

fortunately lacks any arguments for dating individual manuscripts and cannot be accepted in all particulars. It might be noted, finally, that Lentin uses an obsolete number to identify the last of three major archival collections; the citation should read TsGADA, fond 1289 (see *Lichnye fondy arkhivov SSSR*, vol. 2, 1963). This fund contains perhaps the largest repository of Shcherbatov papers—originals of his works, correspondence, and extensive papers relating to the management of his estates.

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RUSSIA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1797–1807. By *Norman E. Saul*.  
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970. xii, 268 pp. \$8.75.

Russia's place in the Mediterranean has become the subject of increasing interest in international politics in recent years. One gets the impression that the Eastern Question, in a new form, is still very much alive. Saul deals with one of the crucial and unique aspects of Russia's relations with the Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire.

The book is a detailed study of diplomacy and war during the critical decade that opened with Napoleon's thrust into the Mediterranean and closed with the Peace of Tilsit. This decade witnessed an unprecedented alliance between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. These traditional enemies were brought together because of the threat presented by the French Revolution and its ambitious general. Saul proves conclusively that the major reason for Russia's incursion into the Mediterranean was not Paul's infatuation with the Order of Malta, as is often posited by various historians, but rather his concern with the balance of power in the area and his fear that the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered.

The opening of the Straits to Russian naval units, which resulted from that alliance, was of pivotal importance in establishing a Russian protectorate over the Ionian Islands. Access to the Straits also enabled Russia to intervene in the affairs of the Italian states, and was a precondition for the important role that Russia was to play in determining the fate of the eastern and central Mediterranean. The defeats of Austerlitz and Jena, together with Russia's unwelcome attempts to establish bases on the Balkan coast of the Adriatic, undermined Russia's position in Constantinople. The result was war with Turkey and the closure of the Straits to Russia's naval units. Its bases and its navy in the Mediterranean were eventually liquidated.

Saul succeeds, through meticulous analysis of an impressive amount of archival material and other primary sources, in proving the existence of an intimate relationship between Russia's involvement in the Napoleonic wars and its interest in the Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire. He presents a detailed, close study of intricate personal relations which influenced policy-making. His conclusions are concise and clearly drawn.

The major shortcoming of the book is the omission of Ottoman sources. Since the Russo-Turkish alliance was one of the principal elements of Russian policy in the Mediterranean in the decade 1797–1807, the lack of evidence from Ottoman sources constitutes a regrettable flaw in an otherwise fine, scholarly study. Unfortunately this shortcoming is common to many studies dealing with the Eastern Question.

Saul's book is certainly a most valuable addition to the historical literature on

the Russian thrust into the Mediterranean, and to the history of the diplomacy of the Napoleonic era.

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RUSSIA FROM 1812 TO 1945: A HISTORY. By *Graham Stephenson*. New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 467 pp. \$10.95.

The curious choice of terminal dates for this book was apparently dictated by the author's major interest, which is evidently the relative standing of Russia among the Great Powers. However, as an English schoolmaster, writing primarily for his fellow Englishmen (and Scotsmen), he felt it necessary to stress also the peasantry and the intelligentsia, for "the English-speaking reader needs to have his imagination jogged." Nowhere is there any indication that Stephenson has used primary source materials; he has been content to read widely in an assortment of secondary works, good, bad, and indifferent, and to patch their contents together in somewhat random fashion. The result is an uneven account, prefaced by "The Legacy of Peter the Great" (with no interest shown in his inheritance).

Some parts of the book are excellent, such as the one on the Emancipation, apparently written with Robinson's *Rural Russia Under the Old Régime* at the author's elbow. At the other extreme is the treatment of Nicholas I, about whom Stephenson has been at pains to amass old-fashioned gossip. His treatment of the first two Alexanders is far more gentle, and he has made an obvious effort to rehabilitate the reputations of the last two emperors. He neglects the economic factors making for the industrialization of Russia, treating the whole process as though it were merely a hobby of Witte's. His discussion of the intelligentsia, whom he identifies with "Unofficial Russia," is weak and punctuated with odd judgments—for example, that Dostoevsky was "the profoundest thinker of the period." Strangely enough, considering the author's chief interest, his treatment of international relations is feeble.

Worst of all is the chapter on "The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917–21," an amazing travesty of the history of that complex period, with an extraordinary number of factual errors and (as in most other chapters) omission of really significant developments. In the sequel, Stephenson evinces admiration for Stalin. He does recognize that "in human terms, the policy [of forced collectivization] was no doubt very unpleasant." He notes also that "Draconian measures were taken" to impose labor discipline in industry. Yet he is sure that "without the Stalinist Revolution the Soviet Union would have become a German colony and its people enslaved by an even harsher tyrant." As it was, despite the "monstrous degree of suffering" inflicted by the war, "Russia could have continued the war even had the Allies made a separate peace with Germany."

The book has been very carelessly proofread, but this can hardly explain successive sentences stating that "from 1762 . . . the provincial nobility . . . were uneducated" and that "during the nineteenth century the rural nobility were to give birth to the revolutionary intelligentsia," or the affirmation that "war communism" "was not unlike the system which had enabled Britain and Germany to sustain a long war," or many another such imaginative judgment.

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