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## BOOKS IN REVIEW

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### VISIONS OF CHILE

- Acquaviva, A.; Fournial, G.; Gilhotes, P.; and Marcelin, J. *Chili: Trois ans d'unité populaire*. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1974.
- Arriagada Herrera, Genaro. *De la vía chilena a la vía insurreccional*. Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1974.
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- Balra, Alberto. *Gestión económica del gobierno de la Unidad Popular*. Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1974.
- Baraona Urzua, Pablo, et al. *Fuerzas armadas y seguridad nacional*. Santiago: Ediciones Portada, 1973.
- Blanco, Hugo, et al. *La tragedia chilena*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pluma, 1973.
- Boizard, Ricardo. *El último día de Allende*. Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1973.
- Cerda, Carlos. *Génocide au Chili*. Paris: François Maspero, 1974.
- Chile. Junta de Gobierno. *Algunos fundamentos de la intervención militar en Chile*. 2nd ed. Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1974.
- Chile. Junta de Gobierno. *Declaración de principios del gobierno de Chile*. Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1974.
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- Echeverría, Andres, and Frei, Luis, eds. 1970-1973: *La lucha por la juricidad en Chile*. 3 vols. Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1974.
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- Mistral, Carlos. *Chile: Del triunfo popular al golpe fascista*. México: Ediciones Era, S.A., 1974.
- Moss, Robert. *El experimento marxista chileno*. Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral Ltda, 1974.
- Nef, Jorge. "The Politics of Repression: The Social Pathology of the Chilean Military." *Latin American Perspectives* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1974).
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- Piacentini, Pablo, et al. *Chile: Una tragedia americana*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Crisis, 1974.
- Silva, Lautaro. *Allende: El fin de una aventura*. Santiago: Ediciones Patria Nueva, 1974.
- Steenland, Kyle. "The Coup in Chile." *Latin American Perspectives* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1974).
- Sweezy, Paul M., and Magdoff, Harry, eds. *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- Toer, Mario. *La "Via Chilena": Un balance necesario*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contemporaneo, 1974.
- Touraine, Alain. *Vie et mort du Chili populaire: Juillet/Septembre 1973*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1973.
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The reader in search of a single widely accepted interpretation of the recent and tragic events in Chile is bound for certain disappointment. The vast number of books published since the September 1973 military intervention that deposed the Popular Unity government do not present one, but several—at times diametrically opposed—visions of the Chilean drama. The setting and the names of the actors are the same, the scripts are roughly similar, but the roles and the interpretations of the outcomes are strikingly different. The villains and the heroes, the shortcomings and the successes, the evaluations of particular developments and of the final denouement, as well as the lessons for the future, are all colored by the prisms and the passions of each analyst.

It is difficult, and perhaps unimportant, to draw the line between books that are the expression of scholarly concerns and works that respond primarily to political motivations. The former are also influenced by deeply held values and commitments, while the latter can also provide rich documentation and incisive

analysis. However, the dominant characteristic of many of the books discussed here is that they are *explicitly* designed to vindicate previous political positions and justify the roles played by particular individuals. Hence, it is not surprising to find that their differing visions parallel closely the perspectives of Chile's disparate political forces, and run the full range of the ideological spectrum. As such, these books, taken together, serve an unintended function: They vividly reveal the sharp cleavages that characterized the Chilean polity and illustrate how difficult it would have been to prevent the collapse of Chile's institutional system. The books mirror the drama of contemporary Chilean politics with its multiplicity of truths, its rifts of perceptions, and the resulting animosities and hatred between polarized communities of true believers.

The significant incongruities among these books can be explained in part by the fact that ideological prisms guide the analyst to select certain aspects of the historical record to the detriment of others. For instance, the role of the CIA and of ITT in "destabilizing" the government of Salvador Allende—a role that is now common knowledge based on recent revelations from sources in the United States Congress—is not even mentioned by most authors of books on the Right. Likewise, ideological prisms lead to opposing evaluations of the same facts. A large demonstration in support of further socialization of the economy is interpreted by books on the Left as a manifestation of popular support for more decisive and radical action on the part of the government; by those on the Center as evidence of the generalized chaos the country was experiencing; and by those on the Right as an indication of the ills of a weak political system which permitted totalitarian groups of the Left to build a following on the basis of demagogic appeals. Or better still, the coup itself is seen, in the same order, as a fascist or militarist counterrevolution, the culmination of a process of destruction of the nation's democratic system by extremists of the Right and Left, or the salvation of Chile from totalitarian and foreign communism.

These differences in interpretation and source utilization can be attributed to the basic fact that each set of books deals with a different subject matter. To be sure they are all about Chile; but they are written to answer radically different ideologically inspired questions. The basic concern of the Left is to explain why the construction of a Socialist society, with a radical redistribution of power and wealth, was not possible in Chile. The Center, by contrast, is more concerned with explaining why Chile's vaunted democratic institutions, which made of Chile a model in Latin America, crumbled. In turn, the Right seeks to explain how it is that a nation, proud of its national and military traditions, came to be threatened from within by an alien movement and ideology. Each set of questions leads to different answers within the same web of reality.

But do these answer the fundamental question? Can we *really* discern *the* truth of what happened in Chile with the aid of this bibliography? This is not the place to enter into disquisitions on the meaning of truth or objectivity; suffice it to say that the question must be answered negatively. Plausible but opposing interpretations of the same event will ultimately require the reader to make a commitment to the ideological framework closest to his or her own set of values. Some observers view Allende's speeches as evidence of reformism detrimental to

the revolution. Others see in the same speeches a clear commitment to the dictatorship of the proletariat and a contempt for reform. The reader will have to judge not only the president's "real" intentions but their significance to an understanding of larger systemic developments.

This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to pass judgment on the utility of individual books. Some books clearly present more valuable evidence and more persuasive interpretations within the framework of a particular vision. More importantly, some books have omitted important evidence despite its germaneness to the basic concerns that guide them. It is also possible, though perhaps more difficult, to indicate obvious distortions of evidence. These omissions and distortions are occasionally of such importance that the books are transparently designed merely to affirm the appropriateness of the ideologically inspired question they pose, rather than to provide a searching answer.

Our goal is to discuss systematically the various visions of Chilean reality represented by the available literature. To that end we will describe the assumptions, the perceptions of past events, the evaluations of the Popular Unity government, and, where appropriate, the interpretation of the nature of the current regime, which characterize each vision.

It should be cautioned that we will present the general outline of each vision and cannot report all the views of each particular author within a given vision. Furthermore, we must stress that authors invariably disagree on many facts and interpretations even when they can be generally classified together. These caveats are particularly important because we have opted for conventional Left, Center, and Right categories in structuring each vision. Though table 1 provides a general summary of the principal characteristics of each vision, the reader is warned not to let it take on a life of its own.

#### BOOKS ON THE LEFT

For writers on the Left, the Chilean socioeconomic order is fraught with basic inequalities that relegate the vast majority of the population to a life of poverty. Though allowing, before the coup, a certain degree of representation to popular forces, the political order is basically an instrument of the powerful and privileged few. The principal goal is the transformation of this state of affairs and the institution of a new socialist order. It follows that the dominant theme of books on the Left is the attempt to explain why such socialist transformations did not succeed when Chile seemed to be so close to attaining them. In exploring the answers to this basic question, however, the books on the Left divide into two principal groupings. The first represents those who opposed the Allende government from the Left, viewing with impatience the Popular Unity's strategy of pressing transformations within the institutional framework. The second identifies more closely with the goals and tactics stated in the Popular Unity program and generally followed by the president. For convenience, the first group will be referred to as the Maximalist Left, and the second as Gradualist Left.

*The Maximalist Left*<sup>1</sup>

Writings from this perspective are generally based, explicitly or implicitly, on a rigorous and parsimonious theoretical scheme. The vision is guided by some key assumptions from which relatively simple propositions follow. Given these assumptions and propositions, relatively little data is necessary to elaborate the analysis.

A central assumption is the characterization of Chile as a dependent capitalist society, dominated by foreign interests and their domestic allies. The inevitable contradictions inherent in capitalism, coupled with a nationalistic desire to sever ties of economic dependence, render the country ripe for a transition to socialism. This is not merely latent, but is clearly manifested in a high degree of working class consciousness.<sup>2</sup> That consciousness is expressed not only in the growing strength of working class political and social organizations but in the spontaneous support of large segments of the laboring and marginal population to the organizing efforts of the Movement for a Revolutionary Left.<sup>3</sup> The victory of the Popular Unity coalition in September 1970 was but a concrete manifestation of this mobilization. It placed the nation on a prerevolutionary path.<sup>4</sup> The moment had come to push for an immediate and fundamental restructuring of archaic economic, social, and political structures and the creation of a new man.

What doomed this auspicious beginning of radical transformation? This vision holds that failure was principally due to the misguided reformism of the Popular Unity government, particularly of the Communist Party and of Allende himself.<sup>5</sup> The strategy of building socialism by resorting to the traditional mechanism and institutions of bourgeois democracy, the central premise of Allende's "Via Chilena," was doomed to inevitable failure. It simply ignored the fact that in a capitalist society the state is an instrument of the ruling class, designed to perpetuate the exploitation of the working class and appropriate surplus value for the dominant national and, given its dependency, supranational economic interest.<sup>6</sup> Democratic procedures inevitably meant conciliation and compromise with bourgeois elements such as the Christian Democrats. By definition these elements were hostile to the basic aims of the revolution, and any accommodation with them was a victory for reactionary forces and a serious setback for popular forces. Though at times Allende may have shown that he was prepared to provide genuine leadership to press for fundamental change, in the final analysis the "Chilean Experiment" failed because he and the Communist party continued on the assumption that it was possible to operate within the framework of the old order in bringing about the new. Allende, like others, was under the illusion that Chile was different from other societies—that its democratic tradition could be preserved in a transitional phase. Paul Sweezy succinctly summarizes this argument when he says that the "bourgeois state exists for the purpose of protecting the bourgeois social order. It follows that it cannot be used to transform the social order; it must be broken up and replaced by a state representing the interests of the exploited classes. Only *after* this has been accomplished does it make sense to talk about a transition to socialism."<sup>7</sup> It is simply illusory to think that changes can

be effected peacefully. Those who benefit from the socioeconomic system are bound to pressure the military to defend their privileges. As Silvia Díaz and Andre Méndez forcefully remind us: "In a class society, the army is an instrument of the exploiters."<sup>8</sup> For Sweezy: "The Chilean tragedy confirms . . . that there is no such thing as a peaceful road to socialism . . . The reason is simply that the beneficiaries of the existing system, including many who only imagine themselves to be its beneficiaries, are not going to give up without a struggle or to renounce any means available to them in waging the struggle. . . . At some stage of the process violent confrontation is inevitable."<sup>9</sup>

The Maximalist Left does not ignore the strong domestic and foreign opposition to the Allende government.<sup>10</sup> Attention is paid to the role of the CIA and of domestic sabotage and conspiracies, military and civilian. However, the opposition's uncompromising efforts to destroy the government were simply to be expected. The Popular Unity leadership should have realized this and prepared forcefully from the very beginning to meet this challenge. Concretely, the government should have moved faster to transform the state apparatus. Some authors suggest that after the impressive showing of Popular Unity parties in the 1971 municipal election, the government should have capitalized on its popularity, calling a plebiscite, which would have opened the door to transforming the legislature into a unicameral popular assembly.<sup>11</sup> But even more significantly, as all these authors indicate, the Popular Unity should have given top priority to the task of strengthening popular organizations as the future base for a new state power. This meant fostering neighborhood and worker committees, and providing them both ideological guidance and military training, thus forging a single revolutionary party capable of defending with force the conquests of the working class. A principal corollary of this strategy was the infiltration of the armed forces and the indoctrination of military recruits and low ranking officers. Civil war may have resulted, and armed confrontation was probably inevitable. But, given the readiness of the working class, that confrontation would have led to victory and a socialist society.<sup>12</sup>

Much to the chagrin of commentators from the Maximalist Left, the government not only failed to pursue such a strategy, it deliberately undermined the revolutionary potential of the working class.<sup>13</sup> The Allende government ignored the *Comités de la Unidad Popular*, rank and file organizations that flourished as part of the 1970 election campaign effort. The organizational infrastructure was already there for the creation of a revolutionary working class party. Furthermore, the *cordones industriales*, that emerged spontaneously to defend the government in the October 1972 employer strikes, were stymied by government bureaucrats and politicians fearful that they might get out of control.<sup>14</sup> Since organizations created to defend the Popular Unity could not be dissolved, the Communist party in particular moved to bring them under its influence thus slowing their revolutionary impetus. Even after the aborted coup of 29 June 1973, a harbinger of things to come, the government refused to arm workers and actually moved to disarm some cordones. Foolishly it placed its trust in officers already plotting against the government while criticizing those who sought to acquire the power to defend the

government. In a comprehensive treatment of this thesis, Mario Toer provides copious citations of policy pronouncements by Popular Unity leaders which illustrate their commitment to reformist means and doomed the revolution.<sup>15</sup>

Books that share this vision are quick to draw lessons from the Chilean experience, lessons that reiterate previously articulated positions. Toer's conclusion is typical. He notes that if "the bases of a new popular and revolutionary power built upon an organized and armed people in every locality are not laid, all gains which succeeded in undermining the interests of the enemy are totally precarious. They ultimately serve only to force the enemy into closing its ranks to counterattack and reestablish domination with blood and fire."<sup>16</sup> Or as Pío García expresses it: "The central question of *all* revolutionary processes continues to be the preparation at *every level* and at *every phase* of the necessary conditions to preclude or defeat with physical force the inexorable counterrevolutionary violence."<sup>17</sup> An organized mass movement is an essential ingredient in such a strategy. Les Evans notes that "what was missing in Chile was a mass revolutionary party with a perspective of struggling against the military for power, not collaborating with the generals and urging the workers to trust the local agents of imperialism."<sup>18</sup>

The tone of these books is principled and self-confident and in some cases (while decrying the brutality of the tragedy) self-congratulatory. It follows from the assumptions of the analysis that the Popular Unity government was destined to a dramatic and resounding failure. The bloody military coup of September 1973 is seen as a confirmation of the accuracy of their vision. It ushered in a brutal military regime at the service of the capitalists.<sup>19</sup>

### *The Gradualist Left*<sup>20</sup>

Books classified in this category share a concern for discovering the source of the failure of a socialist option in Chile. However, unlike the Maximalist Left, these authors do not accept uncritically the proposition that the "Chilean Way to Socialism" was a policy destined to fail. While generally agreeing with the characterization of Chilean society as a dependent and capitalist one, they note a series of ambiguities and a multiplicity of variables which detract from an easy and simple assessment of events and processes. This perspective is, consequently, much less rigorous and parsimonious than the previous one. Its methodological strength rests not with its explanatory power, but with its consideration of a broader range of different variables representing a more complex reality. Political, economic, and social structures are seen as constraining, but not necessarily inevitable, hurdles to fundamental transformation. Analysts of the Gradualist Left are much more reluctant to accept the notion that the working class was ready to transform itself into a revolutionary mass movement. Nor do they accept the view that Chilean society was divided into a small privileged and reactionary force, on the one hand, and the people on the other. The middle sectors are viewed as potential allies in breaking ties of dependence and the power of the large capitalists. Finally, they are acutely aware of the minority position of the Popular Unity



government, arguing that only a gradual process of demonstrating its viability might lead to a majority position.

From this perspective, radicalization of the political process, with the formation of a mass revolutionary party and armed confrontation, would have been not only unrealistic, but would have provoked an earlier downfall of the Popular Unity government. As Joan Garcés notes: "It would be a blatant error to think that the Popular Unity government would have had the time and means to distribute arms among the workers. It was impossible to undertake such an action without the Armed Forces knowing about it. Both loyal and disloyal officers would have reacted like one man. The labor movement would have found itself isolated facing a united Armed Forces willing to defend their only power: the monopoly of force."<sup>21</sup>

Given this reality, the only way for the Popular Unity government to consolidate its authority and carry out its policies was to take maximum advantage of the mechanisms provided by the traditional institutional system. In turn, because of the government's minority position, this meant structuring some kind of *modus vivendi* with elements of the Christian Democratic party, Chile's largest single political group. The Christian Democrats are not viewed simply as spokesmen of the ruling class, but as a large amorphous party, with differing factions ranging from progressive to reactionary, and, more importantly, with significant mass appeal in working class and peasant communities. Alain Touraine wrote in his political diary on 19 August 1973: "Chile's political and institutional life at this time cannot rest but on the opposition and transaction between the UP and the DC. If other forces carry the day, whether they are of the National party or of the ultra-Left, of the MIR or of *Patria y Libertad*, the political system crumbles. It will result in violence and chaos, from which there can only arise a military regime."<sup>22</sup> There is a recognition that a strategy of conciliation with the Christian Democrats "would not have allowed," as Gonzalo Arroyo states, "the proletariat to assume power within a short period." However, there is also the realization that "at least it would probably have avoided fascism."<sup>23</sup> In any event, the "Chilean Way to Socialism" is understood to be, as Touraine repeatedly emphasizes, "the only possible way, or at least the only possible expression of the Chilean popular movement."<sup>24</sup>

What went wrong? Although they do not express it in the same terms, most authors within this perspective would agree with Pablo Piacentini's assessment that the failure of the Popular Unity government was due to an increasing process of polarization of the nation's political forces.<sup>25</sup> Polarization and resulting confrontation threw the middle sectors into active and open resistance to the government and an alliance with the right, reduced the influence of center elements within the political system, and created a power vacuum that the Left could not fill on its own because of its weakness and lack of majority support. Touraine repeatedly refers to this power vacuum as he notes the government's increasing inability to make decisions and to control the ever more anarchic social forces.<sup>26</sup> By July of 1973, when Allende sought to structure a compromise with the Christian Democrats to preserve his government, polarization had taken its toll.



The Christian Democrats, concerned over maximizing their own situation, were simply unwilling to respond.

For some the polarization was the result of the Allende government's attempt to carry out too many changes in too many areas at once.<sup>27</sup> For others, it was the result of excessive ideological rigidity on the part of key political actors.<sup>28</sup> The role of the revolutionary Left is viewed as particularly negative in this context.<sup>29</sup> Its continued pressure for a greater radicalization of the political process placed enormous strain on the government, unwilling and perhaps unable to use force to repress their actions. This constraint was aggravated by the fact that the revolutionary posture was also advocated by important elements in the government coalition itself, namely the Socialist party. Extreme pronouncements from elements within the government made it difficult for moderate sectors in the government to structure agreements with the moderate opposition, both because of criticism from the Left and because they strengthened the opposition's mistrust of their will and capability to live up to any agreement.<sup>30</sup> The extreme Left's action simply reinforced the basic weakness and hesitation of the Christian Democrat Left, unwilling to take too great a political risk. From this standpoint the call to further radicalize the process was not only based on an incorrect assumption of the probable consequences, it had the political effect of undermining the viability of the "Via Chilena." The breakdown of the socialist experiment was not so much a prophecy of the revolutionary Left as a "self-fulfilling" prophecy of that group.<sup>31</sup>

Polarization, of course, was also aggravated by a deteriorating economic situation, which led middle class sectors to believe that their livelihood was threatened.<sup>32</sup> And, in fact, many government programs were run with narrowly sectarian objectives by a bureaucracy that had been parcelled out to different elements of the political coalition.

Polarization and its resulting political vacuum broke down the tenuous constraints standing in the way of the long standing *putschist* tendencies in the armed forces. With no accord possible among politicians, all sides appealed to the military to play a role of neutral arbiter. As Jorge Nef indicates in his excellent analysis of the armed forces, the result was to politicize them further and encourage the final denouement.<sup>33</sup>

Authors of the Gradualist Left do not ignore structural features such as the increased participation among popular sectors and the excessive demands that resulted in an economy ill-equipped to handle them. Nor do they ignore the profound damage caused by a mobilized reaction to governmental initiatives. But the explanation for the failure of the transition to Socialism rests largely with discrete political variables. Rather than the inevitable product of reformism, the coup was the result of errors in strategy, pressures from the Left, weakness of the Center—particularly the opposition Center, and ultimately treason within the armed forces. For most of these authors external elements, such as the role of the CIA or international blockades, were not decisive factors—though they added further to the drama.<sup>34</sup>

THE CENTER<sup>35</sup>

The principal objective of works in this category is to explain the collapse of Chilean democracy, not the failure of a socialist experiment. The military intervention that brought down Chile's institutional system was but the final coup de grace for a political order that had made Chile unique among the countries of Latin America. Deterioration of the regime began earlier during the Popular Unity government.

So far, books on the Center are comparatively few and primarily the product of Christian Democratic authors. The most impressive, and one of the best documented books under review, is Genaro Arriagada's *De la vía chilena a la vía insurreccional*. The principal theme of the book is that Chilean democracy failed because of the rise of excessively rigid ideological forces bent on ultimately destroying the system. Eduardo Frei, Chile's former Christian Democratic president, expresses well this theme in the book's prologue: "The unrealistic dogmatism, the uncontrolled process of ideologization that reached not only the Marxist sectors, but also others in the country, prevented many from seeing the precipice toward which we all walked."<sup>36</sup> He notes further that "the truth is that for a democratic society to subsist, it is fundamental to have a minimum of consensus among those who integrate it."<sup>37</sup>

The fact is, however, that for Arriagada the principal culprits of excessive ideology are the Marxist parties. It is the Popular Unity government, and not other sectors of society, that are blamed for the deterioration of democratic consensus. The basic argument is that Salvador Allende and his coalition never really took seriously the notion of a "Chilean Way to Socialism." The slogan represented merely a convenient strategy, given its weak political position, to eventually consolidate a dictatorship of Marxist party elites in the name of the proletariat. Towards the end of his book, after reviewing the strategies followed by Lenin and Trotsky in Russia, he concludes that "in fact, the insurrectionary road was always present in Popular Unity government" and was not merely the extremism of a minority sector.<sup>38</sup> In presenting his argument, Arriagada analyzes several events in considerable depth. He argues that Allende could not have been serious about democracy since he helped Carlos Altamirano, who publicly scorned bourgeois democracy, to become president of the Socialist party in January 1971, defeating a moderate. Further, he cites numerous speeches and writings of Allende and other supporters of the regime which stressed that the Chilean *way* was different. For Arriagada this means, by implication, that the *end* would be the same as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. "The 'political-institutional way' was no more than that: a tactic. In no case was it a path toward a transitional model or a different type of socialism."<sup>39</sup> In fact, he notes, after the first two years of Allende's government, the president dropped the theme of a separate way entirely.<sup>40</sup>

After the 1973 congressional elections, in which the government did not obtain a majority, the Popular Unity decided that there was no alternative but to press for a general insurrection. Citing speeches of this period, which were used by Toer to show that Allende was embarked on reformism and a defense of

democracy, Arriagada tries to show that the president had lost faith in constitutional ways. He praises the hard bargaining position of the Christian Democrats who sought "to impose on Allende that he abandon his objective of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>41</sup>

But this work is not without its contradictions. Though in the first part of the book he goes to great pains to show that the Communists clearly followed the strategic objective of a dictatorship of the proletariat, he notes that until the end they opposed the "popular power" formula and tried through the labor movement to curb the insurrectionists.<sup>42</sup> Even more dramatically, on the last two pages, he seems much less certain that Allende had made a definite commitment to the revolutionary way, noting that his error was one of vacillation. Furthermore, the citations from the work of Joan Garcés which are used in this concluding section are of a markedly different and more moderate tone than earlier references. The vision of Allende and of the Popular Unity mellows considerably as the book is brought to an end.

Perhaps this latter section of the book reflects somewhat the influence of the Christian Democrats of the Left who, while sharing in condemnation of excessive ideology and sectarianism, were less certain that Allende was embarked on a deliberate strategy to impose dictatorship. Agreeing more with elements of the Gradualist Left, the Left of the party saw the last few months of the Allende regime as evidence of anarchy and the loss of power, rather than as evidence of a successful attempt to establish an authoritarian regime of the Left. Unfortunately, books representing this Center Left position are still not available.<sup>43</sup>

Unlike the books on the Left, these from the Center say nothing critical about the actions of the Christian Democrats or the forces of the Right. Thus, there is little of the self-criticism typical of actors of the Gradualist Left. There is no analysis of the dialectical interplay between political forces, or the unanticipated consequences of political actions and events. Events are interpreted purely from the perspective of ideological schemes. Little consideration is given to purely political explanations. Within this framework, Allende's choice of Altamirano is not seen as an attempt to coopt and neutralize the extreme elements of the Socialist party.<sup>44</sup> Nor is it seen as a reflection of intense personal rivalries with Aniceto Rodríguez. Though lacking the ideological rigor of the Maximalist Left, this interpretation shares in its simplicity as it attempts to relate all evidence to a consistent central theme. The entire blame is placed on the Popular Unity government because of its basic commitment to destroy Chilean democracy—or, at times, because of the vacillation of its leader which resulted in the same outcome.

Claudio Orrego shares Arriagada's general concern for the fate of Chilean democracy and generally agrees with his interpretation of its downfall. However, in a privately circulated book, published in Chile, he is more willing to criticize the Right's complicity in sustaining the current military regime.<sup>45</sup> "There you are, poor democracy, crushed between the weight of those who challenged you because of your 'bourgeois' character, and those who now look down on you given your weakness in the defense of their interests." He also blames other sectors of society for the destruction of the system, noting, "When we all thought,

to a greater or lesser degree, that ideological movements were worth more than the forge of consensus which was constitutional democracy, we all began to dig the pit into which we each successively fell."<sup>46</sup> Orrego's more recent private volume was banned by the military government.

#### THE RIGHT<sup>47</sup>

Books on the Right, including official publications of the military government, make arguments similar to those of Genaro Arriagada. However, their tone and ultimate purpose are quite different. They do not hesitate in asserting that Allende was committed to a totalitarian solution, while at the same time drawing a picture of a degenerate president surrounded by a motley band of international extremists bent not only on establishing Communism but on personal enrichment.<sup>48</sup> Books on the Right are consequently much more emphatic than Arriagada in portraying the principal objective of the Popular Unity government as the violent take-over of the state.<sup>49</sup> Great emphasis is given to Allende's close ties with Fidel Castro and to his personal entourage of bodyguards armed and trained with Cuban aid. The more than fourteen thousand political refugees, not mentioned by Arriagada, constituted an army of extremists and the backbone of the insurrectionary movement. Again, unlike Arriagada, all of the books on the Right describe, usually in great detail, "Plan Zeta," a scheme to assassinate key leaders of the armed forces and of the opposition. Citing documents found after the coup, they view the plan as irrefutable proof that the military had to intervene when it did.<sup>50</sup>

The principal source for the argument that Allende and his government were embarked on an "auto-coup," embodied in the "Plan Zeta," is the Junta's own *White Paper on the Change of Government in Chile*. After a first short chapter entitled "Neither ex-president Allende nor his regime were Democratic," the volume devotes its attention to documenting the government's effort to stage a violent uprising. This is done with a large number of photographs of confiscated weapons, a series of documents unaccompanied by much explanatory material, and miscellaneous items such as a list of ninety six people who died under violent circumstances, during the Allende government.<sup>51</sup> The documents include a series of handwritten and typed reports that purport to show the revolutionary character of the Popular Unity and its constituent parties. The most dramatic are those relating to the planned "auto-coup."<sup>52</sup> Allende is said to have been involved in the planning of this violent act.<sup>53</sup>

Yet these documents present the careful reader with a series of contradictions. A document of the Movement of Popular United Action argues forcefully that Salvador Allende was pressing for full implementation of the law on arms control and had ordered that persons (of the Left) carrying arms should be detained or, if necessary, killed.<sup>54</sup> That elements on the Left were unhappy with the president's actions is also vividly illustrated by a letter from the secretary general of the Socialist party urging Allende to dismiss officers plotting against the government in the national police force. The letter notes that Allende had

repeatedly refused this call and that “we frankly cannot understand this attitude of yours in times that require more than ever an attitude of firmness, decision and loyalty to the forces of the revolution. Even less [understandable is] the clear contempt which is illustrated by your attitude toward the principal political force of the government in which you yourself are a militant.”<sup>55</sup> The letter goes on to indicate that in protest the Socialist party would ask the minister of the interior and the intendant of Santiago to step down from their posts. But the most dramatic contradiction of all is the fact that the “Plan Zeta” document envisioned the death of the president himself. The Popular Unity’s insurrectionary plan, implemented at the highest level, contemplated the elimination of its master planner.<sup>56</sup>

The book by Robert Moss is by far the most moderate treatment of Chilean events from the Right perspective. Moss refers to “Plan Zeta,” and seems to accept its veracity. However, it is not a principal preoccupation of the book.<sup>57</sup> Moss, however, shares with the other books the view that the revolutionary Left was a powerful force. He devotes an entire chapter of his book to the MIR and its organizations, while devoting only scattered pages in various chapters to the Communist party. Likewise the MIR’s Front of Revolutionary Workers (FTR) is given considerable attention, while the Communist-dominated labor federation (CUT) is barely mentioned. Moss’s concern with the power of the revolutionary Left is illustrated by his inclusion of a map of Santiago showing the location of the most important cordones industriales. Whereas the writers on the Left had stressed their disarray and lack of direction, Moss portrays them as potent elements in an impending struggle for total power.

What is striking about the books on the Right is that in some respects they are almost polar opposites of those on the Maximalist Left. Where the Left criticized the Popular Unity as reformist and unwilling to embark on a decided attempt to seize force with violence, the Right is absolutely convinced that it was their goal and strategy all along, one that was fully put into practice and would have succeeded had it not been for the resolute action of the patriotic armed forces. And yet, at times the books of the Right complement well the writings of the Maximalist Left. Both give considerable space to the organization of MIR and its actions, stressing their success in channeling popular mobilization. The language is different, to be sure, with the Right condemning the Left as a foreign cancer and extolling the virtue of opposition forces and the glorious military—a completely opposite characterization of the same forces than the one drawn by the left.

A striking difference between the books on the Right and those on the Center concerns the treatment of the current military junta. Whereas the books of the Center completely ignore the junta, the books on the Right lavishly praise the *junta militar* as the savior of the nation and justify all of its measures as necessary to root out the evil of Communism. As such they attempt to make a strong case not only for the illegitimacy of the Allende government but for the legitimacy of the junta. Articles reprinted in official publications stress the “right” of rebellion in view of the fact that Allende’s government systematically violated the constitutional order and even the “natural” order (the latter because “in a word, an

effort was made to impose a system radically un-natural and inhuman, immoral in its essence'<sup>58</sup>). By definition a Marxist-Leninist conception was clearly illegitimate.<sup>59</sup> In documenting violations of the juridical order, official publications reproduce statements by the judicial and legislative branches protesting actions by the Allende government or its representatives. The "government of Allende violated deliberately the Constitution and the laws . . . ignoring the regulatory and sanctioning power of the Congress."<sup>60</sup> Not only was the intervention of the armed forces justified because of this alleged violation of democratic constitutional order, but the armed forces, because of their "mission," can legitimately be the final judge of that violation.<sup>61</sup>

Publications of the Right do not see any paradox in the fact that the junta has massively proceeded to violate the same constitutional precepts. While Allende's argument over the necessity of a two-thirds majority in the Congress in order to approve a constitutional amendment was a complex and debatable one, the junta's unilateral closing down of the Congress is an indisputable fact.<sup>62</sup> That the junta has little intention of respecting the original constitution was made explicit in a recent decree law, adopted when civil rights lawyers began to question the constitutionality of earlier decree laws denying individual freedoms and due process of law. The junta stated that any decree law adopted by the four-man body which conflicted with the constitution was to be understood as automatically amending the constitution—even if that modification was not explicitly intended.<sup>63</sup> For supporters of the junta there is no contradiction in such action because the legitimacy of the junta resides in "natural law," and thus the "jurisdiction of the Junta is above positive Law, it is above the Constitution. . . . It therefore has the executive, legislative and constitutional power."<sup>64</sup>

Ironically, while books on the Right stress that the legitimacy of the junta is derived from Allende's violation of a democratic constitution, they also reveal a profound contempt for democratic institutions. In attributing blame for the rise of Marxism and the destruction of Chilean nationalism, a "corrupt democracy" is blamed as the principal cause. Democracy merely encourages ideological demagogues with basically selfish interests to rally the masses with impossible promises. Its effect is to split the community into "un-natural" factions, destroying national solidarity and opening the way for the corrosive effect of alien ideology.<sup>65</sup> The Christian Democratic party as the principal democratic political organization thus shared in the destruction of Chile. Like other democratic parties it also engaged in demagogic appeals and contributed to the excessive mobilization of the populace. It was responsible for Allende's election by voting for him in the Chilean congress when he failed to receive an absolute majority of the votes. It was basically weak in opposing the government, often falling into the temptation of trying to work out a solution when it should have been patently obvious that Allende was bent from the beginning on a course of securing total power. The Christian Democrats, as Lautaro Silva implies, shared the general trait of traditional Latin American political leaders "afraid to fight Communism for fear they might lose the halo of 'democrats', without understanding that, with the triumph of Communism, they would lose not only their halos but their heads. . . . Let's exercise some hispanic



sensibility and understand that we must restrict our ‘liberties’ when we are under the positive threat of losing liberty.”<sup>66</sup>

That the junta shares this contempt for liberal democracy is quite clear in its “Declaration of Principles.” Stressing the importance of nationalism and an *organic* society, it argues that:

The Armed Forces and Forces of Order do not set a time table for their governmental mission because the task of moral, institutional and material reconstruction requires a profound and prolonged action. Without doubt, it is crucial to change the mentality of Chileans. Furthermore, the current government has categorically declared that it does not intend to limit itself to a merely administrative Government; a parenthesis between two similarly partisan governments. In other words, it does not represent a reordering “truce” designed to return power to the same politicians who had so much responsibility either of action or omission in the virtual destruction of the country. The Government of Armed Forces and Forces of Order aspires to initiate a new stage in the national destiny, opening the way for new generations of Chileans formed in the school of healthy civic habits.<sup>67</sup>

TABLE 1 Summary of Chilean Visions

	<i>Maximalist</i>	LEFT <i>Gradualist</i>	CENTER	RIGHT
Primary concern	Failure of Socialism	Failure of Democratic Socialism	Collapse of Democracy	Rise of Marxism
Principal explanation	Popular Unity reformism	Multiple causes: Political polarization, economic deterioration, Popular Unity errors, external and internal opposition, extreme Left provocations, treason by military leadership	Excessive ideology, rise of Marxism, loss of consensus	Democracy, demagoguery, and partisanship
Only alternative	Violent revolution, armed mass party	Accommodation, compromise, plebiscite, presidential resignation	Unfortunately, military solution only one, though temporary	Decisive military action, abandonment of weak democracy
Exclusive contributions	Analysis of divisions among forces of the Left Descriptions of mass movements and organizations Examination of the military, violence by right-wing military and civilian forces, and torture and repression under the junta	Ponders the effect of the interplay between a wide range of forces, discussing events and conditioning factors Analysis of: External blockage and internal opposition; the military; and cases of torture and repression under the junta	Careful, if self-serving, analysis of intentions and positions of Christian Democrats Detailed economic analysis	Detailed but exaggerated account of chronology of violence by the Left
Omissions and deficiencies	Too simplistic: Overestimation of the Left's strength and of worker consciousness, black-white vision	While rich and complex, the analysis sacrifices explanatory rigor in favor of a consideration of a wide array of variables	Attribution of all blame to the Left Lacks analysis of the opposition's role in undermining democracy	Simple black and white vision: All blame on Left and Center, gross exaggeration of extreme Left's influence in the Allende government, sharp inconsistencies



CONCLUSION

The dramatic events in Chile have generated a voluminous literature that will intrigue students of the sociology of knowledge for years to come. Observers and analysts of the Popular Unity years agree on a few basics: Salvador Allende was elected President of Chile, was overthrown, and died on the smoldering ruins of his "Via Chilena." But, aside from a few elementary facts, the many observers disagree widely on the meaning of most individual "facts" as well as on the interpretation of broader events. From the vantage point of different ideological postures, the question "What happened in Chile?" was reduced to a series of narrower questions, each with its own implicit set of answers to the general one. Why didn't socialism succeed? Why did democracy fail? Why did Marxism arise?

If an impartial analyst attempted to set up stringent criteria for judging the validity of specific facts and events, he or she would soon discover that in the final analysis the visions themselves proved to be more important than many of the facts on which they were presumably based. Visions of Chile did not merely seek to understand reality, they became an integral part of reality. The revolutionary Left, convinced that the peaceful road was impossible, did as much as it could to accelerate the violent denouement. The Christian Democrats, certain that Allende was either unwilling, or unable, to control the revolutionary Left, did everything possible to undermine a Center solution. The Right, convinced of the undemocratic nature of the regime, saw to it that democracy was liquidated. Allende and his advisors, through vacillation, reaffirmed the validity of arguments from disparate sides of the political spectrum.

Books both of the Maximalist Left and the Right present the reader with simple schemes. The Maximalists overestimate the level of revolutionary consciousness and the potential power of the proletariat. The Right also clearly exaggerates the strength of the revolutionary Left but, more dramatically, exaggerates its influence on the Allende government. The Maximalist literature tends to draw a full and rich set of theoretical propositions from its assumptions, and presents a full picture not only of revolutionary organizations but of the organized violence of the military and the Right. By contrast the Right, adhering to its simplistic black and white conceptions of the world, replaces theoretical rigor with a mere lambasting of villains and celebration of heroes.

Books on the Center present careful, even if self-serving, documentation of the position of the Christian Democratic party, building a strong case against the failures of the Popular Unity government. But this analysis fails to take into consideration the interplay of forces on all sides and ignores the key role of the Right in undermining democracy.

More than any of the other visions, that of the Gradualist Left has pointed to a greater array of variables and multiplicity of events in judging what happened. This is so, in large measure, because the Gradualists have been more willing to criticize those actors in the Chilean drama who held gradualist postures, rather than simply attempting to justify the correctness of their actions. This vision,

while richer and more complex, suffers by sacrificing explanatory rigor in favor of a consideration of too many disparate factors. Hopefully, a second generation of studies will provide more satisfactory analyses of "what happened" in Chile, even if still within the confines of different visions.

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## NOTES

1. We include in this category Blanco, et al.; Evans; García; Mistral; Sweezy and Magdoff; and Toer. Some of the essays in the special issue of *Latin American Perspectives* should also be classified in this section. Several of these books consist of articles published during the Popular Unity period. Evans draws his articles from *Intercontinental Press*, Sweezy and Magdoff from *Monthly Review*, and García from *Chile Hoy*.
2. Mistral, p. 93.
3. Toer, pp. 22-23.
4. Mistral, p. 109.
5. Evans, pp. 12-15; Mistral, p. 116; Paul Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power," in Sweezy and Magdoff, p. 19; Toer, p. 245; and Kyle Steenland, p. 10.
6. Mistral provides the most detailed analysis of the economic policies of the Popular Unity from this perspective. He notes that the economic strategy merely led to chaos because of the lack of political power. See Mistral, p. 66.
7. Sweezy, "Chile," pp. 11-12.
8. "El golpe de la oligarquía y del imperialismo," in Blanco, p. 22. Blanco and Evans present a Trotskyist perspective.
9. Sweezy, "Chile," p. 11. The "myth" of a democratic transition is also noted by Betty and James Petras, "Ballots into Bullets: Epitaph for a Peaceful Revolution," in Sweezy and Magdoff, pp. 156-60.
10. In his essay stressing the importance of external factors, Victor Wallis notes that the election of Allende was the result of growing anti-imperialism in Chile. See Wallis, pp. 44-57. Scholars who have analyzed survey data in Chile have questioned the view that the Allende election was the result of a significant change in the attitudes of the Chilean electorate. See James Prothro and Patricio Chaparro, "Public Opinion and the Movement of Chilean Government to the Left, 1952-72," in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Chile: Politics and Society* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1975).
11. Paul Sweezy makes this point. See "Chile," pp. 13-14.
12. Steenland, p. 11. He notes, as do other authors, that Popular Unity should have prepared for an armed confrontation in the early months of the government when it had the initiative. Though he notes that by 1973 the initiative was clearly lost, he implies that an armed solution would still have had a good chance of success.
13. Mistral, p. 113 and Toer, p. 110. Toer's book is the most impressive and valuable work in this category. It is a carefully documented source for declaration and policy statements of different political groups, primarily on the Left. Toer follows a chronological approach with relatively little interpretation in the text itself. The interpretation emerges from the many documents quoted often at great length. Unlike Mistral, its focus is primarily on political as opposed to economic questions. The analysis by foreign authors adds very little to the contributions of Mistral and Toer.

14. Toer, p. 176. See also Andrew Zimbalist and Barbara Stallings, "Showdown in Chile," in Sweezy and Magdoff, pp. 125-26. In this article, written shortly before the coup, Zimbalist is more critical of the Popular Unity than in his earlier exchanges with Sweezy in the same volume. Nevertheless, he still implies that the failure was one of strategy and lack of decisiveness in following opportunities, than in the complete bankruptcy of the "Via Chilena" model.
15. See Toer, particularly pp. 211-15.
16. Toer, p. 245.
17. García, p. xlix. This book is a very valuable compilation of articles primarily on the armed forces and the relations between the government and the military. Drawn from *Chile Hoy*, they often reflect the good intelligence work of the MIR.
18. Les Evans, "Introduction," in Evans, p. 14.
19. Initially spokesmen for MIR and MAPU called the military government fascist. See the declarations reprinted in Toer, pp. 301-13. Today, however, published and unpublished sources from the MIR stress the differences of the Chilean regime with the European fascists. They note in particular that the middle classes in Chile are not apt to be mobilized—and in fact are disenchanted with the economic policies aimed at benefiting only the large capitalists. Steenland makes a similar argument, p. 28.
20. Books in this category include A. Acquaviva, et al.; Arroyo; Garcés; MacEoin; Piacentini, et al.; Touraine; and Uribe.
21. Garcés, p. 9. Garcés was a top political advisor to Allende. He published several works during the Popular Unity government which are very useful to anyone interested in studying the period. This volume is a collection of previously published materials and does not provide an in-depth analysis of the Popular Unity years. However, Garcés will undoubtedly make major contributions in the future from the perspective of someone who does not think that the failure of a peaceful road to socialism is inevitable.
22. Touraine, p. 82. This book by a distinguished French sociologist and authority on the labor movement consists of daily commentaries written in Santiago between July and September 1973, supplemented by reflections written after the coup. This is one of the most insightful and interesting books to appear to date on Chilean events.
23. Arroyo, p. 36.
24. Touraine, p. 193.
25. Pablo Piacentini, "Crítica a la estrategia de la UP," in Piacentini. See especially p. 57. See also Guillermo Medina, "La Democracia Cristiana y la crisis de Chile: La quiebra del centro político," in the same volume, pp. 97-136.
26. Touraine, p. 192 and passim.
27. Piacentini, p. 68.
28. Touraine, p. 77.
29. See Acquaviva, et al., p. 177 and passim. These authors reflect the position of the Communist party and are thus very critical of the revolutionary Left. The book was hastily conceived and it has many basic errors of fact. Touraine is also critical of the Maximalists. See p. 91.
30. Arroyo, p. 36.
31. Touraine, p. 230.
32. Observers from this perspective are very critical of mistakes in economic policy. However, a good analysis of the economy during the Allende regime from their point of view is not yet available. The forthcoming book of Sergio Bitar, former minister of mines, will undoubtedly be a first rate work. On the unnecessary alienation of middle sectors through errors in economic policy see Garcés, pp. 208-14.
33. Nef, pp. 58-77.
34. Other authors give strong emphasis on the role of U.S. opposition to the regime. MacEoin, in a very journalistic and uncritical description of the Allende years, devotes substantial attention to the U.S.' involvement in Chilean affairs. See MacEoin, passim. Armando Uribe devotes his entire book to the efforts of the United States government

- to undermine the viability of the Allende experiment. Though somewhat overdrawn, this book presents fascinating material on the perceptions of Chilean policy-makers of United States policy and of the relations between the U.S. and the Chilean militaries. Uribe was a career foreign service officer who occupied several high positions during the Allende administration. See Uribe, *passim*.
35. Books in this category include Arriagada; Baltra; Echeverría and Frei; and Orrego. All were published after the coup.
  36. Arriagada, p. 14.
  37. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
  38. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
  39. *Ibid.*, p. 130. A similar argument is presented in the introduction to the three volume work by Echeverría and Frei, p. 9. This work is an extremely valuable compilation of documents issued by opposing sides during the Popular Unity government. Primary attention is given to Christian Democratic declarations. The volumes include the text of the Statute of Guarantees, of the Christian Democratic sponsored amendment on areas of the economy and of the Chamber of Deputies on the "illegality" of the Allende regime. It includes the exchanges between Allende and the Supreme Court. Baltra also stresses that "from the government, Mr. Allende directed all of his acts towards the rupturing of the legality he had promised to uphold." Baltra, p. 30. Baltra does not attempt to explain or document his assertion. Unlike Arriagada he does not suggest that this was a deliberate strategy stemming from a preconceived ideological posture, but implies that the Popular Unity simply became too power-hungry, unwilling to share its gains with the middle sectors. Baltra's small book contains information on the economic crisis of the Allende years.
  40. Arriagada, p. 149. Arriagada interprets this as Allende's supporting the insurrectionary road, rather than his reappraisal of the "Via Chilena" because its "end" might have been misunderstood.
  41. *Ibid.*, p. 326. It is interesting to note that Allende's declaration to Debray—suggesting that his acceptance of the Statute of Guarantees (a condition for obtaining the necessary votes in the Congress to assume the presidency) was done for tactical reasons—is taken literally. But his many declarations supporting democracy and legality and criticizing the Left are underplayed as not reflecting his real intentions, or are refuted by quoting a contrary position from another member of the Popular Unity.
  42. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
  43. Radomiro Tomic's forthcoming book on Chilean events will fill this important void. Tomic, the Christian Democratic candidate for the presidency in 1970, is one of the principal figures in the left sector of the party. Medina's piece in Piacentini, et al., comes closest to this position.
  44. See Toer, p. 97, for precisely that interpretation of Allende's action.
  45. Arriagada does not mention the military regime, nor do the volumes compiled by Echeverría and Frei.
  46. Orrego, pp. 39-40.
  47. Books in this category include the publications of the Junta de Gobierno; Baraona, et al.; Boizard; Millas and Filippi; Moss; and Silva.
  48. Most of these publications argue that Allende lived a life of luxury. For a sampling of the worst see Boizard's chapter "Las mansiones y las orgías," pp. 69-75.
  49. For example see Boizard, p. 18; Millas and Filippi, p. 5; Junta de Gobierno, *Fundamentos*, p. 11.
  50. The principal leaders of the Christian Democratic party, some of whom were involved in face to face negotiations with Allende, do not accept the view that the Plan Zeta was government policy. They note that many documents were produced by extremist political groups, so the documents themselves may be legitimate. But that Allende was involved in an "auto-golpe" is seen as ludicrous. This is based on interviews in Santiago during 1974.

51. Junta de Gobierno, *Libro blanco*, pp. 79–81. This book is available in an English translation as the *White Paper on the Change of Government in Chile* and has been distributed in the United States by the Chilean embassy. Citations are from the Spanish version. This is a surprisingly small number, given the political mobilization of the Allende years. Of this number, only twenty were clearly killed by members of the extreme Left. Others died of heart attacks when their land was taken, were killed by police or antigovernment forces, or died under unspecified conditions. These figures are in dramatic contrast with the number of deaths since the coup. Though some observers, such as Carlos Cerda, p. 27, exaggerate in suggesting that over 100,000 people died—the number is clearly several thousand. In almost every town and village in the country people were killed or disappeared. The government's policies of imprisonment and torture are well documented in books such as those by Cerda, Villegas, and White. The most substantial volume is that of Villegas. These books do not present reliable global figures on junta repression, but provide very valuable eye-witness accounts. They have been amply corroborated by fact-finding missions from Amnesty International, the Organization of American States, the International Labor Organization, and other special missions. The real scope of the junta's repression is yet to be fully documented.
52. Junta de Gobierno, *Libro blanco*, pp. 39–65.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 54. Even in face of this evidence, Silva persists in arguing that the president was fully behind the Plan Zeta—though he notes that he must have been unaware of its intention to assassinate him. Silva, p. 279.
57. Moss, p. 220. This book was originally published in English. See, Robert Moss, *Chile's Marxist Experiment* (London: David and Charles, 1973).
58. Hector Rieles, "La legitimidad de la Junta de Gobierno," in *Fundamentos*, pp. 114-15. This article is reprinted from Baraona.
59. Rieles, "La legitimidad" in *Fundamentos*, p. 115.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
62. One of the most important accusations of illegality against the Allende government derived from opposing interpretations of the veto power of the president. Allende argued that a two-thirds majority was required to override a presidential veto on constitutional as well as ordinary legislation. The opposition argued that on constitutional legislation a simple majority was sufficient. Since the adoption of the controversial bill on the "areas of the economy" (which would have curbed executive power) was at stake, the juridical debate took on great importance. A reading of some of the literature on the constitutional reforms suggests that the president's position was a very strong one. See Eduardo Frei, et. al., *Reforma constitucional 1970* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1970), and Guillermo Piedrabuena, *La reforma constitucional* (Santiago: Ediciones Encina Ltda., 1970).
63. It is fascinating to read the extensive declarations of the opposition elements of Congress, the courts, and other groups defending freedom and democracy during the Allende regime, with the knowledge that many of those same elements have been silent in the face of the clearly undemocratic practices of the current regime. As an example, see the declaration of the Chilean Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados) reprinted in *Fundamentos*, pp. 103–6. The evidence presented for the "illegality" of the Allende government pales when contrasted with the actions of the junta. And yet, when a prominent conservative lawyer urged the association to stand by its earlier principles, he was arrested for undermining the security of the state, and the Bar Association turned over his remarks to the military prosecutor.
64. Rieles, "La legitimidad" in *Fundamentos*, p. 128.

65. For an example of this reasoning see Ricardo Cox, "Defensa social interna," in Barona, et. al., pp. 73–121.
66. Silva, pp. 15–16. Moss does not go this far. He seems to view the military as basically democratic and intent on reestablishing democracy. But his view is challenged in the Spanish foreword of his book by Arturo Fontaine who notes that the Allende experience "broke the juridical mold of Chilean democracy and made it physically and morally impossible to restructure it in the same terms as before." See Moss, p. 11.
67. Junta de Gobierno, *Declaración de principios*, p. 66. In subsequent speeches the junta members have continued to affirm that theme. For example, see Augusto Pinochet's speech of 11 September 1974, the first anniversary of the coup. He noted that the decay of Chile occurred with the "advent of partisan or demagogic governments, in which a small and sterile battle for particular benefits criminally divided the country and discredited all public men. . . . The political-partisan recess must be prolonged for years more, and can only be reestablished when a new generation of Chileans, formed in healthy patriotic and civic habits, and inspired by an authentic national sentiment, can assume the direction of public life."