

As might be expected in such an ambitious undertaking, the volume contains some textual inaccuracies as well as debatable judgments which, in some cases, reflect the arms control bias of the editors. For example, on page 65 the reader is told that "undoubtedly one of the reasons the Air Force continues to press for aircraft and the Navy for surface ships is that duty in a missile silo or Poseidon submarine is boring," implying that conventional forces, in particular, U.S. conventional forces, have no real modern military function except as a very high cost form of recreation. This has clearly not been the case since the end of World War II, is not now, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.

In addition, the authors may have allowed their enthusiasm for arms control to cause them to be overly sanguine about the arms limitations achieved by SALT I. The United States and the Soviet Union did not forgo as yet undeveloped weapons technologies for exotic ABM systems (p. 204); they did agree (in Agreed Interpretation E) that, in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems would be subject to discussion and agreement between the two sides. The ABM Treaty did not solve the problem of defining the difference between ABM and air defense systems (p. 138), but established areas in which ABM components may be deployed. Moreover, the signatories of the treaty undertook not to give ABM capabilities to missiles, launchers, or radar systems, other than specifically ABM missiles, launchers, or radars. The two sides also agreed that only ABM systems could be tested in an ABM mode, thus providing a verifiable means of declaring any system so tested an ABM system. These appear to be reasonable safeguards against the possible upgrading of an air defense system. However, estimating system capabilities in this way can hardly be called defining the difference between the systems. The limitations on silo dimensions did not alleviate U.S. concerns over the dangers that might arise if high-yield weapons were made more accurate and MIRVed so as to be effective against Minuteman missiles (pp. 202-3). The 10-15 percent increase in silo dimensions, the development of MIRVs, and the improvements in re-entry vehicle accuracies—all authorized under the Interim Agreement—have, as readers of the daily press are aware, raised questions about the survivability of fixed ICBMs.

In most respects, however, the book provides a balanced presentation of the complexities of arms control negotiations, whether between the superpowers or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The chapter on the institutions of arms control, based on a lecture by Ambassador James Leonard, is particularly useful in its explanation of the terms "inspection" and "verification." The institutions discussed, unfortunately, are primarily U.S. institutions. Although information on parallel Soviet institutions is sparse, the text would have been improved by at least an attempt to describe them.

WILLIAM J. SPAHR
Central Intelligence Agency

THE RUSSIAN NAVY: MYTH AND REALITY. By *Eric Morris*. New York: Stein and Day, 1977. 150 pp. Map. \$9.95.

The student of Soviet affairs who is not a specialist in military matters will be considerably informed by *Eric Morris*. His book contains much that the scholar needs to know in order to gain some appreciation of the complex factors affecting the development of contemporary Soviet naval power. However, if the reader is seeking to illuminate fully the realities behind the myths surrounding the Soviet navy, he must read more than this brief, general work.

Morris presents a balanced picture of checkered Russian maritime history. Moments of glory and periods of impotence punctuate an uncertain maritime tradition. Indeed,

as Morris makes clear, a coherent Soviet naval policy did not emerge quickly, even under the Bolsheviks. Though it is also available elsewhere, the reader will find a useful summary of Soviet naval policy through the end of the Great Patriotic War. The development of the contemporary Soviet navy is described in a less disciplined, but quite readable manner.

There are two errors commonly made by commentators on the Soviet navy: First, the historic limitations upon tsarist naval power, to the extent that they still apply to the nuclear-age Soviet navy, are frequently not recognized. Second, Western analysts seldom arrive at any coherent description—or “model”—of Soviet naval power, often leading to lapses in analysis where it is assumed that nothing prevents the USSR from developing a traditional type of navy.

The book under review avoids the first pitfall. It is sprinkled with common-sense judgments about limitations on the contemporary Soviet navy, especially about geographic, economic, and mission-related constraints. However, even though Morris is surely aware of basic asymmetries between Russian and Western sea power, his failure to deal with them in terms of a vigorous analytical framework sometimes leaves the reader with the impression that the Soviet navy suffers no inherent, long-term limitations. This is the case, for example, when the Kiev class aircraft carrier is discussed in terms of “global maritime power.”

The Soviet Navy: Myth and Reality is more of an essay than a vigorous, well-documented work. It provides little new information and no new approaches, but it does present useful background and reasonable argumentation. Though the book will benefit the generalist more than the specialist on Soviet military matters, both should read it.

STEVE F. KIME
National War College

THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY. By *Jerry F. Hough*. Russian Research Center Studies, 77. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1977. xviii, 275 pp. \$16.50.

Any book by Jerry Hough—one of the most knowledgeable, industrious, and original students of Soviet politics today—is bound to arouse high expectations. His readers should not be disappointed, although some will find much to argue with: indeed, this is clearly part of the author’s intention, since the book is essentially a barrage of argument and evidence designed to provoke critical reexamination by Sovietologists of the assumptions and methods of their research. Judging by the preface, the author evidently hopes to exert a wider influence, encouraging more realistic understanding of the Soviet Union and thereby more appropriate American policies toward that country.

The book consists of an introduction and eleven essays, five of them originally published between 1971 and 1976. It has two distinct but interrelated themes: the first is that the study of Soviet politics and social (including political) science have much to learn from each other, and the second is that faulty assumptions and methodology have led to a serious underestimate of the degree of pluralism and participation in the Soviet system. Hough is not content, however, with merely commenting on others’ work. He supports his arguments with much new research of his own, which would make rewarding reading even if one could not agree with a single one of the author’s major conclusions.

The advantages of applying what has been learned from the study of large-scale organizations in the West to better understand the nature of Soviet politics and society is the subject of chapter 2, “The Bureaucratic Model and the Nature of the Soviet System.”