

What do the people's controllers accomplish? Adams's answers to this difficult question are scattered throughout various parts of her book, but are found mainly in chapter 6 and in the concluding chapter. Most of her efforts to answer questions about effectiveness and impact are more in the form of statements of intent—found in official documents and instructions—than in analysis of specific cases, though she does touch on several interesting examples of the latter. For example, a local branch of the People's Control Committee succeeded in forcing the builders of a Moscow housing complex for one hundred thousand people—which was under construction and already occupied by thirty thousand residents but lacked necessary service facilities, such as stores, laundries, and so forth—to install such services. No mention is made in connection with this or other such examples of action by injured parties in defense of their rights, such as they may be under Soviet law.

Professor Adams does not conceal the fact that all of the "participation" engaged in by citizen inspectors is tightly supervised by the party, which, in fact, has recently intensified its control. Adams asserts that by 1977 People's Control had been "transformed into a party organization," more than four million People's Control members being party members. Adams indicates that Brezhnev trusts the masses less than Khrushchev did (see pp. 150–53).

This is a useful book and it can be used for reference purposes by scholars working in numerous areas of research on Soviet politics. It makes good use of relevant theory, especially the bureaucratic theory of Anthony Downs. Its description of the substitution of new kinds of mobilization for police terror stimulates thought on prospects for change in the relationships between rulers and ruled in the USSR. While I do not reject the occasional hopes expressed by Professor Adams that Soviet citizens will some day enjoy more of the self-management functions they were promised in 1917, I find no convincing evidence or argument to that effect in her study.

I think that Professor Adams might have imparted a greater air of realism by including some data on bureaucratic malfeasance and corruption contained in reports by Western journalists and by Soviet dissidents. Undoubtedly, People's Control accomplishes a great deal, but in view of what is reported in sources other than the official Soviet press, one wonders how fully it is permitted to accomplish its assigned mission, and to what extent its functions are symbolic and psychological, rather than administrative and economic.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

SOVIET POLITICAL ELITES: THE CASE OF TIRASPOL. By *Ronald J. Hill*.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. x, 226 pp. \$16.95.

This short volume is a splendid example of the contribution to our knowledge of the Soviet political system which an intensive investigation at the local level can make. Through good luck or a sound proposal, in 1967–68, as a member of the British-Soviet academic exchange, Hill was able to study at the Moldavian Academy of Sciences. This unusual assignment enabled him to pursue his investigation of a single medium-sized city, Tiraspol. His candid description of this investigation tells us a great deal about the possibilities for local research in the USSR and the stringent limitations as well. Hill apparently was able to use the Tiraspol newspaper collection in Kishinev without serious restrictions (he seems to have used the Moldavian-language version—which may differ substantially from the Russian in some aspects—only as a supplement). Considering the severe restrictions on *current oblast-level* newspapers (to say nothing of back files for lower administrative levels) in the Lenin Library, this was no slight advantage. Hill was able, moreover, to make an extended field trip to Tiraspol—certainly an unusual experience for an observer from outside

the Soviet bloc. He regrets that his interviews with city officials, who tended to repeat the clichés of legal definition, were not very productive. One wonders whether a less direct approach, focusing on some specific policy (perhaps something like the *sovnarkhoz*, discredited shortly before his visit), might not have elicited more cogent information than overt interrogation concerning party and state organizational processes. Nevertheless, Hill acquired (perhaps more than he realizes) an intangible grasp of the personality of Soviet officials and a feel for the Tiraspol environment which would have been hard to achieve without the benefit of his extended visit.

The chief merit of Hill's book consists of the skillful and infinitely painstaking way in which he utilizes his data. Merely reading the local press would have availed him little; his basic approach consists of elaborate recombination of scattered evidence on local administrative elites. By constructing patterns of career advancement and of participation in formal sessions (of the *gorsovet*, the *gorkom*, and occasionally their executive bodies), Hill is able to detect a second more profound level of patterns, namely, the organizational behavior characteristics of officials. He generously acknowledges models provided by earlier students of regional and local elites, notably this reviewer's. Hence, I am embarrassed to quibble over his truncated quotation (p. 107) of my general position (in *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union*) on Soviet-party relations: "The Soviet state is . . . a facade behind which the real power of Communist control is exercised." Hill might have recalled the old adage of readers of *Pravda* editorials: always pay attention to what follows *odnako*, for I add, "but it is a facade that is not wholly devoid of functional significance." I believe, however, that Hill and I agree on basic issues, such as the high degree of career interchangeability between state and party officials below the top levels. Where we appear to differ, as in the notably higher role he ascribes to local Komsomol organizations, his more recent, precise data are frequently persuasive.

Like all case studies, Hill's provides a mine of evidence. The book is, however, much more than that. Its clear, admirably concise style and excellent use of statistical tables, charts, and maps are useful examples for anyone. Above all, the extraordinarily skillful combination of conceptual frameworks, general data concerning the Soviet system, and rich new material make the book a model which should inspire a new generation of intensive analyses.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
University of Wisconsin, Madison

REVOLUTIONARY LAW AND ORDER: POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE USSR. By *Peter H. Juviler*. New York and London: The Free Press
and Collier Macmillan, 1976. xiv, 274 pp. \$13.95.

In this wide-ranging review of Russian and Soviet responses to the phenomenon of crime from 1864 to the present day, Professor Juviler seeks to identify the basic patterns of and trends in criminal policy, with emphasis upon the post-Stalin era. He brings to his study some two decades of research and reflection, including a number of visits to the Soviet Union. He is sensitive to the various approaches of Soviet policymakers and crime experts in their efforts to diagnose and resolve the root causes of criminal behavior, often lacing his observations with perceptive analogies to American experience.

The study comprises seven chapters. A succinct introduction sets the framework for an examination of the social changes which have occurred in the USSR (and the tsarist background to these changes) and of the efforts by the Soviet leadership to pursue various aspects of the revolution while responding to the consequences of both political upheaval and the impact of industrialization and collectivization. In the