

with Renaissance illumination and iconography. An index and summary bibliography at the end of the volume facilitate the work of the reader. Since most of the material presented is new—Ilona Berkovits's recent study (1964) deals only with items preserved in Hungary—the work constitutes an authoritative and indispensable source for anyone dealing with the spread of fifteenth-century Italian humanism into East Central Europe.

THOMAS R. MARK  
*Colorado State University*

MAGYARORSZÁG KÜLPOLITIKÁJA, 1919–1945. By *Gyula Juhász*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, n.d. 374 pp. 40 Ft.

I trust that this new study by Juhász will sooner or later be translated into English; it should definitely be made available to the general English-reading public, both because of its scope and because of the competence displayed by the author. It confirms the impression created by Juhász's earlier study on the foreign policy of the Teleki government (*A Teleki kormány külpolitikája, 1939–1941*) that he is one of the soundest interpreters of contemporary Hungarian history.

While the book includes introductory observations on the armistice negotiations in 1918, the Károlyi government, and the Republic of Councils, as well as a brief mention of the formation of the Debrecen government in December 1944, its topic is Hungarian foreign policy during the Horthy era. This is not to say that Horthy is the main protagonist. In fact, the regent is infrequently mentioned, for while the name may be a convenient tag on the era, he did not dominate or attempt to dominate the formulation and conduct of Hungarian foreign policy.

The study confirms the notion that in this period Hungary played a role (albeit often negative) quite out of proportion to the country's size, population, or economic and military significance. The main purpose of the Little Entente in the 1920s was defense against Hungarian revisionism, a clear case of overkill. In the 1930s Italy and Germany seemed to vie for Hungarian friendship; the Second Vienna Award (August 1940) was an indication that the Axis partners courted Hungarian friendship even at the risk of losing that of Rumania, on whose oil the Italian and German war machines depended. Ribbentrop even promised, in January 1939, that henceforth Hungary would always be mentioned first among the little countries in Hitler's speeches (p. 193). Perhaps the Hungarian government should have rejected such flattery; but Juhász unequivocally condemns the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon and points out that much of the reactionary and chauvinistic nature of Hungarian policies between the wars can be explained in terms of the shortcomings of that treaty (pp. 65–69).

Since I am in the process of completing a study of German-Hungarian relations during the Second World War, the last two sections of Juhász's study (dealing with the period 1939 to 1944) interested me most. Presumably Juhász is a Marxist historian, whereas I have not received training in Marxist history. It does not seem to make much difference. Juhász abstains from using worn-out epithets such as fascist, feudal, or "semifeudal" in his characterization of the Horthy regime, contenting himself with the term "counterrevolutionary"—which it undoubtedly was. Nor is it merely a matter of style, but also of interpretation: basically I must agree with Juhász that Hungary was subjected to an increasing amount of economic, diplomatic, and eventually military pressure on the part of

Germany; and that Hungary's leaders tried to cope with these pressures, but failed almost completely.

MARIO D. FENYO  
*Portland State University*

ARROW-CROSS MEN, NATIONAL SOCIALISTS: 1935–1944. By *M. Lackó*.  
*Studia Historica, Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 61. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969. 112 pp. \$6.00.

This volume is an abridged and inferior version of the original (*Nyilasok, nemzetiszocialisták, 1935–1944*, Budapest, 1966). Missing are, among other things, the fine analysis of the 1939 secret parliamentary elections and the biography of Ferenc Szálasi, the Arrow-Cross leader. One is not even told of Szálasi's Army General Staff background. Still, even the English version is valuable as the only study on the Hungarian far right based on archival sources. The author argues correctly that interwar politics, both popular and high level, were dominated by counterrevolutionary ideologies; that a sharp distinction must be made between Horthy's own conservative camp and the more dynamic rightist opposition; that a further distinction must be drawn, within the far right, between the "gentlemanly" National Socialists and the more plebeian Arrow-Cross movement; and that, finally, within the Arrow-Cross a distinction must be made between the middle-class opportunists and the anarchistic, social revolutionary extremists. The rapid growth of the Arrow-Cross between 1937 and 1940 and its equally rapid decline thereafter is well illustrated, destroying the widely held belief that Szálasi's assumption of power on October 15, 1944, was the culmination of a long development and not the result of a last-ditch German maneuver. The author, a Marxist, freely admits that the Arrow-Cross had a wide mass base, even among workers, and that at one point the Arrow-Cross miners almost brought the Hungarian economy to a standstill while vainly hoping for a German invasion of their country. On the other hand, the book swarms with unsupported statements on the collective behavior of such groups as "the upper strata of the medium landowners" or "the antipopular and anti-progressive, uneducated, low-minded stratum of the officers." Every representative of the old order is mercilessly criticized, and there is no end to the author's righteous indignation.

ISTVÁN DEÁK  
*Columbia University*

IDEOLOGIA GENERAȚIEI ROMÂNE DE LA 1848 DIN TRANSILVANIA.  
By *George Em. Marica, Iosif Hajós, Călina Mare, and Constantin Rusu*. Bucharest: Editura politică, 1968. 334 pp. Lei 9.75.

In the past twenty years Rumanian scholars have published a large number of monographs, shorter studies, and collections of documents dealing with the revolution of 1848 and its antecedents in Transylvania, but the present work is the first systematic analysis of the thought and preoccupations of those who provided the Rumanian national movement with its ideological basis. The authors have used the writings of twenty-two persons whom they consider most representative of the period as their primary source and have produced a lucid, scholarly introduc-