

## References

- Alvarez, Maria. *Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Reasons for Action: Rationale, Motivation, Explanation. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2016 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/>.
- Anscombe, Elizabeth. *Intention*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000 [1957].
- Arpaly, Nomy and Schroeder, Timothy. Deliberation and Acting for Reasons. *Philosophical Review* 121(2):209–239, 2012.
- Asarnow, Samuel. Rational Internalism. *Ethics* 127(1):147–178, 2016.
- The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 95(3):614–636, 2017.
- Bader, Ralf. Conditions, Modifiers and Holism. In Errol Lord and Barry Maguire (eds.), *Weighing Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–55, 2016.
- Basu, Rima. Can Beliefs Wrong? *Philosophical Topics* 46(1):1–17, 2018.
- Benmakhlouf, Ali. *La force des raisons: Logique et médecine*. Paris: Fayard, 2018.
- Berker, Selim. A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief. *Analytic Philosophy* 59(4):427–470, 2018.
- Boghossian, Paul A. The Normativity of Content. *Philosophical Issues* 13(1):31–45, 2003.
- Broome, John. Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, Samuel Scheffler, and Philip Pettit (eds.), *Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28–55, 2004.
- Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity. *Ethics* 119(1):96–108, 2008.
- Rationality through Reasoning*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
- Reason versus Ought. *Philosophical Issues* 25(1):80–97, 2015.
- Reason Fundamentalism and What Is Wrong with It. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 297–318, 2018.
- Brown, Campbell. The Composition of Reasons. *Synthese* 191(5):779–800, 2014.
- Brown, Jessica. Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics. *Analysis* 73(4):626–635, 2013.
- Brunero, John. Reasons and Evidence One Ought. *Ethics* 119(3):538–545, 2009.

- Reasons as Explanations. *Philosophical Studies* 165(3):805–824, 2013.
- Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 321–341, 2018.
- Chappell, Richard. Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. *Philosophical Quarterly* 62:684–704, 2012.
- Crawford, Lindsay. Believing the Best: On Doxastic Partiality in Friendship. *Synthese* 196(4):1575–1593, 2019.
- Crisp, Roger. Review of ‘Value ... and What Follows’ by Joel Kupperman. *Philosophy* 3:452–462, 2000.
- D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61(1):65, 2000a.
- Sentiment and Value. *Ethics* 110(4):722–748, 2000b.
- Dancy, Jonathan. *Ethics without Principles*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Davidson, Donald. Actions, Reasons and Causes. *Journal of Philosophy* 60:685–700, 1963.
- Actions et événements*, translated by Pascal Engel, Paris: PUF, 1993.
- Deonna, Julien A. and Teroni, Fabrice. *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2012.
- Dietz, Christina. Are All Reasons Causes? *Philosophical Studies* 173(5):1179–1190, 2016.
- Drucker, Daniel. Policy Externalism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 98(2):261–285, 2019.
- Dutant, Julien and Littlejohn, Clayton. Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance. In Mona Simion and Jessica Brown (eds.), *Reasons, Justification, and Defeat*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 233–246, 2021.
- Echeverri, Santiago. Emotional Justification. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 98(3):541–566, 2019.
- Engel, Pascal. Présentation. In *Davidson 1993*, translated by P. Engel, Paris: PUF, pp. v–xxxi, 1993.
- Truth and the Aim of Belief. In Donald Gillies (ed.), *Laws and Models in Science*. London: King’s College Publications, pp. 77–97, 2004.
- Belief and Normativity. *Disputatio*, II(3):153–177, November 2007.
- In Defence of Normativism about the Aim of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), *The Aim of Belief*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 32–63, 2013.
- Interprétation, raisons et faits. *Critique* 2015, 6(817–818):502–517, 2015a
- Retour à la raison. *Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l’Etranger* 140(3):359, 2015b.
- Les vices du savoir*. Marseille: Agone, 2019.
- Le mauvais type de raison. In B. Langlet and J. M. Monnoyer (eds.), *Reasons, La question méta-éthique: autour de l’oeuvre de John Skorupski*. Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, pp. 145–165, 2020a.
- Contre le neo-pragmatisme doxastique. *Klesis* 45:1–30, 2020b.

- Epley, Kelly. Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 100(1):256–282, 2018.
- Faraci, David. We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. *Mind* 129(513):225–234, 2020.
- Fassio, Davide. The Aim of Belief. In *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2015, <https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/>.
- Finlay, Stephen. The Reasons That Matter. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84 (1):1–20, 2006.
- Explaining Reasons. *Deutsches Jahrbuch Fuer Philosophie* 4:112–126, 2012.
- Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- A ‘Good’ Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 33:62–104, 2020.
- Fletcher, Guy. A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence. *Utilitas* 25 (3):417–420, 2013.
- Fogal, Daniel. Reasons, Reason, and Context. In Errol Lord and Barry Maguire (eds.), *Weighing Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 74–103, 2016.
- Fogal, Daniel and Sylvan, Kurt. Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons. In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Contextualism*. London: Routledge, pp. 375–387, 2017.
- Foley, Richard. *Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Frege, Gottlob. *Posthumous Writings*. Edited by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach and translated by P. Long and R. White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.
- Gendler, Tamar. On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias. *Philosophical Studies* 156(1):33–63, 2011.
- Gertken, Jan and Kiesewetter, Benjamin. The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. *Philosophy Compass* 12(5):e12412, 2017.
- Gibbard, Allan. *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Gibbons, John. *The Norm of Belief*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Goldie, Peter. Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1(3):235–254, 2002.
- Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–104, 2004.
- Goldman, Alvin. What Is Justified Belief. In George Pappas (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge*. Boston: D. Reidel, pp. 1–25, 1979.
- Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification. *Journal of Philosophy* 106(6):309–338, 2009.
- Gordon, Robert M. *The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

- Greenspan, Patricia S. *Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry into Emotional Justification*. New York: Routledge, 1988.
- Gregory, Alex. Normative Reasons as Good Bases. *Philosophical Studies* 173 (9):2291–2310, 2016.
- Grice, H. Paul. Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41–58, 1975.
- Aspects of Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Harman, Gilbert. *Change in View*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
- Hawthorne, John. Knowledge and Evidence. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70(2):452–458, 2005.
- Hawthorne, John and Magidor, Ofra. Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113–143, 2018.
- Hempel, Carl. *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Free Press, 1965.
- Hempel, Carl and Oppenheim, Paul. Studies in the Logic of Explanation. *Philosophy of Science*, 15:135–175, 1948. Reprinted in Hempel, 245–290, 1965.
- Heuer, Ulrike. Reasons and Impossibility. *Philosophical Studies* 147(2):235–246, 2010.
- Hieronymi, Pamela. The Wrong Kind of Reason. *Journal of Philosophy* 102 (9):437–457, 2005.
- The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments). *Ethics* 124(1):114–127, 2013.
- Horty, John F. *Reasons as Defaults*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Hughes, Nick. Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’. *Utilitas* 30(4):439–457, 2018.
- James, William. The Will to Believe. *The New World* 5:327–347, 1896.
- Kaplan, Mark. Williamson’s Casual Approach to Probabilism. In Duncan Pritchard and Patrick Greenough (eds.), *Williamson on Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 122–139, 2009.
- Kearns, Stephen and Star, Daniel. Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? *Ethics* 119 (1):31–56, 2008.
- Reasons as Evidence. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 4:215–242, 2009.
- Weighing Reasons. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 10(1):70–86, 2013.
- Weighing Explanations. In Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds.), *Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 232–251, 2015.
- Keller, Simon. Friendship and Belief. *Philosophical Papers* 33(3):329–351, 2004.
- Kelly, Thomas. The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes. *Philosophical Studies* 110:163–196, 2002.
2003. Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66(3):612–640.

- Evidence. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/>, 2016.
- Kennedy, Christopher. *Projecting the Adjective: The Syntax and Semantics of Gradability and Comparison*. New York: Garland. [Santa Cruz: University of California, Santa Cruz dissertation, 1997.] 1999 .
- Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Gradable Adjectives. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 30(1):1–45, 2007.
- Kennedy, Christopher and McNally, Louise. Scale Structure, Degree Modification, and the Semantics of Gradable Predicates. *Language* 81:345–381, 2005.
- Kenny, Anthony J. Practical Inference. *Analysis* 26(3):65–75, 1966.
- Kiesewetter, Benjamin. You Ought to  $\phi$  Only if You May Believe that You Ought to  $\phi$ . *Philosophical Quarterly* 66(265):760–782, 2016.
- The Normativity of Rationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting (eds.), *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 90–114, 2018.
- Kratzer, Angelika. The Notional Category of Modality. In Hans-Jürgen Eikmeyer and Hannes Rieser (eds.), *Words, Worlds, and Contexts: New Approaches in Word Semantics (Research in Text Theory 6)*. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 38–74, 1981.
- Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. Guidance, Epistemic Filters, and Non-accidental Ought-Doing. *Philosophical Issues* 29:172–183, 2019.
- Lassiter, Daniel. *Graded Modality: Qualitative and Quantitative Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Leary, Stephanie. In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 95(3):529–542, 2017.
- Littlejohn, Clayton. Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 93(3):720–727, 2016.
- Livet, Pierre. *Qu'est-ce qu'une action ?* Paris: Vrin, 2005.
- Logins, Artūrs. Save the Children! *Analysis* 76(4):418–422, 2016a.
- Necessary Truths, Evidence, and Knowledge. *Filosofia Unisinos* 17(3):302–307, 2016b.
- Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K. *Theoria* 83(2): 120–137, 2017.
- Two-State Solution to the Lottery Paradox. *Philosophical Studies* 177(11):3465–3492, 2020a.
- Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support? *Erkenntnis*, DOI:10.1007/s10670-020-00241-4, ahead-of-print: 1–25, 2020b.
- How to Argue with a Pragmatist. *Inquiry*, DOI:10.1080/0020174X.2021.1919199, ahead-of-print: 1–16, 2021.
- Lord, Errol. What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do. *Mind* 126(504):1109–1154, 2017.

- Lord, Errol and Maguire, Barry. An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons. In Errol Lord and Barry Maguire (eds.), *Weighing Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–24, 2016.
- Löschke, Jörg. Reasons to Act, Reasons to Require, and the Two-Level Theory of Moral Explanation. *Philosophical Studies* 178(1):169–185, 2021.
- Maguire, Barry. The Value-Based Theory of Reasons. *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy* 3:233–262, 2016.
- There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. *Mind* 127(507):779–805, 2018.
- Maguire, Barry and Woods, Jack. The Game of Belief. *Philosophical Review* 129(2):211–249, 2020.
- Markovits, Julia. (2011a). Internal Reasons and the Motivating Intuition. In M. Brady (ed.), *New Waves in Metaethics*, pp. 141–165. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- (2011b). Why Be an Internalist about Reasons? In R. S. Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, vol. 6, pp. 255–279. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marušić, Berislav. Promising against the Evidence. *Ethics* 123(2):292–317, 2013.
- McBride, Mark. Kearns and Star on Reasons as Evidence. *Analytic Philosophy* 54(2):229–236, 2013.
- McCain, Kevin. Explanationist Evidentialism. *Episteme* 10(3):299–315, 2013.
- Explanationist Evidentialism: A Defense. In McCain Kevin (ed.), *Believing in Accordance with the Evidence*. Cham: Springer, pp. 375–391, 2018.
- McCormick, Miriam Schleifer. *Believing against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief*. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Can Beliefs Be Based on Practical Reasons? In Pat Bondy and J. Adam Carter (eds.), *Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation*. New York: Routledge, pp. 215–234, 2019.
- McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. Fittingness First. *Ethics* 126(3):575–606, 2016.
- McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. Elusive Reasons. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 7:110–137, 2012.
- McKeon, Matthew W. On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments from Explanations. *Argumentation* 27:283–303, 2013.
- McNaughton, David and Rawling, Piers. The Making/Evidential Reason Distinction. *Analysis* 71(1):100–102, 2011.
- Melden, Abraham Irving. *Free Action*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
- Mele, Alfred. Agents' Abilities. *Noûs* 37:447–470, 2002.
- Meylan, Anne. Justification et rationalité des émotions. *Philosophiques* 45(2):477, 2018.
- Millgram, Elijah. Williams' Argument against External Reasons. *Noûs* 30:197–220, 1996.
- Mulligan, Kevin. From Appropriate Emotions to Values. *The Monist*, 81(1):161–188, 1998.
- Na'aman, Oded. The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View. *Noûs* 55(2):245–269, 2021.

- Nair, Shyam. Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting Ought's. *Philosophical Studies* 173(3):629–663, 2016.
- Nebel, Jacob M. Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought. *Mind* 128 (510):459–484, 2019.
- Ogien, Ruwen. *Les causes et les raisons*. Nîmes: éditions Jacqueline Chambon, 1995.
- Paakkunainen, Hille. Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action? *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 12(1):56–93, 2017.
- Internalism and Externalism about Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 143–170, 2018.
- Parfit, Derek. *On What Matters: Two-Volume Set*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Pascal, Blaise. *Pensées*. Translated and edited by A. Kreilsheimer. New York: Penguin, 1960/1995.
- Pelser, Adam C. Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification. In Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd (eds.), *Emotion and Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 106–122, 2014.
- Pickard, Hanna. Responsibility without Blame for Addiction. *Neuroethics* 10 (1):169–180, 2017.
- Piller, Christian. Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 59:155–182, 2006.
- Pollock, John. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.
- Potsdam, Eric, and Edmiston, Daniel. Imperatives. In Mark Aronoff (ed.), *Oxford Bibliographies in Linguistics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Preston-Roedder, Ryan. Faith in Humanity. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 87(3):664–687, 2013.
- Prior, Mary and Prior, Arthur. Erotetic Logic. *The Philosophical Review* 64 (1):43–59, 1955.
- Pryor, James. The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. *Noûs* 34(4):517–549, 2000.
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value. *Ethics* 114:391–423, 2004.
- Raz, Joseph (ed.). *Practical Reasoning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Raz, Joseph. *Practical Reason and Norms*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Reisner, Andrew. Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief. *Philosophical Studies* 138(1):17–27, 2008.
- The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. *Philosophical Studies* 145(2):257–272, 2009.
- Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity. In Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds.), *Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–206, 2015.
- Pragmatic Reasons for Belief. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 705–728, 2018.

- Rinard, Susanna. Against the New Evidentialists. *Philosophical Issues* 25 (1):208–223, 2015.
- No Exception for Belief. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94 (1):121–143, 2017.
- Believing for Practical Reasons. *Noûs* 53(4):763–784, 2018.
- Equal Treatment for Belief. *Philosophical Studies* 176(7):1923–1950, 2019.
- Ross, W. David. *The Right and the Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930.
- Rossi, Benjamin Cohen. Introducing a New Elusive Reason. *Ratio* 34 (3):227–235, 2021.
- Rowland, Richard. *The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Salmon, Wesley. Statistical Explanation. In W. Salmon (ed.), *Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 29–87, 1971.
- vos Savant, M. *Ask Marilyn*. New York: St. Martin's, 1992.
- Scanlon, Thomas M. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Being Realistic about Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Scarantino, Andrea and de Sousa, Ronald. Emotion. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/emotion/>, 2018.
- Schmidt, Eva. New Trouble for 'Reasons as Evidence': Means That Don't Justify the Ends. *Ethics* 127(3):708–718, 2017.
- Schroeder, Mark. *Slaves of the Passions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Having Reasons. *Philosophical Studies* 139(1):57–71, 2008.
- The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons. *Ethics* 122(3):457–488, 2012.
- State-Given Reasons: Prevalent, If Not Ubiquitous. *Ethics* 124(1):128–140, 2013.
- Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. Reasons as Right-Makers. *Philosophical Explorations* 12(3):279–296, 2009.
- Setiya, Kieran. *Reasons without Rationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Reply to Bratman and Smith. *Analysis* 69(3):531–540, 2009.
- What Is a Reason to Act?. *Philosophical Studies* 167(2):221–235, 2014.
- Shafer-Landau, Russ. *Moral Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Shah, Nishi. How Truth Governs Belief. *Philosophical Review* 112(4):447–482, 2003.
- A New Argument for Evidentialism. *Philosophical Quarterly* 56:481–498, 2006.
- Shah, Nishi and Velleman, J. David. Doxastic Deliberation. *Philosophical Review* 114(4):497–534, 2005.
- Sher, Itai. Comparative Value and the Weight of Reasons. *Economics and Philosophy* 35:103–158, 2019.
- Silverstein, Matthew. Reducing Reasons. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 10 (1):1–22, 2016.

- Sinclair, Neil. Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 15:647–659, 2012.
- Singer, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (3):229–243, 1972.
- Skorupski, John. *The Domain of Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Smith, Michael. *The Moral Problem*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
- Internal Reasons. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55(1):109–131, 1995.
- Reasons with Rationalism after All. *Analysis Reviews* 69:521–530, 2009.
- Smithies, Declan. Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85(2):273–300, 2012.
- Reasons and Perception. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 632–661, 2018.
- Snedegar, Justin. *Contrastive Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Sobel, David. Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18:218–235, 2001.
- de Sousa, Ronald. *The Rationality of Emotion*, vol. 100. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
- de Sousa, Ronald B. Emotional Truth: Ronald de Sousa. *Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 76(1):247–263, 2002.
- Srinivasan, Amia. Normativity without Cartesian Privilege. *Philosophical Issues* 25 (1):273–299, 2015.
- Star, Daniel. Reasoning with Reasons. In Jonathan Way, Conor McHugh and Daniel Whiting (eds.), *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 241–259, 2018.
- Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn and Skipper, Mattias. An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief. *Mind*, 129(516): 1071–1094, 2020.
- Stroud, Sarah. Epistemic Partiality in Friendship. *Ethics* 116(3):498–524, 2006.
- Streumer, Bart. Reasons and Impossibility. *Philosophical Studies* 136(3):351–384, 2007.
- Sylvan, Kurt. Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity. *Philosophy Compass* 11 (7):364–376, 2016.
- Timmerman, Travis. Sometimes There Is Nothing Wrong with Letting a Child Drown. *Analysis* 75(2):204–212, 2015.
- Velleman, J. David. *Practical Reflection*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, online version, 1999 (originally 1989).
- On the Aim of Belief. Chapter 11 In J. David Velleman (ed.), *The Possibility of Practical Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 244–281, 2000.
- Way, Jonathan. Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason. *Ethics* 122 (3):489–515, 2012.
- Value and Reasons to Favour. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 8:27–49, 2013.
- Two Arguments for Evidentialism. *Philosophical Quarterly* 66(265):805–818, 2016.

- Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98:251–270. DOI: 10.1111/papq.12135, 2017.
- Reasons and Rationality. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 485–503, 2018.
- Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. Reasons and Guidance. *Analytic Philosophy* 57(3):214–235, 2016.
- Wedgwood, Ralph. The Aim of Belief. *Philosophical Perspectives* 16:267–297, 2002.
- The Right Thing to Believe. In Timothy Chan (ed.), *The Aim of Belief*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–139, 2013.
- The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’. *Philosophical Issues* 25(1):123–143, 2015.
- Whately, Richard. *Elements of Logic*. Delmar, NY: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1827/1975.
- Elements of Rhetoric*, 7th ed. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1828/1846.
- Whiting, Daniel. Right in Some Respects: Reasons as Evidence. *Philosophical Studies* 175(9):2191–2208, 2018.
- Wiland, Eric. *Reasons*. London: Continuum, 2012.
- Williams, Bernard. Deciding to Believe. In Bernard Williams (ed.), *Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–151, 1973.
- Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), *Rational Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–113, 1979.
- Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame. In William J. Prior (ed.), *Reason and Moral Judgment, Logos*, vol. 10. Santa Clara, CA: Santa Clara University, 1989.
- Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons. In E. Millgram (ed.), *Varieties of Practical Reasoning*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 91–97, 2001.
- Williamson, Timothy. *Knowledge and Its Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *The Blue and Brown Books (BB)*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
- Wodak, Daniel. Redundant Reasons. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 98(2):266–278, 2020.
- Wright, Crispin. Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? *Aristotelian Society Supplementary* 78(1):167–212, 2004.