

that attention to the human needs to which this image-making responds takes us into an “inarticulated and abstract realm”: literature articulates the needs—the desires and dreams—which call it into being. Abstraction comes rather from a criticism which refuses to deal with the primary project of literature, treats it as self-contained and self-justifying, and hence loses sight of its engagement in the world.

There is a misunderstanding between Professor Moriarty and myself on the use of the word “homology,” which he takes to imply “genetic connections” and “*rapports de faits*”: it is for him a term describing diachronic relations. As currently used in structural analysis (especially in anthropology), however, homology can, I think, refer to a perception of functionally similar patternings and structures. It can be applied synchronically, and permit the comparison of structures to one another, or to a structure of reference. Homology, as I intended the term, would preserve the specificity of a phenomenon while permitting comparison to other phenomena in terms of organization and role.

Professor Moriarty’s vision of a course encompassing Romania, Germania, Orientalia, and the rest is unimpeachable at a certain level of literary studies. Our disagreement is no doubt one of priorities and progression. I do not think that such attention to cultural and historical spheres means much to a student until he has first had a chance to explore the nature of culture itself—specifically, to confront writing as a confrontation of the unwritten. Culture risks being an abstract and a dead concept unless we seize it in its activity. The United Nations of Literature is a noble idea, and one that I subscribe to; but the metaphor may, alas, suggest a debating society somewhat removed from the real confrontations of literary study. Such a superstructure must be built on a common experience of struggle with what and why literature is.

As for Professor Harrier, he should be assured that I admire Curtius as much as he does, and believe in the continued relevance of Curtius’ work. This does not mean that we can or should try to reproduce such an approach in our criticism and pedagogy. Precisely in the measure that we *are* aware of our cultural and intellectual assumptions, we must recognize that Romania is an inadequate base from which to approach talking about literature today. Professor Harrier’s contention that I favor a “thematic arrangement” of courses and works is an elementary misconstrual of my argument, which clearly rejected this stance. Thematic study as it is usually conceived masks radical confrontation of the text, and of the text’s own confrontations. “Comparison and analogy” I certainly do favor, but why must they lead us back to the Romanic tradition of Curtius? They can lead in many directions,

among others to the structures of language, or the structures of the imagination.

One must wonder, finally, what “changes in pedagogy” Professor Harrier does think “may be worth a try.” He seems intent to exorcise some menace he can’t quite put his finger on, and resorts to ominous but undefined pronouncements about one man’s dreams being another’s nightmares. Are we therefore to pretend that dreaming is irrelevant to our task? I divine that there is here some submerged argument for teaching literature only in terms of literary traditions. There is room for this, of course, but it should not interdict exploration of the full range of discourse which literature solicits in us.

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### Juvenal as Sublime Satirist

To the Editor:

Does *PMLA* have some finely calibrated instrument that determines what belongs in the “Forum,” what belongs in “Notes, Documents, and Critical Comment,” what belongs up front in the full light of day? I’d have thought that William Kupersmith’s “Juvenal as Sublime Satirist,” *PMLA*, 87 (1972), 508–11, belonged in the “Forum” where I suppose I’d have had the chance to answer it. Since I’m congratulated in the first sentence and taken to task after that, it looks to me as if Mr. Kupersmith’s subject is in some good part the essay of mine, “Satire, Sublimity, and Sentiment: Theory and Practice in Post-Augustan Satire,” *PMLA*, 85 (1970), 260–67, that he talks about. On the other hand his abstract is amiably nonpartisan and doesn’t mention my essay at all. Am I just imagining things? I leave that determination to observers “quite indifferent in the Cause.”

I seem to be charged with doing two things wrong: (1) giving the reader “the misleading impression that high esteem for Juvenal’s satires is a peculiarity of later eighteenth-century taste” (p. 508); and (2) misinterpreting what Johnson said about Juvenal and his translators. Number two, which I’ll get out of the way first, engages Mr. Kupersmith’s rhetorical verve especially.

He says: “Dryden’s reference to ‘commonplaces’ explains Samuel Johnson’s remark about Juvenal, which unfortunately Professor Carnochan gives in deceptively mangled paraphrase (p. 263): ‘The peculiarity of Juvenal is a mixture of gaiety and stateliness, of pointed sentences, and declamatory grandeur.’ ‘Pointed sentences’ is probably a translation of Scaliger’s ‘sententiae acriores.’ A *sentence* is ‘a maxim; an axiom, generally moral’ ” (p. 509). Now I suppose

Mr. Kupersmith might be charged with giving readers the misleading impression that I write like Samuel Johnson—or at least those readers who don't know that the words he quotes are Johnson's, not my "deceptively mangled paraphrase." But no matter what Mr. Kupersmith's syntax seems to say, probably most people can tell the difference between me and Johnson.

As for my "paraphrase," which Mr. Kupersmith nowhere quotes, it went like this: "Samuel Johnson said that Juvenal's translators had concentrated on and accurately caught his 'points' at the sacrifice of his 'declamatory grandeur.'" In what does the mangling consist? Mr. Kupersmith tells us: "The 'pointed sentences,' then, are not jokes, as Professor Carnochan thinks, but gnomic utterances, sharp little maxims like 'orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano' (x.356), and 'quis cutsodiet [sic] ipsos custodes?' (vi.347–48)" (p. 509). Why does Mr. Kupersmith suppose that I think "points" are jokes? And to go a little further, in what does the "paraphrase" consist, if it is "points" we're talking about? After the sentence that Mr. Kupersmith quotes, Johnson says of Juvenal and his translators: "His points have not been neglected; but his grandeur none of the band seemed to consider as necessary to be imitated, except Creech, who undertook the thirteenth *Satire*."<sup>1</sup> It must be Mr. Kupersmith who thinks "points" are jokes. I think "points" are pointed sentences, and so obviously does Johnson. One of the definitions of "point" in the *Dictionary* is: "A sting of an epigram; a sentence terminated with some remarkable turn of words or thought." Who is it who has deceptively (or at least unfortunately) mangled what?

Then there is the other matter, whether readers may be misled into thinking that nobody before the later eighteenth century ever thought well of Juvenal. Well, I suppose it's possible, but I shouldn't have thought likely. In *Lemuel Gulliver's Mirror for Man* I had referred to Scaliger's opinion of Juvenal (and Lipsius' also), not to mention Bishop Burnet's and Dennis' and Dryden's—all of this, material that Mr. Kupersmith produces here as evidence. In the article, which was intended as something of a sequel to the book, I call it the "old" quarrel about the satirists. I talk about the "revival" or "rehabilitation" of Juvenal. My point was not that Juvenal had never done Christian service before. It was not that no one had ever called him sublime before. It was not that he hadn't had his turn as "Satyrorum . . . princeps." It was that just as the idea of sublimity changes, just as religious feeling changes, just as the whole culture changes, so do attitudes toward the satirists; and that these attitudes are conditioned partly by what readers want to see, partly by old expectations. When Mr. Kupersmith warns us, "we should remember that the main tradition of

Christian humanism was yet alive in the late eighteenth century" (p. 510), he may not be altogether wrong, but he befogs the issue. Does he really believe that the eighteenth century "*simply* [my italics] held what was the standard opinion of Juvenal from the time of the early church fathers till the nineteenth century" (p. 508)? I don't believe he does. Since the rules of debate in *PMLA* have become obscure to me, however, I wonder (as I write) whether I'll ever find out.

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Note

<sup>1</sup> "Life of Dryden," *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1905), I, 447.

### Stoicism and Prose Styles to 1700

To the Editor:

Some new evidence has come to light concerning my article and the two important rejoinders to it ("Patterns of Stoicism . . .," 85, Oct. 1970, 1023–34; Professors Williams and Freehafer, *Forum*, 86, Oct. 1971, 1028–30).

A. N. L. Munby, general editor of a new series, *Sale Catalogues of Libraries of Eminent Persons*, has himself edited the first volume, *Poets and Men of Letters* (London: Mansell, 1971), which includes the sale catalogue of the library of one seventeenth-century poet and his family, Edmund Waller (1606–87). Munby prints the catalogue prepared for the sale in 1832. The books in the collection evidently entered the family library over a long period. Those with very early sixteenth-century imprints must surely be purchases made either by the poet's ancestors or possibly by him in purchase of some smaller library en bloc; similarly, books with imprints after 1687 could only have been purchased by the poet's descendants. All this makes little difference to immediate purposes. We can still take a period from 1530 (so excluding two relevant earlier titles: Horace, 1509; Livy and Florus, 1521) to 1700 (so adding a few titles purchased after Waller's death) and get what may be termed a Waller library acquired by a family in the course of the Renaissance and seventeenth century. I must add that the catalogue includes some mention of "others," books apparently beneath the dignity of naming, mostly shelved with "Octavo et infra." It seems unlikely that the "others" would include classics or theological works, unless perhaps in bad physical condition, but one cannot be sure.

In what follows I have chosen the classical authors referred to in my article. Since there are but nineteen titles, I can put them in a single list. I shall star those by authors usually thought Stoic, especially by English professors.