

of a single testable hypothesis to emerge from all the space supposedly devoted to method. Furthermore, "oil politics" and the related "oil weapon" are presented as self-evident concepts, which are of obvious importance in international relations; as they are neither self-evident nor obviously important, however, they remain nebulous throughout the book. Finally, the author has a tin ear for economics; one typical example is a paragraph on "Pacific options" (pp. 278–79) in which straightforward applications of opportunity cost and price are sabotaged by "essential" efforts, soaring "requirements," domestic and East European oil "needs," and a "growing oil squeeze." This would be an unfair criticism of Professor Klinghoffer (a political scientist) by this reviewer (an economist), were it not for the necessity of using economics once one decides to study foreign trade in oil.

The lapses of execution are of three kinds, listed here in order of decreasing seriousness but increasing vexatiousness: First, there is no relative weighting of the footnote citations, so that popular and scholarly, biased and objective sources rank equally in authority. Second, the author has a penchant for attributing motives and feelings instead of interpreting actions, as though he had access to the inner thoughts of world leaders. Thus, "the Soviets felt left out of the diplomatic maneuvering" (p. 166), while the "prime Soviet motivation [in selling oil to ENI of Italy] was to weaken the hold of the major Western oil companies over the Italian market" (p. 221). (The accepted view, given the evidence, is that Moscow sought to sell oil for hard currency.) Saudi Arabia "distrusted Soviet intentions" (p. 167), and China "also hopes to spread some political good will" (p. 276). Third, the book is riddled with annoying mistakes of style and usage (which a good editor would have corrected); the most curious is the almost studied absence of commas between independent clauses.

Readers who question whether the largely negative remarks in this review are warranted may conduct their own inexpensive test by reading the last two chapters (pp. 280–97).

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THE SOVIET UNION 1976–77: DOMESTIC, ECONOMIC, AND FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by *Wolfgang Berner* et al. New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1978. 270 pp. \$24.50.

This yearbook, fourth in a series edited at the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Cologne, is a must purchase for university libraries. It provides the advanced specialist or neophyte with an authoritative survey of Soviet domestic and foreign policies in 1976–77 and, for those wishing to delve deeper, an invaluable starting point for further research. Each chapter is rich in factual material and interpretation, buttressed with ample references to Soviet and Western sources. Although the authors' interpretations should not be regarded as definitive, they do offer a set of balanced judgments and propositions that may be tested and refined by further research.

The book differs from the many almanacs that give statistics on Soviet military forces two or three years prior to publication. While such volumes are often dated and redundant by the time they appear, this book provides a vivid cross section of Soviet history of enduring interest. Thus, the comments of Soviet trade unionists on human rights problems offer many gems. One sales clerk, for example, held that individual freedom is the freedom to be a "person of the state [*gosudarstvennyi chelovek*]"! Important acts by the Soviet government and party are also noted, such as Moscow's ratification of both human rights conventions in 1973, followed by reticence on them in 1976–77. The review of the sparring among Soviet writers over the definition of "the Soviet socialist way of life" is no less interesting, as is the

indication of the jump in trade union membership after a decision to admit all collective farm workers. There are also valuable analyses of Soviet economic problems and prospects for Soviet external policies from Cairo to Cape Town to Washington, D.C.

The book also offers Americans a reminder about the strengths of West German Sovietology, the quality and quantity of which often go unnoticed as we strive to cope with masses of Russian and English-language materials. Most chapters in the book, except some dealing with economics, read smoothly in English translation. Unlike some German scholarship, the present work is compact, covering a wide horizon in pithy, nonpedantic language. It is also a valuable source for teachers seeking to introduce recent developments into the classroom or to work up simulation exercises. They could do no better than to use this volume, along with excerpts from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, and thereby present students with a sense of context and primary materials for analysis.

One can only hope that the Cologne Institute is able to continue this worthy endeavor.

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CITIZEN INSPECTORS IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL COMMITTEE. By *Jan S. Adams*. Foreword by *Jerry Hough*. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. xviii, 232 pp.

One way of classifying political systems is in terms of their primary mode of "mass participation." Autonomous groups are dominant in polyarchies, while in Soviet-type systems a centrally directed, "participatory subject" pattern prevails. In the developing world, no effective pattern seems to have taken shape, and that fact perhaps explains much of the disintegration and disorder rife in the Third World. In this scholarly study, Jan Adams adds a great deal to our knowledge of the organization of political participation in the post-Stalin USSR. She accounts for the existence of the enormous centrally directed structures, such as the one on which she focuses, namely, the People's Control Committee in terms of Downs's theory, which says that a system lacking market mechanisms, a free press, competing political parties, and so forth, requires vast monitoring agencies to combat the malfunctioning of bureaucracy.

The model for the present-day People's Control Committee dates from Lenin's era; it was revived by Khrushchev in the form of the Party-State Control Committee. During the Stalin period, the dictator relied on professional bureaucrats and police terror to perform the functions now handled by People's Control, which, incidentally, represents a watered-down, less ambitious, less "democratic" version of Khrushchev's Party-State Control Committee. It is staffed mainly by unpaid "volunteers." People's Control is an enormous bureaucracy—or perhaps to some degree, at least in pretension—an enormous counterbureaucracy.

According to Professor Adams, as of January 1976, the citizen inspectors enrolled in the People's Control Committee numbered 9.5 million, "not including the 20 million people annually drawn into ad hoc mass inspections or consulted informally as technical specialists" (pp. 152–53). Little information is provided by Professor Adams on the process of their recruitment or on the state of their morale. She does refer to one conversation with a Soviet emigrant in the United States, who reported that she and fellow inspectors "experienced at least a modest feeling of authority and a great sense of accomplishment in monitoring their enterprise" (p. 183). One would like to know more about the psychological aspects of all this.