Independence in 1821. The rebellious Greeks, fighting for national dreams, severed ties with their former religious leader. The earlier overriding influence of the church upon the Greeks waned during the war years. With independence the young monarch of Greece, Prince Otho of Bavaria, and his German advisers legalized in 1833 the ruptured relations: the church of Greece became autocephalous and separated from the patriarchate, which ruled from the enemy's capital. The Holy Synod, established to govern church affairs, soon fell under the domination of the civil authority. As the years passed, the Greek leaders recognized that the existing state of tension between the Greek church and its traditional seat of leadership satisfied few people. To complicate matters, England, Russia, and France exerted varying degrees of influence in internal Greek politics. It was not until 1852, with both parties in a compromising spirit, that the autocephalous Greek church resumed formal relations with the patriarchate.

Although Frazee's use of diplomatic correspondence, contemporary newspapers and government publications, and published works is extensive, there is a noticeable absence of any material from patriarchal sources in Istanbul. Furthermore, the author fails to mention, as A. J. Toynbee and George Finlay do, the hopes for a reincarnated Byzantine Empire under Greek leadership, which many Phanariots and patriarchs supported. For the purpose of clarifying a pattern of nineteenth-century Balkan history, the author might have commented on the declarations for an autocephalous church made by Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria shortly after they achieved their national independence. There are some interesting comparisons and contrasts with the Greek experience.

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THE RUSSIAN LANDED GENTRY AND THE PEASANT EMANCIPATION OF 1861. By *Terence Emmons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. xi, 484 pp. $13.50.

Emmons's book was and is a very good doctoral dissertation, and it is as good a book on the Emancipation as there is in English. Aside from being informative and useful for students in Russian history courses, it contains an insight that is well worth a book: to wit, that in the late 1850s and early 1860s the Russian gentry developed corporate consciousness, pretensions to a glorious past, and a liberal program all at once, primarily in response to pressures being exerted upon them by the central government. Emmons gives almost all his attention to the liberal program, leaving corporate consciousness and heritage to the side, but he notes the close connection between all three phenomena and thereby makes his work a perceptive case study in the development of public opinion as well as a historical monograph.

Unfortunately, the book is not well organized. A diligent reader can find a historical account of how liberal sentiment sprang into an organizing principle among the gentry, but he has to search through a mass of material which, though sometimes interesting, does not relate to the subject. It is my impression that Emmons wrote the book with two purposes confused in his mind: to show how liberal opinion emerged among the gentry and to describe the enactment of the Emancipation Statute of 1861 from a liberal point of view. He studies liberal opinion as a historical phenomenon, but often slips into using it as a basis for historical interpretation, and this does not make for clarity. Nor does it make for

accuracy. Emmons has not done enough research to cover the enactment of the statute nor even the role of the gentry in it, and whenever his account swerves into these wider subjects it gets thin. In any case, there is not much point in writing yet another history of the statute from the liberal point of view, and in his better paragraphs Emmons shows his awareness that this is the case. What is chiefly of interest in the book is the story of how the gentry's experience in 1856–62 led many of them to find liberal principles meaningful.

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DMITRII MILIUTIN AND THE REFORM ERA IN RUSSIA. By *Forrestt A. Miller*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968. ix, 246 pp. $7.50.

Although the title suggests a study of greater scope, Professor Miller's book is essentially a detailed description of the Russian military reforms planned and executed during the reign of Alexander II together with an account of the exertions of Dmitrii Miliutin, minister of war during virtually all of Alexander's reign, to guide the emperor's reform measures through the labyrinth of bureaucratic and court intrigues. The book does not provide a full biography of Miliutin nor does it point to the meaning of the military reforms in the context of autocratic reformism of the 1860s and 1870s, which began with the emancipation of the serfs.

The book contains admirably clear and thorough descriptions of the reform of the military district system (1862), the reorganization of the structure of military education (1863–70), and the introduction of universal military training (1874). It also presents, though less critically than one would have hoped, the general principles on which Miliutin based his plans for reform. Miller accepts without reservation Miliutin's claim that his policies served the "best interests of the nation" and concludes that Miliutin's enemies were defending only narrow class or personal interests.

Much less satisfactory is Miller's account of the tortuous passage of the reform measures through the higher reaches of the military and governmental bureaucracies. It is to this narrative that we look for Miller's interpretation of the politics of the reform era. What we find is the familiar tale of personal likes and dislikes, patronage and vendettas, which for too long has passed for an acceptable version of the politics of autocratic Russia in the nineteenth century. By introducing such notions as "planter party" and "Miliutin party" into his retelling of this story, the author has merely encumbered it with questionable terminology. For example, Miller uses "planter party" to denote a faction of noble landowners, of which, he asserts, P. A. Valuev, minister of the interior, was a member and spokesman. No evidence is adduced in the book, however, to connect Valuev with any incipient "party" of noblemen. On the contrary, during his years as minister of the interior, Valuev was no less adamant than Miliutin in opposing political pretensions of any kind by representatives of the nobility.

Behind the personal conflicts among members of the government and court lay the important issue of the future development and political influence of the state bureaucracy—its role and responsibility in creating legislation and its relationship to the emperor. A struggle went on between those who believed that the bureaucracy should retain as much as possible its traditional, prescribed character and those who wished to introduce into the operation of the government the principle of *Rechtsstaat*, including a definite legal role for the bureaucracy in the legislative process,