

in theory he was a partisan of private land property for peasants, but "in practice I doubt whether it should be given to them."

The authors review Witte's achievements in negotiating a huge loan from France, which staved off government bankruptcy; the organization of elections to the State Duma, "with considerable efficiency and with a minimum of either disorder or government interference"; his influence on the drafting of Fundamental State Laws (sanctioned by the tsar on April 23), which "were a constitution just as surely as were the constitutions of The Netherlands, Denmark, and Prussia in 1848, 1849, and 1850, respectively" (p. 290); and his legislative program for the Duma, "modest and incomplete" yet "sensible and forward-looking."

In a perceptive concluding evaluation of Witte's "evasive" and "enigmatic" personality, the authors opine that the problem of combining order and basic political reform in the face of emotional and irrational forces then present "may have been insoluble."

The text, heavily documented (821 references to sources), is followed by documentary appendixes and a twenty-one-page bibliography, including some unpublished material found by Professor Thompson in Soviet and American archives. By way of minor nit-picking one may note that contrary to the authors' assertion, Trotsky was in 1905 a member of the Russian Social Democratic party, although, like Plekhanov, he did not classify himself as either a Menshevik or a Bolshevik. Also, listing grand dukes in the index under their patronymics only ("Aleksandrovich") is unenlightening, though very amusing.

To conclude, this is an important, competent, and well-balanced book dealing with a turning point in Russian history, when the government was headed by a remarkably gifted yet very unbalanced statesman.

SERGEI G. PUSHKAREV
New Haven, Connecticut

SOCIALISM AND THE GREAT WAR: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL. By *Georges Haupt*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. x, 270 pp. \$17.00.

Where did the socialists go wrong? An older school casually disposed of the question in this manner: in 1914, nationalism proved stronger than socialist internationalism, period. Today, we can no more tolerate this facile observation (one can hardly call it analysis) than we can accept the old charge that evil munition-makers planned the great catastrophe in order to line their silken pockets. We have begun to understand that nationalism was much *less* strong than we used to think; that there was some chance that Russia, properly mollified, might have let Serbia go under, thus at least postponing the disaster; that few Frenchmen had forgotten Alsace-Lorraine, but also that even fewer (in 1914) wanted to die to get the provinces back; and so on. But we still do not know precisely why socialists in France and Germany failed so miserably to exercise at least moral suasion and, in the summer, outright obstruction.

The ghosts of the First International haunted the Second. Stung by the incessant anarchist *and conservative* criticism of Marx's "general staff," the founders of the Second International waited eleven years—until 1900—to found the International Socialist Bureau, and then they gave it no power. There was no mechanism through which socialists could act quickly and decisively. This does not mean that

the ISB might have prevented the war; but it could not even speak a few words in the name of the entire International that might have given some pause to the chancelleries.

When they mounted large and impressive demonstrations over the Balkan Wars, the socialists thought they had some power—that the antiwar movement was on solid footing. They foolishly forgot that governments pick the sideshows that interest them and ignore the others. Kautsky believed in July 1914 that the International had never been stronger or more united. Jaurès and his “ethical idealism” (Haupt’s term) loomed as a tower of reason and restraint. True, the German and French parties (not to mention the Russian) had split on the question of a general strike against war; but gradually German opposition began to soften, and there was reason to hope that the 1914 Vienna Congress would produce an effective compromise.

Great events overwhelmed the preparations for that meeting, which became another, minor victim of madness unleashed. With Jaurès dead, the SPD voting war credits in lockstep, Frenchmen rushing to the colors in part because they feared the consequences of staying home, and Lenin hammering out the first drafts of his plan to transform the very nature of the war—with all this going on, the International died an ignominious and unmourned death. It had neglected to propagandize the armies, had passively and senselessly accepted the respectability thrust upon it by calculating governments, had squabbled over minutiae, and had in the end done all it could to commit suicide. It succeeded. And history repeated itself as tragedy.

Georges Haupt has given us yet another version of the story in this long introduction to the sixteen-page record of the July 29–30, 1914, Brussels session of the ISB. There are changes in this version, but they do not render it substantially different from the 1965 French original, *Le Congrès manqué*. Haupt brings his unique knowledge of the International to bear in effective fashion. But still many tormenting questions remain, and one turns again to Roger Martin du Gard.

WOODFORD D. McCLELLAN
University of Virginia

LENIN: THE EXILE RETURNS. By *Kenneth F. and Heloise P. Mailloux*. Princeton, Philadelphia, New York, London: Auerbach Publishers, 1971. Published simultaneously in Canada by Book Center, Inc. ix, 150 pp. \$5.95.

This is a semipopular biography of Lenin, published in the Auerbach series, Great Events in World History. It is hard to say what audience it is really aimed at, for it tells nothing of significance to one who has read any serious biography of Lenin, yet it is not dramatic enough nor popular enough for a general audience. Its modest bibliography suggests a fair amount of reading but no serious checking of moot points. Its system of footnoting is sporadic, and when we really want to know the source of a statement attributed to Lenin, such as “The worse, the better” or “One who has been whipped is worth two who have not,” there is no source given at all.

The book contains much that is interesting and unexceptionable, but nothing that suggests original research or turns up new material. In one respect at least it is gravely misleading. On page 11 the authors, writing of Lenin’s “unreasoning admiration for the peasantry,” say: “He thought that peasants were basically more