

the objectives and activities of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The main theme of McLaurin's study, that Soviet influence in the Middle East remains quite limited, is one with which I fully agree. Unfortunately, the very brevity of McLaurin's analysis has led him to make a number of sweeping generalizations which not only are insufficiently supported by facts, but which also are often incorrect. Thus, on page 88, he describes Soviet financial aid to Egyptian oil exploration in the Sinai as "stupendous" without citing any figures to support this assertion. On page 38, he even goes so far as to claim that "as time went on, the [Soviet] call for nationalization [of Western-owned oil companies] was silenced." This assertion is at variance with the facts. Soviet advocacy of the nationalization of Western-owned oil companies increased markedly, particularly after the Libyan regime of Mu'ammar Kaddafi came to power in 1969, and reached a high point at the time of Iraq's nationalization of the Western-owned IPC oil fields in June 1972—an event McLaurin fails to mention.

One of the major problems in McLaurin's book, perhaps made necessary by the brevity of his analysis, is his failure to deal with a number of important aspects of Soviet Middle Eastern policy in sufficient depth. Such issues as Soviet policy toward the Palestinian Arabs, Soviet policy toward the Iran-Iraq conflict, the role of the Communist parties of the Middle East (the Communist-supported abortive coup d'état in the Sudan in 1971 is not even mentioned), and Soviet policy toward the Persian Gulf are treated on the level of highly superficial generalization.

An even more fundamental weakness of McLaurin's analysis is his almost total reliance on *secondary* sources of information. This often makes the book appear more like an extended undergraduate term paper than a scholarly research effort, and may account, in part, for some of the errors in the study.

All in all, McLaurin's book is a highly superficial analysis of Soviet policy in the Middle East, one that cannot be recommended either for student or specialist.

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ARMS FOR THE ARABS: THE SOVIET UNION AND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By *Jon D. Glassman*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. x, 243 pp. \$12.50.

The initial "Czech arms deal" in 1955, when the first Soviet hardware was sent to Egypt, effectively broke the feeble attempt by America, Britain, and France to keep a reasonable "balance of arms" in the Middle East, so that no single state would be militarily strong enough to make war on any other one. In furtherance of the foreign policy in the post-Stalin, anti-Imperialist era, the Soviet Union tried to establish friendly relations with non-Communist regimes, a policy of which Stalin disapproved. Since 1955, in an effort to gain and maintain its influence in the Middle East, Soviet arms have been sent to selected "progressive states," mainly Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, in quantities that have varied from a flood to a trickle. In spite of rebuffs and failures, the Politburo has continued to supply hardware, viewing this policy as the best way to exclude Western influence and to foster its own.

The author, a Foreign Service career officer, has served in Moscow, worked on the SALT talks, and is currently handling Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Thus he has a sound background knowledge of Soviet motives, methods, and

strategy. He wrote this book during a one-year leave, having been awarded an International Affairs Fellowship by the Council on Foreign Affairs. In the book, he sets out to prove his theory that the three major wars in the Middle East, in the less than two decades since the Politburo decided to supply arms to that area, have all ended with threatened Soviet military intervention, and that in each case a sort of super power confrontation erupted. He has made his point well. Russian arms sent to foreign countries mean war, the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union being to foment trouble abroad to the embarrassment of Western governments. If it were not so, the Soviet Union would send tractors and civilian development aid instead. The Soviet difficulty lies in trying to control and direct the hostilities it provokes, when its clients come up against better trained, mainly American armed, Israelis.

Glassman examines the strategy behind the Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East, and the motivation, which he traces through the Arab-Israeli wars, cataloging all known information on this matter. After an introductory chapter, "Detente and Local Conflict," he goes on to consider "The 1956 Suez War," "The Soviet Union and the Six Day War," "Prelude to Yom Kippur," "The October War," and ends with a summary, "The Soviet Union and the Three Wars," in which he shows how Soviet arms were a constraint upon or inducement to the Arabs to make war. His comment that "Moscow will continue to play an important political-military role in the region," is a sound one.

Although the author, in the preface, denies that his views are in any way official ones, he tends to give the conventional United States government "party line," and he also acknowledges his debt for "information" from the Tel Aviv and Hebrew Universities in Israel, which, at times, gives an Israeli slant in the direction of overstatement. He says, for example, that "some 25-40 of the Kelt stand-off missiles were launched from TU-16s," when in fact only one was fired by the Egyptians during the October War. He also asserts "that the US possessed ECMs (electronic counter measures) to foil the SAM-6," which was not so then, and most probably is not so now, because the Israelis failed to capture a "directional guidance" apparatus (the six SAM-6s seized had been gutted of all radar equipment by the Arabs before being abandoned). Despite this slight gilding of the lily, the book, which has been painstakingly researched, is interesting and instructive, and well worth reading by any student of Middle East and Soviet affairs.

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SOVIET NAVAL POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS. Edited and compiled by *Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell*. Published for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. xxvi, 663 pp. \$32.50.

Here in 660 pages one finds the gratifyingly well-integrated contributions of twenty-seven British, Canadian, Australian, and American authors that make marked progress toward the stated goal of the Second Dalhousie University (Halifax, Nova Scotia) Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments (where most of the thirty-four papers which comprise this book were delivered), to raise the level of informed analysis and debate on the subject. Marshall Shulman sets the foreign policy context in the first chapter with his understanding of "a long-term Soviet commitment to