

Soviet policy is firmly committed to *détente* with the West. All of this may be true, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that some powerful opinion groups in the Soviet Union take a hardline approach toward *détente* and are suspicious of any accommodation with the West. Such viewpoints can certainly be found among the Soviet military, party apparatus, and heavy industrial ministries.

This weakness is basically a product of Kulski's approach. He is interested in analyzing the views of Soviet scholars on international relations. In doing so, however, he studies primarily the views expressed by the Soviet intellectual establishment, in several journals dealing with international relations, and the official policy pronouncements made by the country's leadership. Thus the groups which express their views through other sources do not receive the attention they deserve. It is especially regrettable that some of the divergent views published by military officials were effectively excluded by this approach.

A second weakness is the book's failure to examine the process of foreign policy decision-making. How are decisions reached in the foreign policy area? More important, what groups participate, and what is the respective influence of each? Kulski's research is based on the assumption that the specialists play an influential part in the process, but the book never attempts to show how they are involved or to what extent they have influence. Moreover, certain other groups which might be influential are omitted from systematic analysis because the model of foreign policy decision-making is inadequately developed.

Despite these problems, however, the book is important and will be of interest to students of Soviet politics. The analysis is comprehensive and—except for an excessive use of quotations—well written.

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THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA. By *Geoffrey Jukes*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973. vii, 304 pp. \$8.75.

In the first paragraph the author states that he decided to write the book for three reasons: these were his "discovery that . . . no general study has attempted to deal with Soviet interests in the Asian area on a broad basis," his conversations during a journey through Siberia in 1969, and his "realisation that some Soviet apprehensions about Asia are similarly grounded to those of Australia" (where he has been working as a senior fellow in the Department of International Relations of the Australian National University). The last two considerations did not visibly affect the book. (The similarities of Moscow's and Canberra's attitudes toward Asia might be of interest for Australian readers, but for others they are not particularly helpful in the understanding of the problem.) It was clearly the author's first observation—his discovery, as he calls it—which prompted him to write about the Soviet Union in Asia.

After an introduction of some thirty pages, the author treats Soviet Asia (34 pp.), military problems of the USSR in Asia (30 pp.), Moscow's relations with the countries of Asia (155 pp., of which 55 deal with Communist Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and China), and economic relations (35 pp.). Thus a great deal of ground is covered in less than three hundred pages, and not much space is available for the treatment of the multitude of topics discussed. The space, incidentally, is divided quite unevenly. Although twenty-two pages are allotted to Indonesia, Japan is given six and a half pages (not much more than Ceylon has),

four of which go to the Communist Party of Japan. Not much that is new can be said in so few pages. On the whole the author moves on ground covered before, for his sources are mainly well-established books and other printed materials, such as—for his military chapter—the publications of the London Institute for Strategic Studies.

In a new edition the author could perhaps cover more fully the profound effect which China's return to world affairs after the Cultural Revolution has had on Soviet-Chinese relations, and also standardize his spelling of Chinese names (he now uses three versions: Mao Tse-Tung, Peng Te Huai, Liu Shao-chi).

The main virtue of the book is that the author has accomplished what he set out to do—to write a general study of Soviet interests in the Asian area on a broad basis, both inside and outside the Soviet borders. The book can be recommended as a useful text for all those interested in the subject.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGING NATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. By *Harish Kapur*. London: Michael Joseph Ltd., for the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1972. 124 pp. £3.50. Distributed by Humanities Press, New York. \$10.50.

Professor Kapur's study does not provide a detailed analysis of Soviet policy toward India, but it is valuable because the author pinpoints certain aspects of Soviet and Indian policies often neglected by other scholars, and offers some interesting and provocative interpretations. Kapur points out that initially India's policy was very pro-Western, since the country was still tied to the West, especially Great Britain, both economically and militarily. The policy changed, however, with the Communist victory in China. India responded to this northern "threat" by moving toward a "political rapprochement with the Communist world" as the "only rational substitute to a military confrontation."

In Kapur's view, Soviet policy toward India was not so much a response to these changes in Indian policy as it was an effort on Moscow's part to prevent the Communist leadership in Asia from passing into Chinese hands. The Soviets, who were already critical of Nehru in 1947–48, became more critical of his policies in 1949 as the victorious Chinese Communists called the Indian leader an "imperialist running dog" and Mao openly called for a Communist victory in India. Later, the Chinese were to change their policy because of India's opposition to several American moves during the Korean War. It was *after* the change in China's policy that the Soviets also decided to change their policy toward India so they would not be left isolated in Asia and leave the "field wide open for China to increase her influence in the area." Thus we have elements of Soviet-Chinese rivalry present even at this early date. Kapur, however, does not provide any evidence to support this view. In the opinion of this reviewer, Moscow's policy can still best be studied as a response to India's changing postures and the consideration of Soviet national interests.

The author's discussion of the period of "crisis" in the late 1960s is one of the most valuable portions of the book. Here he provides some interesting details about those issues which at the time created difficulties in Soviet-Indian relations.