

SOURCES OF STUDENT VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE*

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THE RESORT TO VIOLENCE BY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAS BECOME A COMMON OCCURRENCE not only in developing countries but also in the more industrialized ones. Voluminous recent literature on the general subject of violence has not greatly expanded our understanding of this important problem. Similarly, literature on student movements is increasing but analyses of student violence *per se* are still scarce. We know less about the causes of student violence than we do about the scope and intensity of the phenomenon, yet why, when, how, and under what conditions people resort to violence are still unresolved questions. Partial answers are in, although to what effect remains to be seen.

Part of the difficulty is that violence in general and student violence in particular are still considered by many as anomalies or aberrations in the political development of nations. In order to understand them better, it seems necessary to treat them as part of the "normal" social process and to see them in their historical context. Particularly in Latin America, violence must be considered as part of the political culture of most of the nations in the area. Students as well as other groups such as the military, labor, and peasants use violence to achieve their objectives. It is important also not to study student violence in isolation. It must be a part of the larger studies of violence and of student movements.

This article does not attempt to be exhaustive in discussing books and articles that deal with student violence.¹ Rather, it is an attempt to systematize some of the propositions that have been advanced to explain student violence in Latin America, and to show where further research seems necessary.

The state of research on violence and particularly on student violence in Latin America is still far from a significant level of sophistication.² Most of the serious studies deal with military interventions and revolutions. But there is little with respect to other forms of violence such as riots, terrorism, or even guerrilla movements. Few sociologists and political scientists and even fewer psychologists have carefully examined the problem of violence in Latin America. Most historians have also shunned it, thus failing to provide comparative analysis at different stages in the development of the various Latin American nations. Those who have looked at the problem seem to be overly concerned with Latin America's stability and "democratic"

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political development and therefore have focused on coups, revolts, and riots as manifestations of instability and lack of "stable democratic governments." Usually these forms of violence have been equated with instability. Yet, with the exception of Mexico and Cuba, countries which underwent revolutionary transformations and now have regained some form of stability, Latin American societies have shown themselves to be remarkably stable despite significant and persistent violence.

Douglas Bwy, among others, has focused on the causes of political instability in Latin America. In an otherwise important contribution, he fails to distinguish between instability and violence. He begins by discussing other research which attempts to establish causal relationships between societal variables and political instability and claims that variables such as dissatisfaction and inequality correlate with instability. In attempting to develop a causal model of political instability in Latin America, Bwy isolated three independent variables—satisfaction, legitimacy, and force—with violence as the dependent variable. He concludes that anomic violence finds its strongest correlate in forces of retribution. "When force (punishment) is both very permissive as well as very restrictive, anomic violence is negligible. Punishment in the mid-levels of intensity (apparently acting as frustrator) elicits high levels of anomic violence." He also points out that organized violence finds its strongest correlate in legitimacy formation. "Organized violence appears to be strongly related to the open or closed nature of the system, and if systems are slipping into more closed patterns (i.e., losing Fitzgibbon points on 'democratic attainment'), the mechanism of participation feeding positive affect closes off this avenue of legitimacy formation."³

It is important to differentiate between violence and instability and to see the former as one of the elements in the political process of Latin America. Cuba, for example, was particularly "stable" throughout the decade of the 1940's, yet violence at the local level and particularly among university students was widespread.

Other authors have focused on violence *per se* in Latin America. In his often quoted essay on violence, William S. Stokes concluded that "there is no one simple cause for violence, which, if removed or corrected, would produce stable, democratic politics in the Anglo-American conception." He argues instead that "Hispanic culture tends everywhere in Latin America to dominate in the power sense; and that the institutions of Hispanic culture such as the family, church, army, educational institutions, and economic systems, are essentially authoritarian in nature, hence conditioning the individual to more frequent acceptance of processes of dictatorship, including violence, than processes of political democracy."⁴

Merle Kling sees Latin American political systems as characterized by violent political behavior and acceptance of violence as a "legitimate" means for the pursuit of power. He concludes that "an active minority engaged in acts of political violence is inhibited neither by a political system that brands such acts as illegitimate nor by internalized values that censure resorting to violent methods."⁵

Martin Needler has systematized the major hypotheses which have attempted to explain political violence in Latin America. He has grouped them into four categories: 1. "Racial" characteristics; 2. Cultural heritage; 3. Geography; and 4. Economic factors. Needler warns that "violence does not occur with equal frequency in all

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countries in the area nor does it occur with equal frequency during different periods in the history of the same country, despite the fact that its geography and racial composition remain constant." He adds, furthermore, that the high propensity toward violence is one aspect of the generalized failure to conform to constitutionally prescribed modes of behavior, due to their incompatibility with the realities of social structure.⁶

SOME EXPLANATIONS FOR STUDENT VIOLENCE

Although any definition of student violence would have a number of shortcomings, it seems necessary, before proceeding any further, to delimit our subject by defining what is meant by student violence. Criminal as well as other acts of violence perpetrated by students without political or academic objectives are excluded. Included are such types of actions as demonstrations, riots, terrorism, guerrilla activities, abductions, and political assassinations. Student violence can then be defined as collective or individual action which employs physical violence or the threat of physical violence to make demands upon or to overthrow political and/or university authorities.⁷

In a discussion of student violence in Latin America, several elements should be noted at the outset. First, in societies where violence is an important factor in politics, the propensity of students toward violence seems to be more common. In Latin America, where universities are deeply involved in the political life of the various countries and politics are partially characterized by violence, student violence is an extension as well as a reflection of the larger polity.

Similarly the boundary between student violence to achieve academic objectives and student violence to achieve political objectives is porous. Academic and political issues usually overlap and interact and it becomes difficult to distinguish between them. Since university and polity intermesh empirically they should be distinguished analytically.

Second, the conditions under which student violence might erupt are not easy to determine and the predictability of violence has proven difficult. Although student violence could erupt either "spontaneously," or as a deliberate and rational attempt to attain certain objectives, some necessary pre-conditions seem to be present before it occurs. These might be connected with, among other factors: a) campus issues; b) societal issues; c) campus-societal issues; and d) the perception by the students of the issues involved. The students' socio-economic background, pre-university life and environment, and university life, habits, and traditions, as well as certain features of the university such as location, type—whether autonomous or not—staff and academic quality, are other factors that might contribute to student politicization and possibly student violence.

Third, most studies dealing with the role of students in politics fail to distinguish between student politicization and student violence. Politically active students are not necessarily violent. On the other hand, activism, particularly in Latin America, has usually led to violence. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the factors that make for student politicization and those that make for student violence. Al-

though in many instances these might be similar, in some they might differ considerably. A highly politicized student body could be channeled into "the system" or into an anti-system political group, thus preventing the students from becoming violent.

Yet the balance between politicization and violence is a difficult one to maintain. Resort to violence on the part of the students might be accelerated by other factors such as: a) the inability or unwillingness of campus administrators to satisfy or respond to student demands on campus issues; b) the inability or unwillingness of government to satisfy or respond to student demands on off-campus issues; c) the students' perception that either campus administrators or government officials are unable or unwilling to respond to their aspirations and demands; d) the students' perception of the legitimacy of a regime; e) pressure from or rivalry with groups or leaders outside or inside the campus or from groups or leaders inside the campus which respond to outside interests; f) the breakdown of the process of law enforcement; g) excessive police repression; h) the students' belief in the appropriateness or legitimacy of violence as a means for protest.

It is also necessary to distinguish between individual, anomic, and organized acts of student violence. The student who manifests his anger by stoning or killing a government official commits a similar kind of action as the student who assassinates a government official on orders of a movement, but the political act is different in motivation and probably in consequence. Since organized and anomic rather than individual student violence seem to be more important as well as more prevalent in Latin America, most of the studies discussed here will deal with the two former conditions.

One factor worth pointing out is the chain-like reaction characteristic of student violence. There seems to exist a sense of solidarity and identity not only among students within one country but also throughout Latin America. The resort to violence on the part of students in one school is usually followed and imitated by students in other universities, even in other countries, especially if the original attempt achieved its objectives. Student violence is highly contagious and when it produces results the contagion may become epidemic.

It seems hardly necessary to emphasize here that politically active or violent students represent only a minority of the student body of the different countries. Yet these minorities receive national attention, are highly regarded by the population in general and by the students in particular, and find the universities to be excellent training grounds and stepping stones for national politics. Not only university students, but also high school students become quite familiar at a young age with police confrontations, riots, demonstrations, and other forms of violence.

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENT

It should be pointed out also that student politicization and propensity toward violence are not new phenomena in Latin America. A bit of history might help to understand its depth in the area. The tradition of student riots can be traced back to the very founding of the universities and to the European town vs. gown squab-

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bles. In Spain, the universities enjoyed a privileged position in society. University of Salamanca students and professors recognized only the rector's authority and flaunted their exemption from civil arrest. Protected by this exemption, students rioted frequently. Hostility between students and townspeople led to numerous disorders. Spain transplanted these special privileges to Spanish America. During colonial times the university's privileged position persisted, and the students' propensity to riot continued unabated. The most common problems were the selection of new professors and grievances against townspeople. For example, the frequency and fury of student clashes over the appointment of new professors forced the University of San Marcos in Lima to suspend its *oposiciones* (professorial competitions) in 1631.⁸

The political cleavage between university and state characteristic today throughout Latin America did not exist in the colonial era. On the contrary, monarchy and university objectives coincided in most cases. The crown aimed at assimilating and integrating Indians and mixed bloods into the Spanish culture, and the universities provided trained clergymen for that task. Dominicans and Jesuits were the most active in founding and directing higher educational institutions. The crown, however, controlled the university's purse and influenced its internal affairs. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the Bishop of Puebla complained to the Spanish monarch that the viceroy was instructing the University of Mexico to issue degrees to his favorites without completion by the candidates of the stipulated requirements.⁹

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the struggles for independence, as well as the earlier expulsion of the Jesuits, severed state and gown's harmonious relationship. In 1815, the Spanish monarch, Ferdinand VII, ordered his colonial officials to suppress the agitation for independence at the University of San Marcos and in all Spanish American universities.¹⁰ In the chaos that followed the emergence of the new republics, political leaders attempted to control the universities and constantly intervened in their internal affairs. The growing liberalism of professors and students or remaining royalism served as excuses for curtailing university privileges and for incorporating many of them into the state. "The universities," explained Aguirre Beltrán, former rector of the Universidad Veracruzana, "became government agencies and the professors public officials."¹¹

Student unrest, which persisted throughout the nineteenth century, became crucial in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Popularly priced Spanish translations of the writings of Rousseau, Locke, Darwin, and Marx were read widely throughout Latin America, paving the way for the students' intellectual revolution of the 1920's. The new influx of ideas, together with the events of World War I and the Russian Revolution, inspired Latin American youths with a desire to change their societies. The first institution that came under attack was the archaic university.

Student opposition crystallized in the Córdoba (Argentina) Reform Movement in 1918. In several other countries students demanded and obtained a large voice in university management, and university autonomy was secured as a sheltering device against the encroachments of governmental power. Yet, the objective of such movements was not only the reformation of the university but also the creation of an institution capable of transforming and directing a Latin American culture. Students

viewed the university as the embodiment of the national mind. "The basic concern of the movement," emphasized John P. Harrison, "has never been with the university as an institution, but rather with the orientation of the national and ultimately continental conscience."¹²

That traditions seems to be at the root of today's student behavior in Latin America. This is not to say that in attempting to understand present behavior the past alone will necessarily provide us with answers or that by looking at the past, student violence might be easily predictable. Yet it seems that before attempting to point out the contemporary factors, forces, and circumstances that make for student politicization and violence, it is necessary to have an appreciation of the historical antecedents of the phenomenon and of the conditions where it did or did not take place.

These factors, forces, and circumstances are many. Those which seem more significant in explaining student behavior have been selected for analysis in this paper. They include: a) psychological factors; b) class composition and background of the students; c) Latin America's socio-economic and political conditions; d) nationalism and United States imperialism; and e) the nature of education and type of university.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

In discussing the participation of students in violence some authors have focused on students' attitudes and their perception of the society and the problems that surround them. Although not looking primarily at Latin America, Lewis A. Coser and E. Wight Bakke advance insights that might be applicable to the area. Coser, for example, points out that "in routinized social situations the young may feel that . . . the course of time will rectify felt injustices. But in periods of revolutionary normlessness, or in highly anomic and disorganized situations, normal expectations can no longer be entertained." Coser further explains that the breakdown of tradition creates in the young two seemingly contradictory expectations: "the fear that the gradual advancement in the age hierarchy is put into question and the hope that it is no longer necessary to wait the requisite number of years for the rewards of maturity. Insecurity about the future and hope for the present lead behavior which so far had been future-oriented to be replaced by present-oriented activity."¹³

Bakke has advanced two explanations as to the causes of student activism which emphasize psychological factors. 1. *Stage of youth in the maturation process.* He points out that youths approaching adulthood in association with their peer group are concerned "to find a self-identity and its ultimate integration with others in the adult world and are predisposed to assert that self in action"; 2. *Actualization of the image of the "student."* He further explains that these variables are made more specific for those youths who become students by the image of the student held in their society (or particular areas of it) by students and others, and by the frustrations or opportunities provided, when they attempt to internalize that image by aspects of their university experience and by anticipated frustrations or opportunities perceived to exist in the society beyond the university.¹⁴

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Several authors have looked at Latin American students in particular and have found psychological factors accounting for student violence. Alistair Hennessy, for example, considers "turbulent student activity" as the "genuine expression, in an unjust society, of a frustrated younger generation turning to political action with a fervor compounded of opportunism, malaise and genuine idealism as a means of finding its identity."¹⁵ In discussing student participation in guerrilla activities, Hennessy points out that "there will be a fertile recruiting ground for guerrillas among alienated students who face bleak prospects as underemployed intellectuals or underpaid bureaucrats."¹⁶ Robert E. Scott claims that student demonstrations stem from "a sense of frustration growing out of real deficiencies in educational facilities or from a feeling of insecurity that magnifies government decisions which the students see as undermining their present situation or their future hopes."¹⁷

In an analysis of student violence in Uruguay in 1968, Sergio Luján Silveira explains that the Uruguayan students "felt frustrated because they lacked opportunities and areas to apply their energies and idealism."¹⁸ In a study of the 1968 student revolt in Mexico, William S. Tuohy and Barry Ames concluded that norms and structures institutionalized in the society and polity interacted with psychological factors to promote student political concern and activism in Jalapa. "Individual students appear psychologically prone to political involvement because they are more confident than non-students about their [own] political efficacy."¹⁹

CLASS COMPOSITION AND BACKGROUND

In discussing the causes for student violence a number of authors focus on the class composition and background of the students. Ana María Portugal points out that the University of San Marcos has significant numbers of students from middle and lower classes. "It is important," she explains, "to signal this factor in trying to understand the causes of violence . . . because the essential characteristic of the lower class is its attitude of resentment toward society." She adds that this social resentment will push students from the lower class to accelerate the pace of reform by resorting to violence "which in the long run they consider the best and only road."²⁰

Myron Glazer for Chile, S. Walter Washington for Venezuela, and John H. Peterson for Guatemala also show that lower-class students were more prone to political activism. Glazer points out that for these students "politics is seen as an important means of changing an iniquitous social order and, simultaneously, as a way of gaining a place in it."²¹

Yet the evidence is not totally conclusive. Using data from a project directed by S. M. Lipset,²² Orlando Albornoz found that "no clear relationship between social class and political involvement emerges from the survey data studied."²³ My study of the Cuban students confirms Albornoz's findings, although in the Cuban case many active students came from middle-class backgrounds.²⁴ While no detailed study of the class composition of students active in the MIR in Chile is available, it seems that a good number of them come from middle-class families, with the leadership coming from professional families.

A number of authors emphasize the political and socio-economic situation of Latin American countries to explain student behavior. In a perceptive essay, Kalman Silvert has advanced a scheme helpful in judging the intensity and effectiveness of student activism and in understanding the socio-economic and political conditions under which student violence might develop. His "scale" bears quoting at length:

Situations of Stable Traditional Societies. In very rudimentary, almost bi-class social structures, necessarily governed under crude dictatorial forms, students normally play a very limited role in innovation and political activity. This was the situation in the colonial era, and present-day Nicaragua, Haiti, and Paraguay fall into this category.

Situations of Beginning Modernization and Disarray. As the city begins to grow, as an industrially oriented middle class emerges, and as the politics of change begin to operate, students assume a most important role in the importation and adaptation of ideology, in the organization of power as well as of ideas, and in government itself. Factionalism is one of the earliest signs of modern pluralism. El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Panama are currently in this stage. In a world of political factionalism, more than in any other social milieu, the student, as one of the aspirant elites, finds a situation sufficiently simple so that he can exercise relatively great power over political events.

More Mature Situations of Temporary Resolution. When the social structure is relatively complex, politics turbulent, and at least interim political decisions are made with the immediate future in mind, student groups are usually very active but limited in their role by other established interests. In such situations student activity can still be of great importance in defining issues and precipitating incidents or even full-scale revolts. But usually the university as an institution begins to turn inward, preparing to meet the demand for professionalism that always arises in times of rapid economic and political development. Columbia, Venezuela, and Bolivia, for varying historical reasons, all fall into this category.

Situations of Institutional Complexity and Relative Strength. Where the student finds himself in a plural-interest structure and complex class system, his relative power becomes even more limited. The Mexican experience is a useful case in point. . . . The strength of the Mexican government, the ideological weight of the Revolution and the institutional expression of this ideology by the state, the single governing party, and the intellectual community all combine to strip from the students much of their political reason for being. To take another example, active as the Cuban students were against the Batista regime, they are now contained by the ideological as well as military strength of Castro's modern dictatorship. In Argentina, even though the country exhibits institutional disarray, effective student action in public affairs is impeded by the massiveness of Buenos Aires, the strength of the competing interest structure, and the

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complication of motivations and values. In these situations the students may and usually do have much influence over university policy and affairs, but in national politics their role must of necessity depend on other, more primary definitions of interest. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and Cuba are all within this category.²⁵

Silvert's argument that as given societies modernize, student activism will decline might be valid for some Latin American nations but has not been totally substantiated by studies for other parts of the world. In his work on Burma, for example, Lucian Pye shows that there was no clear connection between movement into the modern world and decline in violence.²⁶ The United States might be a case in point of a "modern" society where student propensity toward violence has been on the rise. The effectiveness of students might decrease with modernization, as Silvert himself has pointed out, but this does not necessarily mean that student politicization or violence will decrease.

Other writers have also focused on Latin American societies in attempting to explain student behavior. Darcy Ribeiro blames socio-economic and political conditions for student violence and concludes that "the students of poor countries, conscious of their privileged positions as members of the tiny factions who succeed in entering the universities, keenly aware of national poverty and indignant about its visible causes, inevitably give expression to their attitude by acts of insubordination."²⁷ Domingo M. Rivarola attributes student violence to a state of tension in society, "a process of internal maladjustment which is also perceived by part or the whole of society."²⁸ In his study of Chilean university students, Myron Glazer found that "the quality and amount of student political involvement seem to reflect the responsiveness of political institutions and the strength of the various groups representing major interests. The more rigid the institutions and the weaker the established interest groups, the greater the students' political involvement."²⁹

NATIONALISM AND U.S. IMPERIALISM

Several writers have attempted to find a connection between nationalism, United States policies in Latin America, and the propensity toward violence among students. Octavio Paz attributes the 1968 student riots in Mexico to "nationalism against . . . North American imperialism." Yet he adds other causal factors such as "aspiration for democratic reform, and opposition to the bureaucracy . . . of the PRI." He further points out that police brutality united the students and concludes that the crisis facing Mexico is the result of changes in the social structure and of the development of new classes—"a crisis of developed Mexico."³⁰

Marxist writers have attempted to explain student violence by emphasizing the socio-economic and political backwardness of the various Latin American countries, and effectively have been responsible for the injection of a new causal factor: imperialism. Writing in the *World Marxist Review*, Manuel Cepeda rejects "those bourgeois ideologists who maintain that youth has risen against the *status quo* and that the dynamism of the movement is attributable to a struggle of the generations whose

roots should be sought in the biological rather than the political sphere." Cepeda maintains that Latin America provides clear evidence "that youth non-conformism has objective class roots in our dependent status. The main thrust of the youth movement is directed against imperialism." Cepeda finds other causes for student violence in the polarization of Latin American society which has made the universities the centers of sharp social struggles and of police terror against recalcitrants. Although he welcomes the role of the university as supplier of guerrilla fighters, he cautions against those "utopian trends looking for immediate solutions." Echoing the Soviet line in Latin America, he rejects armed struggle "as the only possible answer." Advocating a broad united front of different groups, he concludes that "the students must march shoulder to shoulder with the working class and peasantry and other sections of the people."³¹

The influential Chilean Communist, Volodia Teitelboim, claims that the only way to end "the economic backwardness and poverty of Latin American countries is by deposing the ruling oligarchy and—more important still—breaking the stranglehold of American imperialism." He explains that the students are particularly affected "by the conflicts that are part of our time." "Some," he adds, "are depressed by lack of personal and direct contact with production . . . yet [they] share in the intellectual revolt, protesting against social injustice and the spiritual poverty of the world they live in."³²

NATURE OF EDUCATION AND TYPE OF UNIVERSITY

A few writers attribute the student propensity toward violence in part to the type of education they receive. Leopoldo Zea blames student behavior on the incompatibility between the ideals they develop at the university and the reality they find in society. "It is not surprising," claims Zea, "that it is the youth receiving a [university] education and facing a reality which not only limits but also slows down ideals, that clamor for the implementation of those ideals."³³ Ivan Barrientos also blames the educational system of the Latin American countries for the students' frustration and resort to violence. These occur, he says, "when the student contrasts social reality with university teachings which are empty of content."³⁴

Questionnaire-oriented researchers have found that students who study humanities and social science are more active than those who study the exact sciences. They point out that students in the *facultades* of law, economics, and humanities have been more active than students of other facultades.³⁵

It could also be argued that certain features of the university influence student behavior. Autonomy and the restraint exercised by police toward entering the campus lest they bring about a public outcry have created a sanctuary for political agitators and for storage of weapons. Also, the location of the universities, usually in the center of the capital city, exposes the students to the shock waves of Latin America's political turmoil and increases their awareness of and involvement in political affairs.

Similarly, students in Catholic or private universities seem less politically active and involved than students in the national universities. Albornoz found that "opposi-

tion is more frequent in the state urban universities; and cooperation is more frequent in the Catholic universities, whereas in the private non-religious universities which try to discourage politics within the university, there is a certain indifference to any such activity."³⁶ Chile is an exception to this. Concepción, a private university, has been more violent than the national university, and the Catholic University in Santiago and in Valparaiso have been more politically active internally. Finally, where universities allow for *cogobierno* it could be pointed out that this practice of allowing student participation in the government of the university may increase student academic as well as political activism. Yet, more empirical research seems necessary before these assumptions are totally accepted.

A number of authors claim that activism correlates with the length of time the student spends at the university to obtain a degree, the type of residence in which he lives, and the relationship he maintains with his parents. These authors hypothesize that the largest percentage of student activists lived on their own away from their homes are more prone to political activism.³⁷ From the data surveyed, Alborno found that the largest percentage of student activists lived on their own away from their families and homes. "Living with the family," Alborno concluded, "seems to be a restraining factor on the political involvement of university students."³⁸

Although this point seems substantiated by some quantitative research, the statement that "professional" students are more active does not seem borne out by empirical evidence. As a matter of fact, contrary evidence has been advanced, as by Frank Bonilla for Chile.³⁹

In my study of Cuban students, I have found that some of the above-mentioned propositions explaining student violence were valid. Cuba's socio-economic and political conditions as well as psychological factors converged to produce highly politicized and violent students. The so-called "student generation of 1930," for example, found their country internationally dependent on the United States, economically and socially backward, and politically dominated by the ruthless Machado dictatorship which refused major reforms and attempted to perpetuate itself in power. Finding few avenues to express their discontent or to pressure for reforms the students resorted to violence. Their actions contributed to the overthrow of the Machado regime, but their revolutionary effort was frustrated among other things by opposition from the United States and from Cuba's vested interests as well as by the intervention of the Cuban military. The students' own inexperience and inability to govern also contributed much to the downfall of the student-backed Ramón Grau San Martín regime in 1934. The frustration of this revolutionary process led in the late 1930's and 1940's to widespread urban violence in which many of the student leaders of the generation of 1930 participated.

The Cuban case shows, furthermore, that several factors were instrumental in politicizing students at the University of Havana and in leading to their violent behavior: 1. The impact of outside ideas, ideologies, and movements such as the Córdoba Reform Movement, the Mexican Revolution, nationalism, and Marxism; 2. The desire on the part of the students to modernize their university and to change their country's socio-economic and political conditions; 3. The perception on the part of

the students that change could come about only through violence; 4. The belief on and off-campus that the students had the capability and responsibility to orient and lead the other sectors of society; 5. The rivalry between students and the military—another group also committed to violence; 6. A generational conflict with older groups; 7. The location of the university in the center of the capital city, which exposed the students to the shock waves of Cuba's political turmoil; 8. The autonomy which converted the university in the 1940's and 1950's into a sanctuary for political agitators; and 9. The influence of faculty members as well as political parties, groups, and leaders who either opposed the reigns in power or used the student to obtain benefits and privileges.

In Cuba most of the student leaders came from areas outside the capital and thus lived away from their homes, free from parental control; there was no evident relationship between social class and political activism; and those committed to student violence were only a minority but usually supported by a majority of the students.⁴⁰

THEORETICAL MODELS

Models of student violence are still scarce.⁴¹ Ted Gurr has proposed a theoretical model of "social patterns that dispose men to collective violence"; the model encompasses both the complexity of variables tending toward behavioral outcomes and the nonrational nature of human response to social circumstances.⁴² The essence of Gurr's model is "that discrepancies between value expectations and perceived value capabilities of societies result in relative deprivation [perceived discrepancy between what people think they will get and what they believed they are entitled to] and the consequent response tendency of frustration-aggression is channelled into collective response alternatives by available facilities of social control and social facilitation." Several studies employing cross-national aggregate data have utilized this model.⁴³ Among others, Bryant Wedge has tested the model through case studies based primarily on the reports of student participants in political events in which violent uprising was perceived as a possible outcome. He shows that explanations for behavior must be sought "in individual reactions to circumstances as well as in circumstances themselves." Using examples from Brazil and the Dominican Republic he concluded that where the social pre-condition and psychological predisposition for violence have only moderate force (Brazil) there is considerable tolerance for provocative incidents. On the other hand when the pre-conditions and predisposition have great strength (Dominican Republic) relative minor provocation may precipitate violent response.⁴⁴

THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Most of the prevailing dicta about student politicization and violence in Latin America need revision. Because student violence has become a world-wide phenomenon both in developed and developing areas, causal factors such as lack of socio-economic development, low quality of educational institutions, or dictatorial regimes seem less relevant now in explaining student propensity toward violence. Many observers came to believe that if Latin America arrived at a "developed stage," "solved"

its socio-economic problems, and upgraded the quality of its educational institutions, student politicization and propensity toward violence would diminish. It is obvious that these explanations are not sufficient. Without discarding them we need to look for new, more meaningful answers.

Student violence should be restudied in the context of new developments in Latin America. Increasing nationalism and radicalism as well as the rapid change the area is experiencing are creating new opportunities for the various social groups to attain their objectives. These groups are showing greater expectations which, if not satisfied, could lead to a greater violence. Similarly, the growth of new forms of violence such as urban guerrillas open opportunities hitherto unavailable to the students to express their grievances.

A number of aspects connected with the students deserve further attention. For some countries, a need exists for basic historical and sociological research about students. Student organizations, for example, have been little explored but seem a fruitful area for research. Although political parties and labor union and military organizations have received attention, student associations have been almost neglected.⁴⁵ Rivalry between hostile organizations claiming to represent the students within a university, or rivalry between student organizations and the military, are significant sources of tension and violence but remain virtually unexplored. Similarly, relations between student associations and guerrilla groups need attention.

Outside groups and parties are an important factor in politicizing students and promoting their violent behavior, but their impact has been little studied. The role of Marxist and Castroite groups in particular could be an interesting and revealing area for further research.

Also, the role of generational conflict as a motivating factor for student violence deserves more study. As James F. Tierney has indicated, "student rebellion is in large part a reflection of a pervading dissatisfaction of the younger generation with what it regards as the failures and shortcomings of its elders."⁴⁶ In some instances two generations might work together while in others they could be in opposition. Student violence can be studied in both cases as an expression of generational transfer and conflict. Theories of generational conflict, particularly as they relate to student groups, need testing and elaboration.

One aspect that deserves attention is the personality of student leaders. What is their background, ideology, style of leadership? Do they tend to be dogmatic or open-minded, pragmatic or ideological? Is there a particular type of person who is attracted to student political activity? Although this type of research would require collaborative efforts among several disciplines or training in psychology and psychoanalysis to carry out in-depth interviews with student political leaders, it could provide rich insights into student behavior.

There are a number of questions which, despite their difficulty, deserve further study. 1. Are students more violent than other groups—labor, peasantry, the military—in Latin America? 2. How are students mobilized? How immobilized? 3. Does the transitory nature of student life make students more impatient and therefore more prone to violence? 4. Do the quality and nature of the educational system relate to

the students' propensity toward violence? 5. What is the impact of professors on student behavior? 6. What is the role of ideology in promoting student violence? 7. How much does government violence contribute to student responses?

This essay has focused primarily on the causes of student violence, but one important and often neglected aspect that deserves mention for possible research is the relationship between violence and modernization. Has student violence contributed to modernization either within the university or in society as a whole? Violence undoubtedly has contributed to change but how much change, or what type, and in what direction? Persistence of violence, furthermore, might indicate lack of change or at least that something is not changing—the persistence of violence.

The illustrations of further research that should be conducted on the causes of student violence or on violence in general are many. This paper touches only a fraction of this important area. It is a call for more systematic research and understanding of that elusive personality—the violent student.*

NOTES

1. Some of the contemporary research on Latin American students has been summarized by John H. Peterson, "Recent Research on Latin American Students," *LARR*, 5:1:37–58 (Spring 1970), and Robert Arno, "A Survey of Literature and Research on Latin American Universities," *LARR*, 3:1:45–62 (Fall 1967). See also Philip Altbach's useful annotated bibliography, *A Select Bibliography on Students, Politics, and Higher Education* (Cambridge, 1967); H. F. Dame, et al., eds., *The Political Influence of University Students in Latin America: An Analytical Survey of Research Studies and Related Lectures* (Washington, D.C., 1965), and Joseph Love, "Sources for the Latin American Student Movement; Archives of the U.S. National Student Association," *The Journal of Developing Areas* (Jan. 1967). Much of the recent scholarly research on student behavior has been summarized by S. M. Lipset, "University Students and Politics in Under-developed Countries," In: *Student Politics*, S. M. Lipset, ed (N.Y., 1967).
2. The one exception to this generalization seems to be *la violencia* in Colombia, which has generated numerous studies. See Richard S. Weinert, "Violence in Pre-Modern Societies: Rural Colombia," *The American Political Science Review*, 60 (June 1966); Robert C. Williamson, "Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural Colombia," *Western Political Q.*, 28 (March 1965); and Germán Guzmán, et al., eds., "La Violencia en Colombia," *Monografías Sociológicas* (Bogotá: National University, 1962). For a fine collection of essays on the causal factors of violence in Latin America, see Francisco José Moreno and Barbara Mitrani, eds., *Conflict and Violence in Latin American Politics* (N.Y., 1971). (Ed.: The next issue of *LARR* (8:1, Spring 1973) will contain an article by R. W. Ramsey, entitled, "Critical Bibliography on *La Violencia* in Colombia.")
3. See D. P. Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross Cultural Test of a Causal Model," *LARR*, 3:2:17–66. Comments and criticisms on Bwy's article can be found in the same issue, 67–87.
4. William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," *Western Political Q.*, 5:445–469 (Sept. 1952).
5. Merle King, "Violence and Politics in Latin America," In: *Latin American Radicalism*, I. L. Horowitz, et al., eds. (N.Y., 1969).
6. Martin Needler, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change*, 44–46 (N.Y., 1968).

* The next issue of *LARR* (Spring 1973) will carry an article by Dani B. Thomas and Richard B. Craig entitled "Student Dissent in Latin America: Toward a Comparative Analysis."

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7. This definition is based partially on a more general definition of political violence provided by Donald Morris in "Political Violence and Political Modernization in Mexico" (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
8. John Tate Lanning, *Old World Background of Latin American Culture*, 22 (Tucson, 1960).
9. Cristóbal B. de la Plaza y Jaén, *Crónica de la Real y Pontificia Universidad de México escrita en el siglo XVII*, 1:8 (México, 1931).
10. See Daniel Valcárcel, *Reformas virreinales en San Marcos*, 67–68 (Lima, 1960).
11. Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, *La universidad latinoamericana*, 5 (México, 1961).
12. John P. Harrison, "The Confrontation with the Political University," In: *The Dynamics of Change in Latin America*, John D. Martz, ed., 229 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965). See also International Student Conference, *University Reform in Latin America* (Leiden: COSEC, n.d.); Richard J. Walter, *Student Politics in Argentina* (N.Y., 1968); and Arthur Liebman, Kenneth Walker and Myron Glazer, *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).
13. Lewis A. Coser, "Violence and the Social Structure," *Science and Psychoanalysis*, 6:30–42 (1963).
14. See E. Wight Bakke, "Roots and Soil of Student Activism," In: *Student Politics*, S. M. Lipset, ed., 69–70 (N.Y., 1967).
15. Alistair Hennessy, "University Students in National Politics," In: *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, Claudio Véliz, ed., 119 (London, 1967).
16. Hennessy, "University Students," 143.
17. Robert E. Scott, "Student Political Activism in Latin America," *Daedalus*, 97:70 (Winter 1968).
18. Sergio Luján Silveira, "La juventud uruguaya," *Mundo Nuevo*, 34:5 (April 1969).
19. See William S. Tuohy and Barry Ames, *Mexican University Students in Politics: Rebels without Allies?* (Denver, 1969–1970).
20. Ana María Portugal, "Realidad y rebelión en el Perú," *Mundo Nuevo*, 34:25 (April 1969).
21. Myron Glazer, "Student Politics in a Chilean University," *Daedalus*, 97:104–105 (Winter, 1968); S. Walter Washington, "The Political Activity of Latin American Students," In: *Latin American Politics*, Robert Tomasek, ed., 125 (N.Y., 1966); and John H. Petersen, "Student Political Activism in Guatemala," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* (Jan., 1971).
22. The project covers five Latin American countries: Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and also Puerto Rico. Data from other countries, such as Brazil, were incorporated. The project was initiated at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, and was later continued at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
23. Orlando Alborno, "Student Opposition in Latin America," *Government and Opposition*, 2:105–118 (Nov., 1966).
24. Jaime Suchlicki, *University Students and Revolution in Cuba* (Coral Gables, 1969).
25. K. H. Silvert, "The University Student," In: *Continuity and Change in Latin America*, John J. Johnson, ed., 222–224 (Stanford, 1964).
26. See Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity*, 166 (New Haven, 1962).
27. Darcy Ribeiro, "Universities and Social Development," In: *Elites in Latin America*, Seymour Martin Lipset, Aldo Solari, et al., eds., 368 (N.Y., 1967).
28. Domingo M. Rivarola, "Universidad y estudiantes en una sociedad tradicional," *Aportes*, 12:50 (April 1969).
29. Myron Glazer, "Chile," In: *Students and Politics in Developing Nations*, Donald K. Emerson, ed., 309 (N.Y., 1968).
30. Octavio Paz, *México: la última década* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, Institute of Latin American Studies Hackett Memorial Lecture, 1969). Arthur Liebman, "Student Activism in Mexico," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (May 1971), concludes that the principal moving force behind the student rebellion was

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- the moral outrage of thousands of uninvolved students who responded to what they felt was unwarranted police brutality in quelling a campus uprising. But he adds that other factors which increased student rebelliousness included cuts in the university budget, strong antipathy toward the PRI, and the fact that "the students knew that the PRI had made graft and corruption an intrinsic part of the Mexican people's way of life." See also James N. Goodsell, "Mexico: Why the Students Rioted," *Current History* (Jan. 1969).
31. Manuel Cepeda, "U.S. Imperialism Penetrates Latin American Universities," *World Marxist Review*, 11:8:58-65 (Aug. 1968).
 32. V. Teitelboim, "Problems Facing Latin American Intellectuals," *Political Affairs*, 48:3:4-5 (March 1969).
 33. Leopoldo Zea, "La universidad aquí y ahora," *Deslinde* (México), 4:8 (May-Aug. 1969).
 34. Iván Barrientos, *La formación del estudiante universitario*, 25 (Lawrence, Kan.; The University of Kansas, Center for Latin American Studies, Jan. 1968).
 35. See Albornoz, "Student Opposition," 109; Petersen, "Student Political Activism," 1; and Lipset, "University Students," 45.
 36. Albornoz, "Student Opposition," 112.
 37. See Francis Donahue, "Students in Latin American Politics," *Antioch Review*, 26:94 (Spring 1966); E. Wight Bakke, "Students on the March: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia," *Sociology of Education*, 37:204 (Spring 1964); Petersen, "Student Political Activism," 4; Hennessy, "University Students," 132.
 38. Albornoz, "Student Opposition," 109.
 39. Frank Bonilla, "The Chilean Student Federation," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, 2:329 (July 1960).
 40. Suchlicki, *University Students*.
 41. Roberta E. Koplin has proposed a model of student politicization which isolates three systemic variables which are essential in influencing student behavior: 1) the structure of the educational system; 2) the propensity of the authorities to sanction (positively or negatively) political opposition; and 3) the degree of political congruence between the student population and the political elite. See Roberta E. Koplin, "A Model of Student Politicization in the Developing Nations," *Comparative Political Studies*, 3 (Oct. 1968).
 42. See Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, 20:245-278 (Jan. 1968).
 43. Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (Dec. 1968), and Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model*, Research Monograph 28 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1967).
 44. Bryant Wedge, "The Case Study of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965," *World Politics*, 21:188 (Jan. 1969).
 45. For a general discussion see Philip G. Altbach, "Student and Politics," *Comparative Education Review*, 10:2:180-187 (June 1966). For fruitful results that this type of research can provide see Frank Bonilla's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard, "Students in Politics: Three Generations of Political Action in a Latin American University," and his article "The Student Federation of Chile: 50 Years of Political Action," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, 311-334 (July 1960).
 46. See James F. Tierney, "Students, Politics, and the University: Some Inter-American Observations," *Student Activism and Higher Education* (N.Y., Institute of International Education, 1970).