of Soviet history. The text, however, contains only a few cross references to the documents, and the documents have neither introductions nor notes.

The narrative itself is indeed concise, only a little more than half the length of Treadgold's *Twentieth Century Russia*, a textbook which is more broadly conceived, substantial, and thorough, but which lacks documents. On the other hand, Dmytryshyn's account is more factual and a bit longer than the only other comparable survey, J. P. Nettl's *The Soviet Achievement* (1967). The latter is more interpretive, more challenging, better written, and has superb illustrations, many in color. Nevertheless, Dmytryshyn's book probably serves the beginning student somewhat better.

In fact, complaints about this textbook verge on quibbles. It is, as the preface claims, a reasonably “complete, accurate, clearly organized, and dispassionate” survey of major trends of development in the Soviet Union, while not purporting

to be "exhaustive or definitive." The balance between domestic and foreign policies, between political and other sorts of history, is remarkably well struck for a work of this brevity. There is little in-depth interpretation, but most of the analyses presented, such as the discussion of "war communism," are reasonable and lucid. One can, of course, grumble that the language at times mirrors cold war rhetoric, but overall the tone and evaluations are evenhanded. The Bolsheviks get their share of censure, yet their achievements are acknowledged as well.

Like most historians, Dmytryshyn is better on earlier periods and weaker as he approaches the present. After chapters on 1917 and the Civil War, he treats the next fifty years by decades, with such silly chapter titles as "The Cosmic Sixties." While this approach works to some extent for the 1920s and 1930s, the scheme begins to come apart for the 1940s and provides almost no framework for the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently the narrative of the last twenty years often turns into a rather disjointed semichronology of names, dates, and events. A minor but irritating point of style is that the author frequently puts sentences or phrases in quotation marks without explaining why this is done or what the source is.

A weakness of this second edition is the unsatisfactory nature of the revisions made. The bibliography at the end is updated (though still without annotations), but the lists for recommended reading following each chapter—of most help to students—are left as they were in 1965. Moreover, the chapters since 1945 have not been rewritten; instead an additional fifteen pages have simply been tacked onto the last chapter. Outdated comments on Indonesia and on the 1958 educational reform are reprinted without change. Finally, this means that such key questions as arms control and Sino-Soviet relations are inadequately treated.

Despite these difficulties, this remains the best book for the teacher anxious to introduce students to an outline history of the Soviet Union, as well as to some important sources helpful in understanding that complex society.

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SOVETSKAIA ROSSIIA I SShA (1917–1920). By *Liudmila Gvishiani*. Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1970. 328 pp. 1.36 rubles.

In the introduction Liudmila Gvishiani states that her purposes are to detail the "foreign policy activities of the Soviet government in relation to the U.S.A." in the period 1917–20 and "to reveal to all, by means of an investigation of the concrete factual material, the bankruptcy of the anti-Soviet fabrications of American bourgeois historians. . . ." But the book is more an examination of U.S. than Soviet policy, and those American "historical falsifiers" were her main source of information. For the Western specialist, then, this study offers little that is new. This is not to say that Ms. Gvishiani has turned out yet another cold war polemic. Though in dealing with the intervention she relies heavily on an article by William Appleman Williams rather than George Kennan's detailed works, and tends to cast American actions in the worst light, her approach is understandable considering the ambiguities of U.S. policy in that period and the undoubted psychological scars the Russians still bear as a result of the intervention. Her treatment of the period of the Paris Peace Conference is reasonably objective—even to the extent of admitting that both Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George found the Soviet note