

the points we attempted to make. We were invited to write our articles for the Theories and Methodologies section to address the question of how debates about the Spanish Golden Age challenge the configurations of early modern studies (and vice versa), as well as the question of how this “age of gold” travels across countries and continents. Doing so in under 3,500 words and attempting to engage with the broad readership of *PMLA* were not conducive to highlighting noncanonical authors, as Figueroa recognizes. That is a challenge for us to address collectively in the field of early modern Spanish studies. Part of that challenge, of course, is the extent of literary production in Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an outpouring too vast, rich, and diverse for any one critic’s lifework, much less these brief articles, to fully encompass. Although we did not have space in our articles to discuss noncanonical authors, we recognize the importance of expanding the canon, and we celebrate the recent publication of many editions and studies of little-known dramatists, poets, and religious writers. It could be argued that Hispanists have been in the vanguard of the recovery of early modern women’s writing.

Decreasing the relative marginalization of Spanish studies in the early modern field—or ensuring that attention is paid to the Spanish Golden Age in Renaissance studies, if one prefers those terms—is necessarily a bidirectional effort. *PMLA*’s publication of our articles is but one indication of a gradually increasing interest in Spain on the part of other European cultural scholars over recent years. To encourage the continued growth of this interest and engage effectively with other traditions, we should produce more translations of Spanish texts—works by noncanonical authors as well as the less read works of canonical authors—to make them accessible to general readers and useful in comparative courses. (Unfortunately, the academic tenure and promotion policies in the United States do not encourage this effort, so translations, like good scholarly editions, are done more for the love of the art than for career

advancement.) At the same time, we need to become familiar enough with other traditions and their critical and theoretical debates to engage with those debates in the articles and books we write or encourage our students to write.

*Margaret R. Greer*  
Duke University

*Alison Weber*  
University of Virginia

#### *Reply:*

We would like to thank Melissa Figueroa for her thoughtful response to our Little-Known Documents entry “Three Literary Manifestos of Early Modern Spain.” She perceptively points out that the poetic manifestos we translated reveal the anxieties of a newly formed *mentalité* that corresponds to the historiographical designation *early modern*. Yet because the conventional term *Golden Age* is intended to describe not the social conditions of early modern Spain but the aesthetic qualities of its literary production over two centuries, it seems to us still taxonomically useful in that it asserts the literature’s classical European roots while proclaiming its distinction. The literature’s worth is all the more significant given its authors’ diverse social, religious, and cultural origins and, no less, the many obstacles that most authors encountered when attempting to write. If, as Saint Teresa rightly bemoaned, those were exceedingly rough times, they also left us a legacy we cannot afford to devalue. In our own *tiempos recios*, Figueroa’s regard for the field is heartening.

*Anne J. Cruz*  
University of Miami

*Elias L. Rivers*  
Stony Brook University  
State University of New York

#### **Talking about Lebanon and Gaza**

TO THE EDITOR:

In replying to Basem L. Ra’ad’s recent Forum letter on the exclusion of Lebanon and

Gaza from *PMLA*'s October 2009 issue on war (126.1 [2010]: 243–45), Srinivas Aravamudan, coeditor of that issue, concedes Ra'ad's criticism but goes on to muddle the topic with talk of heroic monumentalization (126.1 [2010]: 245–46). Ra'ad's point is simple: we should talk about Palestine, Lebanon, and Gaza. And the end of such conversation would be, well, the opposite of not having such a conversation and being silent about Palestine, Lebanon, and Gaza. Whatever else Troy and Guernica might be brought to signify, their representations in art are first acknowledgments that certain events took place.

*Petar Ramadanovic*

University of New Hampshire, Durham

*Reply:*

I thank Petar Ramadanovic for his letter. In response to his concern that I conceded Ra'ad's criticism but am muddling the issue with talk of heroic monumentalization, I can only remind him of the complex nature of literature as both imaginative and referential.

Literature is neither history nor politics, even though literature and literary criticism are much the poorer if not in constant conversation with both. But this conversation cannot be obligatory: it has to be voluntary, which means some might choose to enter it, and others might take a pass. Ra'ad's simple point—as Ramadanovic puts it, "*we should* talk about Palestine, Lebanon, and Gaza" (emphasis mine)—is not so simple. Who is "we"? Antiwar activists?

Certainly. Literary critics? Not necessarily. The moral imperative carried by "should" is coercive. Should everyone? Why? And while some may, others might not. Why should everyone agree to discuss one particular (even world-historical) conflict to the implicit exclusion of others, given that time and space are always limited?

Does focusing on one conflict universalize priorities for everyone, and what would "we" say if someone else counters that "we should" instead, at this very moment, be talking about the Arab Spring or the much greater human toll of the civil wars in Libya, the Sudan, and the Congo, or break the deafening silence about the recent genocide of the Tamils in Sri Lanka? Of course, we can't talk about everything at once: the Jakobsonian principle of the axis of selection teaches us that. An infinite conversation may include everything, but everyday attention spans are brutally finite.

Naming something or talking about something does not necessarily acknowledge that "certain events took place"—witness the way the Nazis manipulated the Reichstag fire. Conversely, world history and even current events are littered with many genocides and wars that are hardly ever brought up for moral contestation in our imperfect forums—but that does not mean they did not occur. I would insist (maybe this is *my* moral imperative) that we *also* imagine damages and losses beyond our capacity to render justice by positively acknowledging specific wars, which are legion.

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