

grants as compensation to the provinces for giving up shared tax fields. This was a development which seems likely to constitute a distinctively Canadian contribution to the practice of federalism. Fifth, there was the notable financial provision for country-wide welfare programmes which in essence were financial in that they involved money payments rather than services.

These were remarkable changes over a period of little more than a decade. To some degree they were so far-reaching as to be almost revolutionary as they affect the functions of government. The still more remarkable achievement was that they were carried through with a retention of popular and business confidence and with enhanced international respect when one might have anticipated alarm in some quarters.

In some substantial measure this continued confidence in the working of government institutions in the face of striking changes was a tribute to the position and reputation of Clifford Clark.

It is appropriate that this body should wish in some formal manner to show its respect for Clifford Clark's memory. For twenty years he occupied the post of Deputy Minister of Finance, for about nine years he engaged in business in Chicago and New York, for about eight years he held academic posts. Throughout both his government and his business career he always retained a respect for and an interest in academic work and retained, too, the awareness of the good economist of the interaction of many forces which give rise to the patterns of human behaviour occasioning economic and financial problems. He retained, too, a respect for the economists' contribution to problems of policy. Beyond his official position and his notable achievements, he was the helpful friend of many who are in this audience.

WILLIAM CLIFFORD CLARK, 1889–1952

CLIFFORD CLARK, Deputy Minister of Finance of Canada since 1932, died suddenly last December in Chicago at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, where he was to deliver a paper on "Canada's Post-War Finance." Despite the anonymity which must cloak the views and actions of civil servants, Dr. Clark's ability, energy, and enterprise had won him renown in Canada and abroad as a leader in the public service and particularly as a practitioner of applied economics.

Clark grew up on a farm near Martintown, in Glengarry County of Ontario, attending the local elementary and high schools. He entered Queen's University at sixteen in mining engineering, but quickly transferred to the honours arts courses in Latin and French. He secured his M.A. by getting first class in both these honours courses, and then proceeded to complete in the next two years the honours courses in English, in History, and finally in Political and Economic Science. This last became his main field of interest under the stimulus of O. D. Skelton, at that time Professor of Political and Economic Science. Clark developed for Skelton the greatest admiration and affection, which shaped not only Clark's studies but his career and personality as well.

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In 1912 Clark went from Queen's to Harvard for post-graduate work in economics. Here he stayed for three years, working mainly under the direction of Taussig, winning various scholarships and awards but not finishing the thesis work for a post-graduate degree. Although fond of Harvard, and of Taussig in particular, he preferred to return to work with Skelton at Queen's, which he did in the fall of 1915. The following year he married Margaret Smith, also of Martintown and Queen's, whose good sense and good humour contributed in very considerable measure to Clark's success throughout the rest of his life. The Clarks had two sons and two daughters, all now married.

In his period of teaching, from 1915 to the end of 1922, Clark began to show his leaning to applied economics of a constructive sort, no doubt under the influence of Skelton, who excelled at bringing clear thought and good scholarship to bear upon the problems of the day. Clark assisted with the special courses for bankers arranged by Queen's with the Bankers' Association. He became the first head of the Commerce Course in 1919, and then launched and directed the major correspondence course by which Queen's provided the necessary academic work for the training of chartered accountants in Ontario. During this period he published in 1916 a short but excellent analytical study of the country grain elevator in Western Canada, which reflected some of the detailed research he had done on the grain trade in preparation for a thesis. In April, 1918, he published a short essay which argued from the principles of economics and the nature of man that a price ceiling was not a practicable control measure in wartime.

Clark interrupted this period of teaching for a year just following the end of the war to undertake his first venture in public administration, assisting the Department of Labour to plan and organize a national employment service. He worked primarily on the statistical aspects, both the internal working figures and indexes of employment to be published.

While Clark as a teacher is said to have found great interest both in his subjects and his students, and must certainly have found the company of Skelton and W. A. Mackintosh wholly congenial, it seems that his enterprising spirit could not find full scope at any university. When an opportunity arose for him to become one of the earliest business economists in the United States, with the firm of S. W. Straus & Co., he left Queen's early in 1923 to take it. This long-established firm specialized in the financing of urban real estate, and provided Clark with many chances to grapple with specific problems and exercise his talent for balancing a promoter's zeal for what appears to be a constructive, imaginative project against a careful economic and financial analysis. He did a little part-time teaching at the University of Chicago before he was moved by the firm to New York in 1926, becoming then a Vice-President as well as economist. Mackintosh reports¹ that after 1925 Clark "became increasingly concerned over the policies of the rapidly expanding business, control of which was passing from an older to a younger generation, and fearful of the effects of any recession on a business which was built on the issue of mortgage bonds. . . . Increasingly he urged caution and conservatism. Eventu-

¹In his memoir on Clark in the Spring, 1953, number of the *Queen's Quarterly*.

ally in 1929 the crisis broke, and S. W. Straus and Company shared with other firms in the disasters which followed.”

Clark has left a most interesting publication from this Straus period—a small book on the skyscraper, which he wrote jointly in the late 1920's with an architect, Mr. J. L. Kingston.² That Clark thought the subject worthy is shown by these two sentences: “For such is the skyscraper—a new and powerful economic idea or force with which is being recreated the framework of the cities which our grandfathers fashioned for an age of horse-drawn vehicles and of small things in population and in commerce” (p. 148); and “With each passing decade it has become more and more a part of the fibre of American civilization, contributing to its efficiency, reflecting its economic conditions, typifying its passion for achievement, furnishing it with an outlet for creative genius in the aesthetic field” (p. 150). The nature and conclusion of the study itself is summed up by the authors (on page 146):

An exhaustive investigation of possible alternatives for the development of a specific plot of appropriate size and location in the Grand Central Zone in New York City has conclusively demonstrated that the factors making for diminishing returns on the intensive development of such plots are more than offset by the factors making for increasing returns until a great height is reached, thus establishing the point of maximum economic return or true economic height for such sites at an unexpectedly high level.

Exhaustive it must have been, and fascinating for Clark—for in this great exercise in applied economics eight alternative architectural designs and engineering plans were produced and studied; the influence of size and height upon the various details of capital and operating costs, and upon rentals, were analysed, and the results reconciled with considerations of municipal problems and public policy.

Clark's more general views, his philosophy, which persisted in later years, are well revealed in two more short passages from this work, written before the conventional restraints of public office made his writing less self-revealing: “We have no quarrel with the idealist, or with the visionary, but only with the idealist whose ideas are half-baked and with the visionary whose vision is too limited” (p. 149); and “This does not mean that city planning and zoning have no place. Quite the contrary! It means merely that deliberate planning of city development should be intelligent and based upon sound economic analysis, that it should be flexible rather than arbitrary, that it should regulate rather than block the natural working of economic forces, that it should prevent parasitic development by making each economic activity bear its own fair costs rather than by attempts at arbitrary prohibition” (p. 144). The analysis of the technical and financial considerations seems to have been thorough and impartial, and if those who knew Clark seem to detect a familiar tendency to weigh the imponderables in favour of his intuitive conclusions, they will respect his judgment.

The anxiety and stress of life with Straus at the end of the boom finally broke Clark's health and forced him to seek a less strenuous occupation. He returned to teach at Queen's, but for only about a year as it turned out. There

²W. C. Clark and J. L. Kingston, *The Skyscraper: A Study in the Economic Height of Modern Office Buildings* (New York, 1930).

he recuperated quickly and turned his interests to Canadian and international economic affairs in a world that was patently out of joint. Here was something to baffle any economist and for which neither his pre-war teachings nor his intensive work with Straus had prepared him. Yet he plunged into it with zest and soon had ideas as to what should be done.

He was quickly drawn into the *mêlée* of public affairs. O. D. Skelton, as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, had been assigned by R. B. Bennett the task of preparing for and organizing the work of the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa in the summer of 1932, and it was natural that Clark should be among the Canadian university economists brought in to assist in this major task. He prepared the basic Canadian papers on monetary questions, and on silver, which was an issue of some considerable importance at the time, not least because the dynamic Hon. H. H. Stevens, Minister of Trade and Commerce, was to be found among its champions. Clark's ability and his skill in dealing with men on difficult issues so impressed the Prime Minister that shortly after the Conference was over he invited Clark to fill the office of Deputy Minister of Finance, which had been vacant since the death of J. C. Saunders in April, 1930.

Here indeed was the opportunity to put economics into practice, but the circumstances might have daunted anyone. The economy of the Western world was in the depths of an unparalleled depression that everyone explained but no one understood. Trade, the life-blood of Canada, was spiralling downward because of the depression itself and a host of barriers created in defence against it. The growth and confidence of North American society seemed to have been shattered. Canadian public finances, like all else, were in the grip of the depression, and though the banking system was strong, it was going through the throes of deflation and no machinery existed for arresting this movement and promoting recovery. Despite it all, Clark again left the relative quiet of Queen's and moved into the East Block—which was no skyscraper but was the domain of O. D. Skelton.

Clark remained Deputy Minister of Finance until his death twenty years later. This period saw the transformation and flourishing of the Department, as was also the case, of course, with other portions of the public service of Canada. Skelton and his men at External Affairs had made it possible for Canada to have a foreign policy of its own; Clark and his works made it possible for the Government to have an economic policy.

It would not be possible to catalogue, let alone describe, Clark's myriad interests and activities in Ottawa, and a proper reticence must constrain one in writing about a civil servant, even after his death. But before recollections fade, and necessarily without perspective, it seems worth while to record here something about his major fields of work in the Department.

After attendance with Bennett at the abortive World Economic Conference in London in 1933, of which their agreement on silver was one of the few accomplishments, Clark's first major project was to assist the Prime Minister in the establishment of a central bank for Canada. Clark felt this was essential if any effective economic and financial policies were to be carried out, and if the government were to have the benefit of expert and impartial advice on

fiscal matters. He felt that what was needed was not a new type of institution or policy, but the transplanting and adaptation to Canada of an institution already developed to a high degree in England and elsewhere. Opposing arguments and interests had to be heard and assessed and public opinion brought to bear on the issue. Mr. Bennett established for the purpose a Royal Commission headed by the distinguished Lord MacMillan, certain to listen, examine, and report without delay. With a favourable report and widespread opinion in support of the proposal, notwithstanding the opposition of most of the banks, the Government brought into Parliament immediately legislation which Clark must have drafted under Bennett's direction.

Once the Bank of Canada had been constituted by Parliament, Clark played a substantial part during late 1934 in getting it organized, mindful of the high importance of selecting the right men to launch this key venture and become the Government's expert financial advisers. He retained an intimate interest in the affairs of the Bank throughout his life, both as Deputy Minister and as a Director and member of the Executive Committee. When the Bank was well established he advised the Minister to transfer to it the Currency and Public Debt divisions of his Department, and in general ensured that it was utilized in the full measure and in various ways which he had advocated before it was established. If on occasion he would pit his judgment against that of the Bank's experts to a degree that one can hardly expect of future Deputy Ministers, this was consistent with his character and his special position termed by the newspapers of the day as "the godfather" of the Bank. Certainly the very close and harmonious relations of the Bank with the Department of Finance, and, indeed, with all parts of the Government, are due in large measure to his efforts.

The second major subject of special interest to Clark was housing. It was to his work in this field that the Prime Minister made special reference at the time of his death. Clark saw in housing during the thirties the greatest opportunity for constructive, positive action of a financial nature to provide more employment in creating what many Canadians needed. He considered private investment and export trade the only durable bases for economic recovery, and housing the most essential and yet most obstinate element in investment. He was convinced that sensible measures could make housing economically sound. His diagnosis of the many troubles underlying the housing situation, in all their variety and complexity, he stated publicly and with considerable frankness in an address to the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities in August, 1937. He believed action was needed by municipalities and provinces, building contractors and home purchasers, financial institutions and the Dominion Government. The Government he served took action to improve the financing of housing. This was done first in the Dominion Housing Act of 1935, providing for mortgages jointly financed by the Government and lending institutions, then in the Home Improvement Loans Act of 1937 and the National Housing Act of 1938, which amplified the basic principles of the 1935 Act and provided also for special loans for low rental projects and for some temporary sharing of the costs of municipal taxes on low cost housing.

The principles of this legislation reflected Clark's philosophy and the

circumstances of the budget. By the legislation the Government accepted a large share of the economic risks and offered relatively low cost credit, but did not become involved in outright construction or ownership of housing, rental subsidies, or direct expenditure of any kind. In contrast to the establishment of the Bank of Canada, this was an invention of a new device and arrangement suited to the peculiar Canadian situation where no adequate institutions specializing in housing finance had developed.

Clark took the administration of the housing legislation directly under his own wing in the Department of Finance and devoted a surprising amount of his time and energy to it. He utilized the opportunity to insist on certain standards of design, specifications, and inspection of houses being built with the aid of the Act, and hoped this would help to establish better standards throughout the industry. This effort he later continued in the formulation of the National Building Code, with the aid of the National Research Council and others.

Until World War II, Clark was impatient with the response to the Housing Acts and disappointed at the lack of action in the low rental field and in the reform of the building industry and building practices. His credits and exhortation were not enough in the uncertain thirties. He retained his interest in housing through the war, but became convinced that a further extension of action on the financing front would be needed after the war. Amid all the other activities of 1944, he found time to redraft for the Government the new and much more comprehensive National Housing Act of that year. He continued to hope that the Government could avoid having to build or own houses directly, even for its own employees and servicemen in isolated areas, and he was uneasy over the rush of events and requirements in the post-war period that made it necessary for the Government to enter actively into a building programme of its own. Although conscious of the social welfare aspects of housing, he felt these should be secured by vigorous private or philanthropic enterprise, or by only indirect government action. In his last months he was still thinking ahead on housing, and having seen the wheel turn full circle he was concerned now over the problem presented by the magnitude of the financing requirements for housing on the scale of the busy mid-1950's and the limited funds likely to be available from the life insurance companies and the other lending institutions already in this field.

Advising his Minister on budget policy occupied much of Clark's attention and effort for several months each year, and to it he brought all his varied talents. In his early years deficits and other financial difficulties were thrust upon the Government by the depression, and the budgets reflect an orthodox budgetary policy and concern to maintain the Government's credit standing and business confidence. As the thirties went on, and as confidence revived and the central banking machinery developed, there is more and more evidence of economic motives entering into the formulation of budget policy, and of a greater willingness to tolerate deficits while measures are taken to induce recovery. One cannot tell how much this reflected Clark's thinking at the time, and how much the views of his Minister and the Government. On the whole, it seems safe to say that during the thirties Clark was little convinced by the

arguments of economists in the States and Britain in favour of budgetary "pump priming"; he was inclined to emphasize the importance of business and financial confidence together with such direct influences upon incentives as were found in the exemption of building materials from the sales tax in the 1938 budget, and the tax credits for capital expenditures introduced in April, 1939. Clark believed in monetary and credit policies, including the special arrangements to make these effective in the housing field, as the proper means to secure enduring economic recovery, but as the years went on, he seemed to wish there was some more positive action consistent with his basic philosophy.

The war brought the need and the occasion for more positive action and consequently the development of budgetary policies more closely related to the state of the nation's income and employment. The development of public opinion and business opinion made possible this new approach and the new measures to implement it. Clark's own thinking along these lines developed rapidly in these circumstances, as witness the first war-budget speech of September, 1939, which he organized for the new Minister of Finance, and with the basic doctrine of which Clark himself concurred. As the war went on, Clark came to think more and more in terms of the aggregate money flows of the economy, and saw the budget, as well as other measures, in terms of them. But he did not view the problems as merely ones of forecasting and arithmetic; he felt one had to consider incentives and equity, incidence and policy. He took a large part during the war in working out tax measures—particularly the income tax and the perennial problems of the excess profits tax. It was in this activity particularly that one remembers Clark at the height of his powers, conducting the long night sessions in Ilsley's office, where his chief assistants were invited to disagree and argue at length until the Minister, enjoying it all but conscious of the conflicting arguments, would finally make up his mind.

By the end of the war Clark was prepared to agree to the careful statement of contra-cyclical budgeting policy contained in the White Paper on Reconstruction Policy presented to Parliament by the Rt. Hon. C. D. Howe in April, 1945. He assisted his Minister in preparing budgets in the succeeding years which were founded upon this philosophy and upon a recognition of the need to reduce wartime tax rates in order to create production incentives. Clark notes this himself in his last paper, and indicates that these considerations were conflicting ones at this time. As the post-war period went on and the inflationary pressure slackened and then was renewed by Korea, and the economic and budgetary situation was complicated by the balance of payments problem, defence needs, and the inevitable federal-provincial problems, as well as by the changing currents of public opinion, Clark became more and more cautious about stating any general principles for budgeting, but was more conscious than ever of the influence of the budget upon the national economic situation.

During the war Clark's primary role was to knit together all the various strands of economic and financial measures. Much of this he was able to do directly as Deputy Minister of Finance, and through the advice given his Minister and through his many contacts with colleagues in other departments.

Much of it he did through his membership in such bodies as the Foreign Exchange Control Board, and through the activities of his assistants in such organizations. He also used his powers of persuasion to help in getting the right men in the key places. But in addition he had an important function and influence as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Economic Policy. This committee was established by the Cabinet to advise the Government on many technical economic problems and on organization matters. It was particularly active in the first half of the war when the main lines of organization and policy were being formulated by the Cabinet. Here Clark was in his element, though at times he must have found it difficult to reconcile his role as chairman with the full flow of proposals and opinions which he wanted to put before the meetings. Space does not permit, nor memory enable, one to recount the range of issues Clark dealt with during the war, but there does seem to have been one central theme—the effective integration of financial policies with measures of economic control. In the early part of the war he believed financial measures must bear the main burden, and controls deal only with exceptional situations. As the degree of mobilization that was possible and necessary increased, he came, as others did, to think that in a full-scale war the control measures must constitute the effective first line of defence against inflation and the use of resources for civilian purposes, and that finance must somehow mop up the excessive buying power so as to enable the controls to stand the strain, and to be removable when demobilization came.

No account of his war period would be complete without mention of Clark's work on international financial arrangements, particularly the Hyde Park Agreement, which he and E. P. Taylor helped to work out for the Prime Minister, to make it possible for Canada to meet its requirements in the United States without receiving lend-lease or other financial aid. The implementing of this arrangement led Clark into many Washington discussions, just as the financial arrangements with the United Kingdom led him into very many conferences with its representatives, culminating in the major meetings with Keynes in 1944 and 1945, and with Sir Wilfred Eadie in 1946.

The decision of the Government to introduce a programme of post-war legislation in 1944 gave Clark an opportunity to turn from the negative operations of war, which he always disliked, to constructive ideas for making the future better than the past. He threw himself into this project with enormous zest, undeterred by the mountains of detail to be worked out or the grave responsibilities in preparing boldly for a most uncertain future. The Bank Act might have been thought routine, but he had to suggest means to improve it in many important respects. The Industrial Development Bank Act, the Farm Improvement Loans Act, and the Export Credits Insurance Act were all new financial legislation that owed much to his suggestions and work. Yet he had energy to propose major reforms in the Civil Service Superannuation Act, and to draft a complete overhaul and expansion of the National Housing Act. Apart from these and other bills of the Minister of Finance, he took a large share in the working out of other new and important legislation—such as, for example, the Prices Support Acts. Concerned as he was with all this detail, trying to see the programme as a coherent whole, to see that it was economically

sound and to relate it to the great unsolved problems of federal-provincial relations, it is no surprise that he was able to put in only a nominal appearance at the Bretton Woods conference that summer.

Two features of Clark's participation in this 1944 programme deserve special mention now that it seems possible to record them, for they cannot be inferred from the financial measures proper. He took an active part in the working out of the post-war programme for veterans, particularly the re-establishment credits plan, which he saw as unifying and making constructive various particular proposals, and as far better than extended gratuities, which their military proponents could not reconcile with the more progressive proposals of those experienced in veterans' affairs. He also had a large share in advising the Government when it reached its decision to introduce family allowances. His support for this far-reaching measure was not based, as some have inferred, on an expectation of the need for more spending to support employment. Rather he saw in it the most constructive element in a social security or welfare programme, promoting the better health and education of the future citizen and worker, simplifying the approach to social insurance and housing, extending to the poor that consideration for family responsibilities the income tax allows to others, and rectifying a fault inherent in the wage system.

As soon as the end of the war in Europe relaxed the tension under which Clark was working his health collapsed, and it was eight months before he could return to work. He had taken ill before the Government's proposals to be laid before the Dominion-Provincial Conference were completed; he returned in time to see the unsuccessful efforts of the Conference in 1946 to reach agreement on any proposals, and to help Ilsley in working out the offer the latter made individually to the provinces in his budget some six weeks later. Such was the climax of the problem that gave Clark his most persistent concern over his twenty years in office. The necessity for some action to strengthen the finances of the Western and Maritime Provinces was obvious in the middle thirties, and Clark took the only possible course in working out interim solutions until the strong Royal Commission the Government had appointed could find and prepare a lasting, logical answer. All the labours and wisdom of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, and the effect of war upon the willingness of men to grasp the nettle, were not enough to produce agreement. Clark assisted Ilsley to find an interim solution to meet the needs of the war after the 1941 Conference could not agree on the Sirois proposals. By 1945 many in Ottawa, including Clark, had come to the conclusion that the Sirois proposals involved too great a transfer of constitutional power to be acceptable to provincial governments, and that a continuing solution to the problem of the use of taxing powers should be sought without constitutional change by applying the principles of the wartime agreements. This was to be accompanied not only by the Dominion's own 1944 legislative programme, but by an agreement with the provinces in the fields of health, welfare, and national development. In the initial preparation of all this Clark had shared, believing that under it the federal budget would be manageable, with defence costs at a moderate level.

When collective agreement upon this integrated programme proved un-

attainable, Clark still believed that agreements limited to the tax field alone, on the wartime principle but the post-war formula, were desirable with individual provinces. He believed such action was required not only to strengthen the financial position of the less wealthy provinces, but also, as he stated in his posthumous paper, "to make it easier for the Federal Government to follow fiscal and economic policies designed to minimize cyclical fluctuations." This dual purpose was important, for the first could be achieved by arrangements that would attract only the smaller provinces; the second required a more extensive appeal. Circumstances have not yet put to the test the effectiveness of the post-war agreements in accomplishing this second purpose. Nevertheless, the practical arrangement which Clark helped Ilsley and Abbott to devise remains an original and valuable contribution to the solution of the central problem of federal finance which has confronted other countries as well as Canada. Clark regarded this plan as much superior to fiscal need subsidies on the one hand, or conditional grants for specific expenditures on the other, leaving provinces with the means and the responsibility to discharge their constitutional duties to such degree and in such manner as their governments, legislatures, and electors see fit.

In his last few years, Clark took a special interest in the trade and financial problems of the sterling area. Here was a subject demanding one's best—a complex, intractable mixture of economics with political difficulties, of finance with history, of welfare with industrial efficiency, of defence with economic development. It was engaging the attention of many first-rate economists, both in and out of print. He regarded it as at the centre of the future development of international trade and finance—of first-rate, long-term importance to Canada. He read omnivorously on it and discussed it at the drop of a hat. He believed that the solution to the trade and financial problem of Britain and other major nations of the sterling area lay in the direction of expansion of trade, not its restriction; in competition, not discrimination; in the use of the price system, not controls; in reducing the overload on the economy, not in aid. He never believed in trick solutions, and thought there was none here, by international arrangements or otherwise. He realized that the prescription he advocated for sterling was bound to be distasteful and risky, easier to propose than accept. Yet he was thoroughly convinced it was practical and very much in Britain's own interest—not merely in the distant future but within a few years. He felt this solution of the sterling area problem was also very much in Canada's interest, over the long term, however well Canada had managed to weather the current difficulties of trade with the sterling area. Hence he felt it his duty to urge upon his British friends, through his many contacts with them, some solution along these lines. He was much encouraged, in the year before his death, to see evidence that those in authority in Britain and elsewhere in the sterling area were reaching conclusions similar to his own.

No brief account of Clark's major activities, such as this, can convey the scope and intensity of his interests, nor his prodigious industry. Only those who worked with him or for him will know the range of his powers, his patience with important details, his zest for the promising project, his critical judgment, passed even upon his own pet ideas, and the moral courage with which he

would stick to a conclusion he thought was right, no matter what others said. Of his personality and accomplishments Mackintosh³ has written with more grace and perspective than this author commands. But it is fitting to record here the opinion held by many who knew him: that Clifford Clark pioneered with outstanding success in bringing applied economics to the art of government.

[R. B. BRYCE]

³In the aforementioned article in the Spring number of the *Queen's Quarterly*.

THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MENTAL HEALTH

THE World Federation for Mental Health has accepted the invitation of the Canadian Mental Health Association and the Canadian Psychological Association to hold the Fifth International Congress on Mental Health in Toronto, Canada. The World Federation for Mental Health was created in 1948 to promote better human relations and to increase understanding among cultures, among nations, and among professions. The members of the Federation are mental health associations and professional societies. These cover the major fields concerned with mental health, human relations, and intercultural understanding, and include medicine, psychiatry, psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology and social work, education and nursing.

Four international congresses have been held to date. The first two, in Washington in 1930 and in Paris in 1937, were under the auspices of the International Committee on Mental Hygiene. The Third Congress held in London in 1948 had as its theme "Mental Health and World Citizenship." It was out of this congress that the World Federation for Mental Health developed. Since that time the Federation has held annual meetings in Geneva, Paris, Mexico City, and Brussels. The Fourth International Congress on Mental Health was held in Mexico City in December, 1951.

The Fifth International Congress is to be held at the University of Toronto, August 14-21, 1954. The programme is being planned to reflect advances in the mental health field, and to assist in realistic planning for the future. The theme is "Mental Health in Public Affairs." Inquiries about the Congress should be sent to the Executive Officer, Fifth International Congress on Mental Health, 111 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada.