

Rizziello carefully constructed the list of deportees to save local Jews, they were also aware that the Jews they did place on that list were being sent eventually to their deaths. Roumani emphasizes that the main actors in these deportations – those who carried out the order and the man who gave the order (Governor Ercolani) – were Italians. “This over-zealous and ideological prefect [governor] exhibited cruelty and cupidity and active collaboration in the Holocaust in his handling of Jews,” she writes (102).

In this commendable study that sheds new light on the Fascist treatment of Jews on the local level, Judith Roumani concludes with a chapter on the Grosseto province after 1945. Attempts to reconstruct Jewish lives after the war proved difficult, and many left to larger cities like Florence or emigrated to Israel or the United States. The Jewish community in Pitigliano, she writes, “today is largely virtual.” She concludes: “The people and the province, as a whole, are perhaps only now finally coming to terms with the past, their historical treatment of the Jews, and the less-than-stellar behavior of the local Fascists. . . . On the other hand, they can also be extremely proud of those who did indeed risk their lives to save Jews.” The experience of Jews in the southern Tuscan province of Grosseto “embraces two extremes: non-Jewish Italians who fearlessly protected their local Jewish neighbors and other non-Jewish Italians of the province who set up a concentration camp from which they callously and hypocritically sent Jews, some Italian, some foreign, on their way to the death camps” (180–181).

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Belastung als Chance. Hans Gmelins politische Karriere im Nationalsozialismus und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

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Michael L. Hughes

Wake Forest University

In 1941–1945, Hans Gmelin was adjutant to Hanns Ludin, Nazi proconsul in the Slovakian puppet state; Gmelin served in 1954–1974 as self-professedly democratic mayor of Tübingen, a small university city. Niklas Krawinkel explores Gmelin’s life to illuminate issues of responsibility, de-Nazification, and democratization in (West) Germany.

In 1975, Tübingen awarded Gmelin a prestigious honorary citizenship; however, when his connection to the deportations of Slovakian Jews to death camps became known, demands arose for the honor’s withdrawal. Tübingen’s government voted a grant to investigate Gmelin’s actions, which financed Krawinkel’s dissertation and this book. That larger project informed Krawinkel’s approach: he focuses on Gmelin’s relationship to Nazism, his wartime actions, and certain choices as mayor, albeit Krawinkel must rely on indirect sources to establish what Gmelin knew and did in wartime Slovakia.

Born into a conservative family from Württemberg’s bureaucratic elite, Gmelin was, from his early-1920s youth, active in sports groups associated with the Stahlhelm, the conservative veterans group. When the SA incorporated his sports groups, he took on SA leadership roles. He later presented his SA roles as only sports leadership, but in 1938 he

enthusiastically commanded an SA group that participated violently in Germany's occupation of the Sudetenland. When an SA acquaintance, Hanns Ludin, was appointed proconsul in Slovakia (to represent the Foreign Ministry's broader political considerations against the SS's ideological focus and the *Wehrmacht's* military focus), he chose Gmelin as an adjutant.

As adjutant, Gmelin did not issue orders, but he advised on policies that were often criminal, including Aryanization and suppressing dissent and partisan activity. He knew the fate of deported Jews. Krawinkel details the policies being pursued (by the Slovak government at Nazi behest and then by German occupation forces) and Gmelin's knowledge. He lacks sources to document the specifics of Gmelin's advice to Lubin. Gmelin did intervene in individual cases, while making clear that such efforts on Jews' behalf were likely to be unsuccessful. Gmelin was never accused of crimes against humanity but was part of the machinery that generated them. Krawinkel does give a vivid sense of Nazi polycracy in action, by describing clashes between SA and Foreign Ministry personnel on the one hand and SS and later *Wehrmacht* personnel on the other, as well as personal relationships among German Foreign Ministry personnel in Slovakia and between them and Slovak officials.

Gmelin's de-Nazification was ultimately successful. Interned for over three years, he used his old-boy network to ease his de-Nazification with favorable character references (*Persilscheine*) from influential people (and later to advance his career). He secured initial classification as "lesser offender," with two years' probation, after which he was reclassified as "fellow traveler." Krawinkel emphasizes that de-Nazification became not a means of establishing responsibility, but of drawing ex-Nazis back into public life as peaceful democratic citizens. Egon Kogon had called for a "right to political error" in having supported Nazism for those who had not committed war crimes and as a means to reintegrate millions of Germans into a new democratic Germany; however, he predicated it on their "drawing the consequences." Yet, Krawinkel argues, Gmelin and most other 1950s Germans drew no consequences but sought simply to obfuscate their actions in supporting an unspeakably brutal dictatorship. Indeed, he argues, de-Nazification enabled Germans to ignore Nazi racism and the regime's broad support while seeing the Third Reich as a superficial phenomenon that disappeared with defeat. Krawinkel is right to deplore Germans' failure, for a generation, to deal with Nazism, but he might have explored in what other ways they could have secured both democratization and "truth and reconciliation."

In Gmelin's first campaign for mayor, in 1954, his Nazi past proved an opportunity, not a burden. He proclaimed that, like many, he had been young and enthusiastic in the early 1930s, in a society devastated by defeat and burdened with economic depression and dysfunctional governance. The Nazis, he said, had "misused" youth's "idealism" to seize power. However, he told voters that he—and implicitly they—had learned from the past. He now recognized that "democratic freedoms and rules are the prerequisite for a flourishing political life." He won election, a sign, Krawinkel argues, of the way many West Germans explained away, rather than came to terms with, the recent past.

Krawinkel focuses on elements of Gmelin's mayoralty that seem to echo Nazi themes. Krawinkel sees *Volksgemeinschaft* as inherently exclusionary and Gmelin's references to it as of a piece with his emphasis on *ethnos* over *demos*, on a German ethnic/racial community that is transnational and entitled to some of its lost eastern territories. Gmelin rejected as illegitimate student demands to the Tübingen government in the 1960s because municipal government was supposed to be apolitical administration. Gmelin resisted student demonstrations because they interfered with traffic (though, Krawinkel points out, the constitution guaranteed freedom of expression but not smooth traffic flow). And Krawinkel ascribes the liberalization of the 1960s primarily to a generational change, one that replaced people such as Gmelin.

A broader focus might have led to different emphases. Gmelin's preferences for apolitical stances, nation, and *Volksgemeinschaft* were common among the conservative circles he grew up in before Nazism. Concerns he expressed about demonstrations and the *Rechtsstaat* were shared, into the 1980s, by the CDU/CSU and younger conservatives. One could explore where

his choices reflected traditional conservative, not Nazi, influences. Moreover, he resisted proposals for harsh police interventions against demonstrators. He also was willing to say, in the 1960s, that there were “no illegitimate interests,” a statement strikingly at odds with 1920s and Nazi notions of the *Volksgemeinschaft*'s single *Gesamtinteresse*. And he said he personally opposed proposed State of Emergency laws, another striking position for a traditional German conservative. He does seem to have changed in various ways that accorded with West Germany's post-1965 pluralist democracy. Further exploration of how he changed and how he stayed the same, from 1925 till 1974, could be illuminating.

Niklas Krawinkel's account provides a solid assessment of Hans Gmelin's activities under the Nazis, leading to the 2018 withdrawal of his honorary citizenship. With a different remit, Krawinkel might have placed Gmelin more broadly within twentieth-century German history.

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Soviet Judgment at Nuremberg: A New History of the International Military Tribunal after World War II

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Hilary Earl

Nipissing University

In a dramatic scene from the 1961 film *Judgement at Nuremberg*, fictional Chief Trial Judge Dan Haywood (played by Spencer Tracy) proclaims that Nuremberg stands for the American ideals of “truth and justice.” Reminiscent of Robert Jackson's opening statement, Haywood places the United States at the moral and legal centre of international justice and thereby challenges the claim that Nuremberg was a *fait accompli*, nothing more than victor's justice. And, lest there be any doubt about the fairness of Nuremberg, in the final scene Judge Haywood visits defendant Ernst Janning (played by Burt Lancaster) in his cell, so that Janning can acknowledge his own guilt and thereby affirm the legitimacy of Nuremberg. Not surprisingly, such popular films underscore the most compelling elements of criminal trials, not so subtly persuading audiences of their legal value and inherent drama, full of strong personalities, moral dilemmas, captivating testimony, and redemptive endings. Never do movie-goers witness the gaping silences, backroom deals, political compromises, or mechanics of multilingual and multicultural justice that led American journalist Rebecca West to label the Nuremberg trial she sat through in 1945–1946, a “citadel of boredom.” The moralistic, Amero-centric story of *Judgment at Nuremberg* underscores what Francine Hirsch has identified as the “Nuremberg myth” – the belief that international justice, born in the courtrooms of Nuremberg after World War II, was a singularly American invention. In *Soviet Judgment at Nuremberg*, the latest addition to the ever-growing Nuremberg historiography, Hirsch aims to set the record straight. In drawing the curtain back and writing the Soviets into the narrative of Nuremberg, not only does she topple long-standing myths about American exceptionalism and international justice, but she does so magnificently.

Between November 20, 1945 and October 1, 1946, in what arguably was the last great act of Allied unity in World War II, the Americans, British, French, and Soviets prosecuted