

# IO

## International Organization

**Robert H. Bates, Philip Brock, and Jill Tiefenthaler**  
Risk and Trade Regimes

**Andrew Moravcsik**  
Negotiating the Single European Act

**John A. C. Conybeare**  
An Electoral Model of Tariff Policy

**Jonathan B. Tucker**  
International Collaboration in Advanced Technology

**Glenn H. Snyder**  
Alliances, Balance, and Stability

Sponsored by the World Peace Foundation  
Edited at Stanford University  
Published quarterly by The MIT Press

EDITORIAL BOARD

Peter Katzenstein, Chairperson

Vinod K. Aggarwal  
Robert Bates  
Thomas J. Biersteker  
Barry Buzan  
Ellen T. Comisso  
Peter F. Cowhey  
Peter Gourevitch  
Joanne Gowa  
Joseph M. Grieco  
Ernst Haas

Takashi Inoguchi  
Harold K. Jacobson  
Christer Jönsson  
Miles Kahler  
Stephen Kobrin  
Friedrich V. Kratochwil  
David A. Lake  
Charles S. Maier  
Timothy J. McKeown  
Lynn Krieger Mytelka

Donald J. Puchala  
Ronald Rogowski  
John Gerard Ruggie  
Duncan Snidal  
Janice Stein  
Thomas D. Willett  
Beth V. Yarbrough  
Oran R. Young  
Mark W. Zacher

*Editor:* Stephen D. Krasner  
*Managing editor:* Sharon Keller Maddox

*Review editor:* Joanne Gowa

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION invites the submission of manuscripts on all aspects of world politics and international political economy. Abstracts, manuscripts, and footnotes should be double-spaced. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively and placed at the end of the manuscript. Submit three copies (printed on one side of the page only), along with a statement of each author's affiliation, to the Editor, *International Organization*, Dept. of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., 94305. Authors may expect a decision within two months of the Editor's receipt of a manuscript.

Statements and opinions expressed in *International Organization* are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of The Board of Editors, The Board of Trustees of the World Peace Foundation, Stanford University, or The MIT Press.

*International Organization* (ISSN 0020-8183) is published quarterly—Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn—by The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, and London, England.

*Subscriptions and business correspondence:* For inquiries concerning subscriptions, write to MIT Press Journals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, or telephone the Circulation Dept. at (617) 253-2889. Yearly subscription rates for students are \$20; for other individual subscribers, \$28; and for institutions, \$60. Subscribers outside the United States should add \$14 for postage and handling. To be honored free of charge, claims for missing copies must be made immediately upon receipt of the next published issue. Postmaster: send address changes to *International Organization*, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. Second Class postage is paid at Boston, MA, and at additional mailing offices.

*Advertising:* Please write to Advertising Manager, MIT Press Journals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA, or telephone (617) 253-2866.

*Rights and permissions:* All inquiries concerning rights and permissions should be sent to *International Organization*, MIT Press Journals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142.

Permission to photocopy articles for internal or personal use or the internal or personal use of specific clients is granted by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), provided that the fee of \$1.50 per copy is paid directly to CCC, 27 Congress Street, Salem, MA 01970. The fee code for users of the Transactional Reporting Service is 0020-8183/91 \$1.50. For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license with CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged.

---

# International Organization

Volume 45, Number 1, Winter 1991

---

## Articles

Risk and trade regimes: another exploration 1  
*Robert H. Bates, Philip Brock, and Jill Tiefenthaler*

Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and  
conventional statecraft in the European Community 19  
*Andrew Moravcsik*

Voting for protection: an electoral model of tariff policy 57  
*John A. C. Conybeare*

Partners and rivals: a model of international collaboration in  
advanced technology *Jonathan B. Tucker* 83

## Review essay

Alliances, balance, and stability *Glenn H. Snyder* 121

---

## Contributors

---

**Robert H. Bates** is Henry R. Luce Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center in Political Economy at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

**Philip Brock** is Assistant Professor of Economics at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

**John A. C. Conybeare** is Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Iowa City.

**Andrew Moravcsik** is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government and Research Associate in the Program on Political Economy and National Security at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

**Glenn H. Snyder** is Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

**Jill Tiefenthaler** is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Economics, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

**Jonathan B. Tucker** is an American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow in Science, Arms Control, and National Security, Washington, D.C.

---

# Abstracts

---

## **Risk and trade regimes: another exploration**

by Robert H. Bates, Philip Brock, and Jill Tiefenthaler

An analysis of a small sample of countries shows that the higher the level of terms-of-trade risk that a nation faces in international markets, the more likely it is to increase barriers. The analysis also shows that the greater the availability of social insurance programs mounted by a nation's government, the less likely it is to block free trade. In comparison with the small open economies of Western Europe, therefore, developing countries may remain protectionist because they lack the resources to mount internal programs of transfer payments as a means of coping with risk from international markets.

## **Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community**

by Andrew Moravcsik

The unexpected approval in 1986 of the Single European Act and its program for completing the European Community's internal market by 1992 did not, according to the historical data presented in this article, result from an elite alliance of the European Community Commission, European Parliament, and pan-European business groups. Instead, it rested on interstate bargains involving Britain, France, and Germany, for which the two essential preconditions were the convergence of European economic policy prescriptions following the French turnaround in 1983 and the bargaining leverage that France and Germany gained by threatening to create a "two-track" Europe and exclude Britain. This suggests that theories stressing supranational factors, including certain variants of neofunctionalism, should be supplanted by an "intergovernmental institutionalist" approach combining a realist emphasis on state power and national interests with a proper appreciation of the important role of domestic factors in determining the goals that governments pursue.

## **Voting for protection: an electoral model of tariff policy**

by John A. C. Conybeare

The political economy of trade policy has largely neglected popular elections. When legislatures determine protection, politicians supply tariffs that are demanded by their constituents. A model of this political market is specified and tested with data related to the McKinley Tariff of 1890. An index of the extent to which tariff pro-

tection accrued to individual congressional districts is applied, along with demand and supply variables, to three questions: Did representatives supply tariffs to their districts as the model predicts? Did they vote in accordance with the district tariff interest in the roll-call vote on the McKinley Tariff? Did electors reward representatives for the district tariff protection in a manner consistent with a political market model? Empirical estimations based on the model provide answers that are generally affirmative and appear to be inconsistent with the traditional view that the Republican defeat in 1890 was a result of the McKinley Tariff.

### **Partners and rivals: a model of international collaboration in advanced technology**

by Jonathan B. Tucker

Concepts from bargaining theory and neorealist theory are integrated in a partners-and-rivals (PAR) model that explains the terms of collaboration between rational actors (for example, firms) that are potential competitors. The model contends that the stronger player's incentive to collaborate is determined not only by its interest in absolute welfare benefits from collaboration but also by its concern about and loss of utility from unfavorable shifts in relative position vis-à-vis the weaker player. Two propositions are derived from the model. According to the disparity principle, the stronger player's net payoff from collaboration (the sum of its welfare benefits and positional costs) is a function of the disparity in capabilities between the two players. The net payoff curve is low when the disparity in capabilities is large, reaches an optimum when the disparity is moderate, and then falls again as the disparity approaches zero. The slope of the curve is also affected by a coefficient,  $\alpha$ , which reflects the stronger player's sensitivity to positional losses. According to the compensation principle, for collaboration to arise, the weaker player must make an adjustment in the terms of the bargain, or a side-payment, to compensate the stronger player for its positional losses from collaboration. The validity of the PAR model is tested by comparing Franco-German collaboration on military aircraft in two cases, one in which the disparity in capabilities between the players was moderate and the other in which the disparity was small.