suggest that the peasants are in the habit of subordinating their interests to the collective good.

Scott's real ideas are far too complex to present in a short letter. To do so would be gratuitous in any case; his book is easily available. However, readers of the *JAS* who have not seen the book should be aware that the ideas in it bear little resemblance to Keyes's summary of them.

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Still More on *Peasant Strategies in Asian Societies*: A Reply to Edwin Moise

It is unfortunate that Professor Moise has chosen to attack me and my fellow contributors to the symposium on "Peasant Strategies in Asian Societies: Moral and Rational Economic Approaches" for employing a *wrong* interpretation of James Scott's book, *The Moral Economy of the Peasantry*, rather than putting forward an *alternative* reading of the book that would have furthered a discussion of the fundamental issues involved. It is highly misleading, I maintain, to see the symposium as entailing a refutation of the "errors," supposed or otherwise, contained in the work of James Scott (or of Samuel Popkin, whose book, *The Rational Peasant*, was of equal relevance to the symposium).

Moise takes me to task for ignoring the fact that Scott discusses the reactions of peasants to many different politico-economic conditions besides those of the Great Depression. Because of this fact, Moise finds it difficult to accept the conclusion, put forward by Feeny in his paper and reiterated in my introduction, that "Scott *tended* to take as general features of peasantry those that actually stemmed from the particular conditions of the Great Depression. . . ." (introduction, p. 757; emphasis added). Moise has, I suggest, confused levels of discussion. My concern, like that of my fellow contributors, lay in "the *argument* that Scott advances" (introduction, p. 756, emphasis added), not in the application that Soctt made of his own theoretical approach to a number of examples. In seeking for the roots of Scott's approach, I am scarcely alone in concluding that while Scott predicates his theory upon certain assumptions about human nature, the theory has been shaped to a considerable extent by his analysis of major rebellions in Burma and Vietnam that occurred during the Depression. Michael Peletz ("Moral and Political Economies in Rural Southeast Asia: A Review Article," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 25, no. 4:734–35) has noted the implications of Scott's analysis of these rebellions in a paper that I read after the symposium was published:

> One wonders . . . why Scott chose for his case studies two peasant movements that arose in 1930, during the Great Depression. . . . Surely the occurrence (or absence) of peasant uprisings under less catastrophic economic conditions would have provided an adequate (and perhaps a far more appropriate) testing ground for the basic components of Scott's model and for his position on villagers' uniform reluctance to engage in market activities and risk (whether economic or political). In point of fact, an examination of other cases would seem to require a partial revision of Scott's thesis.

Professor Moise has accused me of ascribing to Scott a position he did not take regarding the relationship between peasant communitarian norms and the recruitment of peasants into revolutionary movements. Professor Moise should have noted that the passage in my introduction to which he takes exception is not my conclusion but is one that I have drawn with reference to James Polachek's summary of Scott's argument. Polachek, in turn, refers to Scott's analysis of the Nghe-Tinh rebellion in Annam in 1930–1931 (see Scott, pp. 127–49). Scott situates his analysis of the rebellion in the context of his argument that peasants feel exploited when their "right to subsistence" is threatened and respond to such exploitation by seeking to assert the "norm of reciprocity" (the chapter on "Implications for the Analysis of Exploitation: Reciprocity and Subsistence as Justice" follows immediately the chapter on "The Depression Rebellions"). At the end of his discussion of the Nghe-Tinh rebellion, Scott considers the role of the Indochinese Communist Party and concludes that the party found itself having to adopt "the program of the peasantry" (p. 148), that is, a program based upon "traditional redistributive norms" (p. 149), if it were to make use of the rebellion in its pursuit of its revolutionary goals. Given this conclusion, and the context in which Scott places his argument, it is hardly surprising that Polachek, and also Pierre Brocheux, drew the implications they do.

Moise does raise one theoretical issue, namely that concerning the "rationality" of peasants. While I believe that a significant critique, leading perhaps to a fruitful discussion, might have been made of my use of the notion of rationality in my papers in the symposium, Moise sidetracks such a discussion with an untenable conclusion about my position: "Keyes clearly implies that Scott believes peasant behavior to be guided by moral principles rather than individual (or family) self-interest." I do very much accept that a "moral" approach is rational, and I believe my argument in the introduction and in my other paper bears me out. However, following Weber, I recognize two forms of rationality—"value rationality" and "instrumental rationality." Rather than seeing social action as proceeding from values (which are rational in their own culturally specific terms) *or* from instrumental means-end calculation, I believe that there is a tension between these two. It is the exploration of such a tension in a particular case that constitutes the essence of my paper in the symposium. I now recognize that because I construe the concept of "moral" differently to Scott I may not have adequately conveyed in the introduction how he subsumes means-end calculations (i.e., "rational" in the Popkin sense) under the notion of moral economy. In my own approach, I disagree with both Popkin, who, I believe, ignores the relevance of values in the shaping of human motivation, and with Scott, who conflates value-rationality with instrumental-rationality. Unfortunately, Professor Moise seems to have mistaken disagreement for misrepresentation.

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On Review of *Dissent in Early Modern China*

I-fan Ch'eng's review of my book *Dissent in Early Modern China* (*JAS* 42 [May 1983]:634–35), contains valid criticisms, but I object to his characterization of my thesis and my intentions. Ch'eng exaggerates my claims for modernity and then cites my own recognition of complexity and eighteenth-century conservatism as counter-