

PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT
IN SÃO PAULO:
A Reply*

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The state of São Paulo's economic and social trajectory since the early 1880s offers a fascinating tale of growth and change. Starting as a combination of slave economy and unsettled frontier, São Paulo became a rather prosperous agrarian society specializing in coffee and largely tended by European immigrants. Because coffee was the mainstay of the economy and caused major transformations, analysts have found it eminently plausible to believe that coffee provided the key to the processes of industrialization and development that made the region the top industrial producer in Brazil and perhaps in Latin America after 1910. Coffee begot capitalism and thus begot industry. Who could dispute that general characterization of São Paulo's trajectory? The debate begins when analysts seek to specify the actual processes that linked coffee to capitalist development and industrialization.

One of the chief advantages of the conventional wisdom challenged in my 1987 article in *LARR*, and one seemingly defended by Professors Love and Stolcke, is that this perspective offers a simple interpretation of São Paulo's course of development.¹ The basic features of economic and political life since at least the 1880s are perceived in terms of their functionality to a unitary process of capitalist development led by the emergent bourgeoisie centering around large coffee planters. Labor systems, commercial and financial channels, transportation networks, regulatory agencies, and policies of various kinds (not to mention the very apparatus of government itself) are viewed as neatly institutionalized arrangements, durably subservient or functional to the interests of the ruling planter class or "big coffee" capital until the demise of the Old Republic in 1930 and even afterward. In the light of my research, however, the conventional interpretation appears

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simplistic. While often critical of the planters, the monistic perspective on capitalist development in São Paulo actually awards the traditional coffee elite a role it probably did not deserve. From this perspective, Paulista history appears to have been dominated by the playing out of the modern myth of the *bandeirante*, the opportunistic settler-elites who dominated by force of their deeds and whose ruthless conquest of the virgin Brazilian jungle in a colonial and imperial context fathered the dynamism and vigorous modern capitalist development that has characterized the state since the 1880s. The immigrant agrarian labor force becomes a mere factor of that project, its exploitation guaranteed via repression or manipulation,² while industrialization is viewed as resulting from its penetration of urban-capitalist social space. Is this view myth or reality? Were the Paulista coffee planters really responsible for all the awesome deeds attributed to them? If so, how were these landlords able to organize themselves into such a formidable force?

My work on São Paulo actually began as a search for the roots of this presumed predominance and hegemony.³ The 1987 *LARR* article presented the argument in general and discussed some of the evidence. A full analysis, with considerably more evidence, is to be found in *Coffee, Contention, and Change*, soon to be published by Basil Blackwell. The book provides a great deal of material relevant to the points raised by Love and Stolcke that unfortunately cannot be addressed here for lack of space. In contrast with the monistic interpretation, my analysis proposes that segmentation rooted in the coffee economy, interacting with industrialization and processes of political change and autonomizing impulses by statemakers, made imminent a realignment favoring an emergent alternative economy based on independent producers, merchants, and industrialists. According to this perspective, sustained big coffee predominance and hegemony were problematical. The new approach calls attention not so much to institutional stability but to change and structural problems. The new perspective views the *colono* labor system, commercial and financial mechanisms, and political movements and institutions not as highly institutionalized phenomena functioning reliably to perpetuate planter rule under conditions of systemic closure but as contingent arrangements historically open to change in response to the actions of groups pursuing diverse interests in the context of changing structural dynamics. The two approaches offer contrasting accounts of the critical decade of the 1920s. While the monistic approach perceives this decade as the culmination of the big coffee elite as a hegemonic class, the alternative approach views this period as presenting traditional elites with multiple challenges that compelled them to react politically to restore lost preeminence and hegemony.

The Economic Standing of Big Coffee Elites

The comments by Love and Stolcke cover various interpretive, empirical, methodological, and theoretical issues pertaining to the two broad areas covered in my analysis: the economic strength or predominance of the *fazenda* and the extent to which planters were politically dominant. With respect to the first area, the two main questions posed by the comments have to do with the structural significance of the alternative agrarian economy of independent producers and the relationship between planters and industrialists. Although the degree of mobility from colono to independent producer, the contribution of the labor system known as the *colonato* to the large estate, and the precise origins of the alternative economy are not really essential components of my argument, I shall nevertheless address them in hopes of clarifying the nature and limits of my own and my colleagues' arguments.

No factual elements in the statements by Love and Stolcke challenge the essential claim I make with regard to agrarian social structure—that an alternative economy of independent producers of coffee and other commercial crops emerged before 1910 and that it grew in significance through the early 1930s. The comments raise questions of measurement to assert or imply that the analysis overstates the significance of independent agriculture. Love takes exception with the working definitions of *smallholder*. But it would seem that the historiography of agrarian systems has shown rather conclusively that definitions of *small* and *large* vary considerably over time and space. The proverbial "family" farms of Canada, the American West, Australia, and New Zealand in the 1920s would have been considered very large ones in Central America or Colombia (due to divergent ratios of population to arable land) and often became larger through time (due to mechanization). Similarly, in part because of the ratio of inhabitants to land, a small farm in São Paulo of the same era would also have been considered relatively large in other parts of Latin America. The demand for a narrow definition in terms of acreage runs up against widely differing definitions of *small farm* used by various agencies and authors with respect to the Paulista case.⁴ The same applies to definitions of size in terms of number of trees (and labor power). Using twenty thousand trees as the cutoff point in defining the smaller farms is far from unreasonable. The Sociedade Rural Brasileira itself considered smallholders to be those coffee growers with fewer than fifty thousand trees, a criterion also adopted often in *Boletim* of the Departamento Estadual de Trabalho.⁵ When Paulistas spoke of medium large, large, and very large coffee estates in the 1920s, they may even have been using cutoff points of two hundred and fifty thousand, five hundred thousand, and one million trees respectively. In general usage, a medium farm could range

from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand or even two hundred and fifty thousand coffee trees. Thus although the figure of twenty thousand trees is a reasonable cutoff point for assessing trends pertaining to smaller units, it would be perfectly defensible to use other break points (fifty thousand trees or even a higher figure) in making a simplified or dichotomous comparison.⁶

Stolcke's main objection to the thesis of the increasing significance of coffee production by independent small and medium producers centers on the claim that the use of data from the early 1930s does not reflect the reality of the period before the depression. She uses an indirect quote of obscure origins to argue that in 1927 the share of coffee trees under smallholders with fewer than twenty thousand trees amounted to only 18.4 percent, which she considers a very small total. But these statistics actually originated in 1931. Stolcke obtained the figures presumed to correspond to 1927 from a masters' thesis by A. A. Kageyama (Stolcke 1986, 85–86), who in turn apparently took them from Mircea Buescu's citation of João Normano (Buescu 1974, 125–26). In resting her case on fourth-hand data, Stolcke inadvertently repeats an error that Buescu and Kageyama picked up from Normano (1935, 41; 1945, 55). Whereas Normano asserts that the data pertain to 1927, they actually originated in the *Boletim do Instituto de Café* in 1931.⁷ Although Stolcke implies she is introducing a body of evidence ignored in my work, I discussed the original 1930–31 statistics in Font (1983, 58). As I stated there, these figures are utterly deficient with regard to smallholders because, as the Coffee Institute itself warned when it released them, the tentative count "did not take into account an unknown number of growers responsible for approximately 130 million coffee trees in the very new zones."⁸

It should be noted nonetheless that the reported 18.4 percent of the coffee trees being grown by producers with fewer than twenty thousand may be a rather low estimate but is far from insignificant. In fact, the Coffee Institute interpreted these figures as meaning that the Paulista coffee economy was undergoing a transformation favoring smaller units, a diametrically opposite conclusion to that of Stolcke.⁹ The writer of the original article presenting the data was particularly impressed with the fact that almost six hundred million trees belonged to growers owning fewer than one hundred thousand trees, one figure he used to differentiate large from small producers in São Paulo. But these figures are biased. The number of small and medium farmers and the coffee trees they owned were actually greater in 1931 and even in 1927.¹⁰ As discussed in my forthcoming book (Font n.d.), by the beginning of the 1930s, over seventy thousand growers owning fewer than twenty thousand trees were producing at least a fourth of the coffee in the Santos zone, whereas producers with fewer than fifty thousand

trees were responsible for at least 46 percent of the trees. Meanwhile, producers with more than two hundred and fifty thousand trees accounted for less than 17 percent of the trees. All things considered, the available data for the period from 1905 through the 1930s show that the sector composed of small and medium-sized coffee farms was important and was growing faster than the sector of large coffee estates. The significance of the independent agricultural sector in the Santos zone becomes clearer when other commercial crops are taken into account. The census of 1920 revealed more than fifty thousand farmers producing corn, another fifty thousand producing beans, forty-five thousand producing rice, twenty thousand producing cotton, and five thousand producing sugarcane. These numbers increased dramatically in subsequent enumerations.

Stolcke concedes that the economy was diversifying during this period but insists that the origins were either unclear or should be viewed largely in terms of large planters' decisions to subdivide some of their land and the function that diversified agriculture performed for the large estate. Stressing the theme that all features of rural life functioned according to planter predominance, Stolcke (1986) maintains that a "symbiotic" relationship existed between food production and the large fazenda. I have discussed various types of evidence—number, size, and nationality of producers, struggles over land, commercial channels, and links with industrialists—to show this sector's independence vis-à-vis the large coffee estate and to indicate how the alternative agrarian economy was changing the economic, social, and political texture of the countryside and contributing to major adjustments statewide. Stolcke's main points in this regard are largely assertions that will require substantiation.

Because my research does not focus on the study of mobility and my analysis does not hinge on any preconceived notions that a large percentage of colonos succeeded as independent producers, I must decline Stolcke's label of "optimistic" on the question of the extent of colono mobility. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic; the matter under discussion is an open empirical question. In this sense, my argument is simply that, directly or indirectly, many of the growing number of smallholders came from the ranks of the colonos, which implies only that a significant, but relatively undetermined, number of colonos experienced mobility. In concurring with Holloway that colono mobility must have been the primary avenue to independent agriculture, my analysis posits that usufruct plots were an important factor in the process but not the only one. To support the hypothesis of the significance of usufruct plots in petty production, my analysis employs data on colono budgets and the alternative agricultural system, linking the use value of such plots to broader processes of urbanization and industrial-

ization. In contrast, Stolcke simply reiterates the viewpoint that the plots and inter-row cropping were merely functional and entirely subservient to the large coffee estate. Stolcke's explanation of the significance of land usufruct is that planters offered better land terms at times of low prices but reduced them when prices rose and paid higher wages instead. Perhaps, but such assertions would be more credible if accompanied by evidence.

Love and Stolcke are fully justified in arguing the short-run functionality of land usufruct to the large estate and to the capitalist mode of production represented by the large planters. After all, why else would planters have instituted this system if it did not meet their needs? This arrangement was perceived as giving planters flexibility in dealing with the labor question, and it often did so, just as short-term usufruct plots did not necessarily imply weakness of the large estate. My argument, however, deals with unintended consequences playing themselves out over several decades as a function of evolving structural conditions outside the fazenda. Regardless of planter intentions and short-run benefits, this evolving reality provided conditions that gave land usufruct a high-use value with respect to various commercial crops. Proximity to markets was a key factor, but Stolcke's statement that access to markets evolved very slowly in the frontier region is erroneous. The period in question in fact experienced rapid development of railroads as well as roads. Paulista trackage expanded from 2,400 kilometers in 1890 to 3,400 in 1900, 4,800 in 1910, 6,600 in 1920, and 7,100 in 1930, with expansion occurring in frontier areas. Meanwhile, more than a thousand kilometers of highways and many other roads were built by the mid-1920s. As a result, dozens of new counties were established in the frontier between 1900 and 1930, and the number of towns multiplied. Stolcke's claim that whatever mobility was experienced by colonos resulted from their ability to save when task wages rose as a function of good coffee prices (rather than from their ability to make demands or from labor-market conditions) does not fit in well with some of her other views, including her general picture of colonos as immiserated under brutal and uniform proletarianization. At the same time, Stolcke's stress on the full functional subordination of the colonos and the rural masses implies a lack of bargaining control on their part that would seem to contradict her own arguments about colono proclivity toward collective action. Moreover, additional important elements of Stolcke's position or assumptions about the labor market are not supported by other bodies of evidence.¹¹

Love is right in saying that it is pointless to dwell too much on characterizations of Paulista social structure in such grand polarities as feudal-capitalist. Still, I fear that my main point here is being lost. I do not argue in either my article or book that the large coffee estate was

not generically capitalist. What I find highly pertinent and timely is the questioning of simple arguments that advanced capitalism based on surplus value was a homogeneous modality of production characterizing the entire Paulista coffee economy. Plenty of grounds exist for entertaining doubts about the labor force in the large estates being uniformly proletarianized in the sense of being dependent on wages.¹² Historically, several modalities of production evolved in São Paulo that, if clearly related to capitalism, diverged in important ways. Even glossing over the question of slavery, landlords who relied largely on land rent or rent equivalents for their income were different kinds of capitalists from those whose income sources were surplus value as such, or from farmers who relied heavily on family labor (with or without hired labor). To subsume such diversity under a broad definition of capitalism obscures more than it clarifies. Diverse modalities of production had differing impacts on systems of commercialization, financing, and regional development that cannot be predicted by the logic of the large estate. To unravel these relationships and their role in the state's dynamism and diversity calls for elaborating adequate theoretical framework and concepts as well as for conducting careful historical reconstruction.

With regard to the relationship between planters and industrialists, Love reiterates arguments about planters investing outside coffee. The gist of my argument is that the presence of big coffee capital in industry was visible through the 1890s but that most of the new industrial capital after the early 1900s did not come from traditional planters, who at that time were really losing ground in industry (Prado included). Wilson Suzigan's recent book agrees with this interpretation (Suzigan 1986). I also claim that significant associational differences existed between industrialists and planters.¹³ All this argument remains unchallenged in this regard. Love accepts the assertion that the emergence of a coffee economy outside the large estate played a role in creating a market for industry.

The Political Standing of Big Coffee Elites

The real core of my work on São Paulo is the analysis of the collective actions of coffee elites, as expressed in associations and the political conflicts of the 1920s. In contrast with the unitary perspective's imagery of undisturbed stability and hegemony, my analysis depicts a polity fraught with increasing tensions, realignment, autonomizing impulses on the part of statemakers, and a reaction by established elites to reverse their loss of political standing. While the *LARR* article presented some data on the relationship between the planter reaction and political polarization in the state, this line of analysis is considerably more developed in my forthcoming book (Font n.d.).

Love indicates that a longer-term perspective would lead to a different conclusion about the relationship between planters and the Partido Republicano Paulista and the state's ruling party, a premise I find doubtful. Love presumes that Washington Luís, a "planter-president," was concerned with the long-term interests of the coffee economy and was therefore an instrument of planter hegemony. Indeed, no one was more concerned with coffee than this PRP politician, who had dominated São Paulo politics since 1920 and served as the last Brazilian President of the Old Republic. But Washington Luís viewed coffee primarily from the fiscal and financial perspective of a statesman rather than a planter. Thus to call Washington Luís a Paulista planter is doubly debatable—he had no visible major personal involvements in coffee nor was he Paulista by birth, as the planter press never let him forget. From mid-decade to his demise in 1930, he was openly and constantly attacked in the planter press.

Much perspicacity needs to be applied to the notion that the huge debt chalked up to coffee in the 1920s was truly incurred for the sole or main purpose of helping planters. Many planters thought otherwise. Whatever else the coffee defense program adopted by the Coffee Institute may have been, it represented an attempt to encapsulate the coffee economy within broader fiscal and monetary objectives rather than the simple expression of planter instrumental control of the state. Love concedes that fiscal considerations were prominent in economic policy-making and that planters may have been losing power to politicians in this regard. But he proposes that this outcome resulted from pressures from international financiers. São Paulo was indeed tied closely to the world system and to foreign bankers, who no doubt played a role in shaping economic policies, and external constraints should therefore be given a prominent place in the analysis of policy-making.¹⁴ My own study, of course, does not focus on such external constraints or pressures. But neither Fritsch nor anyone else has seriously argued for an analysis of policy-making based solely on external constraints. My focus on the social nature of the subjects who made decisions that guided the trajectory of development is in principle at least as defensible, particularly for such a large country as Brazil. It seems unreasonable to measure the validity of such arguments in terms of whether a hypothetical full analysis of external constraints might provide a better explanation, especially because such a line of reasoning does not follow at all readily from Love's own insistence on the hegemonic role of local big coffee capital. In light of ample evidence that internal structural factors shaped Paulista politics and policy-making, the intimation that world-system determination will prove to be anything close to a sufficient cause seems strained.

Several specific points that Love makes regarding the relation-

ship between intra-elite economic cleavages and the political differentiation and conflicts leading up to the revolution of 1930 scarcely contradict the main thrust of my analysis. He points to evidence of planter disunity as early as 1901, a view entirely consistent with my analysis. Because my analysis posits an entrenched elite in the Partido Republicano Paulista, Love's findings of a tendency toward gerontocracy in that party reinforce, rather than challenge, this view. Regarding the Partido Democrático (PD), Love's argument that "most" leading Democrats (eight are mentioned) had some investments in companies, banks, commercial houses, and newspapers does not necessarily deny that traditional big coffee capital was the main force behind the PD. As João Manuel Cardoso de Mello, Sérgio Silva, Wilson Cano, and Flávio Saes have all established, traditional big coffee capital constituted a "complex" of investments in diverse sectors of the economy (including railroads). Saes shows that this component of the Paulista economy was undergoing a process of "disaggregation" after the 1890s. The PD largely represented an attempt to reintegrate at the political level the increasingly "disaggregated" traditional big coffee capital. This interpretation would be proved wrong if it were shown that the most important emergent industrialists were also part of the big coffee complex as well as members of the PD. But Love himself agrees that no immigrant industrialist was found in the top leadership of the PD, while the available evidence indicates that immigrants were highly represented in the waves of industrialization after the 1900s and that such immigrant industrialists were far from appendages of planters and their allies. Love counters that no immigrant industrialist was in the PRP either, but this absence is explained by the fact that the main link between the PRP and immigrant industrialists was provided by clientelistic and associational links. Immigrant elites shunned direct political participation, partly because of the structure of the political system, the dynamics of clientelistic incorporation, and their own "foreign" status.¹⁵ My analysis of the political interactions among immigrant organizations and political parties shows immigrant support for the PRP and little for the PD, which is shown to have been xenophobic at a time when one major trend in Paulista society was the rise of immigrants. According to Stolcke, my analysis provides a "persuasive demonstration that the PD essentially represented 'big coffee' interests."¹⁶

Love's finding that members of the Paulista political elite also tended to occupy economic roles is logically akin to the observation that one is likely to run into a professor on the streets of Princeton—both have to do with the makeup of the population as much as with anything else. As by far the most economically developed state in the Brazilian federation, São Paulo contained an economic elite that was large in both relative and absolute terms, and the political elite would be

expected to reflect the makeup of the elite as a whole.¹⁷ Is Love pressing for a tightly class-based instrumentalist approach to Paulista and Brazilian statemaking? If so, some of our differences may be due to the fact that my analysis points to tension and problematic closure in the relationship between coffee and other economic elites and statemakers. Historical contingency, structural realignment, and social-organizational dynamics all conferred on powerholders the ability at least to claim a significant measure of operational autonomy.

Love and Stolcke agree that the coffee bourgeoisie was not a cohesive elite. But although Stolcke interprets associational activity as reflecting and enhancing planter rule and intra-elite coherence, my detailed study of collective actions taken by these associations shows that they expressed the differences and lack of unity of the Paulista elite. In challenging my explanation based on segmentation, Stolcke states that "alignments and cleavages among coffee growers and exporters themselves should be viewed primarily as the combined result of potentially conflicting interests among planters (due to relative advantages created by regional differences in age of trees and soil fertility between coffee zones) and export interests as well as the diverse effects of government coffee policies on different sectors." But Stolcke fails to consider evidence about diversity in social structure and its relationship to conflict. While I posit interregional differences and competition as important, I show them to be part of a broader process of segmentation in social and economic structure and present various bodies of evidence as substantiation. If Stolcke is serious in advancing geographic or agronomic determinism as a full explanation of political contention, more than sheer assertion is required to accept the notion that regional differences based on age of trees and soil fertility were largely responsible for the cleavages and conflicts among the Paulista elite.¹⁸ Love would explain the evidence of intra-elite conflict as possibly due to elite self-assurance. Indeed, Paulista elites often acted with a degree of self-confidence that bordered on arrogance. But whether such behavior is incompatible with the hypothesis of segmentation and realignment is another story. Again, a detailed analysis of the substantive nature of the claims, patterns of contention, conjuncture, and intention of the actors indicates that traditional coffee elites set out to reverse what they themselves perceived as loss of political and economic standing.

Stolcke's main point in challenging my arguments about the importance of underlying conflicts between the alternative agrarian economy and the large estate is that "competition and contradictions . . . inhered in the coffee production system itself, just as they inhere in capitalism per se, governed as it is by the market principle." These "contradictions in prevailing relations of production whose costly flexibility benefited planters . . . also created a rural labor force prone to

take collective action against them." Few would doubt that capitalism and the market intensify conflicts and "contradictions" (whatever that abused term is taken to mean). If Stolcke wants to imply that the predominant form of conflict in São Paulo was vertical class conflict between an agrarian bourgeoisie and highly proletarianized colonos, then it is obvious from the above statements that I take such a position to be a case of misguided emphasis.¹⁹

My analysis discusses autonomizing "pretensions" or "impulses" by statemakers in the context of shifting realignments in civil society. The argument is derived from the detailed empirical study of action and coalition-formation. Love's arguments about political participation by the economic elite are not incompatible with this analysis. Similarly, the arguments about loss of hegemony have to do specifically with decreased power by traditional coffee planters and their close allies, not with the entire capitalist class or even all coffee interests. The traditional Paulista coffee elite was so upset with the PRP and Washington Luís that it organized a movement to overthrow them. This opposition was projected to the national level and must thus be recognized as partly responsible for the Revolution of 1930. If we say that social classes or class fragments act, then we must also imagine that they can make mistakes. I think they did. The traditional coffee elite's hatred of the PRP and Luís was so consuming that the elite miscalculated the costs that it and São Paulo would pay for the demise of the PRP and the Old Republic. The solidarity Love perceives in the 1932 Paulista rebellion is easily explained in that context; by that time, the costs of the Vargas victory for all segments of the Paulista elite had become highly visible.²⁰

Professors Love and Stolcke intersperse their comments with considerations about where to go from here in terms of further research. My own hope would be less for balance sheets of the existing secondary literature to defend one or another perspective than for methodologically sound in-depth research on one or more of the specific issues raised by the contrasting perspectives on Paulista and Brazilian development.

NOTES

1. Professors Love and Stolcke have written accounts of São Paulo's history and society that assume or award a commanding role to big coffee capital (Love 1980, Stolcke 1986, Stolcke and Hall 1983, Hall and Martínez Alier 1979). Stolcke's view of the Paulista coffee economy and her analysis of the colonato takes as its point of departure the rather grim sketch of conditions faced by Italian immigrants in the coffee fazendas prior to 1914 provided by Michael Hall (Hall 1969), her coauthor in several works. The line of analysis employed in Love (1980) tended to reiterate the thesis of full planter hegemony, but it actually identified a series of apparent anomalies with respect to the conventional wisdom that reinforced my own thinking. In this regard,

- I must acknowledge an earlier and greater debt to the analysis of Boris Fausto (1970, 1976), particularly his exploration of the Paulista coffee elite in terms of hegemony and predominance as well as his discussion of intra-elite conflicts.
2. Planter repression is explicitly posited in Hall and Martínez Alier (1979) as a main factor that cancels a proclivity toward collective action linked to uniform proletarianization.
 3. The methods used and a large portion of the data base are described in Font and Barzelatto (1988). For several years, my assistants and I enumerated and catalogued thousands of collective action events bearing on coffee, as reported in the main Paulista newspapers. We enumerated, coded, and entered into a data base different versions of every instance of organized action by coffee groups between 1920 and 1930. Additionally, we prepared a series of notebooks and a parallel file containing more than fifty thousand pages of material. This method allowed systematic immersion into the daily rhythm of mobilization and demand making by the associations, which subjected their statements to detailed and critical scrutiny. More recently, this effort was complemented by a systematic analysis of census data, for which another large data base was created with materials from censuses and surveys between 1920 and 1940.
 4. Whereas some parts of the 1940 census used the cutoff figure of fifty hectares to differentiate small farms from other categories, the 1920 census defined farms with fewer than one hundred hectares as small for general purposes. See Brasil, *Recenseamento do Brasil, 1920*, vol. 3, pt. 3 (1927), p. x. Warren Dean defined a family-sized plot as forty hectares, but Caio Prado chose twenty-five hectares, and Milliet defined a small farm as less than sixty and one-half hectares (twenty-five *alqueires*). Prado considered a medium-sized farm to be between twenty-five and one hundred *alqueires*, large as one hundred to five hundred, and *latifundio* as more than five hundred *alqueires*. All these definitions equal or exceed the categorization to which Love objects.
 5. *Boletim* of the Departamento Estadual de Trabalho, nos. 38–39 (1921):97–98.
 6. The level of detail and precision required of categories depends on their intended use. Again, I am using these numbers merely to assess notions that the large and very large *fazendas* were securely strong and that an alternative sector existed and was growing in significance.
 7. *Boletim do Instituto de Café* 6, no. 55 (Apr. 1931):1.
 8. It seems ironic that Stolcke would dismiss my evidence as “incomplete” (see also Stolcke 1986, 85), given that the source of the “1927” figures on which she makes her case was actually the very incomplete one on which she believes my case to have rested. It should be added that it was only after consulting the available sources and ascertaining the absence of reliable evidence before 1930 that I felt compelled, following Holloway, to spend a great deal of time scrutinizing diverse bodies of data (the nationality of producers, case studies of communities, accounts of various ethnic experiences, and the like) to determine trends in land tenure patterns prior to 1930. Available breakdowns by size from censuses pertaining to this period generally correspond to all farms; moreover, accurate analyses of change are inhibited by the fact that size categories differ from one enumeration to the other and by the shortcomings of the censuses and surveys.
 9. The article in the Coffee Institute’s *Boletim* cited above stated, “from the social point of view, [the table] demonstrates a very pronounced subdivision of coffee lands. . . . The idea, still found at times, of the preponderance of the *latifundio* . . . has been completely destroyed, it has been reduced to an ‘ad absurdum.’ . . .” See *Boletim do Instituto de Café* 6, no. 55 (Apr. 1931):1.
 10. Whereas the 1930–31 figure mistakenly imputed to 1927 lists 39,897 coffee growers, 40,181 growers were reported in a 1926 report by the Secretaria da Agricultura. See the *Revista de Sociedade Rural Brasileira* (Nov. 1927):398–99.
 11. Although Stolcke states flatly that “nowhere did crops go unharvested . . . until the late 1930s,” frequent statements were made to the contrary. For example, in a famous article published in 1924, Antônio Prado argued that because of labor shortages, “10 percent of production was lost in the coffee groves during harvesting,

- while 20 percent was damaged by inadequate processing." See Antônio Prado, "Notas sobre a Colonização de S. Paulo," *Revista do Brasil* 8, no. 99 (Mar. 1924):197. I found dozens of such statements indicating serious labor shortages, despite large immigration flows. It seems likely that these labor shortages had much to do with the increases in wages observed during and after World War I (Font 1983).
12. Likewise, traditional planters' efficiency across the board or their effectiveness as capitalist entrepreneurs has yet to be fully demonstrated. Certainly, their widespread reliance on extensive cultivation, insatiable labor requirements and demands for continuous immigration flows, negligence in not using fertilizers and not mechanizing, and high rates of absentee ownership all would seem to qualify arguments about the advanced capitalist nature of planters.
 13. In this respect, Love's statement that the recent article by João Manoel Cardoso de Mello and Maria da Conceição Tavares (1985) makes a convincing case for a direct relationship between the two should not go unquestioned. I greatly respect the work of Cardoso de Mello and Tavares, but that article contains little that has not already been argued, especially in the Portuguese literature. More important, although the paradigm associated with Cardoso de Mello is badly in need of empirical verification, this article reiterates widely known abstract arguments, which should be taken as hypotheses rather than proof. What is needed most to clarify the relationship between coffee and industrialization is new evidence. Stolcke's statement in this connection is ambiguous: "It is among the social agents of industrial capital accumulation that immigrant importers predominated, although merchants operating in the internal market and coffee planters (especially in those in São Paulo) also played a significant role."
 14. In fact, I cite Winston Fritsch to that effect in my dissertation. (Professor Fritsch kindly let me see his dissertation when it was being finished during my visit to the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro in 1982.)
 15. Love may be right that education was an additional factor, but I am more convinced by his argument that the PRP was a very structured organization with a stable core of leadership. Yet this pattern did not prevent Menotti del Picchia and other Italians from rising within the PRP, as did some new party chiefs. To answer Love's query as to how I know that at least eight of the names in the PD were members of coffee families, my data bank contains actual lists of participants in the collective action events involving coffee associations, and those eight names appear frequently on such lists.
 16. Antônio Prado's name comes up often in discussions of the class basis of the PD. Love views him as a modern entrepreneur and industrialist, while Stolcke emphasizes Prado's role as a coffee exporter. It would seem one-sided to argue that Prado's opposition to government controls and regulation was due only or primarily to the fact that they threatened his interests as merchant and exporter or that he acted as an industrialist. For several decades, Antônio Prado championed coffee planters' concerns about overproduction and about São Paulo losing its global competitiveness. His main demands over the years centered on measures that would reduce costs, particularly sustained immigration flows and lower taxes. Prado wanted to keep the government out of coffee protection on two grounds: fear of overproduction and fear of governmental control of the export economy. He repeatedly declared himself an advocate of planters and was thus perceived by other actors. His demands also fit analyses of the predicaments of coffee growers. Moreover, although Prado was connected with planter associations, he was not a leader or even an active member of the leading industrialists' organizations in the 1920s. The same was true of the PD leaders whom Love claims were full-fledged industrialists.
 17. It would seem debatable on methodological grounds to infer hegemony only from data showing the economic roots of political elites. The safest interpretation of a higher incidence of political activity on the part of economic elites, if that were to be established after taking São Paulo's economic peculiarities into account, would be that such economic elites had special reasons to participate in politics (because Love's data pertains only to the political elite, it would seem difficult to make inferences in this regard). But that outcome could be due to hegemony as much as to a

- reaction to a loss of hegemony or some other factor. Additionally, because the traditional elite had made land the ultimate status symbol, most members of the elite felt obliged to own at least a small fazenda (even Matarazzo bought some land). But such ownership hardly qualifies them as full-fledged coffee growers, much less as highly efficient ones.
18. On a related point, there is little to dispute in Stolcke's assertion that planters from the older region welcomed prohibition of new plantings in the early 1900s because of fear of competition of high-yielding plantations. But I fail to see the relevance of subregional differences and conflicts in the assessment of the validity of my arguments. I may even have been the first to explicitly posit such regional tensions, although within a structural theoretical framework.
 19. As also discussed in my forthcoming book (Font n.d.), the available evidence does not readily lead to an open-and-shut conclusion that the Paulista countryside was prone to frequent, large, and much less politicized colono strikes. Evidence of frequent strikes may exist for the period before 1914, but the subsequent period offers a much less compelling record. Several dozen strikes were recorded between World War I and 1930 but were localized and dealt with diverse issues (terms of land use were frequent claims). None of them had political overtones. Monbeig refers to the colonos as a "disorganized" class and states that their strikes and violence were "episodic happenings, without a doubt . . ." (1984, 156). When someone unearths the archives of the Patronato Agrícola, which handled cases of strikes and other grievances through the 1920s, researchers will be able to reconstruct strike activity during this period. But until better evidence is found, my response to Stolcke's characterization is suspended judgment tending toward skepticism. Meanwhile, available data suggest that in terms of violence, struggles over land titles may have been a more important form of conflict in the Santos zone after World War I.
 20. Based on my research on the 1920s, my guess is that São Paulo would have put up a much stronger fight if it had been internally united.

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