THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF URBAN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

Santiago's Recent Experience and Its Implications for Urban Research

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On 11 September 1973, heavily armed troops attacked the Chilean Presidential Palace in Santiago and toppled the government of Dr. Salvador Allende. The military coup brought an end to Latin America's first democratically-elected Marxist government. Since the September military takeover, the Chilean armed forces have moved with unparalleled harshness to suppress the base of the Allende regime's popular support.[1] The Allende government's efforts toward raising the consumption level of Chile's lower classes had earned his Popular Unity (Unidad Popular—UP) coalition a high degree of political support among the nation's working class and urban migrant population. Because his Socialist-Communist coalition had been actively competing since the 1960s with both the reformist Christian Democratic party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC) and the ultraradical Leftist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR) for the support of the urban poor, Santiago's migrant shantytowns had an unusually high level of political mobilization.[2] The squatter settlements outside of the capital provided some of the strongest support for Chile's various Marxist parties. Not surprisingly, since the military takeover many of Santiago's squatter communities have been subjected to mass arrests and even executions by the rightist government (Slaughterhouse, 1973; Terror, 1974).

These dramatic events focus attention on the somewhat unique mobilization and radicalization of Chile's urban migrant population in the decade preceding Allende's fall. The politicization of Santiago's squatter communities seems to contradict many widely held scholarly assumptions about the political orientations of Latin America's urban migrants. Consequently, it seems appropriate to reexamine the current state of scholarly literature in this area in the light of Chile's recent political experience.

Students of Latin American politics now recognize the growing importance of urban migrants in that region's political development. The inhabitants of Santiago's shantytowns are part of a vast population movement throughout Latin America which has made it one of the most urbanized areas of the world. In nations such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, over 60 percent of the population now live in cities of over fifty thousand persons. These levels of urbanization not only far exceed India's (19 percent urban), but are also greater than in Austria, Belgium, or France (Hauser, 1961: 96–97; Stepan, 1966: 229). A flood of migrants from the countryside has doubled or tripled the populations of Caracas, Lima, Mexico City, and São Paulo during the past twenty-five years. In Belo Horizonte, Brazil—a city of over one million inhabitants—migrants constitute some 80 percent of the population (Hutchinson, 1963: 43).

On the peripheries of Latin America's major cities a vast migrant population has occupied vacant land areas and established a network of shantytowns or squatter settlements ("squatments").[3] Known as *barriadas* (Lima), *barrios* (Caracas), *callampas* (Santiago), or *favelas* (São Paulo), these legally unrecognized communities are often considered "marginal" to the existing political and economic systems. Generally their inhabitants receive no municipal services (electricity, water, etc.) and lack legal title to their homes. Often 25 percent or more of the squatment population lack stable employment (Matos, 1961: 180). In Lima, Caracas, and elsewhere, these migrant squatters represent over one-third of the metropolitan population.

What implications does this tremendous demographic phenomenon have for Latin America's political development? What role are the "cityward migrants" likely to play in their nations' political systems? In recent years a considerable body of literature has emerged on the political behavior, orientations, and organization of Latin America's marginal urban population. Much of this research has been summarized and analyzed in extensive review articles by William Mangin (1967), Richard Morse (1965, 1971), and Wayne Cornelius (1971). These authors, along with Anthony Leeds (1969), Alejandro Portes (1971b), and others, have tried to synthesize the vast array of research in this area into more developed conceptual models, typologies, or theories of migrant attitudes and behavior.

Yet very little progress has been made toward developing a coherent theory of migrant politics. Various scholars have offered sharply contrasting images of the shantytown dwellers' political potential. Much of the early research on the developing nations suggested that urbanization correlates positively with political mobilization (Deutsch, 1961) and,

consequently, that the urban migrant was a potential source of social and political unrest. Thus, James Coleman maintained, "there exists in most urban centers [of the third world], particularly in the capital cities, elements predisposed to anomic activity" (1960: 537). Samuel Huntington added, "On the surface, the most promising source of urban revolt is clearly the slums and shantytowns produced by the influx of the rural poor. . . . At some point, the slums of Rio and Lima . . . like those of Harlem and Watts, are likely to be swept by social violence, as the children of the city demand the rewards of the city" (1968: 278, 283).

But, as Huntington notes (1968: 279), that point has not yet arrived. On the contrary, more recent scholarship has pointed to the apparent political passivity of Latin America's shantytown population (Schoultz, 1972; Mangin, 1967: 66) and to their lack of "class antagonism toward the upper [classes] or the status quo" (Cornelius, 1971: 106; Stepan, 1966: 229–34). Why have Latin America's squatter settlements failed to erupt into disorder and violence? Why have the urban poor not offered more support to radical political movements? How satisfied or dissatisfied have cityward migrants been with their new lives, and how well integrated have they been into the fabric of urban society? These and many other questions have not been adequately resolved.

Too frequently our knowledge of the urban squatter's political world is derived from individual case studies or abstract theoretical propositions lacking in empirical support. Although such works have often provided valuable insights, there is clearly a need for systematic comparative research in the area of urban mass politics. Attitudinal and behavioral surveys of Latin America's migrant population, coupled with carefully organized case studies, could hopefully fill many of the serious gaps in our knowledge and resolve some of the major debates in the field. Yet such research must be cumulative in its conceptual development.

This article, then, will have two fundamental purposes. First, it will summarize and discuss a major investigation by Santiago's Center for Urban and Regional Development (Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Regional—CIDU) into the political mobilization of squatter settlements during Chile's last years of civilian government. Because of the unique importance of migrant mobilization in Chile, and because the results of CIDU's research are generally unavailable in the United States, it is essential that the Center's findings be brought to the attention of the American scholarly community.[4] It is my belief that the CIDU study and, more generally, the experiences of Santiago's *poblaciones* call into question many current generalizations on migrant politics.

Consequently, the second portion of this article will examine the

relationship of the CIDU research to a number of recent studies on the political orientations and behavior of Latin America's cityward migrants. In doing so, I hope to update the seminal review articles by Mangin (1967) and Morse (1965, 1971) and to indicate possible theoretical frameworks toward which political research on urban migrants might be directed.

THE CAMPAMENTOS OF SANTIAGO[5]

The dramatic political developments which Chile has experienced in recent years provide a particularly valuable setting for the study of mass political orientations in Latin America. Prior to the 1973 military coup, Chile was one of the few nations in the hemisphere where Marxist political parties appealed to the urban masses (and the peasantry) as a viable alternative within the electoral process.[6] That is to say, only in Chile could Marxist parties realistically hope to win a national election and to be allowed to assume office. Chile was also one of the few Latin states where the more radical, revolutionary left (such as the MIR) worked relatively freely and openly among the urban poor. It is hard to overstate the significance of these facts in the analysis of migrant politics. As I shall insist later, it is pointless to maintain that urban migrants have rejected leftist political parties if the migrant population under consideration knows that such parties would never be allowed to take power. Chile was clearly an atypical political system within Latin America. But its very uniqueness provided the only true test of whether an urban shantytown population might respond to the appeals of leftist political parties and revolutionary groups when given a meaningful opportunity to do so.

In the closing months of 1971, one year after the election of Salvador Allende to the Chilean presidency, a team of researchers from the CIDU of Santiago's Catholic University began an intensive study of twenty-five campamentos (organized squatter settlements) surrounding the nation's capital.[7] A questionnaire was submitted to campamento leaders, political organizers, and activists in the *sin casa* committees (organizations of "homeless ones"). Subsequent political developments in Chile since the military takeover have retarded analysis of that data (Chile's academic community is currently in a state of disarray) and have made follow-up surveys impossible. However, preliminary analysis of the data by Manuel Castells et al. (1972) offers important insights into the political mobilization of Santiago's urban migrants prior to the 1973 coup. After describing these findings, I will examine their significance in relationship to more general theories of migrant political mobilization in Latin America.

*The Origins of Migrant Mobilization**

Political and economic developments in Chile during the administration of President Eduardo Frei (1964–70) contributed to the growth of discontent within Santiago's migrant population. While Frei's Christian Democratic party and the leftist Popular Revolutionary Front (Frente Revolucionario Popular—FRAP), a Communist-Socialist alliance, competed for mass support and raised the level of popular aspirations, an already critical shortage of low-income urban housing was intensifying. As early as 1967, following nationwide municipal elections, squatters in Chile's largest cities initiated a wave of illegal land seizures around the metropolitan centers. The 1970 presidential election stimulated further mobilization of the campamentos. Between 1969 and 1970, the number of squatter land invasions rose from 21 to 215 (Castells, 1972). Thus, by 1971 approximately 275,000 persons in Santiago—some 10 percent of the city's population—were living in marginal shantytown communities. The earliest land invaders were often expelled from their sites by the police, sometimes at the cost of bloodshed. However, as the 1970 national elections approached, such evictions became politically inexpedient for the Frei administration. Following the electoral victory of leftist candidate Salvador Allende, the wave of seizures could no longer be controlled.

Thus, the housing crisis in Santiago and its accompanying mass mobilization presented great political opportunities for the legitimate working-class political parties (principally UP, the new leftist electoral coalition) and the more radical, revolutionary left (the MIR, a militant, armed student group). Activists from both wings of the Chilean left took an active part in organizing and politicizing the migrant settlements during the late 1960s. Consequently, the focal point of class conflict in the nation's capital moved from the industrial sector (i.e., labor-management conflict) into the mushrooming shantytowns.

What precisely was the role of the campamentos in the political mobilization of Santiago's marginal population? The CIDU study was principally concerned with the influence of the squatter settlements on class relationships (i.e., their effect on the political orientations and "class consciousness" of their inhabitants) and with the opportunities which these communities presented for new organizational forms in the nation's political and social systems. Research was conducted on two levels. First,

*Professor Castells, in a personal communication to the author, noted that a significant proportion of the campamento population were not recent migrants. They had either been born in an urban center or had lived there for over ten years. Thus, he feels that one cannot fully equate the campamento population or that of squatments with migrants (or at least *recent* migrants).—*Ed.*

the authors described the basic "life styles" and social organization of the various campamentos. Second, they examined the political attitudes and orientations of the settlement population. What was the relationship, if any, between the internal sociopolitical structure of the campamento and the ideological orientations of its members? To answer this question more adequately, the authors also focused their attention on the role of outside political organizers (from the UP or MIR) in the process of political mobilization. Under what circumstances, they asked, do outside political activists have the greatest influence on the development of mass political orientations?

The Social and Political Organization of the Campamentos

Because the campamento is somewhat removed from the existing sociopolitical order and lacks basic municipal services, its inhabitants develop their own civic institutions to deal with a variety of daily problems—maintenance of law and order, criminal justice, housing, local administration, and the like. For the most part the police, welfare agencies, courts, and government bureaucracies of both Frei and Allende's civilian administrations did not operate within the campamentos. Consequently, the marginal communities created new alternative institutional forms in some of these areas that offered the basis for greater mass participation and political consciousness in the society at large. Thus, the settlements may well have contained the seeds of a new, mass-based social order. Needless to say, these institutions have been terminated by the current military regime.

Apparently the campamentos were most creative in the areas of police regulation and criminal justice. The majority organized both a camp guard and a court system; a few created judicial systems which the squatters felt were more responsive to their needs than were the established courts. Because the campamento courts lacked formal authority to impose sanctions on convicted offenders, they had to rely on the force of community moral persuasion. That is to say, the settlement population had to accept the normative order being enforced. This seemed an important step in the creation of a new political consciousness. Many squatters viewed their courts as an expression of popular will, rather than as an instrument of repression.

Sentences handed down by the campamento courts differed from those imposed by the traditional (official) court system. Obviously there were no imprisonments. Fines and physical punishment were used occasionally, but were usually not favored by community leaders.[8] In general,

the campamento courts tended to stress rehabilitation rather than punishment in their decisions. The ultimate purpose was to raise the defendant's level of social and political consciousness; thus, convicted offenders might be required to read portions of revolutionary texts as a form of reeducation.

In short, the campamento courts were an important means of politicizing the urban masses and creating new social values. Persons might be brought to trial for nonparticipation in community meetings or for excessive family quarreling (wife beating, etc.) as well as for the more traditional crimes of disturbing the peace or theft. Drunkenness was the most prevalent form of antisocial behavior; consequently, several marginal communities totally banned alcohol.

The court systems of these settlements varied considerably according to the degree of organizational complexity. In the most politically unsophisticated camps, judicial decisions were rendered by a single leader who had a high degree of moral authority in the community. Other, more politicized campamentos invested legal authority in the elected community directorate. Finally, the most developed settlements established a series of appellate courts, starting on a block-to-block basis and working up to community-wide appeals courts.

Descriptions of the campamento court system provide one of the most unique and fascinating areas of the CIDU study. Fortunately, the research team has published a more extensive paper on this topic (Cuellar et al., 1971). If, as our scholarly colleagues generally suggest, the Latin American urban masses are largely "too busy" improving their own lives to get deeply involved in politics beyond the most pragmatic level (Mangin, 1967), or are totally apathetic politically (Schoultz, 1972: 382), then Santiago's "people's courts" provide a fascinating deviant case. We know, of course, that people's courts administered by untrained members of the working class exist in the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. Persons accused of misdemeanors and other petty crimes may be tried by their peers who serve as judges and prosecutors as well as jurors. Yet in all of these nations, the impetus for the peoples' or workers' courts came from the state; consequently it is the state which holds ultimate authority in their development and administration. Only in Chile was a network of courts and affiliated political institutions established among the urban masses, outside the boundaries of the existing political order.

A number of other campamento institutions were designed to meet the socioeconomic needs of the inhabitants. Elected officers carried out the administrative functions of the community and maintained links with external political organizations (the state, political parties, etc.). In the

more highly politicized settlements there was a complex pyramidal structure of block committees, a campamento assembly, and a directorate. Here again, as with the court system, these institutions provided new opportunities for mass political participation.

Campamento organizations such as these were part of a broad spectrum of community institutions. Work brigades were created to provide useful employment within the settlement for the large reserve of jobless men. Other units operated in the areas of health, education, and housing. Campamentos having the most complex and sophisticated organizational structures in one area—such as criminal justice—also tended to have the most advanced institutions in other areas—political administration, employment, and the like. Settlements with a significant proportion of inhabitants drawn from the working class tended to have a higher level of mass participation in campamento institutions and a greater level of political consciousness and mobilization. The campamentos whose population was drawn primarily from the lumpenproletariat tended to be administered by a small elite (often composed of outside political organizers) with a lower level of mass participation.

Had the Chilean military coup not terminated such campamento organizations, their political implications might ultimately have been quite significant. In effect, some campamentos had created a small-scale state within a state. Locally controlled courts, work brigades, and other administrative agencies offered an opportunity for active political participation that is normally far beyond the reach of the urban poor in the developing world.

Political Mobilization and Radicalization in the Campamentos

Having described the internal organization of the squatter settlements, the Santiago study turned to the political behavior and attitudes of the campamentos' population and focused on aggregate political mobilization within each campamento rather than on the correlates of individual participation. What factors influenced the level of political mobilization and ideological consciousness *in each community*? Were the squatters' political objectives short-ranged and narrow in scope, or did they encompass broad-scale challenges to the existing political and economic systems? Not surprisingly, campamento leaders could most readily mobilize their settlements around issues that had a direct impact on the migrants' lives. Squatters frequently organized political demonstrations to secure improved government services in the areas of housing, health care, and the like. Thus, when a local hospital failed to provide adequate

health care for one campamento, inhabitants staged a sit-in at the hospital. Demonstrations were also organized in the offices of unsympathetic government bureaucrats.

As political issues became more remote from the immediate needs of the marginal communities, mobilization was less frequent. Only two of the most radical campamentos had actively supported workers in labor-management conflicts (they had cooperated in the seizure of factories by the strikers). The remaining settlements, including those with predominantly working class populations, showed little solidarity with other members of the working class. In general, leftist student organizers from the MIR had not significantly politicized their followers or inculcated them with a radical ideology. Ideological orientations rarely extended beyond the level of revolutionary folklore.

It is difficult to evaluate the importance of this finding. Clearly it refutes the romantic assumptions of some radical activists and scholars who presume that the rank-and-file of a mass movement necessarily share the revolutionary orientations of the movement's leftist leaders. Yet it is well to remember that the urban and rural masses generally do not become highly politicized or ideologically oriented even in the midst of a revolution. A recent study of Viet Cong defectors and captives indicated that most of them joined the movement for very narrowly defined reasons (desire for land, bitterness over treatment of their village by South Vietnamese troops, lack of viable alternatives, etc.) and virtually none had any understanding of Marxist ideology (Record, 1971). I presume that the same could be said of most peasant-based or lumpenproletariat-based revolutions.[9] However, as will be indicated later, what may have been most significant about the Santiago campamentos was simply the fact that they were one of the only networks of urban migrant settlements in Latin America where radical activists created an organizational base.

The Role of Outside Leadership

While the overall level of political mobilization and radicalization in the twenty-five campamentos was somewhat lower than one might have expected, several settlements were highly politicized. The survey disclosed a varying level of aggregate political involvement, ranging from relative apathy through strong radicalization. Initial analysis suggested that the major determinant of politicization and radicalization in the campamentos appeared to be the nature of outside leadership. Not surprisingly, when other variables were held constant, settlements organized by revolutionary students tended to be more radical and politicized

than those led by activists from the established political parties—the PDC or the UP. However, the capacity of outside leadership to influence campamento behavior was by no means unlimited; analysis of the survey data indicated that the social structure and class base of each campamento established constraints on the efficacy of outside leadership.

Using a typology of outside leadership, the heads of each settlement could be placed along a five-point scale of political orientations. On one end of the spectrum were organizers representing legitimate political parties wishing to establish a patron-client relationship between their own party and their campamento. Communities with such leaders might solicit specific services from the political system in return for the promise of electoral support. At the other end of the political spectrum were highly radical campamento organizers who saw the urban squatter movement as a means of creating revolutionary consciousness among the masses and challenging the existing political order. They were less interested in instrumental, pragmatic goals.

We have indicated that the behavior of the various campamentos was strongly influenced by the political orientation of its leaders. However, the CIDU study suggests that four independent variables clearly affect the efficacy of each type of leadership:

a. The class base of the campamento population: Inhabitants were either primarily lumpenproletariat, working class, "elite" workers (i.e., highly skilled workers), or some combination thereof;

b. The level of internal cohesion within the settlement;

c. The style of settlement leadership: This ranged from *caudillismo* (rule by a single strongman) to popular control;

d. The source of campamento leadership: Leaders might be elected rank-and-file, party politicians, students, etc.

The configuration of these four variables within any particular campamento seemed to have strongly influenced the effectiveness of each type of political organizer (moderate, radical, etc.). Thus if we consider the three squatter communities with highly radical leadership, we find that these activists were most successful in effecting radical political mobilization in a campamento composed primarily of blue collar workers. UP organizers were most successful among well-paid workers in more modern industries, while MIR was more successful among blue collar workers in more traditional, low-paying industries. They were least successful in a settlement of lumpenproletariat. Moderate, pragmatic leadership successfully mobilized a settlement composed mainly of workers with a small number of "elite" workers. Moderate leadership had mixed

success in a marginal community of skilled (elite) workers with a small percentage of unskilled workers (*obreros*). In short, the capacity of outside leaders to mobilize their campamento toward the position favored by the leadership was circumscribed and limited by the internal social structure and class origin of the community. Certain class mixes were more amenable to leadership by radicals, others were more easily organized by moderates. Neither moderates nor radicals had much success in organizing lumpenproletariat populations.

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF MIGRANT POLITICS

What are the broader theoretical implications of Santiago's *poblador* experience for our understanding of the political world of urban migrants? What insights can be gathered from the CIDU study regarding the current literature on squatment politics? Several years ago Theodore Shanin took note of the incredibly polarized viewpoints which scholars have presented on the political orientations of peasants in the developing world. "The image of the peasant," he said, "has swung from that of an angelic rustic humanist to a greedy, pig-headed brute and back" (1966: 5). Shanin was referring to the tendency of some social scientists to see the peasantry as a major force for revolution in the third world, while others view them as inherently conservative obstacles to change. Much of the same polarization has characterized the literature on Latin America's urban migrants.

As noted previously, early scholarship on urban squatments warned that the barrios and favelas of Latin America were "tension-ridden zones of transition" and "seed beds of political unrest" (Howton, 1969: 444; Thein, 1965: 469). Schmitt and Burks (1963: 84) warned that "unemployed and unskilled workers have clustered into shantytowns . . . in Latin America [where] they are vulnerable to the blandishments of radical agitators and revolutionaries." Koth et al. (1964) indicated that "political agitators in urban slum areas find fertile ground for spreading doctrines of conflict and social disorder. . . ." Predictions such as these were particularly common in the first years after the Cuban revolution and frequently came from authors whose area of expertise lay in housing (Koth, 1964), demography (Thein, 1965), or economics (Ward, 1964), rather than political science.

Yet the decade which followed Fidel Castro's revolutionary triumph was, to a large extent, a period of frustration for Latin America's radical left, both in the countryside and in the urban shantytowns. Urban rioting was very infrequent during that period and never approached the

magnitude of Watts, Harlem, or the Colombian *bogotazo* of 1948. Nor did such urban unrest, carried out by migrants, ever pose a serious threat to any Latin American political system. Urban guerrilla movements in Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay failed to evoke massive support among the so-called marginal populations and were eventually contained (Bravo, 1970: 89–91).[10] Even "legitimate," radical opposition parties, operating within the electoral system, had only limited success in the barrios of Venezuela (Martz and Harkins, 1973) or the poblaciones of Santiago prior to 1970 (Jones, 1967).

These general trends were consistent with a host of empirical investigations within individual migrant neighborhoods indicating that the urban poor were relatively conservative in their social and political orientations. The Leeds and Leeds (1970), Mangin (1967, 1968) and Ray (1969) studies of squatter settlements in Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela all indicated that cityward migrants were rarely predisposed toward violent or radical political activity. Summarizing these findings, Wayne Cornelius (1971: 106) argued that the inhabitants of Latin America's shantytowns "exhibit no well-developed sense of class antagonism toward the upper strata of society, do not see politics . . . as instrumental to the attainment of personal aims, and frequently acquiesce in regimes that sustain the status quo." Similarly, Schoultz (1972a: 382) maintained that "studies have shown that in the absence of other independent factors, the urban poor are most likely to be passive and apathetic to politics."

While the preponderant body of scholarly literature points to a conservative and paternalistic ideology among urban migrants (Mangin, 1967: 83), significant counter-evidence does exist. Martz and Harkins (1973: 548) demonstrate some tendency toward "an increasing leftist vote . . . among the lower class Caracas residents." Campos and McCamant indicate a widespread protest vote for the "populist" Popular National Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular—ANAPO) in Colombia's 1970 presidential election and "a class cleavage of greater strength than . . . anywhere else in Latin America today . . ." (1972: 8). Most importantly, Pratt (1971b), Castells (1972), and Vanderschueren (1971a, 1971b) describe impressive organizational breakthroughs by Marxist parties within the campamentos of Santiago. In short, it may be that reports of the death of radicalism or political discontent among the urban poor have been somewhat premature.

Thus the vast body of empirical literature now available on the politics of cityward migrants has failed to produce a consensus in a number of critical areas. Scholars remain sharply divided on three fundamental issues underlying the actual behavior and political potential of Latin America's squatment population.

Optimism or Frustration Among Cityward Migrants

Many of the early predictions of migrant radicalism or unrest assumed that high unemployment and inadequate housing would produce a significant level of frustration within metropolitan shantytowns (Hauser, 1963; Soares and Hamblin, 1967). "Frustrated and disillusioned," so the theory ran, "the migrant is readily persuaded to political violence and extremism" (Nelson, 1970: 396). Indeed, some empirical evidence did exist for such assumptions. Germani's inquiry on migrant workers in Buenos Aires showed that most were disappointed with the housing conditions which they encountered (1961: 16). Surveys by Portes (1971c) and Vanderschueren (1971a: 103) within Santiago's shantytowns indicated that most migrants were dissatisfied with their jobs and the majority felt that their purchasing power was declining.

Still, Nelson argues that "the assumption that migrants are . . . disappointed and frustrated by economic conditions is simply wrong" (1970: 397). A survey by Bonilla in 1961 indicates that while most of Rio's *favelados* felt that their economic situation had deteriorated in the past five years, they still "believed that the way up was not barred to their children . . . " (1970: 80). Portes's study of Chilean poblaciones (1971c: 718) indicates that the migrant's failure and frustration often does not lead to radicalization because of his tendency to avoid "imputation of responsibility for personal failure to the social order" and instead, to blame it on personal inadequacies, "bad luck," or other "non-systemic" factors. Cornelius (1972: 41) argues that "even if there is a high level of frustration among migrant populations . . . to the extent that frustrated migrants can be manipulated by ambitious political leaders, there is little to favor the chances of the militant left. . . ."

The Level of Social Cohesion or Disorganization in Urban Squatments

Whatever the attitudes of cityward migrants, social scientists have recognized increasingly that the political potential of the urban poor depends not merely on the attributes of individual slum dwellers but on the aggregate level of social cohesion. In initial investigations of migrant communities, many researchers were struck by the apparent lack of cooperation or trust among the marginal urban poor. Oscar Lewis's studies of the lower classes in Mexico City (1960) and San Juan (1966) depicted a "culture of poverty" marked by a "minimum of organization beyond the level of the nuclear and extended family" (1966: xlvi). Moreover, said Lewis, the slum dwellers' lack of class-consciousness or "the

vision or the ideology to see the similarities between their problems and those of their counterparts" inhibits their politicization. Lewis's picture of social disorganization and mistrust in the slum conformed to Carolina de Jesus' (1962) autobiographical description of favela life in São Paulo. More recently, Bryan Roberts has argued that the lack of trust among Guatemala City's migrants and the consequent inability to organize on a long-term basis inhibited their political effectiveness (1973: 5–9).

Yet Lewis's highly atomized (or at least, "familistic") "culture of poverty" contrasts sharply with descriptions of well-organized, socially cohesive squatments in Lima (Matos Mar, 1961; Mangin, 1965; Doughty, 1970), Rio de Janeiro (Pearse, 1961), Santiago (Giusti, 1971), and Caracas (Peattie, 1968; Ray, 1969). Similarly, Leeds (1969, 1970) takes strong issue with the contention that shantytown dwellers are anomic, crime-oriented, or plagued by psychological disorders. Like Mangin (1965, 1967), he finds migrants adapting amazingly well to their new environment.

The Relationship of Squatments to the National Political System

Oscar Lewis insists that the urban poor have "a strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependence, and inferiority." Moreover, says Lewis, such a fatalistic outlook is not irrational, but rather a realistic "adaptation of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individual, capitalistic society" (1966: xlvii, xliv). The theory of urban "marginality" is even more forcefully presented by Latin American sociologists such as Cotler (1967), Di Tella (1966), and Quijano Obregón (1967), who see the shantytowns as lying outside the mainstream of national economic and political life, subject to manipulation by the ruling elite.

Once again, such a pessimistic view of squatment life is strongly rejected by Leeds (1969, 1970), Mangin (1967, 1968), and Nelson (1970), who maintain that cityward migrants are generally well integrated into their nations' political systems and are often capable of manipulating those systems to their own advantage. In Leeds's words (1970: 249), "both *favelas* and *barriadas*, as a rule, are highly political places . . . in that they often have very elaborate political relations with politicians and agencies outside the *favela*." Silberstein (1969) and Roberts (1968, 1973) indicate that migrants often establish "personalized, dyadic ties" with a patron in the political power structure.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN URBAN POLITICAL INQUIRY: TOWARD A THEORY OF MIGRANT POLITICS

In short, while most scholars agree that urban migrants have generally been nonviolent, unresponsive to radical movements, and even conservative in the past (Cornelius, 1972: 29–31), there is little agreement as to *why* these conservative orientations have predominated or how likely they are to continue into the future. For example, have shantytown dwellers generally been satisfied with their new lives, perceiving their situation as being superior to the rural environment from which they came? Or has their political conservatism merely resulted from a failure to channel their discontent and frustration into radical channels?

In many instances, authors have reached diametrically opposed views on the preconditions necessary for the radicalization of cityward migrants. Thus, Lars Schoultz (1972a: 382) has suggested that the cohesiveness of shantytown life inhibits radical behavior. "If there is no social disorganization," says Schoultz, "there should be no radicalization." Implicitly, Schoultz and others have accepted William Kornhauser's theory of mass society (1959) which attributes the radicalization of the urban poor to anomie and the breakdown of traditional social bonds. Yet Oscar Lewis maintained that it is precisely a "low level of organization which gives the culture of poverty its marginal and anachronistic quality. . . ." Only "when the poor become class-conscious or active members of trade-union organizations, or when they adopt an internationalist outlook on the world, are they no longer part of the culture of poverty" and can become politicized (Lewis, 1966: xlvii–xlviii).

Unfortunately, much of the confusion and apparent disagreement regarding the urban migrant's social and political orientations stem from imprecision in specifying variables and defining terms. Rarely do debates concerning the political potential of the squatment define precisely such terms as "radicalization" or "mobilization." Thus when Schoultz (1972a) associates "radicalization" with "social disorganization," he is apparently referring to rioting or other forms of anomic urban vioence. If, however, "radicalization" is to involve the mobilization of long-term support for a programmatic, ideologically oriented, leftist political movement (Goldrich, 1970; Pratt, 1971b), then cityward migrants first have to develop the kind of class consciousness and social cohesion called for by Lewis (1966).

Imprecision in the definition of terms is merely part of a broader problem that plagues most of the literature on migrant politics. Too much of the debate is based upon individual case studies of favelas, barrios, barriadas, or callampas from which the authors are prepared to generalize to

Latin America's entire squatment population. As Portes notes, "none of those approaches, however, deals systematically with differences within the Latin American slum population. Although the process of cumulation of knowledge has led to dispelling many myths about these areas, the tendency still remains to speak of the slum as a unitary phenomenon" (Portes, 1971b: 236).

In fact, there are over twenty thousand different squatter communities throughout Latin America functioning under a wide variety of economic, social, and political conditions (Leeds, 1969: 80). "Comparative studies of local communities within Latin American cities have revealed distinctive neighborhood patterns with respect to a wide range of attitudes, behaviors, and value orientations. Even geographically contingent communities have been found to differ sharply in the extent and manner in which their inhabitants are integrated, socially, economically and politically into urban life" (Cornelius, 1973b: 15). Consequently, "most discussions of 'squatments' which generalize about them as a universe usually make fundamental errors and many assertions that are false in whole or in part" (Leeds, 1969: 49).

Much of the existing literature on Latin America's urban migrants indicates that they tend to have limited capacity for ongoing political organization, narrow-ranged socioeconomic and political goals, and a desire to preserve the limited gains that they have acquired through migration, rather than attacking the status quo (Mangin, 1967; Cornelius, 1972: 30). In Cuba (Zeitlin, 1967; Fagen, 1969) and in Chile (Castells: 1972; Vanderschueren: 1971a, 1971b; Petras: 1973; Goldrich: 1970a), however, radical movements mobilized important segments of the urban poor. Thus the relevant question is not whether shantytown dwellers are always latent revolutionaries or inherent conservatives, but rather, what are the most important socioeconomic and political preconditions for the political mobilization or radicalization of Latin America's urban migrant population? That is to say, under what conditions are migrants likely to remain politically apathetic or conservative and under what circumstances are they likely to challenge the status quo?

Despite the vast outpouring of scholarly research on the social structure, political attitudes, and behavior of cityward migrants, "it is surprising to find that the number of *systematic* studies focusing directly upon the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of the migration experience . . . have been relatively small" (Cornelius, 1971: 95). Portes's (1971b) typology of urban slums (which draws together much of the existing literature on Chilean shantytowns) is an important breakthrough toward making the study of the urban poor *cumulative*. As Leeds notes,

"it is necessary to develop theory about the causes, nature and variety of 'squatments' which reduces the masses of data to some basic underlying order or lawfulness" (1969: 80). If not, case study after case study will be randomly added to the literature, but little will be contributed to our basic understanding of the process of politicization.

In the remainder of this article, I will suggest a number of independent variables, drawn from the existing literature, which appear to determine the political potential of Latin America's urban migrants. It is here that the CIDU study of Santiago (1972) makes one of its most critical contributions. Essentially, the study suggests that the nature of migrant political involvement is determined by two factors: First, the degree of "in-group solidarity" or "group consciousness" among the inhabitants of a given squatment; and second, the nature of the community's relationships with external political actors.

Various studies have indicated that the majority of urban migrants do not belong to labor unions or political parties. Consequently, the neighborhood in which they reside becomes their only institutional vehicle for political socialization or mobilization (Cornelius: 1973b; Chalmers: 1972; Goldrich: 1970a, 1970b; Lutz: 1970; McKenney: 1969; Roberts: 1970b, 1973; Vanderschueren: 1971a). Without a certain level of solidarity or social cohesion, shantytown dwellers are incapable of sustaining ongoing political organization of either a reformist or radical nature.

The level of group solidarity, then, will determine the degree of *availability* (i.e., potential) of a particular migrant community for political mobilization and organization. But a second factor, the organizational assistance of external actors, is needed if a squatment is to realize its full political potential. Ultimately, if Latin America's urban poor are to be politically efficacious at all, they must first create links with political parties or movements outside of their communities. These external linkages may serve two possible functions. First, they can create channels of communication between the shantytown and the state through which migrants may transmit their "demands" to the political system (Almond, 1960). This is a more traditional or reformist function of external political parties and, as the CIDU study showed, was fulfilled by both the Christian Democrats and by the Popular Unity in the campamentos of Santiago (Castells, 1972). A second, more "radical" role of external political organizers is the inculcation of class consciousness and a political ideology among the relatively apolitical urban poor. This is the function which Chile's MIR strove to fulfill in the campamentos, with only limited success (Castells, 1972; Goldrich, 1970a; Petras, 1973a).

THE "AVAILABILITY" OF URBAN MIGRANTS FOR POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

As indicated previously, any theory of migrant politics must recognize the wide variety of experiences within the thousands of Latin American shantytowns and slums. Clearly, all low-income urban neighborhoods are not as anomic or familistic as the São Paulo favela described by de Jesus (1962), the Sánchez family's *vecindad* in Mexico City (Lewis, 1960), or the Rios's San Juan barrio (Lewis, 1966). Nor are they all as socially cohesive as the barriadas of Lima described by Mangin (1965) or Doughty (1970). If the "availability" of squatments for ongoing political organization is determined by the level of social cohesion within the community, then the first task of a theory of migrant politics must be to isolate those independent variables which influence the level of solidarity within a particular shantytown or slum neighborhood. The Castells (1972) Santiago study and other contemporary research point to five critical determinants of community solidarity.

The Location and Size of Migrant Communities

The most widely researched type of migrant settlement is the shantytown community, usually located on the outskirts of Latin America's metropolitan areas (though they may be on river beds or hills within the city). Lima's barriadas or Santiago's campamentos often consist of hundreds of families which have jointly invaded an unused area of land and established a squatter settlement. But many urban migrants first settle in small, inner-city slums known as vecindades, *turgurios* or *callejones*. Various studies have suggested that central city, tenement slum dwellers are far less socially cohesive and have lower levels of political interest than do inhabitants of squatter settlements (Collier, 1971: 139–40; Mercado Villar, 1970: 224–25, 262–63; Mangin, 1970: xxix; Dietz, 1973). Mangin's more optimistic view of migrant social cohesion (1967, 1965, 1970) may result from his study of barriadas, while Lewis's more gloomy picture of urban anomie (1960, 1966) may have been induced by his concentration on inner-city slums. Leeds notes that the urban poor may be found in eight or nine different types of housing, ranging from decaying inner-city tenements to outlying squatter communities (1970: 265–66).

These various types of housing conditions reflect considerably different levels of social cohesion. Nevertheless, scholars have paid little attention to the location and type of migrant housing as a determinant of political "availability." In fact, with the exception of Lewis's study of Mexican vecindades (1960) and Patch's investigation of a Peruvian

callejon (1961), virtually all migrant research has been conducted in the barriada or favela type squatment. Such a bias in sample selection may have produced a deceptively optimistic picture of migrant social organization and cohesion.

The size of a migrant community may also influence its potential for political organization. Lutz (1970: 118), Roberts (1970a: 365), and Rogler (1967: 521–27) all suggest that smaller migrant settlements encourage a sense of community identification. Thus we might expect the small outer-city squatment to have the highest potential for political mobilization and the inner-city tenements, the lowest.

Socioeconomic Homogeneity

Earlier we noted that the CIDU study of Santiago's campamentos indicated that those squatments which were more heterogeneous in terms of class (i.e., a mixture of skilled workers, unskilled laborers, and lumpenproletariat) were somewhat less amenable to political mobilization behind either radical or moderate leadership. Roberts's (1973: 8–9) investigation of Guatemala City maintains that, in general, more homogeneous migrant communities—in terms of class or ethnic background—are likely to have higher levels of social trust and social cohesion simply because members feel that they have more information and understanding of one another. Similarly, Vanderschueren's (1971b) study of Santiago, Dietz's (1973) investigation of Lima, and McEwen's research (1971) all suggest that the level of socioeconomic and ethnic homogeneity within a migrant settlement correlates positively with the settlement's cooperative ethos and level of community identification.

Rural Origin of the Migrant Population

Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of existing research on cityward migrants is the scant attention paid to the great variations in the migrants' rural backgrounds. It is widely known that the Indian or mestizo *comunidad indígena* from which most of Lima's urban migrants originated differs widely from the rural society of Brazil's Northeast or the Colombian *llanos*. Yet rarely do inquiries into the political and social orientations of cityward migrants explicitly discuss the impact of such differences. If, however, we examine the literature with that question in mind, we find that two factors are particularly salient: First, the extent to which migrants in a particular neighborhood tend to come from the same rural community or region; second, the level

of social cohesion and cooperation that existed in the peasant society from which the urban poor migrated.

Butterworth (1970) discusses the tendency of Mixtec Indian migrants to settle in the same neighborhood of Mexico City and to socialize primarily with members of their own rural community. A very similar phenomenon may be observed in the barriadas of Lima where migrants from the same peasant village or region tend to settle together, often naming their squatment's streets after the province from which they originated. Mangin (1965) and Doughty (1970) give vivid accounts of the role which regional sports and social associations—based on common geographic origin—play in fostering social cohesion among barriada dwellers. These migrants are far more likely to have a sense of group solidarity within their new urban neighborhood. This would be particularly true when they share a common ethnic identity which sets them apart from their urban environment, as with the Mixtec Indians. Looking beyond the boundaries of Latin America, one observes the importance of common origin and ethnic identity within such divergent migrant organizations as the tribal associations of urban Africa (Anderson et al., 1974: 36–37) and the ethnic clubs of South Side Chicago (Suttles, 1968). In contrast, Roberts argues that low-income neighborhoods in Guatemala City are lacking in social trust because of the diverse geographic origins of their inhabitants (1973: 331; 1970a). Similarly, de Jesus' autobiographical account of Brazilian favela life notes the distrust of "Northeasterners" by migrants from other regions (1962).

A second factor which appears to account for the high level of cooperation in Lima's squatments is the solidaristic nature of Peru's peasant communities. The Indian and mestizo villages of the Peruvian highlands have a long tradition of communal work projects and intravillage cooperation (Handelman, 1974: 29–30). One might assume that this cooperative ethos, coupled with the migrants' tendency to settle with fellow villagers in the same barriadas, contributes to greater social cohesion within the new urban environment. Indeed, Goldrich's comparative study of four squatter settlements in Lima and Santiago indicated that Peruvian families were more likely to recognize the need for collective neighborhood action (rather than family-centered activity) in bettering their lives (Goldrich, 1970a: 189).

Class Structure

In their study of Santiago, Castells et al. (1972) found that socioeconomic class was one of the crucial determinants of migrant political orientations.

As we have seen, moderate organizers (Christian Democrats) were most successful in neighborhoods composed primarily of skilled, highly paid, white collar workers; radical organizers (MIR or UP) were most successful in communities with blue collar laborers; and lumpenproletariat squatments were not amenable to mobilization by either group. A variety of other studies have also pointed to socioeconomic class as a crucial determinant of migrant political attitudes and behavior.

Wayne Cornelius (1973b: 38) argues that migrants who are employed as workers in large-scale enterprises are more likely to support a community-oriented approach to problem solving. Similarly, Roberts found (1970a: 368–69) that Guatemalan migrants working in larger factories tended to be more interested in cooperative ventures with their neighbors. Conversely, self-employed migrants were more inclined to individualistic or "localist" political activity—i.e., they tended to seek short-term assistance from a political *patrón* and were generally uninterested in community mobilization or basic structural changes in society (Roberts, 1973: 304). Indeed, only the minority of Guatemalan migrants who belonged to labor unions were likely to have a sense of class consciousness.

The History and Origin of Squatments

Anthony Leeds notes (1969: 64) that the historical pattern of migrant settlement may vary considerably from city to city, even within a single nation. Thus, São Paulo, a relatively young city, has expanded in concentric waves which have absorbed incoming migrants into conventional housing more smoothly than Rio's more rigid metropolitan housing pattern. Similarly, although Guadalajara has expanded its population at a greater rate than Mexico City, it has more effectively integrated its migrant population into "acceptable" housing. It might be expected that the urban poor in São Paulo and Guadalajara—where tenements and shantytowns are less common—would be more supportive of the existing political system.

The manner in which a particular squatment originated also appears to affect the political orientation of its inhabitants. Investigations of organized land invasions in Santiago and Lima indicate that the "morale and spirit generated in the early invasion can carry on to animate [later] community development efforts" (Goldrich, 1970a: 198; also Portes, 1969). The invasion process requires high initial risk, a need for organization, and the recruitment of external support, all of which tend to politicize the participants. If squatters are confronted by police during the

invasion, ther cooperative spirit may intensify (Goldrich, 1970b: 181). The communal effort necessary for an invasion may help explain the higher rate of politicization in Latin America's outlying squatter settlements as compared to inner-city slums (Collier, 1971: 139–40).

During the initial period following a squatter invasion, attempts to secure legal land title, electricity, and water may produce ongoing, "demand-making" organizations. Yet studies in such diverse settings as Santiago (Goldrich: 1970a, 1970b), Lima (Dietz, 1973), Mexico City (Cornelius, 1973c), Oaxaca (Butterworth, 1971), Guayaquil and Panama City (Lutz, 1971: 122) indicate that "participation in the local [squatter] associations tends to atrophy as the settlement becomes established" and migrants secure land tenure and municipal services (Goldrich 1970b: 185). The arrival of large numbers of new residents who have not shared in the original invasion or early organization further erodes social cohesion (Roberts, 1970a: 349–50, 372–73).

THE CORRELATES OF GROUP POLITICAL ACTIVITY

In our earlier discussion of Castells's (1972) campamento study we noted that the CIDU research focused on the aggregate characteristics of entire squatments rather than on the characteristics of individual migrants. Similarly, most of the literature reviewed here concentrates on the correlates of group behavior. The central concern is not on the type of migrant most amenable to politicization, but rather, on the community characteristics which are most likely to produce neighborhood political action. There are several important factors that make this research orientation appropriate.

Wayne Cornelius (1972: 34–35) points out that most migrant political demands—for schools, sewage systems, land tenure, or the like—are collective rather than individual. Consequently, when the urban poor do participate actively in politics, it is usually through community action (Collier, 1971). In addition, the residential neighborhood is often a critical agent of political socialization (Lutz, 1970; McKenney, 1969; Vanderschueren, 1971b). Consequently, a migrant's political behavior is not only influenced by his own personal characteristics, "but by the social context of the individual, both as it is perceived by the individual and as an objective situation influencing the possibilities of action" (Barton, 1968: 8).

The shift from the individual to the community as the unit of analysis may well be one of the most important conceptual developments in recent research on migrant politics. Yet, with the exception of a small

number of works (Cornelius, 1973b; Goldrich, 1970a; Pratt, 1971b; Roberts, 1973), its implications and significance are not discussed explicitly. Marshall points out (1968) that socioeconomic characteristics which are associated with high levels of political participation among individuals may not necessarily correlate with group political mobilization. Roberts (1973: 286) distinguishes between public political activity (such as joining a neighborhood association) and private political activity (voting). He argues that the socioeconomic factors that lead to participation in migrant associations are not necessarily the same as those which correlate with private political activity.

For example, persons with higher levels of education and income are normally more likely to vote. Goldrich found, nonetheless, that educated persons in his communities had the lowest level of commitment to community-based action. Conversely, the shantytown with the lowest socioeconomic level was the most highly politicized of the communities which he studied (Goldrich, 1973a: 181, 191). If we accept Roberts's proposition that public (group) political activity is far more important than voting or other forms of "private" political activity for most of Latin America's urban poor, then surely further political research in this area should focus on aggregate neighborhood characteristics.

MIGRANTS AND THEIR LINKS TO THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Our review of recent research on cityward migrants has revealed a wealth of material on the determinants of social cohesion and "collective political orientations" within migrant communities. Properly ordered into a conceptual framework, this literature permits theoretical speculation on the determinants of community "availability" for political mobilization. We can now turn our attention to the independent variables which determine whether a migrant community's potential for mobilization will be realized.

Charles Valentine has argued that it is fruitless to discuss the politics of the urban poor without examining the wider socioeconomic and political settings within which low-income people operate (Valentine, 1968: 14–53, 94–97). The lives of Latin America's cityward migrants are "heavily conditioned by the links they have with urban organizations and with other urban social groups. Poor people do not form an isolated group . . . but are permeated by external influences" (Roberts, 1973: 4). Unfortunately, most of the research on migrant politics fails to analyze the constraints which Latin America's national political systems place on the political mobilization or radicalization of the urban poor. Latin America's

migrants face a wide variey of political systems: Cuba—a revolutionary society based on mass political mobilization (Zeitlin, 1967; Fagen, 1969); Chile during the 1960s and early 1970s—a democratic system with strong competition for the urban, lower-class vote (Portes, 1970; Pratt, 1971b; Goldrich, 1971a); Peru in the early 1960s—a democracy with fairly limited attempts at popular mobilization (Collier, 1971; Dietz, 1973); Guatemala—a hierarchical political system with little mass participation (Roberts, 1973).

The Castells study shows that because migrants lack a political ideology or the capacity for ongoing political organization, they are inevitably dependent on outsiders to provide them with these skills. Consequently, the *actual* political behavior of migrant communities, as opposed to their potential for politicization, will depend on the nature of their links to the state, organized political parties, and other external actors. In the concluding portion of this article, we will review the literature in order to create a typology of possible relationships between migrant communities and these external political forces.

Paternalism Without Mobilization

Throughout Latin America, peasants have traditionally been controlled by means of patron-client linkages to members of the rural elite. This dependency relationship affords the peasant a modicum of protection against a hostile environment in return for a series of obligations to his patrón (Handelman, 1974: 27–28, 41–43). Andrew Pearse (1961) and Richard Adams (1967) maintain that most peasants migrating to the city seek a new patrón to help them find their way through the urban labyrinth. In Brazil the migrant worker will look for a *pistalão* (a friend in the right place) to find him a job or secure aid from the government bureaucracy. "The moment the patrón extends a favor to a worker, a state of dependency has been formally bonded" (Silberstein, 1969: 193). In an underdeveloped political system such as Brazil's or Guatemala's, where political parties make little effort to mobilize the urban poor, patronage on an individual or group basis is the core of migrant politics. In Guatemala, "political party organization does not exist beyond the level of their central committees. . . ." Consequently, to gain a following among the migrant population, politicians work through local power brokers. "Recruitment . . . proceeds on the basis of existing [hierarchical] relationships. An employer approaches one of his workers. A priest approaches a parishioner. . . . The art of the patron is to build up a sufficient number of enduring relationships [within migrant communities] to form a basis for mobilization when it becomes needed." (Roberts, 1973: 183–84).

Silberstein argues that these dyadic, paternalistic relationships with local power brokers permit urban migrants some latitude in manipulating their environment. For the urban poor, "remaining in a state of low level organization through personalized ties is probably the most sophisticated adaptation to the 'real' world in which they live" (Silberstein, 1969: 198). Still, Roberts notes that "patronage . . . cannot be used consistently to organize at either the individual or the group level" (1973: 186–87). Ultimately, paternalistic relationships are exploitative to the urban poor (Roberts, 1968: 193). And even Silberstein admits that "no one should deny that the poor could get a far larger share of the cake if they were highly organized on a class, geographic or even labor basis" (1969: 198).

Government Directed Cooptation

In a slightly more politicized society, such as Peru, highly individualized paternalism is insufficient to contain incipient migrant demands. During the late 1940s and early 1950s the Peruvian military strongman Manuel Odría devised a broader policy to cope with the wave of highland migrants descending on Lima. Odría sought to coopt shantytown dwellers (and weaken the potential political base of the opposition Peruvian Aprista party [Partido Aprista Peruano—PAP] by encouraging large-scale migrant invasions of public lands on the outskirts of the capital (Collier, 1971).

Such a policy of government cooptation brought Peru's urban poor more extensive and tangible benefits than their Guatemalan counterparts received. Basically it provided a form of aid to the squatments with little political or economic costs. In Lima, it frequently succeeded in conservatizing the cityward migrants and in fostering a commitment to gradualistic change. Moreover, none of Peru's political parties encouraged the urban poor to demand broader economic or social reform (Goldrich, 1970a: 188). Therefore the political passivity of Peru's urban migrants was, in fact, largely the result of public policy (Collier, 1971). The cooptive policies of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI) serve much the same purpose (Cornelius: 1973a, 1973c).

Populism

Campos and McCamant's study (1972) of Colombia's 1970 presidential election points to yet another possible relationship between migrant communities and external political parties. In that election, ex-dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and his movement, ANAPO, nearly defeated the

candidate of Colombia's Liberal-Conservative political establishment. Essentially, ANAPO conforms to Torcuato Di Tella's (1969) definition of a "populist movement." It is an "organization made up of middle-class persons who have gone out and organized the masses" (Campos, 1972: 42). Thus Rojas Pinilla followed the tradition of Argentina's Juan Perón in his overt appeal to the urban lower classes (Snow, 1969). "Both populist movements appealed to the working class and [urban] poor without evoking marxist" ideology (Campos, 1972: 34). These movements present a more class-oriented electoral appeal than do "cooptive" parties such as the Odriísta National Union (Unión Nacional Odriísta—UNO) in Peru or Mexico's PRI (Snow, 1969; Campos, 1972). Presenting ANAPO as the party of the poor, General Rojas's daughter María Eugenia declared, "it is not justice that the rich barrios should have all the conveniences and the poor barrios should lack every service. I want the street lights to shine not only on the elegant zones but even on the forgotten and broken down shacks . . ." (Campos, 1972: 38). Not surprisingly, Rojas's strongest support came from low-income, urban migrant districts. In fact, "the vote in 1970 in Colombia demonstrated a class cleavage of greater strength than seems to exist anywhere else in Latin America today . . ." (Campos, 1972: 8).

Despite Rojas's support from a number of radical priests and assorted Colombian leftists, "the program developed by ANAPO [was] pragmatic and not based on any coherent ideology" (Campos, 1972: 37). More importantly, populist movements of this type are heavily dependent on the personal followings of their leaders (such as Perón or Rojas) and fail to create an organizational base among the urban migrant population. Basically, populism does not mobilize the urban poor on an ongoing basis or raise their sense of political efficacy. Consequently, its migrant supporters are not truly politicized and may easily desert the movement, as evidenced by ANAPO's poor showing in the 1974 presidential election.

Reformist Political Organization

"One of the most significant aspects of political life in most of Latin America," states Raymond Pratt, "is a relative lack of political organization linking elites with the masses of lower status people . . ." (1971b: 495). The task of "demand articulation and aggregation"—i.e., communicating policy desires or social needs to the political system—should be carried out by political parties (Powell, 1969: 196). Yet as Robert Scott (1966) and others have noted, Latin American political parties have rarely established such links with the masses. None of the political movements

or systems discussed thus far attempt to politicize the urban migrant population or provide it with an organizational base for articulating their demands. Even the parties which Scott sees as having a mass base—Mexico's PRI and Peru's APRA—have either sought to coopt and control the political demands of the urban poor (the PRI—Anderson and Cockcroft, 1970), or failed to establish a strong base of migrant support (APRA—Powell, 1969).

However, during the 1960s (in some instances, slightly earlier), a number of reformist parties began to compete for the support of the urban lower classes including the squatment population. "In Venezuela," for example, "middle-class parties shut out the political arena after a taste of power in the late 1940s found that they could use the power of the barrios. . . . Thereafter, they competed vigorously for control of local barrio organizations and first claim on the loyalties of the barrio residents" (Nelson, 1970: 412–13; Ray, 1969: chap. 7). In Peru, Popular Action (Acción Popular—AP) and the Christian Democrats also attempted, less successfully, to reach the urban poor (Collier, 1971; Powell, 1969).

Reformist political parties such as Venezuela's Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD) or Peru's Popular Action appear to offer the urban migrant a more meaningful opportunity for ongoing participation in the political system. In this respect they differ from any of the previously-discussed political organizations—paternalistic, cooptive, or populist. For example, Martz (1966) and Alexander (1964) argue that the AD for the first time provided the Venezuelan lower classes with effective channels of demand articulation and aggregation. Unlike populist movements it offered the urban poor an ongoing organizational structure, a coherent reformist ideology, and a well articulated program for change.

Nevertheless, Latin America's reformist parties for the most part have failed to realize their potential for mobilizing and politicizing the urban migrant population. Organizational efforts by such parties in urban squatments have generally been weak. For example, the AD finished third or fourth among Caracas's barrio voters in the 1958, 1963, and 1968 presidential elections. In fact, AD candidates did more poorly in the low-income districts of the capital than in upper and middle class areas (Martz and Harkins, 1973: 543). In Lima during a corresponding period (1963–66), reformist candidates from the Popular Action and the Christian Democratic party also failed to carry the barriada vote, finishing a distant second to more conservative candidates (Powell, 1969). Only in Chile did a reformist party manage to establish a firm base of support in the urban shantytowns. Studies conducted in the poblaciones of Santiago after the 1964 election indicated that a majority of migrant voters supported the

Christian Democrats. Yet, even in Chile—as we shall see in the forthcoming discussion—the PDC lagged far behind Allende's UP coalition in its ability to politicize the urban poor (Goldrich, 1970a; Pratt, 1971b).

Radical Mobilization

The last possible linkage that Latin America's urban migrants may have with the political system is through radical political parties. Unlike either populist or reformist movements, these radical groups advocate basic structural changes in the socioeconomic system and espouse an openly Marxist ideology. For reasons discussed shortly, radicals have not frequently developed a strong following among Latin America's cityward migrants. In the 1958 Venezuelan Congressional elections, however, the Communist party received some 20 to 25 percent of the vote in the migrant barrios.[11] Moreover, Wolfgang Larrazábal, the presidential candidate of the leftist Democratic Republican Union (Unión Republicana Democrática—URD) and the Communists received some 70 percent of the vote in migrant barrios (Martz and Harkins, 1973: 543). In Chile, as the CIDU study indicates (Castells, 1972; Vanderschueren 1971a, 1971b), the Socialist-Communist Front (FRAP or UP) became the major political force in the campamentos of Santiago. The more radical MIR attained a far smaller, but still significant, following as well. Finally, in Cuba, a Marxist government has undertaken the political mobilization of the urban lower classes (Zeitlin, 1967; Fagen, 1969).

How does the political organization of the urban poor by radical movements compare to the types of external linkages previously discussed? In Chile, the MIR undertook an intensive program of political indoctrination in the few campamentos which they organized. Limited evidence suggests that they had some success in organizing a revolutionary, Marxist subculture (Vanderschueren, 1971b; Petras, 1973).[12] Similarly, intensive political education and organization (through groups like the "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution") have created a "revolutionary consciousness" among many of Cuba's urban masses (Fagen: 1969; Zeitlin: 1967, 1970; Yglesias: 1968).

To be sure, Castells's survey indicates that the campamentos organized by the UP were not fully radicalized in an ideological sense. Migrants were generally more interested in pragmatic changes directly affecting their lives (housing, schools, health care) and were less concerned with far-reaching structural changes in society. Vanderschueren (1971a: 100–7) and Portes (1970, 1971c) found that the discontent among Santiago's

pobladores did not usually translate into a desire for the radical transformation of society.

Still, political linkages with Marxist parties did create far more dynamic migrant political participation than in any other type of external contact. Pratt's study of two Santiago poblaciones indicated that "FRAP supporters were more active and oriented toward manipulation of the [political] system. . . ." Moreover, "formal party membership . . . was strongly associated with participation in the community association on the part of FRAP supporters, but not so in the case of Christian Democrats" (Pratt, 1971b: 518). Examining the same data sample, Goldrich (1970a: 188) notes that poblador activists in the FRAP were three times as likely as their Christian Democratic counterparts to take economic or educational problems to public officials for help. Finally, Goldrich observes, FRAP adherents were more likely to broaden the scope of their political demands from immediate problems to socioeconomic objectives. "The activist poor who support FRAP tend to maintain a sense of solidarity and make the transition, in their thinking about politics, from the acute housing needs focus to the equally acute but less vulnerable set of economic needs" (1970a: 192).

CONCLUSIONS

Wayne Cornelius expressed the prevailing viewpoint of most research on cityward migrants when he maintained: "In ideological terms migrants have tended toward political conservatism . . . as manifested by a fear of the consequences of sweeping social and political change." This conservatism, he argued, "appears to be rooted in a deeply felt need to preserve the modest but . . . significant gains . . . which they have achieved" (1972: 30–31). Other authors have noted the tendency of Latin America's urban migrants to reject the electoral appeals of radical political candidates and to cast their ballots instead for established reformist parties or even—quite frequently—for charismatic populists or conservative caudillos (Argentina's Perón, Colombia's Rojas Pinilla, Peru's Odría, or Venezuela's Pérez Jiménez).

At the same time, we must avoid facile conclusions about the alleged inherent conservatism of cityward migrants. In the foregoing examination of the determinants of migrant political attitudes and behavior, we saw that squatments *within* a single nation may have considerably different levels of internal solidarty and, hence, varying degrees of "availability" for political organization. Moreover, such differences

within individual nations appear less significant than the variation *between* national political systems. A particular migrant community's political orientations and behavior depend less on the neighborhood's internal characteristics than on the opportunities which the national political system allows reformist or radical political parties to seek and acquire political power. Thus, Eric J. Hobsbawm notes that the urban migrant may vote for a politically entrenched conservative candidate instead of a radical opposition party because of a pragmatic realization that established parties are more capable of delivering immediate economic assistance to low-income communities. By necessity, says Hobsbawm (1967), migrants support political parties that can potentially assume office in the near future.

Similarly, Bryan Roberts found that Guatemala's highly restrictive political system greatly retarded migrant organization. Comparing that country to Peru, he observed: "Though a country like Peru may be a long way from solving its internal . . . problems, I do not find the active feeling of frustration and helplessness that characterizes so many of the urban poor in Guatemala . . . [where] conservative forces have . . . been unusually successful in resisting an increase in the political or economic participation of the mass of its population" (1973: xv). On the other hand, Pratt (1971b) and Goldrich (1970a) found Peruvian migrants to be far less politicized than their Chilean counterparts in the 1960s due to the intense electoral competition between the Chilean left and the Christian Democrats for the squatment vote. "There is an association between the structure and content of national politics . . . and the response of the *poblador*" (Goldrich, 1970a: 180).

As noted earlier, prior to the 1973 coup, Chile was virtually the only nation in Latin America where leftist (Marxist) political parties were a viable alternative within the electoral system. In nations such as Brazil (prior to the 1964 coup), Colombia, Peru (prior to the 1968 coup), and Venezuela, leftist candidates were permitted on the ballot. However, the urban masses may have realized that their nations' closed political systems precluded a leftist electoral victory. In none of these nations would the military allow a Marxist, or even a left-reformist, party to assume political power (witness the military takeovers which followed Acción Democrática's 1947 victory in Venezuela, João Goulart's assumption of the Brazilian presidency, and the prospective *aprista* victory in Peru's 1969 election). In 1965, several thousand young barrio residents in Santo Domingo took up arms in support of the leftist former president, Juan Bosch. Several months later many of the same people apparently voted for the conservative candidate, Balaguer, rather than Bosch, because they

were convinced that the military would never permit Bosch to take office (Moreno, 1970). Such pragmatic choices may help to explain the weakness of radical candidates in the squatments of other Latin American nations. Santiago's migrant population *was* given a meaningful opportunity to support a radical political movement—the FRAP, UP, or MIR. Many of them apparently availed themselves of that opportunity.

NOTES

1. For details on political repression in Chile see: "Terror in Chile" (1974); "Slaughterhouse in Santiago" (1973); and Anthony Lewis, "The Meaning of Torture," *New York Times*, 30 May 1974, p. 37.
2. The Marxist-dominated political coalition headed by Salvador Allende was known as the FRAP (Popular Revolutionary Front) during the 1964 presidential campaign. During the 1970 campaign, the coalition—led by Chile's Socialist and Communist parties—included leftist splinter groups from the Christian Democratic party as well as the bulk of the Radical party. This new, somewhat broader, coalition was called the UP (Popular Unity). The MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement) was a small Marxist group, led primarily by university students, which took a more radical, militant, leftist position than did the UP.
3. The term "squatment"—an abbreviation of "squatter settlement"—is borrowed from Anthony Leeds (1969). It is used interchangeably in this article with the terms shantytown, migrant community, and squatter settlement.
4. The following pages dealing with the campamentos of Santiago are based on Manuel Castells, et. al., *Los Campamentos de Santiago: Movilización Urbana* (Santiago: CIDU, Documento de Trabajo, no. 46, 1972). For other works by the CIDU on Santiago's campamentos see Vanderschueren (1971a, 1971b). Further research on extensive shantytown survey data collected by the CIDU is now being carried out in Milan. Scholars interested in subsequent publications by the CIDU team in exile or in access to the data should contact: Dr. Franz Vanderschueren, Center for Comparative Regional Studies, Via Giovanni Cantoni 4, Milano, Italy.
5. The term campamento refers to a Chilean squatter settlement resulting from an organized, group land invasion; usually, it refers to a community organized by the left. A callampa is an unplanned squatter settlement in Chile that has sprung up rather spontaneously. A población—technically, a neighborhood of any kind—generally refers to a low-income urban neighborhood in Chile, often with a high percentage of migrants. A poblador is a low-income city dweller.
6. The term "mass" is used here with regard to Latin America's unorganized marginal population of peasants and urban poor, as opposed to the organized "classes" (working class, middle class, etc.). See Horowitz (1970: 3–27) for this distinction.
7. Actually, twenty-three of the settlements were near Santiago and two were elsewhere.
8. A *New York Times* article (26 August 1970) claimed that physical punishment ("violent expulsion" from the community) was occasionally applied to serious offenders, but the CIDU study indicates that such occurrences were unusual.
9. Members of the organized working class, particularly if they are members of communist-led labor unions, are probably far more likely to have a revolutionary ideological orientation. See Hamilton (1967) and Zeitlin (1970); both works investigate the ideology and socioeconomic background of workers in communist-dominated unions.
10. In a conversation with this author, Teodoro Petkoff—a leader of the Venezuelan guerrilla movement in the early 1960s—said that the urban guerrillas in Caracas had strong

support in the migrant barrios during their first few years. That support quickly faded after the guerrillas were unable to stop the 1963 presidential election.

11. This figure is based on my conversation with former Communist party leader Teodoro Petkoff, and differs from Martz and Harkins's (1973) figures drawn from selected barrios.
12. For excellent descriptions of campamentos organized by the MIR, see Petras (1973) and the Maryknoll Order's film, *Campamento*. The film is very interesting despite a strong pro-MIR bias.

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