

appear more as an outstanding representative of the realistic tradition in American foreign policy than as a "European mind in American policy."

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SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS, 1945-1970. By O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov. Edited and with an introduction by Vladimir Petrov. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975. xviii, 364 pp. \$12.50.

In recent years the Soviet leadership has been trying in various ways, and with some success, to get its position on the Sino-Soviet dispute before the educated American public. The volume under review is at least objectively helpful to that effort. It is an abbreviated translation of a book by two pseudonymous Soviet China watchers, allegedly compiled in part from official sources not previously drawn on in a published work. (All the notes refer to previously published material.) It was presumably intended in the first instance for the Soviet public, and it is almost pure propaganda.

Throughout the book, the Soviet Union is purported, without examination and certainly without proof, to have acted from pure and selfless motives in its policy toward China, as well as, presumably, in every other respect. For this, the Soviet Union is said to have been repaid by Mao and his colleagues with perverse, nationalistic, anti-Soviet behavior. That the Soviets could ever have done anything wrong, or the Chinese anything right, does not appear to have entered the authors' heads, or if so then this dangerous thought has been rigorously prevented from passing through their typewriters.

It might reasonably be asked whether the book, granted its essentially propagandistic nature, nevertheless does contain new material, at least on the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The answer is yes, but not very much. Information, whether accurate or not, that has not been previously published in the Soviet Union is indicated by the editor with daggers, which appear on pages 98, 99, 118, 119, 120, 122, 157, 158, 175, 181, 210, 224, 239, 240, 267, 270, and 273. None of it is particularly surprising.

The authors' glowing version of the Soviet economic and technical assistance program in China during the 1950s needs to be balanced by a reading of the more objective account of one of the participants in it (Mikhail Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China*). The ideological and political differences that emerged between Moscow and Peking after the mid-1950s have been analyzed much better by Western specialists, notably Donald S. Zagoria (*The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*). The border crisis of 1969 is plausibly attributed to a Chinese initiative, but nothing is said of the ensuing retaliatory bullying of China by its obviously stronger Soviet adversary.

The American edition of Borisov and Koloskov's book includes a foreword and an introduction by Professor Vladimir Petrov. In the foreword he concedes that the book is polemical and onesided and, apart from its more or less "inside" character, suggests no specific reason why it is sufficiently important to warrant an American edition. In the introduction he discusses the general principles of relations among Communist states and Stalin's foreign policy down to 1950, including his policy toward China, in a clear and competent fashion. He draws heavily, however, on the Yanan diary of the TASS correspondent P. Vladimirov (*China's Special Area, 1942-1945*), whose authenticity and accuracy are highly suspect.

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