

KATASTROFA I VTOROE ROZHDENIE: MEMUARNYE ZAPISKI. By *Evgenii Gnedin*. "Biblioteka Samizdata," no. 8. Amsterdam: The Alexander Herzen Foundation, 1977. 328 pp. Paper.

IZ ISTORII OTNOSHENII MEZHDU SSSR I FASHISTSKOI GERMANIEI: DOKUMENTY I SOVREMENNYE KOMMENTARI. By *E. Gnedin*. New York: "Khronika," 1977. 60 pp. \$3.00, paper.

Evgenii Gnedin's fascinating memoir, *Katastrofa i vtoroe rozhdenie*, concerns three themes: his campaign in 1924–25 to win the inheritance of his father, Alexander Parvus-Helphand, the removal in 1939 of Maxim Litvinov as Soviet minister for foreign affairs, and Gnedin's own imprisonment and interrogation in 1939–40. Always a loyal Soviet citizen, Gnedin offers a remarkable example of the frustration and anxiety officials experienced in their struggle to conform during the Stalin era. Even as Litvinov's policy of "collective security" was being abandoned in 1939, Soviet police interrogated Litvinov's aides in an attempt to prove his disloyalty.

As press spokesman for the foreign ministry, one of Gnedin's assignments, during the brief interval between Litvinov's dismissal and his own arrest, was to explain the change in the minister's office. Since he mentioned the name of Henry Shapiro in his account of those confused days, I asked Mr. Shapiro if he had any recollection of Gnedin's work. Mr. Shapiro declared that he had considered Gnedin one of the ministry's better officials, and he recalled having asked Gnedin whether Molotov's appointment meant a change in Soviet foreign policy. Gnedin asserted that it did not, and then, in a brief aside to Shapiro personally, he snapped, "You know the answer to that."

Gnedin's brief volume on Soviet-German relations constitutes an effort at a revisionist interpretation of Stalin's foreign policy in the 1930s. Gnedin, who still lives in Moscow, firmly believed in Litvinov's efforts on behalf of collective security, and he here examines evidence that Molotov and, initially, Radek—without Litvinov's knowledge but with Stalin's obvious approval—worked to keep open the lines of communication with Berlin. The pact of August 1939, he argues, was not simply the result of developments in the summer of 1939; it had deeper roots. The volume is made up of a series of essays and documents, written during the 1960s, in which Gnedin comments on revelations from published German diplomatic documents and adds his own memories and interpretations. In all, one can only hope that such efforts as Gnedin's will eventually lead to a more critical analysis by Soviet historians of their own diplomatic history.

ALFRED ERICH SENN
University of Wisconsin, Madison

THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS. By *Robert W. Tucker*. New York: Basic Books, 1977. x, 214 pp. \$10.95.

Robert W. Tucker received considerable public attention a few years ago when he suggested that the United States consider military intervention in the Persian Gulf as a feasible and appropriate response to the threat to the Western world caused by the OPEC oil embargo. In this provocative book, he continues his criticism of Western liberals' conventional wisdom, which holds that the Third World's claims to greater power are morally justified and must be heeded. He challenges the premises of the current North-South dialogue, which aims to create a more egalitarian international system. He examines critically the demand by developing countries for a massive redistribution of resources from the developed world, and he questions the nature of

the West's responsibility to the Third World. If there were a large-scale shift of wealth from North to South, the world would become more unstable and not necessarily more equal.

The international system, according to Tucker, is hierarchic, anarchic, and inherently unequal. Traditionally, it has consisted of sovereign states competing with each other through the use of self-help, which means that stronger states will use force if their interests are threatened. This unequal international political system is mirrored in an inegalitarian international economic structure. Equality depends on power.

Until fairly recently, most nations accepted the fact that they were not born equal, but in the last decade the weak states have begun to challenge the rights of the strong states. Tucker believes that the 1973 OPEC embargo was both a reflection of how successful this challenge can be, and acted as a catalyst to greater demands by the South. He carefully analyzes the nature of the Third World challenge. The South demands equality of opportunity in the international system, but this presupposes equality of conditions that will enable the Third World to compete with the developed countries. Tucker stresses that "the new egalitarianism challenges not the essential structure of the international system but the distribution of wealth and power within the system" (p. 64). The Third World supports the system of independent states, but it demands a greater share of power in the system. The South, in effect, demands that the advantaged discriminate on behalf of the disadvantaged, a form of international affirmative action.

If the "new egalitarianism" succeeds, warns Tucker, this will lead to "a growing disjunction between order and power; that is, to an international society in which the principal holders of power . . . may no longer be the principal creators and guarantors of order" (p. 93). This will be destabilizing, because the utility of military power—the traditional instrument of self-help—has declined, but economic power has not become more effective. Economic and military power are not convertible currencies, and it is unclear how conflicts of interest will be solved in a new international system.

Tucker is extremely critical of the "new political sensibility"—the response of guilt-ridden Western intellectuals to Third-World egalitarianism. The West has failed to perceive the South's unwillingness to change the state-centric traditional system. American liberals are ambivalent about the need for nation-states, and they focus on individuals rather than on states in the international system. They are too eager to assume that international capitalism causes underdevelopment, and are unable to admit that the Third World may be responsible for its own backwardness. Furthermore, even if there were a socialist world economy, inequalities among nations would persist.

The "new egalitarianism" and the "new political sensibility," despite their divergent visions, have converged to form a new consensus in favor of the South. Tucker sees little hope, however, for diminishing international inequality. Greater interdependence and egalitarianism will lead to increasing international disorder, and the erosion of American power will be accompanied by growing anarchy.

Tucker's conclusion is pessimistic and he himself offers no alternative solution to his bleak prediction. One can dispute his criticism of Third-World demands and his rejection of the need for a more egalitarian international system; nevertheless, he has raised controversial and complex issues that must be addressed by those who support a new international order.

ANGELA STENT YERGIN
College of the Holy Cross